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PART III 
What; is imperfect can never serve 
as a measure; though people some- 
times think enough has been done 
and there is no need to look 
further. " 
The ReDublic of Plato 
(Translated with Introduction and 
Notes by P. Cornfordt Oxford, Uni- 
yersity, Press, 1973, p. 214). 
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PART X. 11 
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Introduction 
In this Part an endeavour has been made to discuss the 
plans of the United Nations Organisation to suppress the illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugst and the progress achieved. An attempt has also 
been made to show the gaps still left by the U. N. O. in its plans in 
this regard, and suggestions have been advanced for possible improve- 
ments, where necessary. Howeverl before embarking upon thist it 
would be appropriate to look back to see the state of the interna- 
tional community in which the United Nations laid the foundations for 
achieving the above purposes. 
The experiences of the League of Nations were mixed. The 
League directly taught us, in so far as this area of international 
law is concernedg to be more organised, more institutionalised and 
also to respond to "international awareness". It indirectly taught 
us how not to conclude international conventionsq and about the 
nature of the conflict of interests among nations in trying to achieve 
something for the coimnon good. Whatt howeverg the League failed to 
do# was to show us the way to achieve its end in this areoof interna- 
tional law. This failure of the League prompted the nations to make 
a renewed attempt to devise a way successfully to suppress the illicit 
traffic in drugs. In order to do thisp it was found necessary to 
create a climate of "humand understanding" and "progress". 
The economic uncertainties of the 1930's were thought to be 
contributory to the political antagonism amongst nations which led to 
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the Second World War. To put it in another wayl the general 
belief was that political security depended largely upon economic 
security. 
' It was also believed that not only a radical change in 
the economic development programmes, particularly in the underdeve- 
loped areasq was necessaryq but also that an economic depression in 
any part of the world was a matter of "common concern". The faith 
in functionalism 2(i. e. 9 that an improved method of international 
co-operation through international organisations would help supplant 
the ideas of conflicting nationalisms) was re-asserted by the nations. 
The initial ideas of the United Nations were influenced by the idolo- 
gies of. a few powersq and consequentlyp it was unprepared to encounter 
certain problems which, in realityq would have resulted from non-parti- 
cipation by some nations. Moreoverl it initially ignored the importance 
of the universal or near-universal participation of nations in order 
to fulfil its avowed objýctives. This situation was further aggrava- 
ted by the conflict of ideological concepts viz. p the unitarian ideaq 
the reformist idea and the egalitarian idea concerning the role of the 
United Nations in international economic co-operationg although each 
of these ideas was directed towards the economic progress of the 
3 
world. The intentions of the United Nations in its early days of 
international co-operation were progressivet but less precise than 
its political intentions. 
4 Neverthelessq the importance of strength- 
ening the bases of international co-operation by means of multilateral 
treaties andq in many casesq by establishing permanent international 
organisationsp whether of limited or of universal characterp was 
appreciated. In other words, this move of the international society 
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from an essentially negative code of rules of abstention to positive 
rules of co-operationy however fragmentary it was initiallyt was an 
evolution of i=ense significance for the principles and structure of 
5 international law. 
In as much as the control of traffic in narcotic drugs during 
the early period of the United Nations was concernedt the rules of 
international co-operation were basically identical to those of the 
League of Nations. Novelty, if any, in this regardt lay only in the 
presence of a higher quality of intention of the nations to partici- 
pate in positive international co-operation. Neverthelessl the over- 
sensitiveness of the nations in maintaining sovereigntyg balanced out 
the ostensibly higher quality of the intentions of the nations towards 
international co-operation. .. Schwarzenbergerv 
in discussing 
the features of the relations between the international quasi-order of 
the United Nations and the contemporary international lawp rightly 
observed that complementary 11 vested interests of the world Powersy 
middle States and non-Powers, all sovereign and equal members of the 
United Nationsq and the operators of the institutional superstructures 
of contemporary world society intensify the trend not to see the wood 
for the trees. In near-unison, they all busy themselves in hiding 
these realities behind rising mountains of paper and smoke-screens 
of professional image-furbishing. " 
6 
It is from this perspective that the success or failure of the 
United Nations in the field of the control of traffic in narcotic 
N 
drugs will have to be examined. Successive failures do not imPlY 
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the improbability of success; on the contraryl they solidify the 
foundations of success in the future. Hence the relevance of any 
attempt to trace the emergence of success through an examination 
of the failures. 
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CHAPTER V 
ORGANISATIONAL FRMIEWORK OF THE WITED 
NATIONS IN RELATION TO M CONTROL OF 
DRUGS 
7 By the Protocol of 1946, the governments signatory to the 
various narcotic treaties concluded before the Second World Warp 
transferred to the appropriate agencies of the United Nations the 
power and functions exercised by the League agencies in this area 
of international law. The Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations took overv inter alia, the functions of the League Council 
and the Assembly concerning control of narcotic drugsp and the Opium 
Advisory Committee of the League ceased to exist. At its first 
session in February 1946, the Economic and Social Council created the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
8 
and entrusted it with the power, and 
functions which were exercised by the League's Opiun Advisory 
Committee. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugsq 1961 ( hereim- 
after called 11 the Single Convention" )q abolished the Permanent 
Central_Narcotics Board and the Supervisory Body on March 29 1968, when 
the International Narcotics Control Board came into being. 
The Paris Protocol of 1948, which came into force on December lp 
1949, authorised the World Health Organization to place under full 
international control any new drag including synthetic drugs)which 
could not be placed under such control by application of the relevant 
provisions ( Article 11) of the Limitation Convention, and which it 
found either to be addiction-producing or convertible into. an. 
addiction-producing drug. 
9 
11 
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The i4orking method of the organs entrusted with the task of 
administering. the control machinery. of narcotic drurrs, 'until the 
coming into force of the §ingle Convention of 1961p was almost 
identical to that of the League organs concerned with this matter. 
It is therefore appropriate to deal with. those organs which have 
been functioning since the coming into force of the Single Conven- 
tion. Reference will however be made to notable activities of the 
previous organsg wherever necessary. The organs involved in the 
international control machinery for the suppression of the illicit 
traffic in drugs, under the auspices of the United Nationsp may be 
shown, by means of a diagram. 
SECRETARY-GETIMRAL OF THE U. No 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUXIL 
'o % 
COMISSION ON INTMINATIONAL NARCOTICS 
NARCOTIC DRUGS CONTROL BOARD 
WORU MALTH 
ORGANIZATION 
WOMD IM ILLM ASSU-IBLY 
MWMT C01,14ITTEE(S) 
E 
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The Econ'omic anil Social Council of the United Nations 
Introduction. 
In its resolutioq of 12 Februnryt 1946 the General Assembly of 
the United Nations stated that it was willing 11 to take necessary 
measures to ensure the continued exercise of these functions and 
powers" ( of a technical and non-political character conferred by 
. 
'certain 
international instruments of the League of Nations) and 
referred the matter to the Economic and Social Council. 
10 Article 62, 
paragraph I of the U. N. Charter also empowered the Economic and 
Social Council to make or initiate studies and reports concerning 
intern 
. 
ational economieg social't-culturalg educationalp health and 
related matters, and to make recommendations on these matters to the 
General Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations and to the 
specialised agencies concerned. In terms of Article 57 of the U. N. 
Charter, the various specialised agencies, having wide international 
responsibilities as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, 
social, cultural, educational, health and related fields, shall be 
brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with 
the provisions of Article 63, i. e., at the instrwaentality of the 
Economi c and Social C'ouncil. It is in pursuance of these provisions 
that the World Health Organization has been brought into relationship 
11 12 
with the United Nations. Both the Comuission on Narcotic Drugs 
and the International Narcotics Control Board are directly responsible 
to the Economic and Social Council. Article 68 of the U. N. -Charter 
has also empowered this organ of the U. N. to set up U. N. Development 
Prograimes in various parts of the world, one of the 6bjectives of 
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which progr! ammes is to implement the policy of the U. N. on the control 
of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugst in a decentraliged fashiong 
and vhere such control is most neade'd. 
13 
The Economic and Social Cotuncil 
has'also boon empowered to 11 make suitable arrangements for consultation 
with non-governmental organisations which are concerned with matters. 
within its competence" and in practice such arrangements have been 
made with the International Criminal Police Organization ( INTIEMOL) 
uhich before its transformation into an inter- governmental organisa- 
tion in 1972, was a non-governmental body. The International Criminal 
Police Organization is represented on the important sessions of the 
meetings of Vic Economic and Social Council, and the Co. =ission on 
Narcotic Druggs also directly request it to pursue or. investigate a case 
in uhich suspicion of illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs has been 
aroused. Of the non-govemnental organisations which are directly 
conceizned with -this area of into rnational lawp mention should be made. 
of the following: 
(a) League of Arab St. ýtes; 
(b) International Federation of Women Lawyerff 
International Conference of Catholic Charities; and 
(d) World Alliance of Young Men' s Christian Associations. 
15 
Relations uith non-governmental organisations are on a far more 
fonualised basis 16 than they are with the inter-governmentaý organisa- 
tions. The importance of the services rendered by non-governmental 
organisations may not however be ignored. 
17 The power of the Economic 
and Social Council to create bodiest whether functional, rcg'ional or 
other, is unrestricted, and this seems to the'abolition of any such 
body. 18 
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FL114CTIONS OF DIS, ECON01"IfIC JA2,11D SOCM COUNIM, 
The functions of the Economic and Social Councill as far as 
this-area'of international law is concerned are various. 
19 Paticle 
60 of the U. N. Charter vests responsibili-ýy for the discharge of the 
functions of the organisation relating to international economic and 
social. co-operation in the Economic and Social Council. The Council's 
functions. in relation to the suppression of the illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs, as enumerated in the U. N. Charterp may be divided 
in-to three categories, viz., 
(a) functions wider Article 62; 
(b) functions under Article 66; and, 
(c) functions under Articles 57 and 63- 
(a) Functions under Article 62 of the U. N. Charter 
Under this Article the Economic and Social Council, in so 
far as this area of international law isconcerned 
(i) may tako or initiate studieý and reports with respect to, 
inter alial international economic, social, educational, 
health and related mattersl and may make recommendations with 
respect to any such mattors to the General Asseniblyq to the 
Members of the United Nationsp and to the spebialised agencies 
concerned; 
(ii)- may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General 
Assembly with respect to matters falling within its com- 
petence; and 
(iii) may call international conferences on matters falling within 
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its competence, but such conferences may be called 
only in accordance with the rules prescribed by ýhe 
Unitca Nations, i. e. , if the nature of the work ne6e- I 
ssitates the calling of such conferences amd also 
uhere, a U. N. organ cannot perform the work effectively t: l 
and satisfactorily. 
In so far as the control of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
is concerned, -the Council, more often than not, initiates various 
studiesp drafts conventions and calls. conferences. The Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control Board is required to submit annual reports 
to the Council. The principal purpose of the submission of such 
reports is to keep, amongst others, 
20 the Council and the Co. mission 
on Narcotic Drugsq informed of the present situation of the interna- 
tional narcotics tradet and also of the manner in i-which the govern- 
ments have complied with the tenns of the treaties on narcotic drugs. 
These reports also enable the International Narcotics Control Board 
to portray. particular trends in various aspects of the problem, and 
21 to propose remedial measlurcs where desirable. " 
(b) Functions under Article 66 of the U. N. Charter 
, 
Iý pursuance of paragraph l'of this Article, the Economic 
and Social Council 11 shall perform such functions as fall within 
its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommen- 
dations of the General Assembly. " Paragraph 3 of this Akiclealso 
provides that it " shall perform such other functions as are specified 
elsewhere in the present Charter or may be assigned to it by the 
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Gencral. Assemblyll,, 
N 
The. provisions of paragraph I are -vel-y similar to those of 
Article 60j. In view of the relationship existing, between the Economic 
-and Social Council and the General Assembly, the Council is supposed 
to function 11 in connection with the carrying, out of the recorriendations 
of the General Assembly". However, the'phrase, 11 as fall within''its 
competence" in paragraph. 1 is a restraint upon paragraph 3- It. trould 
be appropriate to interpret paragraph 3 in conjunction with -, Article 60 
of the U. N.. Charter. 
22 This arg=cnt my further be strengthened by 
reference to the provisions of Article 66, paragraph 2. In its Reso- 
lution of December 15,1946, the General Assembly recommended the 
I 
Economic and Social Council to study the question'of effective ways 
and means of submitting expert economic, social and cultural advice to 
Member countriest especially undeideveloped ones which might desire it, 
and the Council, in turn, decided to instruct the Secretary-General 
to establish machinery within the Secretariat in order to further this 
programme, 
23 
In so far as the control of trade and traffic in narcotic drugs 
is conce'rned, the Council hasp in consultation with the ' Commission on 
Narcotic Drugst given assistancev financial or othenlise, e. g. expert 
adviect elaboration of plans and programmes for the most effective 
utilisation of personnel# facilities-and resources to-various Member' 
States. 24 In addition to its progra=es of technical assistance, the 
United Nations Development Prograrmos, which were designed and'raade 
operative wit1h a view, inter alial to'fi,,,,, hting the evil of drug-abuse, 
25 deserve comendation. The local United Nations Development Programme 
authoiities'have been iaade accountable to the Counciý, and consequently, 
'p 
I 
- the Council retains the right to review such progra=esp if necessary. 
(e) iNmetions under Articles 57 and 63 of- the 
U. N. Charter 
One of tho functions of the Economic and Social Council is to 
co-ordinate the work of the various specialised agencies and to bring 
these agencies in-to relationship with the Unitea Nations. Sach rela- C. 1 
tionship is to be established only by inter-governmental agreements 
26 
concluded under Articles 57 and 63 of the U. N. Charter. 
, 
In so far 
as the international action for narcotic drugs ts*Concernedp such 
treaties are numerousp and the agencies which have been brought into 
I relationship with 
the United Nations are various in kind. 
27 The 
system of reciprocal representation at each other's mcotings 
( without a right to vote) and/br recognition of reciprocal rights 
to-propose agenda itemsp after necessary consultation, to the appro- 
priate organg are means of co-ordinating the work of the specialined 
23 
agencies. The practice of "linking membership" between the World 
- Health Organization and -the U. N. does clearly help co-ordinate the 
work between -these two institutions. 
29 By malting most of the organsp 
including the Commission on Narcotic Drugsp accountable to the Economic 
and Social Council, the prospects of co-ordination of work with the 
said ComAssion have been more manifest. The Co=ission on Narcotic 
Drugs bein, -,,, a functional co=ission of the Economic and Social Councilp 
its economic viability depends upon the General Fund of the United 
Nations. The allocation of such funds is to be approved . by the 
Council before being finally authorised by the General Assembly t: * 
30 
of the United Ndtions. 
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On-the other hand, the World Hcalth Organizationt which is 
closely connected with the work of the Commission on Narcotic Drugsp 
ist . strictly speaking, a technical bodyq and consequentlyp the u 
functional independence of this body heeds to the maintained. The 
basis-of co-operation in this respect is mutuality and understanding. 
In so far as technical legislation and management of their own affairs 0 
are concernedg the separate identities of such specialised agencies 
are to be recognised. 
31 The Co=uission on Varcotic Drurrs also being 
a speciallsed body, the nature of the functions which the Economic 
and Social Council performs in relation to this bodyt in many-cases, 
be deemed to be supervisory in character. 
However, co-operation by means of international agreements is 
of parampunt importancel pince these agreements define the legal 
fr, -=eworL- within which the co-ordinating function is performed. 
Without such agteements the various specialised agencies would 
technically be free to pursue their oi-m independent ways subject only 
to their own. constitutional instruments. 
32 In co-ordinating p -the 
Economic and Social Council does not cowand obedience; consultation 
and roco=endations are the means of fulfilling this task. It is 
41 * 
for this reason that the Technical Committee at tfie San Francisco 
Conference emphasised. that its purpose was It to provide for agree- 
ments sufficiently flexible to enable satisfactory arrangements 
to be vorked out on the basis of need and experience.,, 
33 
(d) Co)mocnts:. 
The U. N. Charter has not conferred any legislative power upon 
the Economic and Social-Councilq which would bind the Member St-atesp and 
consequently, the Council has become a forum of discussions only, from 
31L 
which reco=nendations ensue I 'he scOPe of work of this Council-is 
too uide, and like all other functionally horizontal organiiýations, it 
is likely that this organ will work-wit-b decreasing effect . In 
realit3r, many SPOcialised bodies, and even a body in direct relationship 
tii th -1. d -he Council(c. g. The Comnission on Narcotic DruZs)may gra ually 
assume more 6ffective poimr in the ir respective spheres than the Council 
itself. 35 The operative language of resolutions serves as a general 
indicator of týcir binding effect ( e. g. welcomes, endorsesp approves, 
invites, requests etc. ). Host of. the reco.. -mendations of the Econoraic 
and Social Council are based on consensus, 
36 
although the absence of, 
such consensus becomes in certain instances e.. Vplicit. 
37 The effort 
to arrive at a consensus not infrequently'leads to i-. raterod-downy plati- 
33 tudinous, or ambivalent decisions. Yet, oh the inter-goverrmental 
level, the Economic and Social Council is the Primary organ of overall 
review and haxmonization. 
39 The increasing strength of the subordinate 
b6dies, in relation to their creator should not be a. niatter of concern, 
as the primary purposels not to create a large unwieldy-bodyl but to 
achieve its goal through effective delegated bodies. Since they are 
delegated bodiest they are, ipso facto, required to maintain relationship 
f with the main organg even though they may be allowed to function inde- 
pendently in their own spheres. 
110 
Yet, decisions affecting subsidiary 
bodies of the Council itselft typically take the form of directives to 
14\1 *. 39 6 
undertake new prolg2ram; ncs, 'to modify existing programme prioriticsor, 
at -timesq to discontinue or defer specific operational projects. This 
is particulariy true of regional cc . onomic co=Assion activiticb. As the 
parent bodyp the Council enjoys direct supervisory'authority oyer such 
bodies, whether regional or central- uhich of course does not hold for 
ýý tý 
41 
the specialized agencies, . 
In so far as the inter-governmental organisations ( e. ý., INITZIPOL 
or the League of Arab States) are concemcdq the Economic-and Social 
Council maintains relstionship witli them on an in-lonml basis. It allows 
participation by repro s entative s of such organiksations for exchangiii" 1= m 
ideas, and indeed, there are arrangements for reciprocal participation 
with various inter-governmental organisations. The International Criminal 
P. olice Organisation ( INTEMIOL), since its becoming an inter-governracntal 
organisationt has established a closer relationship with the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs by being promoted from its status as an observer to that 
of a participant with a right to vote. 
Relations with non-governmontal organisations (NGOs) are on a 
42' 
far more formalised plan. . Article 71 of the U. N. Charter authorises 
the Economic and Social Council to raai, -e it suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non-governmental organisations uhich are concerned 
with matters within its competence. " The NGOs enjoy. a c onsultative 
status. In'practicep the Council has categorised them wider three 
categories. - Category A comprises those hIGOs which have a basic interest 
in most of the activities of the Council; in category B are those which 
have special competence in certain of the aspects of the Cou'ncil's 
activitiesp while in category C are included certain organisations of 
- S. 
an ad hoc nature. In no case does an NGO have rights comparable to 
states under. Article 69 or special. 1'sod agencies under Article. 70 
of the U. N. Charter; the difference between 11 participationý' and 
1'3 "consultatiorel is, fundamcntal. Although all these NGOs send obser- 
vers to the public meetings of the'Economic and Social Council and 
its commissions, those in categories A and B also submit uritten 
statements for circulations among the members of the Council, while 
those in category- A may also =Ice oral statements and propose agenda 
items. An NGOts contributions become more concrete and effective when 
its views are specially invited; it is in this sense that the ad hoc 
NGOs. in the opinion of the author., receive no less recognition than 
I th6se in categories A and B. 
However, in its resolution 288(X) of 27 February 1950, the 
Economic and Social Council reviewed the consultative arrangements 
idth'non-governmental organisations, and indeed, having regard to 
Article 71-of the U. N. Charter and recognising that consultation with 
such organisations provide an important means of ensuring the fulfil- 
ment of peoplest continuing interest in the policies and operations 
of the United Nations, and considering that consultation between the 
Council and its subsi-diary organs and the non-governmental organisa- 
tions should be developed to the fullest practicable extento approved I 
certain revised arrangements for consultation, e. g. principles to be 
applýcd in the establishment of consultative relations, principles 
governing the nature ofl-the consultative arrangements and the estab- 
lishment of consultative relationships etc. 
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In so far as the controi of trade and traffic in narcotic drWs 
is co. ncernedt the lollowing non-govermental organisations participated 
-in the U. N. Conference for t1he Adoption of a Single Co-nvention -on 
. Narcotic Drags: 
(a) International Federation of b'omen Lawyers; 
(b). International Conference of Catholic Charities; and 
(c) World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations. 
All these organisations c=e under category D, i. e., these 0 
organisations have a special competence in, and are concdrned speci- 
fically with,. only a few of the fields of activity covered by the 
Council. The Council has also authorised a coraraittoe on non-govem- 
mental organisations to review from time to time the list of non- 
115 
goverrnnental organisations included in categories A and B9 and 
indeed, the exercise of such an au thority by the Council is declara- 
tory of its intention to establish such effective relationship with 
the non-governmental organisations as would be rolevant. to, a particular 
46 
matter of international concern. . Such a. relationship negates all 
elements of competitive status, and/or hierarchy; it is based on 
partnership and mutual understanding. 
01 
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TBB COTMISSIO, N ON MASCOTIC MIUCTS 
(a) lnýxo (lite f. i on 
At its first session, in Febrnary 1946, the Economic and 
Social Council established the Co=ission on Narcotic Drugs 
hercina, fter called 11 the Co-, umission") in order to provide 
machinery whereby full bffect might be given to the interna- 
tioiial conventions relating to narcotic drugs, and to provide for 
continuous'review of the progress towards international control 
This Commission has also been established to: of such drngs. 
(a) 11 Assist tho Council in exorcisin . g, such powers of 
supervision over the application of international 
conventions and agreements dealing with narcotic drugs 
as may be assumed by or conferred on the Council" 
Advise the Council on all matters pertaining to the t3 
control of narcotic drugs, and prepare such draft 
international conventions as may be necessary" ; 
Consider what changes may be required in the existing 
machinery for the international control of narcotic 
drugs mid submit proposals -thereon to the Council"; and 
Pcrfori such functions relating to narcotic drags as 
47 the. Council may direct". 
Although constituted under the auspices of the United Nationsq 
the Coi-, mission was . in effect, the successor'of the Opium Advisory 
Committee of the League. One of the purposes of establishing this 
400 
Commission , at. I east initially, vas to "carry out such functions 
entrusted to the League of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in 
Opium and Other DangerousýDrugs by the international convontiýns on, 
narcotic drugs as the . Council may find it necessary to assume and 
48 
continue. " This Commission was not, thereforep developed ex RihilEj 
aýid the 
. 
continuity was not only that of men 
49 
and problems but also 
50 
of solutions. The establishment of a body like the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs-was being contemplated by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, even before the formal cession of the League of 
Nationst with a view to taking 11 1ýecessary measures to ensure the 
continued exercise" of the functions of the League in this area of 
international law. 
(b) Composition of the Commission 
ý 
At its first sessiont in February 1946pthe Economic and Social - 
Council requested the following governments to designate one repre- 
sentative each to constitute the. Cormission: Canada, China, Egypt, 
Francep Indial Iranp Mexico, the Notherlandsv Peru, Poland, Turkey.. 
U. K. t U. S. A. 9 U*S. S. R. and Yugoslavia. The criteria which it had 
been decided to apply in the selection of members of this Commission, 
were that they would not only be Members of the United Nations, but 
also 11 important producing or manufacturing countries in -which illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem.,, 
51 
Therefore, geographic distribution was not necessarily taken into 
account in the memýership of the Commission. Although the term of 
office of the representatives was initially fixed at three yearsp with 
401 
a provision for re-appointment, the principle of permanent racm7bership 
.1i of the important coýintries was adopted at the eighth session of the 
Economic and Social Council. Me considerations which led to the 
adoption of such a principle were: 
(a) the necessity of crisuring the continuity of the 
functioning of the Coi=ission itself and of its officers"; 
(b) 11... the special interest in the international control of 
narcotic drugs by tho principal drug- roducing, and manu- .p 
facturing countries and those countries in which illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious problem"; and 
(c) "... the importance of the co-operation of all nations in 
this humanitarian effort. " 
It was also decided that the Co=ission would be composed of 
fifteen members of the United Nations and that such members must be 
important 11 producing" : or 11 manufacturing" countriesp or countrics in 
, dAch illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a. rerious social 
problem. It may be observed in this connection that membership of 
the Commission was linked with membership of the United Nations. Thusp 
the non-mcmbers of the United Nations, some of which are 11 important 
producing or manufacturing countries" or non-member countries in vhich 
"illicit traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem" 
have been excluded from membership of the Conriission. This was done 
perhaps because of the fact that the Co=ission is only a subordinate 
body of the Economic and Social Council. At the time the Commission 
i-ras established, the following countries, xvho were members : bf the 
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Opium Advisory Coa-aittee of the League, but riot of the League werot 
52 thereforep excluded from membership of the Commission. 
Belgium II-Lingary Switzerland 
Bulgaria Portumal Thailand U 
Greece Spain uruýnmy 
It may be observed that, for obvious reasonst flio cri-ýcria of 
memb3rship of the Commission should have been drafted in the folloidng 
uuy: 11 Members of the United Nations which are-important drug producing 
or drug manufacturing countries, and/or countries in which illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs constitutes a serious social problem.,, 
53 
4: 2 
Houevorp at its thirtyý-second session in 1961, the Economic and Social 
Council not only decided to increase the Commission's membership to 
twentyonev but aluo revised the conditions of its membership by stating 
that. its members were to be " elected from among the members of the. 
United Nations and of the specialised agencies and the parties to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961; that the members should be 
elected with due regard to the ýadequate representation of countries 
which are important producers of opium or coca leavest of countries 
which, are important in the field of the manufacture of narcotic drugs 
and of countries in which drug addiction or the illicit-traffic in 
narcotic dýugs constitutes an important problem.,, 
54 Such revised 
conditions of membership obviously offered the opportunity of membership 
of the Commission to the non-members of the United Nations, and also to 
those countries which are members of specialised agency / agencies 
only. 
55 Thust in so far as inemb ership is concerned, such conditions 
bave been designed to maintain parity 1, rit. 11 tile specialised agenci. es of 
the U. N. 56 
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Tile phrase 11 adequate represefttition of countries iehich are 
producers of opium ... 11 in the resolution, implied that for the formu- 
lation Oi an effective international policy a ifide range of parfici- 
pation of the countries concerned was necessary. The latter resolution, 
however, emphasised that membership of the Commission should be open to 
those-countries in which It drug addiction or the illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs constitutes an important problem.,, 
57 
This latter reso- 
lutibn also confirmed that the members of the Commission should also be 
representatives of governmonts. 
58 The necessai7 consequances 61 such 
a provision are tivofoldp. viz. 
(a) #e Commission I=ld be collstituted of -thase persons 
most suitable to represent the problems of the countries 
concerned and/or the Co=ission would be enabled to derive 
the benefit of the knowledge and service of persons who, 
according to the government of the country concernedt are 
best qualified for such a purpose; and 
(b) the protection of the interest of the country concerned 
through a representative whom his government deems most 
. suitable for the purpose. 
Howeverp unlike the procedure applicable to all other functional 
commissions of the'Economic and Social Council, appointment of the 
delegates of the CO=ission need not be approved either by the 
Secrctaryý-General of the U. N. or by the Economic and Social Council-59 
This practice'elearly evidences that, since it is an institution composed 
of representatives of governments, tho ultimate authority of selection 
ofits members should lie with the governments concerned. This will 
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also indirectly make the governments-more responsible in the discharge 
of their functions in this regard. 
I 
It is to be noicdg however, that the Single Convention has 
not made any provision concerning the composition of the Commission. 
In Article 5 of the Conventiong the Parties recognisin, (.; the competence 
of the'United Nations with respect to the international control of 
drug(st agreed to entrust to the Commission and to the International 
Narcotics Control Board, the functions respectively assigned to them 
tinder this Convention. The authority to set up such a Conmission nay 
also be found in Article 68 of the U. N. Charter which states that the 
It Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and 
social fields and for the promotion of human rightst and such other 
commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions. " 
Rule 2k of the Rules of Procedure of the Economic and Social Council 
provides that 11 the Council may establish and define the composition 
and the terms of reference of: 
(a) Functional Commissions and regional commissions; 
(b) Sessional Committees of the uhole anA other sessional 
bodies; and 
60 (c) Standing and ad hoe')coMinittees M 
-, It can also change the composition of the CoLimission on Narcotic Drugs 
or can even constitute this Commission partially or fully of experts 
chosen in their individual capacity. At present, the number of members 
of the Comission is thirty. It may also be stated that since it is 
a treaty-body, its viability is dependent upon the length of life of 
the treaty concerned, Le., the Single Convention. 
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n! lnctions of the Commission 
According to its terms of referencefft which constitute the 
basis of its action, the Coi-mission on Narcotic Drugs is required 
to perform: 
1. functions emanating from the narcotic treaties; 
functions imposed upon it by the Economic and Social 
Council in virtue of ALrticle 62 of the U. N. Charter; and 
functions emanating from the Rules of Procedure of the 
Functional. Co=issions of the Economic and Social Council. 
62 
1. Fm-ictions emanatina-frona the narcotic trcaties 
A. P=ctions erianatingfrom the conventions and protocols 
- j2rior-to the Singrlp Convention on Narcotic Dru! Ts, 1261. 
The Protocols which preceded the Single Convention were the 
Paris Protocol of 1948 
63 
and the-1953 Protocol. 
64 
With the march 
.0. 
-of medical sciencet inter alia, in the manufacture of analgesic 
components, the scope of the pre-liar narcotic treaties was generally 
found to be inadcqiiate. The growing numbeýr of dependence-producing 
d. rugs which had been made synthetically were not derivatives, of the 
opiuu poppyp coca bush and cannabis plantt nor did. they belong to the 
chemical groups defined under the Limitation Convention. At its first 
session in December 1946, the Co=ission-proposed a study of the 
procedure necessary for bringing the now synthetically produced drugs 
which were outside the scope of the Limitation Convention) under 
full international control. This study culminated in the conclusion 
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oT- the Paris Protocol of 1943t which came into force on December lp 
191L90 
In terms of Article 1 of this Protocol, if any state Party to 
-the Protocol considered that a drug which was or might be used for 
medical or scientific purposes, and to which the Limitation Convention 
did not apply, was liable to the same kind. of abuse and productive of the 
same harmful effects as the drugs specified in Article 1, paragraph 2 
of the said Convcntioný that state should send a notification to that 
effect to the Secretiry-General. The Secretary-General in turnp was 
required to transmit that information immediatelyt to among, others 
65 
concernod. t the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Although the final- 
decision or finding on the drug in question, i. c. 9 whefher it is 
capable of producing addiction or of conversion into a product capable 
of producing addictiOll Was to have coLie from the World Health Organi- 
zationg the Cor=ission, in terms of Article 2 of -this Protocolq ivas 
authorised upon receipt of the notification from the Secretary-General 
in accordance with Article lt paragraph 1 of this Protocol, to'consider 
as soon as possible whether the measures applicable to drugs specified 
in Article lv paragraph 2t group I of the Limitation Convention should 
provisionally apply to the drug in question,, pending receipt of the 
decision or finding of the World Health Organization, The power of 
decision as to whether aw y measure should apply provisionally to any 
particular dru"v lay ifith the Co=issiont md it was required to coymuni- 
cate this decision to the World Health Organization, the Perýianent Central 
Board and the states Parties to this Protocol f#rough the SeCretary-Gencral 
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of the U. N. This indirectly proves that the CQuwaission hept itself 
alert to the probable loopholes in, 'the control system. In order to 
close the gap caused by the time-lag between the time when a govern- 
mbnt became aware of the existence of an addiction-producing drug and 
the time of the international organ's -takingr action, the Cozzmaission 
-4rged the manufacturing countries to co-operate by promoting the 
implementation of the international control procedure as pr omptly as 
possible. The Economic and Social Council confirmed this policy of 
the Co=ission by adopting a resolution 
66 
in, which it urged the 
governments to take -action for bringing now dru. fls under eff octive IL 
control in that : 
I 
(i) the government of a country in which it. had been 
produced should provisionally subject a new drug, 
if it was thought to be potentially dangerousy to 
-the control measures prescribed by the international 
conventions pending the. decision of the World Health 
Organization; 
(ii) all governments should apply provisional measures of 
control to a drug of which a notification had been 
made by a goverrnnent to the Secretary-General in accord- 
ance with the Paris Protocol; and 
(iii) should apply the necessary measures of control, as a 
matter of urgency as and when they received the co. -, -mu- 
nication of a finding of the World Ifcalth Organization 
or a dedision of the Comrais'sion for provisional measures 
of control, relating to a drug. 
408. 
In so far as the 1953 Protocol was concernýd, Article 10p 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (c) autborised the Commission to prescribe 0ý 
the form for the annual reports on the working of the Protocol, which 
the Parties wore, required to submit to the Secretary-General. In 
addition to thisq the Co, -=ission was also authorised to perfona certain 
f unctioný-, which had been prescribed by the Limitation Conventiont viz., 
(a) appointment of a member of the SUDervisory Dody 
Article 5, paragraph 6); 
(b) appointment of one member of the body of experts 
competent to deal with the regime of a drug, i. e., 
whether or not a drug is capable of prodVeing, addic- 
tion or is convertible into a drug capable of produ- 
cing addiction ( Article llt paragraph 4) ; and 
I 
(C) the drawing up of a form for the annual reports 
which governments were required to, co=unicate to 
one another through *the Secretary-Genoral on the 
working of the Limitation Convention (Article 21) 
Although'the Commission's trei-ty-functions have been more 
elaborate since the coming into force of the Single Convention, 
67 
its functions, by implicationg prior to the Single Convention 
included not only seeking the co-operation of states, but also the 
68 
maintenance of relationship with various international bodies* 
It performed slach functions by inviting observers from various govern- 
ments to attend its meetings, by requesting governments to furnish 
69 information through questionnaires devised by ito by 'making special 
studies ( as it did on ca*is) and even by inviting cor, =cnts on draf t 
I 
.1 
-0 4.09 
conventions. 
70. Although the Commission had maintained contacts 
regularly with various special bodies concerned with narco. ticsq 
vi 
. 
ze, Welfe0e, F*A#Oo, INTERPOL etc., 
71 it was the Permanent Central 
Opium Board and the Supervisory Body wit1i which i-t maintained closest 
contact for practical . reasons. 
72 
The functions of the Co=ission during this period were varied. 
It not only covered areas like the abolition of opium-smoking ý limi- 
tation of the production and manufacture of drugs, implementation of 
the existing systemv supýression of the illicit traffic in drurrs, and 
research/study of the narcoties, problera including drug-addiction, but 
73 
also devised schemes for future improvement. Ilost of these functions 
were inherited by the Commission from the League system. Nevertheless, 
during the War the international-control system of narcotics'was dis- 
torted. The activities of the Permanent Central Board and the Super- 
visory Bo . dy became only nominal and in certain cases the control system 
broke down owing to lack of communication with the international organst 
while in other ýasesv 3mr itself Complicated the system, through the 
74 
surplus stocks held by the armed forces. When the Commission ias 
established, one of its foremost tasks was to re-ostablish the interna- 
tional control system at the pre-War level and also to re-equip the 
national governments for their proper functioning by means of collabo? - 
ration and fuIfilment of their treaty obligations. 
75 The Commission 
passed a resolution requesting the Economic and Social Council to urge 
the governments of France, U. K., U. S. A., and U. S. S. R. to reco=ýend to 
the allied authorities concerned with the control of narcotics that 
N 
4,10, 
-they should take appropriate measures for establishing an effective 
control system in Ger-niany. 
76 As týhe situation of narcotics control 
I. irl certain countries, e. g. Japantprior to the conclusion of-the Peace 
Treaties with her, became alamin-9 a resolution was passed by the 
Economic and Social Council in idUch it reques. ted the governments 
concerned to negotiate such treaties as x., rould produce effective 
measures in this respe6t ; and such control was to be under the super- 
vision of the United Nations or such other body as tho Peace Treaties 
would establish. 
77 The Commisbion acted as a i-ratch-dog" on the Japanese 
and German. situations until the indidence of the illicit traffic in 
drugs arising out of the military stocks in these countries had been 
-reduced to a satisfactory level. Althougrh. thc Co=nission's work 
at least for the filst few years was mostly concerned with repairing 
the damage caused by the War to the international narcotics control 
system, its work may be detailed under the following headings: 
(a) Suppression-of opii=- smolcinfr, 
Despite all efforts to suppress opium-smoking since the 
conclusion of the Hague Opiun Convention of 1912 the progress in 
this direction waý rather slow, 
78 
and the situAion vas further 
aggravated by. the lack of proper control- during World War II. 
The initiative towards suppression of opium-s-moking came from the 
stronger powers like Francep the Netherlands, U. X. q and U, 
ý. A. The 
initial attempt to suppress this evil-was made in those territories 
of the Far East which had been under the Japanese control. The 
 
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Commissipn appreciated the situation and at it3 first session 
ad6 I pted a resolution in which it requested the Economic and Social 
I. 
Coimcil to take appropriate steps for the prohibition of mc-mufacture 
and internal traffic in opium in those countries in which opium- 
smokin g'was still'considered-legal. Since then the Corunission has 
not 'Only reviev., ed the progress made in the policy of the suppression 
of opium-smokingv but also'4dopted numerous resolutions recormending 
to the Economic and Social Councilt various measures for the suppres- 
79 
siOn of this evil. 
(b) k2lementation of the Existing, System of Control 
The Co=ission, at its birth, found itself in'the mids. t of a 
system - of control uhich had existed over a period of years. The- 
drug conventions concluded during the League period had been acceptedg 
at least theoretically, by many nations. The Co=ission"s initial 
"task wasp thereforep to implement and strengthen the control system 
envisaged by various treaties in this matterp'instead of 
disturbing 
the existing system. The duty of implementation and strengthening t* M 
of the control system required the Commission to perform various 
functions i,., hich had been detailed by the Council in its resolution of 
18 Februaryq 1946.80 Such'functions, apart from advising and assisting 
the Council ( i. e. t the Economic and Social Council), included the 
examination of various matters viz., the reports received Jrom 
governmentst 
81 their national lmm and regulations, summary of annual 
reports of governments, 
82 list of drugs under international control, 
A A12 
names ana addresses of national manufacturers of drugag tlj(%. purpose of 
producing such, drugs ( i. e., whether for medicinal use or for export), 
the effectiveness of import certificates and export authorisations, 
reports on illicit traffic during a yeart in order to consider if any 
changes would be required in the existing machinery of control in any 
country and in the machinery for the international control of drugs at 
large and in the latter dasep the submission of proposals thereon to the 
Council. The Commission was also required to consider the questions of 
drug- addiction and necessary research thereon. It also considered, the g 
reports of the Permanent Central Opium Board, of the 1-1.11.0. Expert 
Co, -=ittee on Addiction Producing Drugs. 
83. Its functions were not merely 
I supervisory since it was authorisod to ask for explanations from a country 
on a matter relating 
io narcotic drugs, if necessary. In the case of an 
unsatisfactory situationv it also adopted a resolution to request the 
Secretary-General to. ask for an explanation frora the country concerned. 
The Secretary-General issued directives on the basis of these resolutions, 
and they produced-direct effects in that they made the defaulting nations 
submit their annual reports. These annual reports were essential for the 
Conmiission to enable it not only to examine the varying situtions in 
different countriesv but also toPrepare the Sizmnary of Annual Reports 
Relating'to OPium aiid Other Dangerous Drugs, 
The succesp of the Commission's functions depended primarily upon 
the co-operation of the countries, It ims for this reason that the 
Commission preferred to adopt a friendly attitude towards the countries 
in performing its functions instead of creating a situation which would 
have strained their relationship. 
. ''1 
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Tho. other. treaty-function of the Co. muission ii-as to make an analy- 
tical survey ofýnational laws concerning drugs. In accordance with 
Article 21 of the Limitation Convention, 6e High Contracting Parties 
ve're required-to 11 co=unicate to one another through the Secretary- 
General of the League of Nations the laws and regulations promulgated 
in order to give effect to the present convention", and they were also 
required to forivard to the Secretary-General 11 an annual report on the 
working of the Convention in their territories". It was the Commissionfs 
function to examine those lawst and advance suggestions to the national 
84 
governments concerned to amend or improve the laws as necessary. In 
implementing the treaty-functions the Commission had also to examine the 
le(rality of carrying narcotic, drugs in the first aid kits of aircrafts, 
The quantity of drugs carried in such kitp had not the blessing of any 
government either by way of import certificate or by way of export autho- 
risation. In, other -wordsp these drugs ifere beyond the scope of interna- 
tional control. In fact, this question was brought to the attention of the 
Commission by the International Civil Aviation Organization. The 
Secretary-Goneralf in co-operation with the World Health Organizationp 
the International Civil. Aviation Organization and the International 
Criminal Police Organization f recommended certain requirements in this 
regard. The Commissionp however, in view of the special nature of the 
problemp adopted a resolution in which it recommended to the Economic 
and Social Council a system which would 11 harmonize the need to provide 
control measures against the possibility of abuse or theft of the 
narcotic drugs carried and'the need to interfere as little. as possible 
with the expeditious handling of aircraft on the ground. " 
85 This problem 
86 
i-ras subsequently dealt with in detail in the Singlo'Convention. 
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(c) Limitation of the l3roduction of Ilaw- If. aterinls 
The 14iternational Opiiun Convention of 1925 imposed a general 
obligation upon the Contracting Parties to emict laws and regulations 
with a, vimr to controllin g effectively the productiont distribution 
and export or raw opium only. This Convention did not impose any such 
obligati. on upon the Contracting Parties in respect of coca leaf and 
cannabis. These gaps in the trcatics, iqcre not due to the authors of 
t1he treaties overlooking the problemy but because it was more difficult 
to subject agricultural than manufacturing processes to close'control. 
87 
By iýaturcj both coca bush and cannabis grow wild and it is difficult to 
prevent their growth. bilith this should-also be taken into account the 
domestic use of these plants, ( i. e., for the purpose of cooking) and 
the ignorance of many farmers as to their narcotic potentialities. The 
question of control of the production of raw materials, which had not 
been. brought under control by the International Opium Convention of 19259 
was already under contemplation by. the League. The War interve. nedp but 
the initiative taken by the government of the United Statcs, uras, indomi- 
-table. . 
Me process of persuading countries continued and in 1947 the 
Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution to this effect. 
88 
The Commission, having appreciated the difficulties involved in 
the conclusion of a general convention restricting the production of 
raw materialsp suggested to the Secretary-General that some interim 
mc-asures in this regard would be more appropriate. The Co-, inission also 
requested the Secretary-General to initiate studies and inquiries for 
this purpose. C. onsequently, an ad hoc co=ittec and a joint co=ittee 
9 
consisting of producers and manufacturers met at Geneva in August, 1950Y 
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io consider the feasibility 9f setting up of a system of national 
monopoly ( vvhich would imply setting up a system of control for . 
national 
production under govprnment supervision), and intornational monopoly for 
trade in opium. The failure of t1ac joint conunittoe to come an agreement 
on the question of national or internatiohal monopoly prompted the 
Commission to consider the possibilities of signing a protocol with a 
view to limiting the production of opium. 
89 
and it requested such of 
Ii 
the Council. The Council adopted that resoltuion at its thirteenth 0 
session. 
90 It was at the- initiative of the Commission that in 1953'the 
conference. for adopting the Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the 
Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of International'and 
91 
Wholesale Trade in and Use of Opium was convened, This Protocol 
iras drawn up by the Secretary-Gencral in accordance with the-principles 
suggested by the Co=ission at its sixth session. This evidently proved 
that*tho Co=ission was not only engaged, inte*r alial in considering the 
various aspects of control measurest national and/or internationalp but 
also contributed positively to the formation of an international policy 
. in this regard. It was also a function of the Comnission to hoop -the 
protocols and convention concerned with drug under constant reviewl and 
-%)rhere necessary, to request the non-signatory states to sign such docu- 
ments. 
92 The Commission's function ims not only that of a watch-dogi but 
.r .0 
. also 
of a policy-maker, direct or indirect. 
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(d). Limitation on Manufacture of Drucrs 
The Co=ission's function in this regard iras inýplied in Article 20 
of the Limitation Convention. According to this Articlep the Parties 
to the Convention were required to submit lists containing the names 
and addresses of the firms that had been authorised to manufacture drugs 
in their respective territories. It was the funct ion of the Cor2nission 
to study those lists, w1d on examining the changes in the situation of 
manufacture of and-trade indrugs, to advance opinions. ' This aspect 
of the function of the Commission necessarily entailed an examina#on 
of ihe lists of the national governments iv&o were authorised to issue 
import certificates and export. authorisations. Since these lists were 
I of vital 
importance to the Commissiong for the publication of a compre- 
Ing both these aspects, the Comission impressed hensive list indicat4 
on the national govemnents the necessity of furnishingaccurate infor- 
mation regularly. The Commissiong in case of doubtv used to verify the 
accuracy of such figures. It was also in the discharge of its functions 
assisted by sub-committees and/or the Secretariat in the preparation of 
a List of drugs under international control. 
93 But it was the function 
of the Commission to study this list and to-advance suggestions for 
possible improven. entsp where necessary. One of the suggestions 1.,,, hich 
ims decided to be qdvanced by the Commission at its eighth sessiong to 
the Secretarp-Gencrall was that such a list'should show the synonyms 
which were used by various countries for the scientific names of basic 
drugs. 94 The-effectiveness of the limitation upon the manufacture of 
drugs was linked with the question of identif ication, of drugs. , It iras 
for this reason that the Co=ission, at its fourth sessiong discussed 
417- 
I 
the desirability of giving a single name to each habit-forming drug. 
The Comission's idea received full support from the Expert 
Co=ittee on Addiction Producing Drugs of the'U"orld I-Icalth 
Org, inizationt when it adopted a resolution to tjliý; effect. 
95 
Although no action in this regard was taken immediatelyq 
owing to the fact*that such a system would prove to be 
difficult for the enforcement officers to implement and that 
such a system alone would not be sufficient to limit the illicit 
manufacture of and traffic in drugs, it suggested some other 
provisions, 
96 
which ultimately laid the f. oundation of Article 30, 
Paragraph 4 of the Sing ..., 
Ie Convention of 1961, which stated that 
if a 11 Party considers such measure necessary or desirable, it 
shall require that the inner package containing a drug or 
wrapping thereof-should bear a clearly visible double red band. 
The exterior wrapping of the package in which such drum is 
contained should not bear a double red band. 
(e) 4inpression of Illicit Traffic 
It is important to emphasise -that by the time the Commission 
came into being, the provisions which had been made by several 
multilateral drug conventions were not inadequate as regards 
regulating the "licit" trade in drugs is concomitant with the 
number of"Illicit"sources of supply. In factp after World liar II, 
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such sources Of SUPly multiplied enorouslyt for various reasons, viz. 
rapid industrialisation in those parts of the world where raw 
materials were produced, *growth of illicit trafficking by ganrrs 
as quick money-making venture, and the socio-economic changes 
which the post-war international societk experienced. Added to 
this there must be taken into account the characterisites of 
each kind of drugp e. g. opiumpcoca leafp cannabis and synthetic 
drugsp which determine the method of traffie*97 
(i) Collection of Information Concerning Illicit Trnffic iLi_PM, -s 
Any successful attempt to suppress the illicit traffic in 
drugs involvesVinter aliap knowledge of the sources of traffic, 
regulation of supply according to. demandq thus closing the door 
to illicit, tradep active participation of stýtes by supplying 
information to the international body concernedg, and, willingnes. s to 
co-operate and also to educate the general population especially 
about the ill effects of drugs. 
In Article 23 of theýLimitation Conventioh the High 
I Contracting Parties undertook to "communidate to each other, -through 
the Secretary-General of the Unitoa Nationst as soon as"possible, 
.., particulars of each case of 
illicit traffic discovered bythem which 
may be of importance either because of the quantities involved 
or because of-the light throim on tho sources from which drugs are %D 
obtained for the-illicit traffic or the methods employed by-, 
4ig 
illicit trafficke3ýs. 1198.111csc provipions generated some functions 
. 
for the Co=iissiony forcmost being to devise a system 
which would'genorate the required kinds of information in 
this matter. The Commission therefore devised the forms, 
providing for the collection of this informationp and 
emphasised through the Council's resolution the necessity of 
furnishing accurate information regularly and compulsorily. 
Because of the indispensability of such infonaation, the 
Com: Assion encouraged the participation-of observers from those 
countries which were not its members but which had been 
eiTerioncing drug problems. The Commission established liaison 
with the International Criminal Police Organization" not 
only for its report on the clurrent state of illicit traffic 
in drugsp but also for other related matters. The Secretary- 
Generalp in prcparingthe review of the illicit traffic in drugsp 
was assisted by the Commission. The Cormiission's function was 
not confined'to-studying: the drug situation 
100 in general, 
but extended even to analysing the problem drug by drv,, Yp 
and country by country. 
Action Against Illicit Trade 
Action*against illicit trade presupposes action against Cý 
illicit supply. ' .- 
Ai3y action against illicit supply is 
dependent on detemination of the origin'of the'drugs, i. e. -j the, 
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place of production and/or manufacture or the drugs. 'Ilie 
Commission emphasised. t4at a simplop and rapid and easily 
reproducible method o-f'detennination of -the origin of drugs 
would 'be necessaryp especially in view of tho fact that such 
a method should be able easily to be carried out in any 
laboratory in the world. Since illicit traffic in opi= 
was very high, it-was decided that the first test of 
determination of the origin of a drug should be carried out 
on opiura. The Economic and, Social Council by its resol-ations in 
194-3 101 and 1952 
102 invited the governments of all opium- 
producing countries to co-oporate in such a progrw=e, 
and required them to supply samples of their ou-n products and 
of those which found their way ýnto illicit traffic, in order 
that research could be carried out. 'This stop was ai%mented 
103 by a resolution by the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
in vhich it was, decided to establish a-laboratory as part of 
the Division of Narcotic Drugs. Unfortunatelyp owing to the 
difference in methods for the. determination of the. origin of 
opium, ýsuggested by various authoritiest, nothing concrete 
vas, achieved until 19'589 when it was affiraed that the method 
which had been suggested and emphasised 
101, by the Co=ission 
would be the best method. 
105 The'-Co=ission's suggestion as to 
0 
the determination of the origin of drugs extended to 
lo6 
manufactured narcotic drugs and cannabis also. 
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Thc. Cq=issiqnt as a part of iýs progra=c to fight against 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugsq took action to control the 
supply of such drugs also. ý The Comission's persistent efforts 
to control the supply of opium resulted in the conclusion 
of the 
. 1953 Protocol. 107 Provisions for the control of the 
supply of coca leaf and cannabis have also been made in the 
Single Convention. 108 In this case also, an attempt was mmade 
to restrict the supply at the root. The main opium-producing 
countries are India and Turkey. As far as illicit production 
and supply were concernedf both the countries responded well 
to the call of the United Nations (which was initiatcd by the 
Commission. ) In both countires, 
109 the opium situation 
is adminstered by national opium agencies. 
Any measure of effective control over illicit supply and 
illicit t rade in general, is fraught with difficulties. 
110 
The Commissiong appreciating the difficulties, e. g. socio- 
economic conditions prevailing in a country or lack of knowledge 
as tothe abuse of drugs etc. precommended to the. -Econ&iic 
and Social Council that the goverrunents should not only 
restrict the number of manufacturing firms to a minimum, but 
0 'ealso mahe arrangements f6r exchanging information on their 
control methods. 
ill As a direct measure against illicit' trade 
in narcotic drugsp -the Co. =ission was not only requested. the 
I 
6 
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See'retary-Gencrall through the Economic and Social CAncil, to 
compile a libt of ýersonnql of morcliant vessels who, had been convic- 
ted of smuggling drugsf but also suggested to him that he should 
send that list to the goverrunents idth a request to take all possible tý 
measures to prevent any activity culminating in illicit traffic in 
112 drugs. The Commission recommended all governments to take all 
possible measures to keep aircraft from use by traffickers in drugs. 
The Comnissiong of course, pursued the other policies concerning 
suppression of the illicit traffic which were included in the 
International Opium Convention of 1925 and the Limitation Conven- 
tion of 1931. The Corrunission at its twelfth sessiong re-emphasised 
'to the governments the importance of implementing the measures 
relating, to the suppression of tr. affic in narcotic drugs as enunciated 
in the narcotic conventions. 
113 
(f) Study of -the Drug Problems 
The Commission was established to consider, inter aliag 11 what 
changes may be required in the existing machinery for the interna- 
tional control of narcotic drugs and submit proposals thereon-to 
the Council. " 
ill, The Commission was also required to perform this, 
functiong i. e., to study the drug problems, in partial fulfilment of 
its legacy from its predecessor, i. e., the Opium Advisory 'Committee 
of the League. Its study prograrme extended not only to the drugs M 
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referred to in the international drug conventionsv but also to 
It such drugs which have psychoactive effects comparable to those of 
the. drug's 'under control. " 
115 
This the Coimmission found necessary to 
do for obvious reasonsi i. e., to prevent abuse in respect of the 
un-listed drugs. This aspect of the Corjunission's work involved not 
only. a study of the characteristics of drugs, i. e., their converti- 
bility, their necessity-for medicinal purposes, the incidence of illicit 
traffic, the conaitions of their production and/or manufacture and the 
possibilities of finding suitable substitutes for drug manufacture 
production but also of the socio-economic aspects of drug-consiziptiong 
their attraction for the inadequate personalityt and the probable 
methods of cure of addicts. The drugs on ý., hich the Commission did 
spýnial studies ivere' opiiva, heroin, coedine, morphine, cannabisq 
cocaine and barbiturates. The Cormission did such studies on raw 
materials, viz. poppy straw and coca leaf. If, also completed pilot 
studies on certain countries which were much affected by the dru. ", 
problemy e. g. Mghanistany116 Iran 
117 Peru and Bolivia. 
118 One of 
the other important contributions of the-Commission has been its 
119 
belief in the efficacy of holding regional conferences as a means 
of studying the problems of narcotic drags on a broader basis and 
tak-ing-joint action for their suppression. The Cormnission also drew 
attention to the possibilities of joint international action under 
programmes of technical assistance in the field of narcotic drugs* 
120 
Such joint international action took place in the form of seminars, 
task forces or consultative groups with a view to developing co- 
operation between the enforcement services of countries affected by 
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illicit traffic in drugst-and proved to be successful. 
The direct resultd of such action have been that the national 
authorities have been more involved in solving their oxm problems, M 
and that the pattern of the drug-problem in each region as established 
by such studies has helped identify the problems more accurately. It 
also helped develop a better method of co-.: operation with various orga- 
nisationst viz. t the 1-1orld Health Organization, the International 
Criminal Police Organization. The initiative which had been taken by 
the Co=ission in this matter pro-. -, lpted the nations to bring their 0 
problems to the United Nations for solution. 
122 Evidently, the 
countries which for socio-economic and/or cultural reasons prefei., 'red 
I to keep the problems alive, were now assured of a solution by interna- 
tional mcansl and thus by helping the United Nations in identifying 
the problemp they helped themselves. This has always been the funda- 
menteil philosophy of the Co=ission's work. In studying the narcotics 
problemsp the Co=ission had to consider the question of "drug addic- 
tion" too. Attention to the question of drug addiction 
123 
necessarily 
bntails a consideration of the related questions, viz. causes of drug 
addictionp treatment of the drug addicts etc. p and this the Cormission 
124 
-did 
in collaboration with the Worl. d Health Organization. i 
.0 J* 
(g) Technical Assistance/ Technical Co-operation in, 
L TY - A; Ln Control 
125 
Technical assistance does not denote financial assýsiance only, 
it includes services of experts to the beneficiary, such as fellowships 
425 
-and/or trainingr for the selected members of the country concernedg 
idth a view to equipping them for the'development of their own 
coiuitry. - In its resolution No. 548 13 , 
(XVIII) of 19549 tbo Economic 
and Social Council declared that technical assitance would be made 
availabale to any country for implementing and developing its social 
and economic programmes, nnd this was further confirmed 
126 in its 
twenty-second session. One of the primary conditions of obtaining 
technical assistance from the United Nations is that the request for 
it must come from the country concerned. As far as award of technical 
assistance to the oauntries oppressed by the narcotics situation was 
concerned, it was imperative that a country. should have given high 
priority to narcotics cOntrOlP even though it needed such technical 
assistance in other areas of its economic and social prograTmaes. In 
full recopition of this. fact, týc Commission emphasised to the 
Economic and Social Council that not. only a separate financial allo- 
cation for narcotics control within the regular bud, (, Tet of the United 
Nations would be necessary, but also that this should be coupled urith 
. -a continuing progra), mc for, technical as sistance. 
127 The General 
Asserably at the reco-, =. endations of the Economic and Social Council, 
128 
passed a resolution to this, effect. 
129 
One of the important effects which the Couunission's efforts 
produced was the idea that nations should deal- with the problem 
through regional institutions. Such a regional approach ivras justified 
on two groundsv viz., (a) identical-or near-identical nature of the 
problems and (b) advantages of regional administration by regional 
institutions. The, United Nations encouraged this idea, not only in 
42 
principlet but. also recognisod cortain regional narcotics bureau 
130 Missions and organised various. nice tingrs which took the form of 
131 132 Consultative Groups and/or Seminars. In certain cases, 
officers of the U. N. Narcotics Division were sent to rogrions as a 
IL33 form of technical assistance. 
B. Functions Emwiatin,, r .,. 
jroi,. i thp Sinf: l(, Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs 
The fimetions of the Conunission on Narcotic Dkugs have been 
dotdiled in Article 8 of the Single Convention, according to which 
-the Comission is authorised to 11consider all matters, pertaining to 
the aims. of this Conventiong and in particular: 
(a) To amend the Schedules in accordance with Article 3; 
b) To call the attention of'the Board to any matters which 
may be relevant to the functions of. the Board; 
(C) To make recommendations-for the implementation of the 
aims and provisions of-, this Conventiont including 
programmes of scientific research and, the exchange of 
information of a scientific or technical nature; and 
(d) To draw the attention of non6-parties to decisions and 
recommendations which it adopts under this Conventionp 
with a view to theirtonsidering, taking action in 
accordance therewith. " 
4,27 
These provisions do noty howevert prevent the Conu-iission from 
performing the functions which it performed before the coming 
into force of the Singlq Convention. On the c. ontrary, tile functions 
lihich the Coimiission '. performed. are still applicable mutatis 
mutandis in the suppression of the drug problem, and indeed the first 
sentence of Article 89 which provides that 't the Co: lr,,, Iission is autho- 
kized to considerall matters pertaining to the aims of this Conven- 
13" tion" certainly includes its fomer functions. The only limita- 
tion upon this is that the Commission can now perform those functions 
135 only if the Economic and Social Council so wish. In fact, prior to 
the coming into force of the Single Conventio" n, the Coi=ission in 
performing most, of its functions needed the prior approval of the 
Economic and Social Council. This improvement upon the fonmer situ- 
ation has given-the Commission much freer hand in performing its 
fiulctionsp and thus in fulfilling the aims of the Convention. Its C3 
functions as enumerated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 8 are of 
a general nature. Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this Article have, 
howeverp brought in certain innovations in that-uhile paragraph (c) 
has specifically authorised the Co=ission to make recom-ondations for 
-the implementation of the aims and provisions of the Conventiont inclu- 
ding the programmes of scientific research and exchange of information C1 
of a scientific and technical nature, paragraph (d) has authorised it 
to draw the attention of non-parties also to its decisions and recommen- 
dations with alview to their considering taking action in. accordance 
therewith. " "Non-parties" in this connection presumably includes 
non-parties to the Single Convention, the U. N. Charter and even 
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136 inter-govemmental organisations. 
The other functions of the Co=nission which emanate from the 
Single Qo4volition may be found in Jkrticles 15(l), 189 31(5) and 
32(2). Paragraph I of Article 15 provides that the reports of the 
International Narcotics Control Board ( i. e. p hnnual reports on its 
work and such additional reports as it considers nocessaryg contain- 
ingr analyses of the estýmates and statistical information at its 
disposal)"shall be submitted to the Economic and Social Council 
through the. Commission, which may make such corurients as it sees fit. " 
This directly evidences the Council's desire to have the Board's 
report first examined by a technical body, i. e., the Commissiont which 
is in direct contact with the Board. According to Article 18, the 
Parties to the Convention 11 shall furnish to the Secretary-General 
such information as the Corranission may request as being necessary for 
137 
. 
the performance of its functions, and the Parties shall furnish 
such information in such form and manner as the Convaission may desire. 
It should be observed that the'Single Convention has made it obligatory 
for, the Parties to furnish annual reports, the texts of laws and 
regulations9 and seizure reports. Under the earlier narcotics treaties 
the Parties were under no such obligation to furnish information at 
the request of the. Commission. The Commission may now ask a non- 
partyv but one who is a Member of the United Nations, to furnish any 
relevant infoimation concerning the drug problem, and such a non-party 
is, in terms of Article 55 of the U. N. Charterv wider an obligation 
to supply the required information to the Commission. A non-member of 
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the United Nati. ons wh6 is also a non-party to this Convention is, 
howeverf, wider no obligation to coniply with such a request, yet, on 
the basis of past r9cords it may be hoped that even such a cotintry 
will co-operate with the Coi-miission in this matter. 
138 Paragraph 
of Article 31 stipulates that the Parties -to -the Convention 11 shall 
follow as closely as may be practicable the form of import certificate 
a, mission. 11 This implies that the C. O=isision Will pproved by the Coir 
139 
have to review the forn of import cortificateg as and when necessary,. 
The Comission has also been autliorised to devise appropriate safe- 
guards for the prevention of the illicit use of or traffic-in those 
drugs that are carried in, Vie .f irstý-aid -kits of ships and/or aircrafts 
ged in international traffic. 'In terms of Article 32t paragraph 2, . enga 
the Commission, in consulfzation with tho appropriate international 
1110 - orn-anisationsg shall recommend such safefruards. 11 It is for the 0u 
CorMUssion to decide which international orgahisations would be the 
11 appropriate organisations" in a particular case. 
1111 International 
organisations, in this context, will also-include inter-governmental 
and international non-governmental organisations. Reco. -=endations 
of ille Commission in this matter are subject to approval of , or 
modification by the Council or the General Assembly in the same way 
as recoimiendations of the Comqlssi 
1112 
ion. 
.-d 
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2. - Rinctioun iraj2osed u-jon tho Cominission by tho 
Economic ond Social Conneil in virtue of 
I. 
Article 62 of the U. N. Charter 
143 
Article 62, of the U. N. Charter has given the Economic and 
Social Council a general authority to impose functions upong amongst 
others r any specialised. agency, and any comiission which it may set 
up in accordance with Article 68,11 in economic and social fields... 
and such other commissions as mCly, be required for the performance 
of its functions. " The "Charter functions" of the Commission hava, 
been enumerated in its terms of reference. It may be observed that 
-when 
adoptintgr the Draft Protocol on Psychotropic Substances, 
110 the 
Commission. was authorised to act under these tenas of reference, in 
addition to its general authority under Article 8 of the Sin gle 
ConVention. Although characteristicallyp "Charter functions" would not V7 
allow the Commission a free hand ( because its activities will be 
dictated by the directives of the Charterp which in, the present 
case will be issued by the Economic and Social Council), it appears- 
that at least in two areas of its "Charter functions" the Comission 
has been allowed a certain degree of independence: 
, (a) in advising 11 the Council on all matters pertaining 
to the control of narcotics and preparing such draft 
international conventions as may be necessary" ; and 
(b) in 11 considering what changes may be required in -Che 
existing machinery for the international control of 
narcotic drugs and submitting proposals tbercon to the 
Council. " 
II- 
-0 4-31 
In practicep most of the reco,, qmendat -ions of Vie Economic and 
Social Counci*l cvený -under the "Charter functions" are initiated by 
the Conunission, despite. the fact that the Council h. -, s toniple-te autho- 
rity over the recommendations and decisions oi t1le Commission in reg , ard 
146 
to such functions, The Co=issioii's'attempt to adopt a broader 
147 
conception of narcotics control by considering those substances 
that are outside the purview of the narcotics treaties, has not met 
with any objection from the Economic and Social Council; on the 
contrary, such activities of the Conmission received the approval of 
the Council in the form of resolutions. 
1118 It may, however, be observed 
that the "Charter Ruictions" of the Commission are concomitant with 
the onlargemoni of the activities of the Economic and Social Comcil. 
Also, the Commission, in perforaing its obligatory "Charter functions" 
. tý 
is under the complete authority of the Economic and Social Council. 
The "Charter functions" of the Comm ission may be vicisred as complementary 
to its "treaty fwictions". 
Functions, Emanating from the Rules of Procedure of 
the Func-tional CoTmissions of the Economic an4 
I Social Council 
149 
Rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the Functional Cormissions 
of the Economic and Social Council prdvides that the functional 
comissions of the Economic and Social Council shall hold ohe session 
annually unless He Council decides othonrise. 11 The Conunission on 
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Narcotic'Drugs has been recognised as one of tho functional commissions 
'150 
of the Economic aqd Social Councilp and indeed, in terns of Rule lip 
11 the Secretaxy-General shall notify the members and also in the case 
of the Comission on Narcotic Drugs, Uie President of the Into mational 
Narcotics Control Board, of the date an4 place of the first mooting of 
each session. " In drawing up the provisional af, -,,, enda, the Secretary- 
General shall, in the case of the Commission oil Narcotic Drugsp commu- 
nicate it to, among others, the President of the International Narcotics 
Control Doard. 151 Such a provisional atr r, cnda shall include items if 
proposed by the Commission. 
152 In other w6rds, the Conanission must take 
the initiative and the appropiiate measures, at appropriate timesq in 
I order 
to propoqe necessary items for their inclusioft in the provisional 
agenda. At each sessiong the Corcaission may also, in consultation with 
the Secretary-Generalo set up such cormittees as are doomed necessary 
and refer to them any qucsi; lon on -the agenda for study and report. 
15-3 
The Rulos of Procedure do not prohibit the Commission, nor any of its 
subsidiary bodies from approving dny proposal, to further its cause, 
except that any proposal invoiving expenditure from the United Nations 
fund must, before being approved by the Commission, be submitted by 
the Chairman to the members, their attention to be drawn to the 
estimate and discussion invited on it.. 
154 
Rule 66 has empowere-d the Commission to set up such sub- co=is- 
I sions as may be authorised by the Economic and Social Council, andq 
unless othenfise determined by the Council, the Cowission shall define 
the composition and functions of each sub-commission. It appears 
433 
/ 
that such a sub-commission cannot be terminated or woiuid up at 
thýc discretion of the Co; uzaission. 
155 
One of the remarkable functions which Vie Commission has been 
empowered to perform is its right to invite any 11 11ceber of the 
United Nations which is not represented on it to participate in its 
deliberations on any matter which the Commission considers is of 
particular concern to any such Member. 11 
156 Although. a discretionary 
right, Rule 72 has indeed been designed to honour the rules of 
natural justice. 
Co-iments 
The Single Convention did not provide for the composition 
of the Connission on Narcotic Drugs, and it may therefore be presmacd 
that the already existing Commission was found suitable by the Parties 
to the Single Convention. The functions of the Comissiong as has 
boon indicated abovep are not only'wide but also varied. ll'unctionallyp 
it is a horizontal body. In its functional sphere, it is not only 
assisted by the Secretariat but also by the Division of Narcotic Drugs 
and even by some specialised agencies viz. t the World Health Organi- 
zationt the International Labour Organizationt amongst others. Although Cý 
the Coinnis.,; ion has supervisory authority in its oun sphere of work, 
in performing its functionst it maintains a co-operative and: friendly 
attitude towards the states and or ganisations concerned. -. 'Ihe Conmis- 
sion, in fulfilling the objects of the Single Convention has adopted 
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an inter-disciplinary approach embracing medicinal, scientific, 
economic and social aspects of the drug problem. In extension of this 
I. 
argumentp it may also be stated that it has been treating the urord 
narcotic" in its widest possible interpretation, and thereby extending C) 
tho international narcotics regirle as far as possiblo. The extra, 
authority given to the Commission through the Single Convention in 
fighting the narcotics ýroblcm ( i. e., the authority given to it in 
addition to its "Charter functions" with which alone it was empoirered 
prior to the coming into force-of -tic .u Sin-le Convention) has gredtly 
strengthened the position of ' 
157 
tho Com-iission in executing its lunctions4o 
One of the important aspects of the -Si*ngle Convention is its- 
-aira to implement its provisions universally, 
158 
whether or not the 
siates are'partios 
io it, or to the United Nations. The nove.. lty of 
the Commission's work perhaps lies in its attempt -to make, -the Single 
Convention a totally universal one by inducing non-parties to observe 
its recommendations and decisions. This has furth3r been strengthened 
by the provisions Of Article 3(i. e., the provisions 1,71lich enable 
the Cormission to communicate its decisions on changes in the Schedules 
of the Single Convention to non-parties who are Members of the United 
Nations) and Article 8(d) (i. e. 9 the provision for apprising all 
non-pairties9 whether or not they are Members of the United Nations 
of the decisions and recomendations of the Co=iission). Although 
the reconunenda 
. 
tions and decisions of the CoMission. are subject to the 
approval of the Economic and Social'Council and/or the Gerýeral Assembly, 
159 
except recommendations and decisiolls"Of minor importance, they are 
I 
N 
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usually acceptod by the afor 
. 
esaid organs 
160 
vithout =ny 
modificAtions. 
The -Coimiiissiont s role should not be vievad as that of a 
"guardian". - Its role is more that of a "monitor" It is an expert 
body. It has not law-making function; nevertheless, it initiates 
law-making. It has'no judicial power and/or functions. It 
exercises only administrative and executive powers, uhich include 
the power to impose sanctions upon states, if necessary. Although 
the Con-nission has been given extensive power of a varied nature? the 
fullest exercise of such power depends upon the extent of co-operation 
the states are willing to offer. A potential h, -Is been establishedq 
and it is for the states to realiso that potentiality by co-operation 
and-mutual understanding. 
-k 1 
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TIM, INTMUMIO'NAL NARCOTICS UYNTROL BOARD 
The International Narcotics Control Doard ( hereinafter 
c. alled the Board) ims created to replace the Permanent Central 
Board and the Supervisory Body. The composition and functions of 
161 the latter two bodies have already been discus. §ed. The Board 
assumed office on 2nd March, 1963 
162 
and although until týhis date 
both the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory Body were 
wor3king in its place, it is observed that the nature of the functions 
of the latter two bodies was not significantly different from idiat 
it was at the time they were createdy and thereforeq it is not 
necessary to give an account of their functions fr. om the date they 
came under the U. N. system of control until the date of their 
dissolution. 
ýJ) CoMosition of the Board under the Single Convention 
on Narcotic Druis 
The procedure which offers the basis of-election of the 
163 
members of the Board was drawn up -. by the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugsq and approved, by-the Economic and Social Council. 
164 Articles 
9 and 10 pf the Single Convention detail the method of composition 
of the Board. It consists of thirteen members 
165- 
who are elected 
for a period of five years by the Economic and Social Council. Such 
166 
members may be re-clected. The procedure for election. of members 
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is as follows: 
(a) ". Three'. members with majd 
. icalq phainacolorrical or pýarmzct- 
ceutical exTerience from a list at leas. t of fivo. per'sons 
nominated by the World Health Orgranization, and 
(b) Ton members from a list of persons nominated by the 
Members of the United Nations and by Parties whiph are 
not Members of the United Nations*" 
167 
It may be observed in this connection that, in c4nstitutingr 
. 
the Board, much emphasis has been griven to the medical considera- 
tion, justifiably, in that the Board's functions need, inter aling 
the service of medical experts. 
168 This was also found necessary 
since the Doard virtually took over the functions of the Perianent 
Central Board and the Supervisory Body, and tvo members'of these 
bodies were nominated by the World Health Organization. IThat, is more 0 
interestingg however, 
'is 
the nomination of some members by the Parties 
to the Convention, uho arc n6t Nembers of the United Nations. In 
order to achieve-full co-operation in this areýL of international lawq 
membership of the Board has not been linked with that of the United 
Nations. 
169 
This is al 
. 
so justified in view of the principle of 
, 
"equitable geographid representation" of the producing, manufacturing 
and consumýng countriest which the Convention has adopted. The novelty 
of the nomination of candidates by governments lies in the fact that 
such candidate s need not be their nationals; 
170. 
persons with a good 
knowledge of the problems concerning narcotics in those areas and also 
of international narcotics administration should, as a matter of 
4 
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policy, be nominated. 
' 71 The EconorUe and Social Council is not 
bound to choose the candidates from the panels prepared by the' 
172 Coinittee on Candidates,. On the other handq the treaty does not 
prohibit the Economic and Social Council from electing two persons 
of the same nationalityt although such an evontuality will necessarily 
disturb the balance which is meant to be attained by following the 
principle of equitable geographical representation. 
173 
General provisions aimed at iýpholding the impartiality of 
the members of the Doard have been made in the Convention. In tc=s 
of paragraph 2 of Article 9, " Members of the Board shall be personsp 
iiho by their competencog impartiality an'd disinterestedness, irill 
connand general confidence. " During the term of office, they shall 
not be allowed to engage in any activity which would impair their 
impartiality in the discharge of their functions, 
171L 
and the 11 Coi3neil 
shallp in consultation with the Board, make all arrangements necessary 
to ensure the full technical independence of the Board in carrying 
out its functions, " The phrasd " full technical independence" implies 
that the Economic and Social Council shall ensure the independence of 
the Board only in discharging those of its functions, which are of a 
technical nature. The General Asisembly of the United Nations has fall 
control over the budget of the Board, 
175 
and it is accountable to, the 
Council. 176 The provisions concerning impartiality of the members 
bear a marked similarity to those of the Permanent Central Board. 
177 
0 
It may also be observed that, in terms of Article 99 parag. *raph 2. 
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government officials may be appointed members of the Board, which 
ims -also the case ivith the Permanent Central Boardp provided of course 
I. their appointments with their respective governments cease. 
One of the principal differences between the International 
Opium Convention, 19.0 '15 and the present Convention is that wh reas 
the former categorically excluded government employees only 
1-18 from 
membership of the Permanýent Central Doard, the latter, by emphasising 
that*during their i. e., the members) term of office 11 they shall 
not hold any position or engage in any activity... " im-plies that fa 
exclusion not only of government assigmentsp but also of non-govern- 
mental assigiunents. Howeverg the question re6ains as to how far these 
members will be able to-maintain their impartialityt aftor sorvinrg 
., a 
long period with a government, and especially if they are to. seek 
employment with Cneir governments in the future. The technical inde- 
pendenco of the members has, however, been maintained by Article 11 of 
the Convention alsog according to which the Doard shall, inter alia, 
(a) elect-its om President and such other officers as it 
may consider necessary; 
179 
(b) adopt its oim rules of procedure. 
The provisions empowering the Board to elect its own President 1-2 
and such other officers ( e. g. Vice-President, Rapporteurs etc. ) as 
it may considcr. necessaryt and to adopt its oum rules of procedure are 
laudabley 
180 because members of a technical body should be elected 
by the body itself. The meetings of the Board are usually jaeld in 
9 
privatog and to nuch meetings are usually invited two other 
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representativesp one representing the Secretary-General of the. 
United Nations andýthe otherv the World Health Organization. The 
Board shall invite a. representative of a state if wy item on an 
agenda of its, meetin, (-, directly relates to the narcotic drug matters 
of that state. It may hold confidential meetings among its members 
only I if necessary* 
Howe, ver, it appears that the Board can not only accept the 
resignation of its membersp but also dismiss them, if necessary. 
In terms of Article 10, paragraph 3.11 a member of the Board who 
has failed to'attend three consecutive sessions shall be deemed to 
have resigned. " Evidentlyp. any failure on the part of a member oi 
I the Board to attend three consecutive sessions will automatically 
authorise the Board to assume that the member concerned has resignedt 
although a replacement will be found in the usual wayt i. e-, in 
accordance with the procedure of appointment of a, new member, Howeverl 
presence for a very short period at the sessions will not justify loss 
of membership. 
The Board appears to have been given more. effoctive power in 
respect of dismissal of its members. In terms of Article 10t para- 
graph lit the 11 Councilt on the recormendation. of the Board, may dismiss 
a member of the Board who has ceased to conu=nd, the general confidence 
of the Boardp" as referred to in Article 9p paragraph 2,, and 11 such 
recommendation shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members 
of the Board. 11 
181 Should however a member fail to resign promptly 
0 
in terms of Axticle 109 paragraph 3. the power of dismissal of the 
4,41 
Board under paragraph 4 may come into operation. This system has 
presumably been recommended in vi6w of the nature of the work -the 
Board is required to perform. That decisions concerning this M 
inatter should require a two-thirds xaajorityg instead of unnnimity, 
I is. essential to efficient operation, since any other procedure would 
have a crippling effect upon the proper functioning of thig technical 
body. 
The method of composition of the International Narcotics 
Control Board under the Single Convention is highly elaborate. 
Nevertheless# the drafters of the Convention seem to have taken 
into consideration the important points uhich are usually found 
necessary in constituting such a body. The degree of success in 
this matter way be assessed in terns of its capacity to discharge 
the functions uhich have been entrusted to it. It is, thereforep 
necessary to examine the functions of the International Narcotics 
Control Board. 
f 
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Yanctions of the International Narcotics Control Board 
The functions of the Board have been emmerated in Articles 
I- 
12p 13; 11's 19 and 20 of the Single Convontiont mid in Article 2 
of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 9 of the Single Convention. 
Althouýh each of these Articles covers a different kind of function 
of -the Board , in view of their close relationship it is appro- 
priate to deal deal 'with them under the following headings: 
(a) - Adrainistration of the Estinates Syntorl 
(Article Ig) 
The importance of the Estimate System has already been 
explained in a provious Part of this thesis. 
182 Administration of 
I. the estimate system under the Single Convention is closely connected 
with the 11 ostimatýs of drug requirements" ( Article 19)p tho Parties 
are required It to furnish to the Board each year for each of their terri- 
torics, in the manner and fom prescribed by'the Boardt183 estimates 
on forms supplied by it. "14he P arties shall also inform the Board 
of the method 
185 they have used in detemining the quantities shown 
in the estimates and of any changes in the said method ( Article 
186 
By Article 12 the Board has also been authorised to fix the date(s) 
by which such estimtes should be submitted to it. The authority of 
187 
the Board in this regard extends even to the countries and 
territories 
188 to which this Convention does not apply (Article 12(2)). 
Should phoimver p any state, vhother or not a Party to the 
Convention , 
fail to furnish estimates Ivithin the specified date, the Board shallp .9 
in co-operation vAth the government concerned, to the extent possible, 
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establish the estimates for that country. The Board shall ex=ine 
the estimateýSy 
189 including suppleýmcntary estimates and except as 
regards requirements for'special purposes, 
Igo 
may 6ither ask any 
country to supply further information on the estimates which have 
already been furnishedg or to explain any statement contained 
therein (Article 129 paragraph 4). It is also the function*of the 
Board to confirvi the estimatest including the supplementary estimatesp U 
expeditiouslyp 
191 
and to amend such estimatest where necessaryv with 
the consent of the goverment concernedt and especially in the event of 
a disagreement betifeen the goverment and the Board, the littter shall 
have the right to establislit commiinicate and publish its oiM esti- 
192 
mates including supplementary estimates. The Board shall, in 
addition to the annual report on its i-., orko and analysis of the 
estimates and statistical information at its disposal 
(Article 15)j. 
issue such information as in its opinion will facilitate the 
carrying out of this Convention. "-(Article 129 paragraph 6) 
The Board's function in this regard under the Single Conven- 
tion is much wider than that of the Pennanent tentral Board. The 
Board has been authorised by the Convention to ask for estimates of 
193 
opium productiono in addition to furnishing estimates of opium C2 
requiremenist miongst other narcotic substances. -Unlike the previous 
conventionav -the Single Convention has also authorised the Doard. to 
fix the date by which estimates are to be furnished by w1rious countries 
to this organ. In order to make the Convention universally'applicablep 
the Board has also been authorised to apply its estimates system. to the 
countries and territories to vhich this Convention does not apply!, 
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Such a provision has a further bearing because in the event of, such 
a territory*or comitry not complying with the request of the Dbardt 
not only vill its estimates be established by the Boardq but also 
the limits of imports 
194 
and exports 
195 
of drugs. The Boardto 
position in this matter appears to be stronger than that of the 
Supervisory Body. The Single Convention does not however offer 
a guide-line which the Board is required to apply in examination of 
the estimates. It has indeed given the Board a considerable degree of 
discretion in this regard9 despite tho. fact that the Board in perform- 
ing this function should collaborate uith the government aoncerned 
and onsure, that no undue difficulty is caused to governments through 
a short supply of drugst especially for medical and scientific purposes. 
The Board's function in this regard isq howeverv lintited to the extent' 
that it cannot re-examine the estimates in force other than those 
established by it 
( Article 129 paracgraphs 4 and 5) unless the govern- 
ment concerned has furnished supplementary estimates. 
196 Neverthelessp 
the Convention does not preclude the Board from advancing suggestions 
to any government at any time should a re-consideration. of the 
estimates of that country appear to be desirable. The general 
authority given to the Board 11 to issue such information on the 
estimates as in its opinion will facilitate the carrying out of this 
Convention "( Article 12, paragraph 6) 9 is laudable. The Board, 
in fulfilment of this fuuctiont publishes each year four supplementsp 
in order to bring the position of drug requirements up to-date. 
Howeverg in view of the varying aituations in different countries it tl> 
is not possible for the Doara to administer the cstimatessystom 
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absolutely accurately. The most it cmi do is to offer certain 
guiding principles to the govarn. -i*onts so as to enable them 0 
develop their own methods in accordance with the hoods of the 
prevailing pircirastances. 
(b) Administration of tbe Statistical 11p. turniSystem 
In tenas of Article 10 of the 19722 Protocol ti., tinch has amended 
Article 20 of the Single Conventiong the Parties are required to 
furnish to the Doard by a certain datev for each of their territoriest 
statistical returns on forms supplied by the Boardin respect of 
197 
certain specified matters. Article 13 has authorised the Board 
to detemine the manner and foM' 
198 in which statistical returns 
shall be furnished and to proscribe the forms therefor. This 
A. rticlo has also empowered the Doard to exwaine the rotums " with 
a view to determinin,,, r, whether a Party or any other State has complied 
with the provisions of this Convention. " The_Board has notp howevorg 
been authorised to question or express an opinion on statistical 
information relating to those drugs which are required by a 
Party or any-other State for specinl pnrposese'99 Although the 
Convention expressly. au-thorises the Board to reqncst the governments 
of those countries, to-ibich this Convention does not apply, to furnish 
estimates in accordance with its relevant provisions ( Article 12) 
no such express authority has been given to the Boardp by which it 
can ask such governments to furnish statistical returns. Nevertheldssp 
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the statistical returnssysten is complementary to the estimitog 
system. the Drafting Cormnittee of the Plenipotentiary Conference which 
adopted this Convedtion, having noted this omission opined that the 
authority of the Board to invite non-parties to furnish statistical 
200 
returns may be "implied" by Article 13P paragraph 2. In practicep 
howeve rt the non-partios willingly siibmiý such returns for their oi'm 
benefit because by not doing so they will be unable to correct' 
inaccurate information furnished by other governments. Alsol in the 
event of a(ountry indicating tiat a nqn-party has imported drugs in 
excess of its authorised limity the Board, in the absence of a statis- 
tical. return from the non-party concerned, may impose all embargo on 
future imports of narcotic drugs by that country. 
201 
The Doardq being the ultimate authority to determine the 0 
manner and fox= in which the countries should supply the statistics 
on drugsp may also ask the governments to indicate thequantities of 
drugs obtained from various sourcesp i. e. t iihother from opium or 
from poppy straw or obtained as a by-product etc., and the total 
quantity of dru. - C_, s -they will manufacture in a given period of -time. 
The Board has also designed the form accordingly. 
202 - Similar 
instructions are issued by the Bbard to the governments in respect 
of various preparations they manufacture. 
203 The Board's functions 
I 
extend even to international trade in narcotic drug . 3, s. 
The exporting 
countries are required to submit to the, Board details of their exports 
of drugs and the importing coiuitries are similarly obliged to furnish 
to the Board the =ount of each hind of drugs they have imported from 
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204 the various countries or territories of origin. Such dotailp 
enable the Board to determine the discrepancy, if any, in the. 
I figures relating to import and export of drugs ando in the case 
pf any discrepancy, to alvise a government to investigate if there 
has been any illicit traffic in drugs. The Doard has also the 
authority to ask the governments to show separately the amounts of 
drugs imported for "special purposes'19 
206 
and also to include them 
in the total figures of imports. 
207 Although the Board does not 10 
require separate figures on domestic and international seizures, 
203 
( althowgh entitled to do so209) it may, however, ask the govern- 
m3nts to indicate separately the quantities of drugs so seized 
uhich have been employed for licit purposes or destroyed. The Board 
will have an account from the governments not only of refined and 
crude drugs, their salts and preparations other than those in Schedule 
Int 210 but also of the drugs held in bonded i'farchousesq free ports C21 
or free zones or passing in transit, 
211 
It appears that the Board has devised a comprehensive system 
of collecting statistics on drugs. Article 139 paragraph 2 gives 
rise to the question as to how the Board can determine whetber or 
not a country has failed to comply with the provisions of this 
Convention, i. e. 9 by not furnishing accurate statistics and other 
relevant infomation'in, the manner and form prescribed by the Board. 
This the Board can do in tim vayso namely, by corroborating the 
figares with the Food and Aggriculture Organization which also 
receives information on the production of opium in accordance with 
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Article 11 of its. constitution, a4d also by verifying the 
figmres which it receives on drugs seized from the illicit 
212 traffict but which have been used for licit purposes. The 
Doard may also detect any discrepancy by comparing the figures 
of. import of a country with those of ex-port of the countries of 
origing and in this respect the Board is assisted by Parties 
furnishing relevant information in accordance with Article 18 of 
the Convention. The Convention, howeverg does not specify whether 
information front private sources is acceptable, 
It appears that in order to enable the Doard to discharge 
this function, i. e. 9 administration of the statistical return 
system, the Convention has given it effe. etive power. Yet the 
Board's authority has been limited by Article 13, paragraph 4v 
to those dru,,,, s which are required for special purposes. Horeovert. 
the Boardts success in this regard is to a considerable extent 
dependent upon the co-operation. of the countries and their ability 
to maintain 11 a special administration for the purpose of applying 
the provisions of this Convention" in pursuance of Article 17, and 
to adopt 11 measures of supervision and inspection" of the matters, 
relating to drug-manufacturing in pursuance of txticle 34(b). 
Nevertheless, it is to be observed that the states are willing to 
co-operate positively in order to enable the Board to discharge its tý 
functions effectively. ' 
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(C) To Talce Measuren to ensim., -nip F,,. xccuf. ion of the 
Convention 
(Article 1.4 of the Sinerle Copvention and 
Article 6 of the 1972 Pt-otocol. ) 
-. 
The Board is required to take measures not only when the 
government of a country has failed to carry out the provisions of 
the Single Convention but also if there exists a potential risk 
that it may become an important centre of illicit cultivation# 
production or inlanufactura ofv. or traffic in or consumption of 
dxugst even though a goverrmaent kis not failed to implement the 
provisions of the Convention. In other uords, the Board's measures 
I. are remedial and preventive. 'The Board will have opportunity of 
iaking such measur6s wider Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Single 
Convention at four different stages: 
Article III, paragraph 1, sub-pin; fmnph (a), and 
Article 6, paragraph 1, sub-pnragraph ( a) of the 
1 
1272 Protocol 
If on examination of therinformation submitted by govern- 
ments to theýBoard under the provisions of this Conventiont or if 
on having some relevant information from the United Nations organst 
or a specialised-agency or an inter-governmental or a non-govem- 
mental organisation. which has direct competence in the subject matter 
aud which has consultative status with the Economic and Social Council 
under Article 71 of, the U. N. Charter or which enjoys a similar statuB 
by special agreement with the Council,. thc Board has 11 objective 
reasons to believe that the aims of this Convention are being seri- 
ously endangered by reason of the failure of any Partyp country or 
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ferritbry to carry out the provisions of this Convention"t it shall 
have the right to propose to the government concerned the opening k5 U 
of. consiirtations or to request it to furnish an explanations 
'(ii) Article 111, paraf_, raph 1. sub-nara, -raph (b ana 
Article 6, pnragral! li 1, sfib-I! arafýraph ( b) of 
tho 1222 Protocol 
After taking action under sub-parag , r, -, tph 
Ws the Board should t: A 
it find it necessaryt may call-upon the gov6rnment concerned to 
adopt such remedial measures as the circumstances will deriand; 
(iii) Article 6. Dara,,. rrjnh 1. sub-paraZraph (c) of 
the 1272 Protocol 
"The Board mayp if it thinks such action necessary for the 
purpose of assessing a matter referred to in sub-paragraph (a) 
of this paragrapht propose to-he Government concerned that a study 
of the matter be carried out in its territory by such means as the 
Government deems appropriate. If the Government concerned decides 
to undertake this study, it may request the Board to make available 
the expertise and the services of one or more persons with the 
requisite competence to assist the officials of the Government in 
the proposed study. The person or persons whom the Board intends to 
make available shall be subject to the approval of the Govenimente 
The modalities of this study and the time-limit within uhich -the 
study has to be completed shall be determined by consultation between 
the Government and the Doard. The Government shall communicate to the 
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Board the results of the study and sball indicate the remedial 
measures that it Iconsiders necessary to talco. " 
k decision of. the Doard concerning the matter in Article 
6(l)(c) of -the 1972 Protocol is largely dependent upon the 
decision of the government concerned. The incorporation of 
jlrticle 6(l)(c) in the 1972 Protocol does. not appear to represent 
any improvement in that the proposed action may be undertaken by 
the Board under.,, 'Irticle 6(l)(a) through consultation with the 
government concerned. The real purpose of a consultation is not 
merely to discuss but also to suggest remedies. 
I 
(iv) Article 14, jmragrnph II sy2=orar-rr. rnli (c) , tind 
Article 6,32nra! -raph 1, sub=aragraDh (d) of the 
1972 Protocol 
If the measures taken by the Doard. under Article 14p para- 
graph. lt sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of the Single Convention do not 
produce the desired results, or that there is a serious situation 
ýtha-t needs co-operative action at the international level with a 
view7to remedying itq the Board may call the attention of the Parties, 
the Council and the Commission to the matter. The Board shall so 
act if : 
4. # 
11(a) the aims of this Convention are being seriously 
endangered and it has not been possible to resolve 
the matter satisfactorily in ally other way; 
452 
(b) it finds that thore is a, serious situation 
that needs co-. operativd action at the interra- 
tional level -with a view to remedying it; and 
(c) bringing such a situation to the notice of the 
Parties, the Council and the Commission is the 
most appropriate method of facilitating such co- 
operative action. " 
If one of those conditions is fulfilled, the Councilp after 
considering the reports of the Doard, and of the Comnission, if 
available on the natter, I= ýraw 
213 the attention oZ the Gexicral 
Assembly to the matter. 
It is in the event of its taking such action that tho Board 
mayv if necessary, reco=end thq Parties to stop the import ana 
export, of drugs f rora or to the country or territory concerned either 
for a designated period or until it is satisfied as to the situation 
Jý2 that country or territory. The right of the state concerned to 
bring the matter before the Council hasq however, been maintained. 
The Singyle Convention, in its present form, is an impr6ve- 
ment in this regard, upon the previous drug conventions. The 
International Opium Convention of 1925, the Limitation Convention 
of 1931 ana the 1953 Protocol authorised the Permanent Central Board 
to take enforcement measures ( or to impose sanctions) arrainst any 
recalcitrant countryv party or not to any of these instrumen ts. 
t Neverthelesso there are differences between the provisions of the 
Single Convention and those of the earlier Conventions and Protocols 
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in that under the previous systempthe Board -wis authorisea to 
reco. rumend an embargo on the importation of ophua only from a 
country, or territory which failed to comply v., rith Vic provisions 
of the treaties in force', 
214 
and a similar embargo on the c. 7por-' 
tation of other drugs to such a cowitry or territory,.. 
15 0 
while 
under the Single Convention the Board has been authorised to 
roco, m. and an embargo on the import or export or both of all drugs M 
which are under international control. 
216 Moreover, under the 
1953 Protocol, the Board had been allowed to hold a local ixiqiLiry 
in an effort to study a particular opium, situation with the consent 
of the goverment of the country or territory concerned. 
217 The 
I Single 
Convention does not contain any provision in this regard, 
although it may be assumed that it does not prevent the Doard from 
holding any such inquiry at the request of the government of the 
country or territory concerned. Under the Singla Convention the 
Doard's position has been strengthened by giving it authority to 
"call upon the government concerned to adopt such remedial measures 
as shall seem under the circumstances to be necessary for the execu- 
tion of the provisions of this Convention.,, 
218 Incidentallyq under 
the 1953 Protocol, the Board had been authorised to take such 
measures only in the case Of"gravely unsatisfactory opium situation". 
219 
Yet againt under the Single Conventionfthe Board's authority to take 
measures in this regard is conditional upon two thingsp viz., 
(a) the Board must have It objective reasons to believe that the aims 
of this Convention are being, seriously endangered by reason of the 
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failure o. f any Party. country or territory to carry out the 
20 
provisions of. this Convention", 
= 
and (b) a persistent failure 
I. 
of 'a country or territory to furnish necessary informationp statis- 
tical or otherwise, which is adversely affecting the international 
situation may cause the Board to take the initiative under Article 
14, paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (a), and Article 6t'paragraph lp sub- L2 U-b 
paragraph (a) of the 1972 Protocol. Howeverg under what circumstances 
the Board will have " objective reasons to believe" cnnnot easily be 
concluded from the provisions of 11is Convention, although it is 
expected that a failure of a Party. country or territory to adopt and 
to observo a proper control cohtrol systeml thus endangering the 
international situation and not the domestic situation, will justify 
tho Board's'taking aýtion* Again, a failure on the part of a-country 
or territory to furnish adequate information or to supply information 
by a specified dates which does not disturb, tlie international situation, 
j, rill not authorise the Doard to take any such initiative. 
221 Under 
Article 149 paragraph lp sub-paragraph (a), an appropriate situation 
for the Board to tahe action may arise where a -government fails to 
supply adequate informationt or supplies such information as is 
adequatep but which represents a state of affairs detrimental to the 
international sitimition. In making a decision as to wheth6r or not 
to tahe measures against a country on the strength of the information 
supplied by a U. N. organ and/or by sPecialised agencies, the Board 
vill take into account such infomation as may suggest that the 
aims of this Convention have been endangered. 
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The Board's authority -to ensure tile C. -cecu-tion of the 
provisions of the Convention is very ivi(le. In rcspec-t of a 
Special Alministration also p as ref erred to in Artich 17 of the 
Convention. - the Board may be informcd by the Secretary-Gencral or 
the CocAssion 223 of any failure on the part of a Gtate or territory't 
Party to the Convention, to maintain such an administrcition. Should 
however a non-par-ty for which maintenance of such an administration 
is not obligal ry, ppear to be endangering the international , -, it Aoo k: ý 
ation, the Board may al so apply pressitre in the usual il-ay, by placing 
an embargo on imports and/or exports to that cowitry. The causer, of 
taking measures to ensure the execution of the Convention-provi'sions 
or-anato also from the provisions of Articles 20 
224 
and Ol 
225 
ubich 
relate to "Statistical Returns to be Fumished to the Doard" and 
11 Limitation of Manidacture and Importation" respectively* If the 
Doard has reason to examine the authenticity of inform, ation on 
Itseizure of dru,, -,, s and disposal thereof 11 supplied by the Parties to it 
on statistical returns, the Doard, in exercise of its po-wer wiLder 
Article l3v paragraPh 3 11 may require such further infonaation as it 
considers necessary to complete or explain the infonnation contained 
in such statistical returns" in. order that the execution of provisions 
of the Convention within its competence may be ensured. Similarly, 
in terms of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 4 of Article 21f Z> 
it it should appear from the statistical returns on imports or exports 
that the quantity ex-ported to any comitry or territoi7 exceeds the 
total of the estimates for that country or territory, subjoct to the 
- 226 
permi: 3sible. additi6ný. to and deduction from the quotap the 
456 
Board will have occasion to communicate this fact to those states 
Parties, to the Cofivention, which in its opinion should be so informodg 
a nd shall place an embargo upon exports of the dnigs concerned to that, 
country or territory. 
227 The Board may notify and request the 
non-parties to the Convention in this regard in virtue of Article 42 to 
of t1lis Convantiong in -the hope that they will co-operato with ito 
The Board may also initiate measures to ensure the execution 
of the provisions of the Convention concerning the manufacture of 
drugsp provided it has reason to believe that a Party to the Conven- 
tion . has violated 
its obligations to prevent the manufacture of 
drugs by non-govcmmental enterprises except under. licenco, and has 
allowed them to abuse the provisions of Article 29(2) (c). 
223 The 
initiative which the Board might'take under Article lik(l)(b), and 
Article 6(l)(b) of the 1972 Protocol to ensure the execution of the 
provisions of the Convention will be aimed at remedial mensureso which 
it 1-jill find advisable for the purpose. The measurýs under sub-para- 
graph (a) are of a confidential nature andtin the exercise of such 
mcasures the Board shall havo the "right to propose to the Government 
concerned the opening, of consultations or to request it to furnish 
the Board's right to ask for an explanations. " Under sub-paragraph 
explanation from the gover=ent or territory concemed acts as 
"entering a cautioiP against that country in that it points out that 
certain irregularities have occurred. The Board has been given a 
141de discretion in taking mamsuras under sub-paragraph (b). It has 
been given discretionary power in deciding whother measures under 
11 
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sub-paragraph (b)-aro warrantedo and if sog what remedial raeasures 
Ifould b. e neccsaaryýs under the circimstances for the execution of the 
provisions of the Convention. What is to be noticed is that in the 
-paragraph (b) situation, the Board has not been authorised to take or 
suggest any measures which will change the existing system of drurr 0 43 
a(buinistration in tilic country concerned, i. e., from a private enter- 
prise to a govermnient enter., L 
229 
althoug, priie, ,h it mmy suggest changes w LA 
in the domestic law-relating, to narcotics in the country or territory 
concerned. The Board may also suggest chang , es 
in the laws and regula- 
tions of a country or territory concerned, as regards the dischar-o of ILP 
230 its functions under Articbe 15. 
The Board's action under sub-parag graph 
(d) of Article 6 of the 
1972 Protocol may be called a "public action" because it not only 
. rebukes 
the country or terriory concerned, but. also has the right to 
publish its reports throug ., 
h the Council. In fulfilment of the princi- 
pies of "natural justice". if the Board publishes in its report a 
z 
-decil3ion taken under Article 14 or any information relating thereto, C 
it shall also publish therein the views of the goverment concernedl 
provided of course that government has so requested. Howeverg such a 
publication of the Boarýdls report under Article 15 ivill not serve its 
purpose unless a coununication has been made separately to the govern- 
ment concernedp indicating its failure to adopt remedial measures 
suggested by the Board or to give a satisfactory explanation as to the 
unsatisfactory situation in the area under the 
- 
jurisdiction of that 
government. 
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The function of the Board wider Article 6(, '. ) Of Ole 1972 
Protocol amendin(v Article 14 2) of the Sincle Convention sho-ald be 
distingui. shed from those wider paragraphs 1(a), l(b) and I(c) ot 
Article 6 of tile -said Protocol. Action under Article 6(2) is not 
warranted unless action under paragraph l(a) of Article 6 has been 
initiated, although action under paragraph l(d) of Article 6 does not 
have to be adjoined to or supported by the provisions of Article 
6 (2) of the Protocol . On the other hand, a simultaneous action 
under paragraph I(d) and paragraph 2 is quite possible, althougli 
the Board may not find it advantageous'or advisable to do so. 
Article 12 (2) of the 1953 Protocol had authorised the Pe=ancnt 
- Central Board to recomend tlýe cessation of import and export of 
oPiwn to and from a recalcitrant country, and embar-oes could be 
Z31 
mandatory. Unlike the 1953 Protocol the Single Convontion has 
not authorised the International Narcotics Control Board to impose 
a mandatory embargo. 
232 Nevertheless, -the' Single Conv 
I 
ention, has C2 
authorised the Board to impose an embargo not only upon opiump but 
also upon all other listed drugs. The decision as to the le'u-th of 
an embargo, however# rests with the Board and it is recorraended to 
be made until such time as the Doard is "satisfied as to tbe situia- 
tion in that counýry or territory. " This means that an embargo may 
be lifted much earlier than the recoinmended period if the government 
of the country or territory concerned has taken appropriate measures 
as reconmended by the Board to remedy the situationt and the Board is 
satisfied as to the degree of improvement in this matter, which the 
eountry has attained or is exp ected to attain. 
233 In the event of 
9 
the embargo being prolon, (,, edl the Boara wi 11 presmably have to go 
-459 
throiLg, h the procedure of Article 14 of the Single Convention and 
Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol. In other words, ony (lecision on an 
extension-of tbý embargo period ieý to be treated as a '"nou" decision. 
2 Protocol amcnding Article 14(2) Action, wnder Article 6(2) of. -the 
197&. 
of the Single Convention is alao applicable to " all non--metropolitan 
territories for the international relations of vhich any Party is 
responsiblep except where the previous consent of such a territory is 
required by the Constitution of the Party or of the territory concerned# 
or required by custom*" 
231k 
The concluding. line of Article 6(2) of the 1972 Protocol 
amendiri, g, Article 14(2) of the Single Convention that 11 the State 
concerned may bring the matter b. oforo the Council',, is rather complex, 
Tha. Convention has throughout used the cx.,,. jression "country" or 
"territory"* The term "territory" Lao been used to mean 11 a part of. 
State"t and in that sense onlyq the state concerned will be allowed 
to bring this matter, i. ýe. q the question regarding embargo before 
the Council. 11 The Statellp in, this paragraph =cans a State Party 
to the Convention" but not necessarily a Member of the United Nations, 
ifhereas in terms of Article 14(5) of the Single Convention any state 
whether or not a Party to the Convention or a Member of the United 
Nations"shall be invited to be. represented at a mcetipg of the 
q 
Board at which a'question directly interesting it is concerned under -- 
this Article. " 
235 "Any, Statell as referred to in paragraph 5 may be t* 
able to bring such a matter before the Council only under the 
-Pro 
the 1972 Protocolp amending Article 14(P. 
) of-the Single Convention. 
The evidences the fact thatv although for technical reasonns the 
Council vill deal with the issues concerning these special cases on 
. 11 460 
the recommendation of tha Board, th, c Board in di-scharginZ its function 
attempts to adopt a very democratic procedure by inviting ", -Uiy State" 
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Aýticle 1": (3) enables the Board to takc -ultimato action in 
an effort to ensure the execution of provisions of the Single Convon- 
tion. Howeverf "report" under this paragraph has a special meaning. 
A report of the Board under this paragraph must be pr9pared separately 
and transmitted to the 'government of the country or territory concerned. 
Thelreforey a report of the Board under Articlo. 15, in uhich mention 
may be made of, the Board's action under Article 14 (3)t will not' 
constitute a report within the meaning of Article 14 (3)- llorý r, Pove 
from a procedural point of view9 a report 'tinder Article 111 (3) has to 
be transmitted to the Partr by the Council, while that under Article 15 
will be coomunicated to to the Parties by the Secrctarý-Gene: ýal. Reports 
under Article 15 are required to be submitted to the Cotmcil through 
the Co=ission on Narcotic Drugs. To put It in another way, tile L2 
Board must maintain the identity of a report under Article 14 (3) in 
order to emphasise the seriousness of a Particular drug-situation. It 
is therefore quite possible for the Board to prepare two reportst one 
in accordance with Article 140) and the other in pursuance of Izticle 
15 of the Convention. The expression , the Board 11 shall have the 
right to publish A reporill in Article 14 (3) indicates that the right 
of the Board not to publish a report iuider this paragraph has been 
maintained, and this may be evidenced by Article 6 (1) (d) of the 
9 
1972 Protocol which states that if the 11 Board finds that-the 
461 
Govermuent, concerned has failed Ilideedt aLly docision as to 
vhat, racasures sho-61d. be fz-ken an(l*ivhctllcr a report should be 'pub- 
I 
lished in the event of - the failure of a government to observe the 
. provisions of 
the Convention entirely rests with the Board. 
In this connection, the decision making process of the Board 01 
merits consideration. In teiins of Article 14 (6), decisionb of the 
Board, on matters comingr under this Article, " shall be tali-on by a 
two-thirds majority of the whole number of the Board". This means 
that for decisions under this Article affirmative votes of nine out 
of thirteen members of the Board will be necessary. 
237 This Article 
has not pre-supposed any situation of "abstention" of any members 
from voting. Rowaver, it is only under bio situations, viz., 
(a) a situation under Article 10 (4)p i. e. j dismissal of a member of 
the Boardf 238 and (b) a situation under Article 111, that a decision 
239 by a two-thirds majority is required. In respect of all other 
decisionsp it is assumed that the rule of simple majority uill 
prevailp 
240 
although in terms of Article 11 (1)9 the Doard shallp 
inter alial 11 adopt its rules of procedure. " It appears that the 
Convention h. -, is rightly emphasised the importance Of the two situations 
where a two-thirds majority will -be required Tor a decision. 
(d) Vifr-ilnnee 
, ov&m 
"--, the liamifacture and Tm]2ortnti-on 
t 
of Dril s 
This function of the Board is complamentary to its function 
relating to the administration of the estimates system. In other 
46 PW 
wordup the estimates systeri is to be used by the Board as a ndrror 
in order to see if a cotuitry is abidizig by the limits of estimates 
2 112 
established either by itself or by the Doard. The system of 
limitation as devised by JVticle 21 o-C the Single Convention is 
applicable to all substances listed in Schedules I and 1,9243 but 
it does not cover poppy straw and the leaves of the cannabis plant 
if not accompanied by the tops) becawse they are not-listod in 
Schedules I and II and hence are not 11 drugs" within the meaning 
of the Sin(rle Convention. Article 21 (1) ofthe Single Convention 
specified the penaissible quantity of each drug that a country my 
import or'manufacture in any one year. 
21111 According to Articlo 211 
if the Board finds that the quantity manulactured and imported in any 
one year has exceeded the total quantities specified in paragraph 1 
less any deductions in accordance with paragraph 2) any such 
excess shall I in the following year, be deducted frora the quantity 0 
to be manufactured or imported and from the total of the estimates 
as defined in Article 9 (2) (a) of*tlie 197ý Protocol amending 
Article 19 (2) of the Sizir" 
245 
., 
le Convention. According 
., 
to this Articlep 
i. e., A-rticle 21 (3) of the Singlc Convention the Board is reqtiired to 
deduct only -those quantities which remained at the end of the year as 
stock in a country resulting from eXcessive manufacture and/or impor- 
tation dnrin(r*t-hat year. 
246 
U However, the Doard can deduct the excess 
amo-Lmt from the estimates of the following year only when it has 
received, statisties of stocks of the following year under Article 
20 (1) (f). 
247 On receivin, ", such estimates the Board informs the 
I 463 
altilolig tlie governments tliemscives are governments individuallYp Oh 
supposed to have the required data at their disposal and als6 
sufficient I'movAedge of I the Board's policy in this regard, to. enable 
them to com-pile and allocate appropriate quotas to mantifocturers and 
impqrters for the followin.,.; year. Article 21 (3) ailiro, wers the D61rd 
to deduct any amount of drugs, froin the ýstimates of a count . ry as if, 
considers necessaryp and in the case of conflict beti-,, een the fit-qires 
of the Board and those of the government conceiiied, the Doard's 
243 
figures will prevai .* 
In temis of Article 21 (4) , if it appears frora the statistical 
returns on imports or oxports tha. t the quantity exported to any 
country or -territory exceeds the total of -tile estimtes for that 
comitry ( as defined in Article 9(2)(a) of the 1972 Protocolf araeuding 
Article 19 (2) of the Single Convention), with the addition of tbo amomts 
shomm to have been exportedg and after deduction of any excess ( in 
accordance with paragraPh 3 of this Article) , the Bocard may notify 
this fact to states whicht in its opinion, should be so , informed. Me 
statesp on receiving such a notifications shall not during the year 
in question authorise any further export of the drug(s) concerned to 
-that country or territory, except: 
(i) 'where a supplementary estimate has boon furnished for 
that country or territory in respect both of any quantity 
over-inported and of Vie additional quantity required; or 
(ii) where the export, in the opinion of the ggovernm6nt of the 
I 
exporting country is essential for the treatment of the 
si c1c. 
dUd' 
Articl c 21 (11) empoi-mrs the Board to ask not only the Parties 
to the Conventiong but also non-paýtics mid territories of Patties to 
vhich the Single Convention does riot applyp 
249 
to dincontinuo exports 
of the drug(s) in quý-stion. Unlike the previous narcotic treaties, 
250 
the Boardo under the Single Conventions may choose the states whether k: 1 
Parties to the Convent-ion or no-,.,, to WhOla such notification6 - should 
be sent. 251 In the case of a non-party bowever, the Board can only 
expect its full co-operation in the mat-ter. The Parties by under-takinOrr 
an obligation to furnish quarterly statistics in respect ol drugs 
coming under Schedules I and II, make tho Board able to impose an 
embargo on-all such drugs. Under the Limitation Convention the Parties t= 
-were only under an obligation to submit ardiual reports, instead of 
quarterly returns, in respect of drugs falling =, der Group 'IL 
25n 
The Board's position under Article . 01 
(4) is stronger than it is wider 
Article 14 (20) because, since in the fonuer case the Board's recoLmon- 
dation is mandatoryg while in the latter, it is only recoi-pinandatory. 
Neverthelesso -the scope of an embargo under Article 14 (2) is wider 
than that under Article 21(4) in that, while in the former situation 
an embargo may be recommended even in respect of those drugs which have 
not violated the regime under the Single Convention, in the latter 
situation in embargo can be imposed only in respect of those drugs the 
importation of which has been excessive, and also whereas Article 21 (4) 
may only stop exports to the recalcitrant country or territory, 
Article III (2)'may be applied for the discontinuation of ex'Ports to or 
imports from the recalcitrant country or territory. It is, however, 
0 
apparent that the Board's slice'ess in illvi, ý 'lilatilig, 
tho manufacture 
and importition of, dritgs depends upon the degroe of co-operatibn 
the countries or tel-ritories are willing, to offer, 
(c) An Rvnluation of ths, Board 
The International Narcotics Control Board is a board of 
e.,, T. crts. It is constituted of e-, ", erts. and is operated by experts. 
In order to maintain this special characteristic the range of 
nomination of members of the Board extends even to non-parties to the 
-Single Convention? and thus the principle of equitable geographical 
representation is also observed. One of' the basic qualifications for 
membership of the Boardo which has appropriately been naintained, 
is that the members vill not only have scientific and tachnical 
imouledge in various related areas viz., pharmacolo( , chemistry, gY 
medicine etc., but also have sufficiently adequate ImoulodgO of 
national and international narcotics administration. It is on this 
ground that a greater number of nominations by the Ul'orld Health 
Ormanization may be supported. The Single Convention has made provi- U 
sions for ensuring only the full technical independence of the Board 
in carrying out its functions. 
254 In other words, the Board does not 
enjoy any independence in other areas# because by its natures all its 
functions are of a technical kind. Indeed it depends upon. -the Economic 
and Social Council and the General Assembly for election of its 
members 
255 
and determination of its budget 
256 
respectively. In 
.., 1 
46,01 
tems of Article 15v -he Board shall prepare an annual report and 
submit it to the Eoonomic and Social Council thro-uyh the Comnission, 
uhich rmy make such- conments as it sees fit. The D, conomic and 
Social Council, howeve . r, in its resolution 1196 (XLII) of 16 Ilay, 1967 
adopted 
257 further measures in order to ensure the full technical 
independence of the Board by granting it*somo degree of budgetary 
discretiong the scope of uhich is determined each year by the General 
Ass ambly. 
As far as the impartiality of the members of the Board is 
concerned, the Singrle Convention, in Article 9 1 
(2) raakes an attempt 
to upbold this principle by providing, inter alint that during their 
. 11 torm of office they shall not hold any position. or eugage in any 
activity which would be liable to impair. their imTpartiality in the 
exercise of their fimetions. 11 Although such a provision excludes the 
Poss ibilities of the members holding any position or engilgin" in any Ol U, L7 
activity gover=cntal or non-governmental, 
258 
it nevertheless raises 
a pertinent question: is a member who has taken leave of absence from 
his government positiony able to maintain impartiality copecially 
when his government is involved in a situationwhich is tantammint to 
a violation of the principles of international narcotics administration? 
I To put it in another wayp since such a member will have to return to 
.*I 
his government positiont he may not for obvious reasons be willing to 
find against his olm gover=ont during Ilis torra, of office with the 
Intcrnational Narcotics Control Board* 259 However, the prqvision of 
')60 
an adequate reiý, iuneration to the racribers of tlle* Board" coupled with 
the grant of privileges and iu=lunities along the lines laid doum in 
the Convention on the Privileges and Inmuniti(, s of the United i1ations, 
as approved by the deneral Assembly on 13 Pebruary, 1946 
261 
has' 
strengthened the chances of ensuring the impartiality of the members 
of the Board. 
Regarding the term of office of members of Vie Boardt it may 
be observed that Article 10 (2) of the "Single Convention does not 
foresee a situation where a member may resign before the expiration of 
his terns of officel 
262 
althou, -, h paragrnph 5 of tile raL-le ,,, rticjc 
prescribes that 11 the Council shall fill such a wcancy as soon as 
possible and in accordance with the applicable provisions of article 9, 
by electing another member for the remainder of the term. , 
263 It may, 
howeverl be observed that the election of a* now member of the Board 
under paragraphs 2 and 5 pre-supposes tiro different situations. 
Paragraph 2 is applicable only in those situations tinlere an existincr 
member of the Board resigns perhaps on the eve of the first meeting of 
the Boardt so that there is not much of a time-Ing between the submission 
of the resignation and the election of the successor. Paragraph 5 
envisages a situation vhero a vacancy occurs at any time durinfy. the 
term of office of a member. Such a member be-elected and allowed to 
function imcdiatelyp othenvisep the Board may not only be incapacitated 
from holding ux", went sessions j if necessary, but also from mustering a 
quor= at its sessions. The same arguinent applies even in a situation 
where the Boardv oving to the urgency of a mattert will prL--. fer to send 
its decisions by mail or by telegraph instead of holding a session. 
68. 
Li so far as the functional aspect of the Board is concerned, 
the present *Board has been given more effective pow'41'r il)-an its 
I 
predecessor, i. e. t tho- Permcaient Central Board. The Board' a 
fiulctions have 
. 
been devised in such a way as not only to help 
organise the national systems of administration of narcoticsy but also 
to re-orientate themp as far as possible, along the line of an 
international narcotics administration. Although the Single Conven- 
tion has empowered the Board to extend, its activities even to 
countries and territories -to uhlich it does not apply, 
264 it may be 
advisable to assess the effectiveness of such powers of the Doard, 
especially in relation to non-menibors, as between non-men. bers and 
members, and also as betiveen non-members. From the legal point of 
view it may be stated that the non-members are not obliged to comply 
1, rith any request of the Doardp vfnether in connection with the adminis- 
tration of the estimates system, or administration of the statistical 
returns systeing or any other matter connected Ivith the administration 
of the international narcotics control. Nevertheless, the Board's 
power to esbiblish its oim drug, requirementsl 
265 
and hence the 
maximum limit of drug importsq 
266 
will obligre the non-members to 
comply -witlh its requests. Moreover, the Parties to the Single Conven- 
e 
tion will, not be allowed to export drugs to any country/tarritory 
-wiich has exceeded the limits set/ approved by the Board. 
267 yett 
functionallyp the Doard does notv nor should it, enjoy a dictatorial 
poiiert because the co-operation of goverrmcntst whether op not Parties 
to the Singlc Conventiony is the basis of its sudcassful functioning. 
I 
AlthoLV-, h estimates (Inigs submitted, by govemments may be disregarded 
or &1wided. by the Board, the goveriments may in their turn not only 
disregard such amandments made by the Board, but also may by supple- 
mentary estimates replace their own estimates aild also tile esti-,, . ates 
established by the Board for them. The governments may also exercise 
their absolute power in allocating, 11 speciial stocks" and thus hold 
back a large amount of drugs frora the administrative jurisdiction of 
the Board. Despite the fact that, compared with previous drug 
convelitionss 
268 tho Singl, e Convention has given the Board a greater 
scope for examination of the estimates, its failure to lay eoln any 
criterion which may be applied by the Doxd for examination of the 
I -estimates has left tlie situation unaltered. 
269 The Board has no 
e: rfective control over the quantities of manufactured substances not 
covered by the Sin,,,,, le Convention, nor can it effectively apply i-Ile 
international narcotics regime to the quantities to be used for the 
compounding of preparations under Schedule III*, Unfinished drugs, or 
drugs that form only an intermediary stage in a continuous manufac- 
turing processp are also outside the control of the Board. 11owevert 
it may be observed that these failures should be attributed to the 
Convention rather than to the Board. I 
The Board. is not only avratch-dog of the international narcotics 
control system; it also administers it- Its authority to administer 
the international narcotics control system has been strengthcned by 
its having been empowered to impose sanctions upon the recalcitrant 
270 
country or territoryg other or not the Convention applies to that 
area. The functions uhich the Board exercises on the basis of Article 14 
ana in particular under paragraph 2 of the Article. - 
071 
although 
47 
-0 
apparently "judicial functionsllp are, - not strictly so because the 
recomendation of the. Doard under this Article is sUbject to cbilf inia- 
tion, by the Economic wid Social Councilp and indee*d the Council my 
i 
ddopt its mm recowaaendation on the subject. 113ven non-c o-m-pl i once urith 
a recomendntion for an embargo does not constitute a violation of the 
provisions of the Single Convention. The Doard's authority io order L> 
discontinuance of the export of narcotic drugs to a country or terri- 
tory which has exceeded its import limits under Article 21 (4)q may not 
even be honoured by a Party, under exceptional circumstances Nrizov"w1joro 
the export, in the opinion of the government of the exportinfl, country, is 
essential for the treatment of the sick. 11 
272 Although the Board in 
issuing an order under Article 21 (11) need not justify its action an 
the ground tLat the failure of n country to comply with the provisions 
of the Conventions has aggravated the narcotics problem, as it does in 
the case of, a recoi-, mandation under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 111 of 
the Single Convention read L") d with Ajýticle 6 of the 1972 Protocol, such an 
order is not of a punitive character. Yet, like the 1953 Protocol i; hich 
authorised the Permanent Central Board to illpo-se a mandatory opium 
embargo, 
273 the Single Convention has armed the present Board with such 
an authority. However, an organ should not be evaluated solely in tems 
of its power to im. -pose sanctions. Like many other international organst 
the Board is an expert body enjoys a special position and does contribute 
to the proinotion of the international narcotic3 control system to a 
considerable extent. It is for this reason that the attent'ion of the 
Board may be draim by the COT-Mission to any matter relevant to the 
functions of the Board, 
274 besides its usual functions. Droadly ýpeaizirjg, 
471 
the Board's functions are of an administrative, specialist and 
semi-judicial naturej but technically, it is Lin expert body, and 
is used and looked upon as such. 
v 
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Introduction 
The Sin,, je Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, has 0 
autliorised the Co=ission on Narcotic Drugs to consider all 
matters pertaining to the aims of this C6nvention. 
275 Cne of 
the functions in particular 'which has been assignmed to the 
Comission is to " =ke recoMendations for the implementation 
of the aims and provisions of this Convention, including programnes 0 
of scientific research and the exchange of information of a scien- 
tific or t echnical nature. " 
276 In so far as the medical aspects 
of addiction and addiction-producing drugs are concernedg -the 
Comission considers the opinion(s) of the Ulorld Health Organiza- 
tion which is assisted by the Expert Co=ittec on Drug Dopandenec*277 
This Committee rceo=ends, inter alia, additions to the list of 
sibstances subject to controlf the examination of suspected subs- 
tances for possible addiction-producing properties, 
273 the transfer ltý 
of a substance from one schedule to another, and the deletion of a 
I substanco from a schqdule of drucrsg if necessary, Tl: ýe Director- 
General of the World Health Organization decides on the question of 
control of drug(s) on the basis of the recomendations of this 
Co=ittee, arid he coimunicate3 his decisions to -he Secretary- 
General of the 
t 
United Nations. The constant discovery of new 
therapeutic substances generates work for this Expert. Committee; and 
tj, e functioning of, the international narcotics control system depends 
to a considerable extent on the findinL,,, s of this Comnittee. Defure, 
.. 73 
however, assessing the role of this Corr. jiti-co, it is necessary 
to examine its structure, functions and contribution to the 
running of the int6rnational narcotics control system. 
9'70 
Although proceded by various other eo=ittees, -, -, in view of 
the present-day importance of this Comlittee in the international 
narcotics control system, an attempt will be made to assess the 
role of this Conmittee onlyt and reference to -the preNrious co=aittees 
will be made -idierever necessary. rrior to 19569 the Ex7,3ort Col=dttee 
Iýhich had been fonned to work au an advisory body to the Vorld Hoalth 
organization and the United 'Nations, was Imown as the Expert Coý=ittee 
on Habit Forming Drugs. According, to a' report of the World Health 
organization: 
Daring 
, 
the Second Session of the Interin Co, -maission (November 1946) the representative from China j? roposed 
tho'creation of an Expert Co=nittee on Narcotic Drugs, 
to co-operate with the ConmAssion on Narcotic Drugs 
aPpointed by the Economic and Social Council. " . 
It it-as therefore resolved that 11 an Expert 
Coimnittee on Narcotic DruP, L. 1sp , 
composed of five persons 
-tecluiically qualified in the pharmacological and clinical 
aspects of drug addictionp be appointed to alvise the 
Interim Commission on any technical question concerning 
this subject which may be referred to it, " 
According to the'Report of the Interim Coaiiission 
to jhc 1ý'irst World Health Assembly, 11 the transfer of 
the international control of habit-forming drugs from 
the League of Nations to the United Nations imposed 
technical and advisory oblig . ations on the Couraissiong for which it i-,, as necessarý, 
on IL-bit-Forming Drugs, " 
6o appoint an Expert Coznittee 
LID 
C 
. 74 
The tasks of this Conunittee were twofold: 
to s tudY those questions which might be 
referred to it as woll as those problems which 
may be raised by the scientific development of 
the subject"; and 
2. to assist and advise the Executive Board of the 
World Health Organization and the United Nations 
in the accomplishment of those functions uhich 
had been entrustcd to the World 11calth OrLaniza- 
tion by the internatio-Dal agreements as far Lis the 
control of Habit-forming Drugs is concerned. " 
281 
It mayi hovevery be mentioned in this co; meýtion that 
the Limitation Convention made provisions for the advice of 
. 
experts to the Health Committee of the League of Nations in 
deciding t1ae addiction-producing capacity of* a drug. 
282 
An Expert Cor-unittee is a co. amittee " established to deal 
Ifith a particular subject and consisting of a group of experts 
convened'for the purpose by the Director-General. " 
28 3 Under 
Articles 13(e) and 33 of the Constitution of tile Iforld Realth 
Organizationp the World Health Assembly and the Executive Board 
have authority to establish such committees as may be considered 
desirable to serve any purpose within the competence of the 
organization. 
p 
4r 
to 
Sj-'r -- ýn-t Co-rdi't-e on Drwr "On-ocn(lonep 111M of tli( IIC!, T 
The m, -, Depondenco are jaijars of the Expert Cowmittee on Dvil, 
selected and appointed by the Director-Goneral oif tho 'World Health 
Organization. The appointwmt of such rjý., mbcrs io reported to the 
r,,, Kecutive Board at its nc,, -t session. 11clubers of the 1:, -. Kport Co-mit- 
tee. shall remain so, until the work of the Seasion -to uhich they arc 
23 11 
appointed is concluded. An earlier tormlijal, i0: 1 O-Lo a SýOssion is 
possible at the discretion of the Diroctor-GAencral, if the intorest3 
Osr, -T'% 
of the Organizntion so deriand. " Uizzparts. arc oligiblo for re-appoint- 
Mont. Appoin-bicut Of ex-rerts is rl,,, (I,, on tile imsia of tlicir special 
jujoifledge and e. ", erience concerning the -subjects on the agenda of -the 
'186 
sessions concerned and taking into account the need for continuity. ' 
In solecting these merabers the Dire c to r-General shall not only colisider 
primarily thoir ability and fechnical experience, but also endeavour to 
secure adquate geographical distribution. 
237 The Director-Geveral of 63 
the world Health Organization is also ex-officio Sceretary of all 
expert . comaittees, and he may deleCate those f-tuictions. 
233 The 
r-General, and the time and venue Col)u, jittee is co-nvened by the Directo 
of each session are also determined by him. The debates of tile !! Npert 
Co,, ); nittees are directed by a Chairman or by a Vice-Chainuan, in the 
absence of tile Chairman or in the case of his inability to carry out 
his functions. effectively* Both of them are elected by the CoXwiittee 
at the bef'rinning of each session. C> 0 
,; es and 3rmunitics 
Granted E2qrts Privilpýn 
Like other inteniational civil servants Y tbc members of 
I. 
this Expert Comittee enjoy privileges and imiunities, which have 
been described in Article 67(b) of the Constitution of tha 1, #'orld 
Health Organization# and set forth in the Convention on the Privi- 
logos and I=unitiev of the Specialized Agencies, and in Aanex VII 
289 
thereof . The members oý the Co=itteo are required to act as 
international experts, and during the session of the Comittec, 
they shall serve the Lorld Health Organization exclusively. in 
order to enhance the value of their services, they are prohibited 
from receiving special instruction or opinions from any goircrnment 0 
or authority external to the World Health Organization. 
290 AB the 
experts' services are obtained by flie World Health Organization on an 
ad hoe basisp the allowance they oarn during sessions is not reffarded 
as remuneration. Presumablyq during a session, tbey are entitled to 
their usual remuneration if thOY have not taken leave of absence from 
their respectiVe employments. They are also entitled to a refund ol 
travelling expenses incurred througgh attending session(s) of the 
Conraittee. 
Exports' Decision-Hril-cinll Cnpnaci. ýZ 
As the members of the Expert Committees may be required to cast 
votes on non-scientific qnestions, uhether by secret ballot or by roll 
call 9 
291 the impartiality of a memberg especially xehan a matter will, 
concern his own countryp may be impaired for psychological reasons. 
liorcovert a vote by a member against his own country my prejudice 
471 
his lutuxe nomination, It is, thercforep suggested that no question 
concernin, (,, r, -a mattet of non-scientific nature shottld be sub. 'Iiitted to 
a vote at any session of Vie Expert Ca-anittees, and in this way the 
possibility of abstention by experts iehich has not been envisaged by 
-the Constitution of tile World Health Organization, may also be avoided. 
As in the case of scientific questions# i; hich are not submitted to a 
vote, 
292 in the case of questions of a non-scientific nature also, 
each expert should be allowcd to retain and express his personal opinion, 
adducing reasons thereto, in tic fOr, " Of 111 individual or aroup report. 
In any event the Co"Clu-91oI15 of ant: q)crt Comnittoe shall not cormit 
293 
the ovanization. Moreover, i&en a dralt report is uildcr coll. si- 4L, 
derationp 11 it is far better to seek a text on which all can agree 
Vian to force certain members to. subscribe to the vicurs of a majority 
by mcans of a vote. Members are much more likely to look for a 
solution of their differences acceptable to all if the majority Imov 
that to force their opinion through in the face of opposition by 
their more numerical supreriority is considered to run counter to the 
spirit of the discussions. " 
294 
JUthough structurally indepandentt an EIxTert Comittee it; to 
I 
a considorable extent. 1unetionally under the control and supervision 
.0, of 
tlic Director-Goneral of the 1,., orld Health Organization. The Director- 
General or his representative, may at any time make either oral or 
written statemcnt(s) concerning a question whicli is under considera- 
tion by the Committee. 
295 Since an Expert Committee is a-'specialised 
\. IN - 478 
committee for special purposes, and since its observations should 
be 'taken only as "opinions", my action taken by such n Committee 
I 
is-subject to validation by the Director-Goneral or his represen- 
tative who shall be present duringp the proceedings. 
296 Ile birth raid C3 L3 
death of an ExTert Comittee are at the discretion of the Director- 
Gene'ral of -the Ul'orld Ileal-th Organization. 
nmetions of the Ex-pert Commýjttco on Drug Del2ondence 
Introeluction 
The purposes §Lnd functions of all Expert Coj=ittees in their 
respective fields, which have been outlined in the Regulatidns for 
Expert Advisory, P. -mels and Committees, are primarily: 
11 to review the lateat lmowledge and expert infonnation 
and make it available to the organization"; 
to formulate technical reco. mmendations"; and 
to make recommendations designed to initiate, stimulate 
and co-ordinate research necessary-for the fulfilncnt of 
297 their terms of reference". 
The functions of the 32"apert CoDuAttee on Drug Dependence will 
very riuch depend upon the connotations of the tenu 11 Drug Dependence". 
"Drug Depen(lence'll according to one Z%pert Committeop is a state of 
293 
"psychic and sometimes also physical (dependcnee), rcýultiug from 
the interactibn between a living organism and a drugo characterised U 
by behaviour and other responses that always include a compulsion to 
take -the drug on a continuous or periodic basis in order to experience 
its psychic effects, and sometimes. to aroid the discomforts of. its 
absence. ' j 
299 Tolerance. may or may not be present. A person rfay lie 
dependent on riore than one drug. 
300 The incidence of "druk-, dc 
.pI 
endencelf 
controlling tha production is closely connected -with the que-StiOll -If- f. 2 
and distribu-tioa of del)ondence-produciiig dru,,,, s, especially ýecauso the 
easy availability of drugs very often contributes to dru. - dependence. 
, nising, the imporfance This Colm-nitteeg in its 
Sixteenth Report, 301 recog 0 
of international control of dx'uggst concluaed that -the need, typa and 
degree of international control must be based on tuo considerations: tv 
(a) the degree of risk to public health and (b) the* ii-sefulness of the 
drug ig; Depon- in medical thera"r . The W. H. O. Expert Contaitiec on Dr'U Py 
dence had been established in order to give the World Health Org, -mi- 
zation, inter alia, expert information on the pharmacological effect 
of druggs covered by the international narcotics treatiosp and on the 
question of extending control to new drugs or exempting drugs from 0 L3 
controlt being guided by the above mentioned considerations. 
302 The 
0 
Co=iittee categorically mentioned that 11 chemical or Phaxraacological 
I 
classifications cannot, however, be used as th. c basis for determining, 
-the need for control 'nor the t3Te of control required.,, 
303 Such an 
Expert CoruAitteefs functions are manifold. Although apparently a 
technical cormittee, its reco=cndations have a bearing upon the entire 
/international 
narcotics control system in that it gives prior notice 
to the controlý authorities by examining the potential risk of abuse 
4so 
ana illicit traffic in certain kinds of drug ., a. Its fwictions may be 
broadly'divided uuder the following headingnot 
(a) To consider the dependence liability- of a drug, and to 
determine the level of control; 
(b) To classify drugs in accordance with Vic level of 
control required; 
(C) To suggest remedies to problems of dependence on drugo-s; and 
(d) miscellaneous functions. 
(a) To Consider the Depe-nelence Liabili-IX of -t -Drtig and to 
Deteriiiine the Level of Control 
The reasons for determining the dependence liability of a drug 
are obvious. There are many drugs which, if talcon into the body, will 
proAucc in some persons a satisfying effect to such a degree that they 
,, ill continue the use of such drugs even to the point of abuse or 
dependence. Also It if the drug dependence is associated with beha- 
. -vioural 
or other responses that adversely affect the user's inter- 
personal relations or cauBe adverse physical$ social or economic 
consequences to others as well as -to himself$ and if the problem 
is actually wide-spread in the population or has a sig, nificant 
potential for becoraing widespread, then a public health problem does 
exist. it 
304 It is for the determination of these points that the 
1&11.0. Expert Co=nittee on Drug Dependence comes into operation. In 
its Sixteenth Reportv the Co=ittec indicated the criterid for deter- 
mining, the need for control. There are tuo, main conditionsp at 
least one of which must exist for a drug to be considered in need t13 
481. 
of control: 
(1) - thoý -dru,,. -, is'knomi to be abusod other -than sporadiýally 
or in a loc. al area and the effects of its abuse a-. ztcncl 
beyond the drug taker; in addition, its mode of spread 
involves commication between existing and potential. 
dxu, - takersp and an illicit traffic in it is developing; or 
(2) it' is planned to use the dru,, Y, in medicine and experimental 
data show that there is a significant psychic or physical' 
dependence liability; tho drug is coya-ercially aviii1able 
305. 
or may become so. 
If neither of these conditions is fulfilledt there is no need 
306 for an agent to coiaa wider consideration for controj. The 
., various mcacures 
Eighteenth World Ilealth Assemblyp in roco'n'nending 
health educationp placing of cllL,, a,, s not wider international 
control on proscriptions etc, 
),, reforred to the recom-icndations of 
I 
f, he II. H. O. Exper-11, Co-mnittee 'on Dependence Producing Drugs, concerning Cý 
the need for the control of certain sedatives and stimulants. 
307 The 
Jýxpcrt Committee performs of a technical nature. In its Thirteenth 
Iteport , 
the W. H. 0, Dxpert Comaittee on Addiction Producin, -, Drugs, 
in considering the do*pendence liability of a dru, " :, p reconmended that 
the tem If Arug dependcncelt should be substituted for -tile tenns 
t1drug addiction" and " drug habituation! ' . "Drug abuse,, p according 
to -this Committee, 11 is the consiLlption of a dnig apart from mcaical 
need -or in unnecessary quantitites. Its nature and significance may 
be considered from two points of vicif: one relates to the interaction 
between the (Iru, (,, r and the individual 9 the other to the interaction 
' 482, 
betireen dfug, abuse and society, The first viewpoint is conce notl rn 
with drurr dependence, and the interplivy betimen the pharziacodýmamic 
actions of the drug and the Physiological and psycholo"ical StatIls 
of the individual. The second- Vie interaction between driv, abuse 
and societyý- is concerned with tile interplay of a wide rwi,,, ro of 
conditions, enviro=ental, sociolo. - ff . 
Jcal and economic. " 
3()3 In ac 
-the Colmnittoe's reconmendation as to whether or not a drug should be 
i1toluded in the international control regime has boon guided. by the 
above factors. The Cor=xittee also emp"hasised. t, iat the ten. -is "sedatives" 
and Itstimulants" should It include any drugr that has boen fotLnd to be 
dependence-producing and sho;, m to be abused because of its cadative 
or stinvalant effects on the central nervous systemq'but excluding 
alcohol and substances under international narcotics control. " 
309 
Realising, that the expression 11 dopendence-producinc,,; d'Ws" should be 
madc'relevant not only to a few specified dnigs, and also renlising, that 
the national efforts in controlling dru, ", abuse were insufficient, it 
310 
phasised the need for the control of such drugs. o, m- t> It also observed 
-that any chemical or pharm, acological classi u fication was found to be 
unsuitable as a scientific basis for determining the need for control 
of drugs. 
313- The Committee also su, -, rrcste(l that, apart from the 
considerati, on of (a) the degree of risk to Public health and (b) the 
usefulness of tbe drug in medical therapy, the international narcotics 
plea: C011-trOl sYstOm 8110uld ClAbOdY VIC f01101-dug princiT- 
(a) 11 the provisýons should be flexiblet so that a drugg can 
readily be placed under appropriate control if Imowledge 
indicates that this is desirable; and 
483 
(b) there should. be provision for making-'even, the raost 
dangerous substances available for scientific res6arch, 
when justifiedl but only under appropriate snfc, r,, ua; -da. 11 
312 
In view of the desirability of varying levels of control j the 
Comaittee even suggested that certain (Irugs which apparently prebent 
313 
a lower degree ol hazard, or substances whiell have no n6cepted use 
in medical practice but. carry a high degree of hazard to public health, 
should also be included ', It also pointed out that, in goncrall cach 
p, libstance would require iridividual evaluation before reco. i.,:,,! cnU'atiuns 
co. neerning, the level of control could be mado. 
315 Mat an expanded 
description of drug-dependence of various tYPeG would be necessary had 
been confirmed by a group of experts, who observed, inter alia, that 
It it has becoric irkpossible in practicey and is scientifically unsound, 
to maintain a single definition for all lorms of drug addiction and/or 
habituation. A feature common to these conditions as well as to drug, 
abuse in genevil is dependence, Psychic or botho ojý t. Le individual on 
a chemical agent. 'Ihereforep better understanding should be ottained 
0r t1l, dependence oj thij3 type -It type, by substitution of the term drug A 
according to the agentor class of agents involved in di scussions of 
these coiiditionsp especially intordisciplinal-y. o, hort descriptions, 
followed Vy concise listings of their characteri sties 9 are formulated 
for the vurious types of dependence on at present widely abused major 
groups of, substanceset, 
316 
p Iloweverp it is on the basis of tllc criteria discussad above that 
the Expert Co-waittec of the II. H. 0, gives its reco'nuacn(lations on thc 
I 
1* 484 
desirability of control of a drug, ana indeed, the Co=ission on 
Narcotic Drugs 317 have so far accepted almost all the recormenda- 
tiQns of the 111.11.0. Expert Committee on Drug Dopendence. 
3113 The 
ExpeA Committee not only gives its recommendations on the dependence 
liability of a new drug., 
319 but also reviews the chemical structuro 
320 
of ýa. drug uhich had been considered pro-viously. ) 'lle recommendations 
of the World Health Assemblies in this regard to the Secretary-General 
of the United. INations are based on the repo rt/re co, =aendati on3 ol 
the Expert Coimuitiees. 
321 Me V1.11.0. Bxicrt Co-r-mittee'n opinion& on 
many provisions of the Revised Draft Protocol on Psychotropic Substances 
had been found to be significant by the Economic and Social Cormcil. 
322 
With reference to this Convention the Cormittee expressed the view thtit 
It (a) the de-ree of Iish to public health presented by a dependence- 
producing drug and (b) its usefulness in medical practice are primarily 
matt6rs of medical assessment and judgment and that this is also true of 
decisions on -Ithe need for and level of control. " 
323 The Co, -=ittee also 
advocated 6c inclusion of treatment and rehabilitation of 4.1 
drur, addicts 
as an alternative arrangement to "penal measures" alid this has bcoa 
expresr; ed in the Convent*on on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, -and wbich 
rmy I)c considered as an improvement upon the provisions of Article 36(l) 
324 
of- tbo Sin,,, rlc Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. 
485 
To Clnssify Drugs in Accordance ifith the Level 
of Control Reauired 
The recent classification of drugs =do by the Expert Colmnittoo 
on Drug Dependence is primarily based on the recorrmendation of the 
previous II. H. 0, Expert Comittees. '"I However, the If., II*O. Expert 
Co=nittee on Drug Dependence, in determining the basis for classi- 
gicition of dm, -, s in accordance with the level of control required, 
re-affirmed the criteria for determining the need for control, uhich 
had previously been advocated by the Committee in its Sixteenth 
Report. 326 jecof 
1.11 The drug is 1moim to be abused other than sporadically 
or in a local area and the effects of its abuse extend 
beyond the drug taker; in addition, its mode of spread 
involves communication between existing and potential 
drug takorsp and an illicit traffic in it is developing. " 
2. It It is planned to use the dru, - ., 
in medicine and experi- 
mental data. zhow that there is a significant psychic or 
physical dependence liability; the drug is comnercially 
available or may become so. " 
Also, the Comittee re-iterated that the " need, type and degree 
of international control must be based on t-xro conside rations: 
the degree of risk to public health; and 0 
(b) the usefulness of the dnig in medical therapy. 
T)ie Committe also re-emphasised that, in embodying any principle 
in this regard, it would be degirable to adopt flexible provisions so 
C-Aat a drag can readily be- Placed under a, -, propriate control, if now 
48U 
Imowledge indicates that this is desirable, and also that 11 there 
should be provision for making even the most dangerous substances 
available for scientific research, when justified, but only under 
appropriate safeguards. it 
327 On the basis of these principles, the 
Committee, in its Sixteenth Reportf recommended that the existing' drugs 
should be classified into five groups. 
328 The following yearv however, 
in roviewing the classification of psychotropic substances not under 
international control q it agreed 
329 for the most part with the 
proposed five groupsq except that a sub-division of groupl(b) 
330 
into tj-jo, sub-groups was proposed 11 in order to givo greater recogni- C3 w 
tion to the criteriag the degree of risk to public health'19 and 
It the usefulness of the drugs in medical therapy'll 
331 
and also that 
-the purposes of the proposed groi; p 
(e) to alert goveniments to a 
potential but low degree of hazardy to encourage them to monitor the C-I 
use of such drugs and report instances of'abusell) would be better 
achieved by finding alternative machinery. The Coumittee found support 
for its decision to omit group (e) from classification, in that drugs t* C2 
under that group present only a very low risk of creating drug depend- 
ence or related abuseq and also in that 11 they would have already 
required a medical prescription in most countries. " 
332 
The total number of groups which remained at five, were the 
f oil oving: 
(a) It drugs having liability to abuse constituting C3 _, an 
espe- 
cially serious risk to public health and having very 
limif, cap if any, therapeutic usefulness"; 
.1 487 
(b) 11 drugs whose liability to abuse conatitutei3 a subs- 
tantial risk, to public health and having little to 
moderate therapeutic usefulness"; (sub-division of 
group IbI) 
(c) 11 druges whose liability to abuse constitutes a subs- 
tantial risk to public health but liav-1n,, -,, moderate to 
great therapeutic usefulness"; ( sub-division of 
group Ib 
(d) 11 drugs whose liability to abuse constitutes a sTnaller 
but still significant risk to public health and having 
ra therapeutic usefulness rantgoingr from little to Creat"; 
caid 
I 
groups (b) . 
(c) or (d) (e) preparations of dru,,,,, sp contained in 
It but compounded with nbn-dependenco producing ingredients 
in such low concentrations or in such otIer manner as to 
render their abuse unlikely and to make recovery of the 
... 
( controlled)-in, alt it 
333 
, evredient very diffici 
g these criterial 
the Co=nittee not only gave In determinin" 
consideration to the broad nature of the control deemed appropriate 
to each groupp but also stressed that it would be most appropriate 
ti 331' to classify them primarily on the basis of "hazard" and "usefulness . 
Nevertheless, since there*ivere considerable variations in the quantity 
and quality of the data available to it on the degree of risk- to public 
health, owing to variations in the extent of work done on a particular 1: 21 
drug$ -the Committee experienced difficulties in performing, this wrh. 
-4 488 .Ii 
- 31olfevert being airare of thIdifficult-yq it compilod tcclmical data 
very extensively in order that a conclusion. might be arrived at by 
335 
conducting experiments on various variables* It should be men- t3 
tioned In this connection that owing in to considerable variations 
the quantity and quality of data available on the drugs under consi. - ep 
deration, the Comittee found it necessary to m,, Oce a distinction 
between 11 drugs reconuncnded for control" and " analogous drugs". It 
, was also for the saxne reason that the drugs originally categorised 
under group (b) had been sub-divided into two parts: (i) 11 
! those drugs 
about which -the evidence supporting a recormaendation for control was 
judged to be clear and -unequivocal; and (ii) drugs for which there uas 
insufficient evidence to penait a f-Im rocomendation to be made but 
336 
,,, hose inclusion in the group unp believed to be justified a nnnloc-. r. 11 
Ilie expression "by analoVllgaccordincr to the Cormittee, implies that 42 
It vdth respect to chemical structureq pharmacodynamic properties, 
therapeutic indicationst or routes of administration, these drugs 
showed such close similarities to the " drugs reco=ended for controll, 
that they vere believed to be likely to present a comparable combina- 
tion of rink to public health and therapeutic usefulness.,, 
337 
On further examination, it appears that this classification of 
drugs bad been designed to cover all possible classes of drugs, not 
only on the basis of their liabilities 'to abuse ( i. e., low riskq or 
inordinate risk or substantial risk), but. also on the basis of their 
jilerapeutic usefulness. IThat isp however, noticeable is that this 
classification included even preparations of drags 11 compounded with 
non-dependence-producing ingredients in such low concentrations or 
, IW 
>F 
in such other ma- mier at to render their abuse unlikely to maie 
recovery of the ... 
(controlled) ingredient very difficult.,, 
338 
Up It 
ims on the basis of these classifications that the Expert Co=ittee 
prescribed a chart*su, -, gesting types of control for drugs by groups. 
339 
The last groupq i. e. I preparations of drugs compounded with non-* 0 
dependence producing ingredients in concentrations etc. does not 
appear on this chartj as in the opinion of the Committee, 11 control 
340 
of such preparations uould be less strict than for those in rroup W*11 
In regard to preparationsv the Committee, also suggested that if 
a preparation was found to contain one or more controlled drugs, it 
should be subject to the same control as applicable to the "most 
controlled" drug in that preparation. 
341 Shotadp hovovcr, the controlled 
I 
drugs involved bear similarities with the drugs classified under 
group (d)v then the resulting preparations would be included in that 
groupt and be subject to controlý suZgested for it. Controls suggested 0 LS 
for drugs categorised under'group (a) should be extended to all propa- 
rations'of tL1Cse drugs. The preparations of a drug cate. "orised under 
groups (b)p (c) or (d) should also be subject to a greater degree of 
control than the basic dru,, r, itself, if the preparation was liable to 
more abuse amounting, to a substantial risk to public health. All new 
preparations alletted, to have contained non-dependence-producing ingre- .7 43 
clients i.., ould presumably come under group 
(6)'unless otherwise proved. 
31'2 
The Co. -=ittee's recommendations also extended to dependence- 
producin, f,., psychoactive druggs not previously under control. In respect 
of these dnigs, ýt suggested that they should, be put under a period of 
(, race for 3 or 4 years during i,, hich time preparations containino" U CJ 
I-q AS 
(b) or (c) drugs would be subSect to a lower level of controlt or 
no control. Should it be intended however to continue such a prepa- 
ration beyond the period of gracop. an application supported by 
73alanced and objective evidence would be required to be made. If the 
application were grantedp the preparation would be included in group 
(d). 343 In 1973 the Ex-pert Cww-iittee on Drug Dependence confirmed 
that the Convention on Psychotropic Substances wasp in large measurop 
in conformity with the suggestions previously advanced by this Cý 
ConuAttee in this regard. 
31,111: It may also be observed in this connection 0 
that the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugst 19619 had received consi4eraule support from the Expert 
Cor, wlittees on Drugr Dependence in. t-le natter of intornational control 
of narcotic drugsl vizz. (a) to limit the cultivationj production, 
manufacture and use. of drugs to the amount required for medical and 
scientific purposes" ( e. g. Arti. cles 2,9 'and 11); (b) 11 the increased 
responsibilities and authority given to -the International Narcotics 
Control Board to help achieve these cnd: 311 ( eog. Articles 6,7 and 11); 
(c) the provisions requiring parties to 11 take all practicable 
measures for the prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early 
identification, treatmenty educationg. after-caret rehabilitation and 
social re-integration of the persons involved" ( Article 15); and 
(d) Of the authorization in. lieu of, or in addition to, conviction and 
punisliment ol'drutr; -using offenders" (, Alrticle 11., ). 
315 
k: ) 
The classification of drugs by lewl of control required, 
as sugrgested by 
6 
the 11-11-0. Expert Committee on Drug Dependenceg appears 
to be quite comprehensive. The CoL-nitteet; recommendations offer a 
491 
constructive guide to the U. N. 'authoritios in their efforts to control 
illicit traffic in drugs. How far the U. N. authorities accept t1jo 
reconimendations of the Expert Co=ittees,, which are foruarded by the 
11,1[, 0,, has been examined in a subsequent Section of this thesis. 
3116 
(c) Td Sufv,, f,,, (-st Remedies -to -the Problemn of Dependence 
on Driif! s 
This aspect of the Expert 
6 
Committee Is f tuiction is varied 
and vast. There are as many suggestions for remedies as there are 
problems** In, its Fourteenth Reportt the IIJI. O. Expert Committee on 
y Dependence-Producing Drugsj endorsed the observation of the Advisor 
Panels that, in view of the ". continuous appearance of new agents 
with (lepondence-producing properties, the chan"ing pattern of drug 
use and abusep and the changing attitude toii-ards and procedures of 
handling drug-dependent patients, narcotics control nut-horities should 
rccogni'ze the need for continuous technical advice, particularly as to 
medical aspects. In a few instances, control authorities arc seeking 
such advice by the setting up of panels of independent and unbiased 
specialists. silch panels should also perfom usefful service in 
fact-finding with respect to the occurrence of drug-dependcnce, 
adequacy Of treatment prograrnes and serveillance of abuse liabili- 
ties of new agents. it 
347 The Comittee also recomended the wider 
utilisation of technical advice -. herev-, r feasible. 
As a part of its wide-ran-ing functions concerning dru, -, - 0. = 
dependence* -Che Cowaittee advocated an international drug-monitoring U, 
c 
4ý 
*1 -0 
.. 92 
343 
progra=ej in the expectation that early indication of dru., r abusog 
especially of new agents, would help identify the characteristics of 
such abuze. It. also hoped that valuable information on the epidemio- 
logy and regional occurrence of drug abuse and drug, dependence of 
3119 different types should also result., This pro-ra; =c was not only U 
occepted by t3he II. TI. O., but also in recognition of its merits, a 
meetin on international drug monitoring was convened by t in Genova 9 f. 12 
in No--; -emberp 1968. The objectives of drug monitoring, as suggested Lý 1-7 
. 2, 
should have txvý major aspacts: It firstly, to estab- by this meetin, - 
I 
lish the frequency and incidence of adverse reactions, both well- 
recognisedt or newly discoveredt in relation to the use of a drug, 
and secondly, to detect serious and unexpected adverse reactions as 
early as pos-sible Ot, 
350 Instead. of going into the details of thi3 
progrwriacp it may be mentioned that this mecting apparently discussed 
most of the major problems that would be confronted in inplementing L2 
the programme; und the hoy to the success of this progranna, as was 
pointed out at t. -Ae inecting, i. -rould be the co-operation of the various 
national authorities throu,,.. rh national centres in their territories . 
351 
Partherp a meeting on the role of national centres in international 
drum monitoring was convened by. the World Health Organization in 
Geneva in Sep-teraberp 1971. This mectintr pr6vided guidelines for 0 
countries wishing to establish national centres for drug monitoring 
to improve the position of the existing national centres caid also to 
identify the contributions that such national centres should make to 
VI 7110 
th-c intemational system. As guidelines, the Committee suggested, 
inter alia., the need for improved methods of collection of health 
statistics and drug utilisation data and for moro offectivo analysis 
of input datat by raising the standard of reports and collaboration 
,h the international system. 
352 between national centres throug 
The World Health Organization also enjoys tho benefit of the 
recommendations of the Expert Committee on the prevention and treat- 
ment of dependence on drugs. A W. H. O. Expert Committee on Mental 
Health met in Geneva in October, 1966 to consider this problem. 
353, 
The international importance of this problem had been pointed out by 
a previous 11.11-0. Expert Committtoe on Mental Health. 
3511 The CoMMA- 
too which in 1966 re-emphasised that it ims essential to make 
attempts to induce authorities to consider the problems of alcohol and 
alcoholism and the use and abuse of drugs togetherp primarily because 
of similarities in the "causation and treatment of the problem 
involved"t and also because alcohol and otl; erdrugs are ofton used in 
. 
355 
-mittee also emphasisedf inter alial (a) that it combination The CoL 
was imperative to. adopt a multi--disciplinary approach to the solution 
of this problem; (b) that wherever possible, services for addictsp, 
alcoholic or otherwise, should be a part of the existing health 
services; (c) that vhere legal prescriptions of drugs find their way 
into illicit traffict perhaps because ol the establiskaent of a 
pattern of prescriptionsp it i, *ould be advisable to correct the situ- 
ation by recourse to a special body, e. g. a modical society or a 
non-medical councill instead of to court procedure; (d) that close 
co-operation between treatment and rehabilitation services on the 
one one hand and'police and courts on the other, is imperative; 
A 
.4 19 
that I'medico-legal measures are essential in the prevention and 
control of dependence on alcohol and other drugsq but it should'be t3l 
kept in mind that reasonably successful control of one agent ofteng 
in fact usually, leads to the emergence of another agent as a 
substitute"; and (f) that not only- training progra=nos nnd f tirthor 
research and educative progranrxes should be adopted by nationsp but 
also that an inter-organizational approach would be necessary in 
dealing iAth problems concerning dependence on drugs. 
356 
k> 
The "combined approach" and monitoring of adverse drugs 
reactions in dealing with problems. concerning dependence on drugs 
received particular confirmation by the W. H. O. Expert Connittee on 
Drug Dependdnce uhich met in Geneva in 1968.357 In fact, the majority 
of the recowmcndations made by the earlier W. H. O. Expert Coccunitteas 
concemed with drug. dependence had been aqccpted by the Commission on 
353 
Narcotic Drugs. In appreciation of the nature of the problem of 
drag dependencel. the World Health Organization rovicus the situation 
from time to time through the Expert Comittees. In 19701 anAber 
Expert Co, -miittee on brug Dopendence met in Goneva ( August 25th to 31 St 
In considering the principles of management of drug- dependence LA 
problemsq it not only confirmed the utility of tho reco=cndations 
in this mattert of which the'principal ones related to the determi- 
C3 0 
thaa adoption nation of the etiological factors in drug deperidencet359 
by the national authorities of therapeutic and preventive programmes in tj 
accordance with their technical and'econouic capabilities, and 
the 
prohibition of iftaintenance progranune . 
36o 
for patients depending upon 
(Irugs of various icindsp without. strict controls and strict sn. pei-vision 
c 1ý 
'In 495 
I by trained medical personnel, &ýt also pointed out the following: 
that absolute legal control prohibiting the use of specific drugs 
may not-necessarily produce the desired effect, since it may lead to 
the introduction of other drugss that it is important to utiliso 
opportunities for scientific observation and (lata collection, and 
lastlyg that a cowilunity approach to the problem would be more 
fraitful. 361 As has been stated beforey almost all the 
I 'oeormawidations 
of the 11.11.0. E. vort Committee on Dru, #, T, Dependence haveg in prnclice, 
been accepted by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs in their efforts to 
abolish traffic in narcotic drugs and to rehabilitate drug addicts. 
362 
(d) Miscellaneous Functions 
Expert Committees are appointed to examine and iýýc recomm-en- 
dations upon various matters concerning international health. A 
consideration of some of these matters necessarily gives rise to 
further probiems, and therefore, Expert Co=aittees also are requeste(i 
to give their recommendations on matters relevant to the main topic 
for which they have been appointed. In so far as tie W. H. O. Expert 
Coimitteeson Drug Dependence are concerned, of the matters so far 
considered by them, mention should be made of the following: 
Coded Tnfomation on, hlarcoties 
The basic idea behind this programme is to establish a central 0 
source of information on all possible aapects of drug dependence. 
This was originally advocated by the 17-11.0o Expert Comittee on 
36)3 Addiction Producing Drugs in 1957, and supported by subsequent 
, -i. " A 
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Expert Committees. In 19731 the 1-1.11.0. Expert Committee on 
Drug Dependence re-emphasised'the importance of this matterl and.. 
opined that to ensure an offective, coverage of information sources 
and to avoid duplication ofýuork an improved method of co-ordination 
of various efforts made in this regard would be necessary-. The 
Committee considered that the "conveninr: y,, of meetings of persons 
actively interested in systems for the storage and retrieval of data- 
in the field mi,,,,, ht be an important means of stimulating co-ordination 
and co-operation. it 
365 
(ii) Treatment of Drug_Acldicts and their Rehabilitation 
Certain general princi]ýIes. of treatment for narcotic addicts 
3 C- 6 
had been reconvaended in 1957 by a W. 11.0. Study Group. The W. U. 0. 
Dependence gave its full suo or Export Cor=ittee on Drug -p 
t to these 
reco"-nondations except that complete abstinence Lrom the use of 
dependdyice-producing drugs was not found by it to be the only C$ 
criterion by which the effectiveness of therapy should be evaluated. 
According. to this Coimuittee, it must be assessed also in terms of the 
patient's mental state and his social and economic adjustment. -'W It 
also emphasised the need for individual care and attention in accordance 
ýjjith the characteristics of, the patient, which are detenained by his 
environmentf socio-cultural setting-, and the phannacodyiiamics of the 
363 As a means of attaining a comprehensive drug or drugs involved. u 
method of treatmq. nt ahd rehabilitation with effective long-term 
6 
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: follow-up and supportive services, the C6mnitteep in addition to 
its support for a multi-approach toirards treatmontp recormendedg 
inter aliap the following: 
(a) utilisation of resources and skills from the fields 
of medicinep PsYchologyj sociology alid even lal;; 
(b) the seeking of full collaboration from each patient's 
family and recotr: rpnition of the factors that i luence 
various persons and groups with respect to their drur, t7 
taking behaviour before and after some experience with 
dependence-producing drugs; and 
(c) attention to the natural history of various . typos of 
369 drug dependence 0 
These recoimmendations were again confirmed subsequently by the 
Committe, 370 Iiixpert and indeedv the- Single Convention in Article 33 
made provisions for the treatment of drug addictsp including their 
rehabilitation. Incidentallyl the U. N. 
/Thailand Prolgramme for Drug 
Abuse Control in Thailandt vhich had been financed by the ITAited 
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, also contained provisions for 
the treatment of addicts and for their rehabilitation similar to those 
previously recommended by the W. H. O. Expert Committee. The work plan 
for this projectg for which 11*H*O* and the International Labour 
Organization were primarily responsiblep sought to improve available 
treatinent facilities by providing material, research and training C3. 
371 n assistance. In its Twentieth Reportp the W. H. O. Expert Committee 
on Drug Dependence once again emphasised that the It aid of traditional 
educationall health and social welfare institutions and also less 
/ 
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traditional contact, consulting, crisis and emorgency services 
should be especially cAlisted ih helping persons involved in problems t3 372 
related to drug taking., to find assistance appropriate to their liceds. 11 
Education and Trnining, Pror, - rprimes 
The necessity of a comprehensive education and traininr, UV 
programmeq as complementary to the total programme of abilition of 
the drur; problem was very strongly emphasised by the 11.11.0. Expert 
Committee on Mental Health. 
373 Thin Committee stressedp inter aliat 
that it is evident that " any educational progranno must give 
primary attention to local circumstances, with particular reference 
to the drugs ... used predominantly in the country and tho dogree - 
U to which such drug-usage creates- a problemy 
together with a consi- 
deration of the locul customst attitudesp. predomirant mores and 
institutional patterns*" 
371' In order to fulfil these ends, the 
Com. ittee advocated professional training courses with a multi- 
di: -, -ciplinary Ptpproachj 
health education and a pramnatic and inter- 
disciplinary research progra=e. 
375 In order to lay the foundation 
for successful research, if, stated the necessi-ty of well-qualified 
personnelp 'and tools, i. e. r improved methods for prompt publication, 
data storage and retrievalv evaluation of significant findings and 
376. 
dissemination of information, and a central international body, 
possibly under the auspices of the 11.11.0.377 The inpartance of such 
programmes vas also reconfirmed by the 11.11.0. Expert Committee on 
378 
Drug Dependence. Hovever, -a subsequent IT. H. O. Expert Committee 
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. pointed out that information-giving, educational programmes aloilo 
woula not be sufficient for the purpose of curing drug-dependonce. 
11 The general public", this Committee observed, 11 should be Imll- 
informed so as to allow the promotion of the necessary legislative, 
preventive and management programmes... Educationnl measures may be 
directed towards changing the attitudes of the co=unity nob only C, 
towards the use of depenaence-producing drugs in particular# but also 
Ug Ste 
379 It also s towards the use of drugs in general. ,, t1lat 
advunced techniques vould be needed for the population "at risk" 
of becoming drug--dependentg and that tho school class may be developed 
as a special form of the "therapeutic communitylt. In addition to 
theset a community approach would beg in the opinion of this Committeep 
very effective. 
330 The U. N. / Thai Progrranwqe for Drug Abuse Control 
in Thailand also contained provi6ions for a narcotics information and 
education sector, with a view to launching programmes of public 
infor- 
"s and psychotropic mation and preventive education on narcotic drucz 
substances and the consequenceir of their abuse. In the implementation 
, raillinep 
the assistance of the 11.11.0,, and -the U. %j. E. S. C. 0,, of this prog 
I, ras found to be essential. 
331 
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In its Twentieth Reportt the W. H. O. I-L-. l)ert Co=uttee on Drug 
Dependence made off orts to ascertain the Imoin and unlmoim areas 
concerning probleras of prevention associated with the liso of PSYCIIO- 
active dependence-producing drugs, when taken in a manner unrelated 
383 
.o to acceptable medical practice. 
In formulatinta- its reports this 
Comdttee emphasised tile urg ency of taking Preventive action, not only 
regard to the above one d kinds of di-u,,, -g but also uith 
regard to the problem of the non-medical use of drugs. In sik-, -esting U 
334 
measures for the prevention of drug abusep the CoL=ittoo urged 
that it would be necessary to 11 eliminate ignorance and. misconccp- 
tions about drug off ects"p to It modify broad and imnediate socio- 
., e actively 
the inappro- cultural mores in such a way as-to discourag 
priate use of drugrs ... 11 and to 11 improve undo rstanding, of the causes 
of problems associated with the. non-medical use of depeýdencc-produ- 
cing- drugsp and of the effectiveness of various approaches nnd 
335 
techniques in preventing those7 problems. " This Committoo, in 
suggesting its plansp found the necessity of maintaining a distinction. t; A Ca 
between 11 information" and Ileducation't on drugs, and in doinrr sop it 43 
referred to the definitions of these terms as augrgested by the Meeting, 
on Education in Ifore-Developed -Countrics to Prevent Drug Abuse, which 
had beun convened in 1972 under the auspices of the U. N. E. S. C. O. 
"Drug information is a form of communication which simply imparts 
factual Imowledge -Or 
transmits 00,11nitive learning. It is a fairly 0 
limited process in which the main elements are usually information 
concerning drugs themeselves and their 
(harmful) effects upon peoplest 
alonm with instruction regarding specific drug-control legislation C> U 
and other ýorms of social control. Drug educationt on the other hnnd, 
is a broad range of'concerted activities relating to teachin,, r, / learning. 
situations and experience which. attempts to maximize opportunities for 
the intellectualp emotionalp p9ychological and physiological develop- 
ment of young people. '' 
386 While iniormation is a one-uay activity, 
education involves a two-way communication, i. e. j expressions of 
.' 
. o1 
foelingsp group discusýions and conferencos or psychotherapy, Sucil 
education should aim at the decision-makinm skills, the classification Cp 
of values and their transformation into action, and the development 
of coping skills, 
387 Monitoring the environment and social contro, 
388 
should also be a part of such a progra=e*389 However, the Co=iii'too 
itself pointed out that the effectiveness of drug education programnon 
390 has not yet been adequately evaluated. Moreover, a series of 
successful experiments vill be necessary to confirm t1le vulitlijy of 
such programmes. Yet, like any. other prograx=es of this naturev their t2 
success dependd upon the co-operation of national Governments. 
Relationship between the World Health Orp,, iniznfion nzid 
the Cornission on Narcotic Drugs in f. he Tnte-mational 
Control of 'Mircotic Driiqs within the Framework of tbu- 
United Nritions 
The views of the IT. H. O. as to iflacther or not a substance 
-warrants control oving to. its habit-forming or addiction-producing C3ý UP 
contenty are primarily based upon the opinion of the a-pert Convaittoo 
on Drug, Dependence. The opinions of ihe W. H. O. on a substance are 
fomarded to tile Secretary-General of the United Nationst and are 
primarily considered by the Co,, mission on Narcotic Drugs. The L"orld 
Health Organization in giving its views on the question of do-control 
of a substance follows the same procedureq but the decisions, whetbor 
provir, ional or finalp concerning application of the control regimal k2 1 
502 
or withdrawal of the control regiiue in respect of a substance, 
emerge t1irough different systems. 
Article 3t paragraph 4 of the Sint-: 21o 
Convention permits the 
Commission to exempt a preparation from certain measures of contro, 
391 
(i. e. v add this preparation to Schedule III) if: 
(a) that 11 preparation because of the substances uhich 
it contains is not liable to abuse and cannot 
produce ill effects"; arid 
(b) that 11 the' druleyx therein is not readily recoverableell 
I 
13ut according to paragraph 4, such findings will havc to be L, r> 
submitted by the W. 11.0. for consideration by the Co=nission on 
Narcotic Drugs. Amy such f inding, of Cac W. -T. O. has the suprort of 
an Expert Co-=Attce. Although Vie Coimission mcay refuse to act in 
accor(lance with the recommendation of -the 11.11.0. p in the event of 
its co: dorming to the recolmendation of the 11.11.0.9 it must do so 
without any reservation. 
In so far as decisionst whether provisional or final, 
concerning the inclusion of a substance in tile control reGime are 
concernedt the Single Convention has brouý; ht in certain now features. 
Article 3 of this Convention hap given the Cormission authority to 
tahe both provisional and final decisions as to the addition of a 
new substance to the relevant Schedule whereas under the Interna- 
tional opium Convention of 1925 
392 
and the Limitation Convention of 
19311 593 jecision. on such matters were taken only by the World 'Health 
Organization- The 1948 Protocol gave the CoLmission authority for 
provis. ional control only# and the authority for final decisions lay 
. 14 U03 
with the loorld Health Organization. 
Even tilough under the Sin-le Convention, chmigas in its U 
Schedulesp whore necessaryp are in the exclusive compotenco of tho 
Co=ission on Narcotic Drugsq such changes can be made by the L, 
Comission only in accordance with the recomendations of the 11911*0*t 
and provided also that such changes have first been reconuende(i by U 
the latter organisation. The Co=ission canp howevcrt refuse to 
comply with such recomnendations of the 11orld Health Or-anizatione 
39? 1 
ka 
The Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, IlAs endowed 
tlac Commission Ilith greater powers than those enjoyed by it wider 
the Single Convention. In so far as the deletion of a substance from 
-a Schedule or its transfer from one Schedule to another or its addi- 
tion to a Schedule is concernedg the Comission, under this Conven- 
tiong can accept or reject the recomendations of the W&IT 
395 
In other wordso the CoTm-aission's decision in this matter, which is 
presumably based on "econoinic, sociall legalp alministrative and other 
factors"y that it may consider relevant, shall override the medical 
and scientific opinion rendered by an Expert Committee. 
396 
Yet the Commissiong which is a political bodyt may also be 
taken as an expert body. The question of control of a narcotic 
substance deserves considered treatment not only from the medical and 
scientific standpoints, but also 
from others, such as, socialt economic, 
legal and administrative etc. It is immaterial to dwell upon -who 
dominates whom; the nodus operendi, in this context, is best explained 
by resort to the maxim lox D3.118 laudatur quanao ratione probabir. 
IIIL-aso . n" iv-arranta a consideration of t.,. o surrounding relevant factors 
45 0A 
alsot and-such relov, -mt factoýs cam beat be considered by a joint 
effort between the institutions concernod, It is believed that 
1. 
the Commissiony in coming, -to itd decision in this matter, does not 
wish to disregard the opinions of Vie IIJI*Oý 9 uhich are based on the 
obsorvations of an Expert Cormittee, 
, 
Comments 
An expert I committee, such as the 11,11.0. Export Committee on 
Drug Dependence p is a specialised c,, umitteo within another specialised 
body. 397 The'marits of obtaining the servide of individual experts 
who constitute such a boiyt hoilever temporary it might beg are 
398 The use of e4crts, whother in their individual controversial. 
399 
capacitids, or as government ropresentativesi ' uras found to bo a 
preferred method of considering any matter of a teelmical nature during 
tile U. N. period. In rainy cases experts are government servants or 
goverument representatives ( e. g. the Food and Agriculture Organization 
and the U. N. E. S. C. O. decided in 1947 and 1934 respectively to transfom 
their executive boards into organs of government ropresentatives). 
11hile government -servants and/or repro solitatives are vory likely to 
be bound by the general policies of their respective govemaentsq 
independent experts are very much less likely to be so. However, the 
value of the ar;, =ent in favour of independent experts depends 11 on 
the task of the organ concerned. It is considerable if the organ 
,s in opposiýion, jo the lllcmbeýr State'st if it has to supervise 0 ex 
t05 
them or it it prepares decisions which will bind them. But the 
argument is veaker if the organ is charged with a co-ordinating 
function, if it has to' try to bring the States together in a tm 1-2 
comon line of policy. " 
1100 On the other hand, it is thought that the 
impartiality of experts may be maintained to a greater extent if, they 
are appointed by an organ itself instead of by a member of the organ, 
because in the latter case democratic principles may not . be observed 
in the choice of experts. 
401 However, experts selected cIn thoir oim I. . 
merits, may individually make attempts to exert some influence or 
eveng as an expression of partriotismt uphold the attitude of their 
respective goveriments. 'fliereforet although government reprosenta- 
tAves arc expneted to naintain a consistent jolicy, tiley nro 
government agents; indeed inaependent expertag as Sellwarzonberger 
at one time observed are morý often than not 11 either only govdrnment 
kor, 
agents in di'sguise or tend to b6 more Popish than the Pope. It Olfin- LA 
to this controversyt a third proposal which has been suggested i)y 
some authorities is that exTert committees should be constituted of 
cenzi-independent persons because those -Wio are 11 partially itidepentlent 
call probably co-operate better and will succeed more easily in achieving, 
compromises than government representatives j; ho are wider instruction 
to suppo . rt 
. one of the two parties. " 
1103 
Any attempt to devise a com- 
pletely satisfactory method of constituting an expert co-,, nittec seems 
bound to racet with disappointment. Illiato howevert appears to be 
reasonable to expect of Cte exports, is that they maintain their 
0.1104 integrity ana impartiality above their chauvinism, as befitting 
their sense of responsibility; 
11 r .50 
The W. H. O. Export Committee gn Drug Dc'pendenco basically T 
conforms to the pattern of a normal Expert Co=aittoo. ]3ut tbi, 3 
Committee is free from the problem of representation of interesi 
groupst and consequently, the inevitable vices of 11 interest groups" 
do not cripple it in its proper functioning. Cýiinm to the nature of 
tile ljork it performs, politics should not be its working, gulde; 
adequate geographical representation iss howevorg worthy of support, 
or-iecially in view of the nature of the commodities it deals with, 
and the related consequences thereof. Equal representation of the 
producer and consumer countries on such a committee is found to 
be necessary in an effort to maintain the democratic principle, The 
political considerations should not have an overriding influence over 
the work for which the members are oppointed, As Loveday very 
appropriately observeds the 11 loyalty 
( of'such personnel) It must 
spring from an understanding of and a belief in the ultimate value of Vj 0 
the Ivork and purposes of the institution. " 
405 
It is a sharp-shock 
universalism and impartiality they have to maintain; a real qs]2rit, de 
col, ps should prevail in a multi-national teamp the uniting factors 
being their impartiality and a common purpose. It is also the 
responsibility of the appointing authority to help create a real 
06 
(, sprit de coD2 by electing the right kind of experts. . The u'. 7-1.0. 
1:, IT. ert Comaittee on Drug Dependence could bacome a typical expert 
co, -mit-teep with considerable c. -, I! rit fle corps, however short its span 
of life my bet if appropriate alterations were to be made in its 
structure. The risk of morale being affected by scepticism arising 
v 
41, 
.. 
lot ro 0 
,I from lack of understanding 
in respect of such a co=i-tteo should be 
slightp because there should be no fear of competition amongst 
e. -zports. There is nd primus intf, -r pires in such a committoop and 
nationality does not determine the status of any expert. Their 
purpose is to advise collectivelyl and not to docidep although 
advicep at timesp may take the form of a recomandation. Lilco many 
other expert, con=itteesp the W. H. O. Expert CormLittee on Drug Dependence 
is not a staýding advisory comr 
407 
jittoo; it is noro like an ad hoc 
IL03 
coanittee. Its functions are not of an academic nature; they are 
truly practical. Its 
ierms 
of reference also, for obvious rea3onsp 
are not very extensive. Since it is not a policy-inaking committoog 
it should ho+, be polluted with politics, and h1ence should be treated 
Ijith respect* 
0.. 
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ibid. 
See U. N. Doc. A/Conf-34/24- 
Res* 288(X) of 27 Februaryt 1950, Part VIIIp Article 35(b). 
infra. 9 
- X, 
75 12' 
47. B/CN-7/471t P. 3. 
48. ibid. t 
49. Some of the original members of the Commission had'aloo worked 
in this field'during the period of the League of Nationst e. g. 
M. G. Bourgois, who was-the rapporteur of the last session of 
the Advisory Committeev was appointed representative of France 
in the Commission, , and the representative of the United States 
in the Commissiont 1.1r. H. J. AnslinCer, had been working in this 
field since he represented his country at the Limitation 
Conference in 1931- See U. N. Doe- E/CN-7/471P pp. 1-2* 
50. U-11. Doe, E/CN. 7/4719 p. 2. ' 
51. U. 11. Doe. E/CN-7/4719 P. G. 
52. ibid. 
53. ibid, 
54. U. N. Doe, E/CN-7/471t P. 10. 
55. Under the second category. came Switzerland. 
56. In this connection the conditions of membership of the 331F, 
IBRD and other such specialized agencies are instructive. 
57. The earlier resolution, i. e. 9 the resolution of the ECOSOC 
adopted at its first session providedl inter alia, 11 or 
countries in which illicit traffic in narcotic drugs consti- 
tutes a serious social problem. " 
. -, 
ECOSOC9 Official Records, First Years First sessions vol. 1. 
p. 169. 
58- E/CN. 7/471t' P. 10-' 
59- See-Rule 12 of the Rules of Procedure of -the Functional 
Commissions of the Economic and Social Council, U. N. Doe, 
B/4767- As examples of such coTnissions of the ECOSOC, mention 
should be made of the Population Commission, the Commission for 
Social Development and. the Commission on Miman Rights. 
60. U. N. Doe- E/57150 
61. The resolution of the first session of the Economic and 
Social Council constituted the terms of reference of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs. 
62. -The Rules of Procedure which had been adopted by resolution 
289/X of-64M-rchg 1950 of-the Economic and Social Council, were 
subsequently amended by the Council resolution 481(xv) Of 
April 1,1953. 
6 
t13 
63. The full title of this Protocol was the Protocol Bringing under 
International Control Drugs Outside the scope of the Convention 
of 13 JulYt 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and llegulbýting the 
Distribution of'Narcotic Drugs, as Amended by the Protocol 3igned 
at Lake Successt New-Yorkq on 11 December, 1946, signed at Paris 
on 19 November, 1948,, see U. N. Treaty Series,, vol. 44Y p, 277. 
64. The full title of this Protocol was the Protocol for Limiting 
and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production 
of, International and Wholesale Trade inj. and Use of Opium, signed 
at New York on 23 June, 1953t see U. N. Treaty-Serieg, Vol. 456t P. 3- 
65- -The "others concerned" in this matter were the other states 
Parties to this Protocol and to the World Health OrLmnization. 
66. Resolution No. 730 (XUIII)D- E/3290. 
67- infra. 42-L -4 1) 
68. The Commissiont however, still performs this function under the 
Single Conventiong infra. 9 
69*, 
'Such 
questionnaries had been sent to various governments in 
1947 to -provide information on drug-addiction. - 
70- Such corrments had been invited on the draft Sinr-le Convention and 
.. __Alpo-on 
the draft of the Administrative Guide to the Single 
-Conv(; ýtion. -(E/0-7/471, P-- We 
71. infra. p- -4: m 
72* -See-. pages 4&6j, 4-12.432. 
73 pie Sinele-Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 owes -the Commission 
much for its contribution to its preparation. 
74- --Germany-and Japan. 
75-, ' In certain cases arrangements for technical assistance to various 
national governments had ýto be made as a part of the re-establish- 
ment work. See further H. L. Hayq "Twenty Years of Narcotics 
Control under the U. N. "t Bulletin on Narcotics, vol, XVIII, No, 1, 
1966, P- 48 et, seqop 
76.. In 19469 a Narcotics Control Working Party had been established 
in Germany to study the question of narcotic drugs, This Working, 
Party was constituted of representatives from each of the four 
zones of Germany, ( E/CN*7/471t po 24)- 
77o Resolution No. 49(IV)* CR/399); see also E/CN,, 7/471, p. 24o 
Q 
C, 
*q Z z14 
78. supra. t ff -2X- 2- 3) 
79- See Resolutions 15911 B(E/1065) and 505 (XVI)B(E/2508) . In 
factt it was thb Commission's indomitable efforts that helped 
keep this matter under constant reviewt although public opinion 
played a great role in this matter. It should also be mentioned 
that it was due to the joint efforts of the. Commission and some 
humanitarian organisations that this evil was brought under 
considerable control in the Far East, by the enactment of prohi- 
bitive laws in this regard. It was not until 1959 that 
Thailand enacted laws prohibiting opium-smoking, 
80. supra. 
81. At present such reports are received by the Division of Narcotic 
Drugs first. 
82. Article 21 of the Limitation Convention, 1931- 
83- This Committee has' been ýmown as the Ibcpert Committeeýon 
Dependence-Producing Drugs since 1965- 
84. The Commission'prepared annually a summary of the laws and , -6-ý 
regulations of various countries related to the drug-problem, 
but at its eleventh session decided to discontinue such Annual 
summaries and advised the Secretary-General to prepare a 
-zumulative index of Iaws annuahy--and-a document -recording 
the changes in the national laws and thereby changes in the scope 
of control. See also Official Records of the FCOSOC, 22nd session. 
85. II. L. Mayq " Twenty Years of Narcotics Control under the U. N. ", 
'Bullatin on Narcotic Drugs, q vol. XVIII, 19669 p. 21 
86. ** See also Council's Resolution No. 770(XXX)E. (E/3422)o 
87.11. Wlayp op. cit-t P. 15. 
Council's Resolution 49(IV) (E/437)t P- 38- 
The Economic and Social Councilq 
Having noted the importance of bringing a speedy solution to 
the urgent problem of the limitation of production of raw 
materials from which narcotic drugs'are manufactured, and 
Having noted the'preparatory work initiated by the Commission 
with a view to holding an international conference to deal with 
this problemt 
1. ApMroves the issue of the estionnaire on raw opium by the 
Commission on Narcotic Drug's 
rDoc. 
E/251/Add. 2)9 and requests 
. _the Secretary- General 
to transmit-this questionnaire, to the 
Governments concerned , 
asking them to communicate, on or before 
15 August 19479 the information called for therein and any 
observations bearing on the subject which they may wish to 
submitt and 
2. Approves tile decision 
* 
of the Commission to draw up a question- 
naire on the coca leafto be considered by the Commission at its 
next session and subsequently to be transmitted to Gove rnm ents, " 
r 
"1 
sq. Such a proposal was originally made by the French Government. 
go. Resolution No- 395 (XIII) (E/2152)e 
91. infra. S-G) 
92. Such an effort was made by the Commission in. respect of the 
1953 Protocol- 
93- The first list was prepared by a sub-committee of experts of 
the Opium Advisory Committee of the League. (E/CN-7/4719 P- 38)- 
94* Such lists are now prepared by the Commission itse f, 
See also, Resolution of the Council No- 505(XVI) ( 
ý/2508) 
95- See'WHO/HFD/9 and Corr, ý. It, was however realised -that noither 
a trade'nor a proprietary name would be appropriate for this 
pUrPOSOe 
96. See the Commission's recommendations at its seventh session; 
see also the Council's Resolution No. 436(XIV)G ( E/2332). 
97. Opiumv for example, because of its smellp weight etc. -is not 
easy to transport. In order to avert this difficulty, the 
traffickers usually extract the morphine near the source of 
production. This may be done in -Wo waysq either by diverting 
-the-product. -from 
licit cultivaiion or by-p=du-ing it illicitly. 
In some casest howeverp owing to difficulties in the procedure of 
enforcement of law, or perhaps due to lack of consciousness of the 
intensity of the problemt such illicit production is allowod. On 
the other handq it is easier to transport hashish, which is a 
-refined resin of cannabis* Although cannabis itself in difficult 
to transportr if it is transported, difficulties are encountered 
d in determining the amount of cannabis seized because of the 
various methods of assessment used in different countries. Some 
countries determine the amount by the weight of the whole plant 
-while some others by the number of plants destroyed. 
Synthetic drugs are difficult to manufacture and, therefore, 
the traffickers attempt tp divert the licit supply into illicit 
traffic, 
98. The particulars of each case of illicit traffic were to include 
as far as possible:. 
a The kind and quantity of drugs involved; 
b The origin of the drugsq their marks and labels; 
0 The points at whi6h the drugs were diverted into the illicit 
traffic; 
(d) The place from which the drugs were despatchedl and the names 
of shipping or forwarding agents or consignors; the methods 
ot consignment and-the name and address of consigneest if 
known; 
(0) The methods and routes used by smugglers and names of shipsl 
if anyt in which the drugs have been shipped; 
516 
r 
98. (f) The action 'taken by the 'Gove=uaent. in regard to the persons 
involvedq particularly those possessing authorication3 or 
licences and , 
the penalties imposed; 
(g) Any other information which would assist in the suppression 
of illicit traffic. " 
99. infra., ý. j: Fl 
100. For some time ( from the ninth to the eighteenth sessions) the 
Co=ission had a Special Committee on illicit traffic, 
101. Resolution 159 IIC(VII). 
102. Resolution 436F(XIV). 
103. General Assembly Resolution 834(Ix) (1954). 
3-04. The Commission persistently requested the governmen 
I 
ts concerned 
to supply more authenticated samples of opium for research; 
see the Commission's resolutions V(XIII) (1956), 6(XIV) (1959) 
and 3(xv-ii7Tl-9T2'T-. -7-- ,- 
105- Such a method had been experimented with not only at the 
- United 
Nations Laboratory b-at also at the Institute for the 
Control of Drugs at Zagreb in Yugoslavia. TI-lis method had the 
advantage of simplicity and unsophistication and was therefore 
very easily applicable in any reasonably equipped laboratory 
in the world, 
See further, U. N. Doe. E/CN-7/471P PP- 52-53* 
3.06. Its recommendation at the-nineteenth sessiong paragraph 165- 
3.07. infra. S-5c, ý s-9 
108, infra., t 12 - -tz 3 
log. Turkey was not a Party to the 1953 Protocol, yet, its Act 7368 of 
JulYt 1959 is based on the principles enunciated in that Protocol. 
See U. N. Doc. E/NL/1959/85- 
1100 In 19649 at the reco=endation of the Commission and the Council 
( see Resolution 962B II(XXXVI) a survery was carried out in 
Dnma with a view to ascertaining the economic and social aspects 
of opium production and consumption in some parts of that country. 
It was re-affirmed after that survey that education and effective 
demonstration as to the abuses of druCs would be essential to 
eradicate such a problem. 
See further Commission's Reportt nineteenth sessiong paragraph 169. 
111. Commission's Reportq eleventh sessiong paragraph 258- 
112, Fifth session. 
113, Twolfth sessiong paragTaph 104, 
1; 17 
114. . U-14. Doo. B/0-7/471, P. 3. 
115. H. L. May, op. cit., p. 28. 
116. 
_The case of 
Afghanistan deserved special attention. Afghani- 
stan did not participate in the 1953 Conference, and in factp 
production of opium in this country went unabated. If a 
country could produce opium in an unrestrictec wayt this would 
defeat the-basic policy of restricted supply and trade. On the 
other handý prohibition of export of opium would mean that the 
produced opium would cause illicit traffic to thrive. With 
this had to be taken into account the eaonomic dependence of 
Afghanistan on opium until a suitable substitute of earnin3s 
-for the country had been found. It was due to the persistent 
pressure which was exercised by the Commission on the government 
of Afghanistan that finallyp at the thirteen sesslon of the 
Commissiont the representative of the government of Afghanistan 
declared that his country would implement a policy of total 
prohibition of cultivation, importj export, purchase, sale and 
trade in opium. The Commission recommended to the Council a 
resolution for confirmation of this policyp and the Council 
adopted that resolution at its twenty-sixth session. 
See resolution No. 689(XXVI)H. 
117. Iran had a deep-rooted problem. At the root of the problem was 
the habit of opium-smoking by the Iranians. Opium was also one 
of the revenue-earning products of Iran. Smoking of opium was 
_--A part of 
Iraninan socio-oultural life. It was at the initia- 
tive of the Commission that the Coi; nc. il adopted a resolution to 
operate in Iran a technical assistance programme known as 
Special Advisory Aid to Iran ( See Resolution 626 E(XXII)). 
Although Iran for reasons stated above was crippled by this 
problemo it was through the constant co-operation and guidance 
. of 
the Commission that she finally passed a law in 1955 banninC 
the cultivation of the opium poppy and the use of opium also. 
Although in November 1947, the Commission requested the 
governments to complete the revised quentionnaire which had 
been sent to them with a view to assessing the existing situa- 
tion on coca leaf-and taking further necessary action for control (see U. N. Doe. E/CN. 7/73) the government of Peru in the same year 
requested that a Commigsion of Enquiry should be set up to study 
the "effects of the u! Ie of coca leaf on the population of certain 
regions in South America ( see U. N. Doc. EýN. ý196; see also 
Bulletin on*lTarcotiest L In Marcht 1948 Too 1#1 1949P P- 41 - the Council# at the surgestion of the Commission, passed a 
resolution approving the despatch of a Commission of Enquiry 
to Peru, The members of the medical team of this Commission of 
Enquiry were elected by the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. The - 
Commission also suggested to the Council that in addition to the 
41 
t18 
usual enquiryt it would be advisable to hold an enquiry on the 
spot to study the possibilities of limiting the production of 
coca leaves, and at its sixth session, the Coimail, in apprecia- 
tion of the Commission's recommendation adopted a resolution to 
this effect ( see resolution 123 C(VI))- 
In April 1949, the Government of Bolivia alao requested if the 
Commission of Enquiry could be extended to that country and the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs considered this request in June 1949- 
The Commission recommended that*in view of the intensity of the 
problem in Bolivia, and in order to enable the Commission to make 
a through study of the problem, a largcr fund than that granted 
by the General Assembly on this account would be ne6easary. The 
-Economic ahd Social Councilp in appreciation of thýs recommendation 
of the Commissiong adopted a resolution at its ninth session. 
The work of the Commission on Harcotic Drugs in respect of 
Peru and Bolivia may be exemplified as the type of work which it 
, did, and still does in evýry such case. It studied the report of 
the Commission of Enquiry and took further necessary action by 
recommending the Council to ask the governments of Peru and Bolivia 
to limit the production of coca leaves and to take all preventive 
measures for the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs. At its fourteenth session, the Council adopted a resolution 
to this effect (. Res- 436E(XIV), Although the Peruvian Government 
enacted laws to combat the illicit traffic in-narcotic drugs 
(see U. N. Doe. E/CN-7/170 dated 13 Nayp 1949), the Commission 
however gave its serious cohsideration to-the proposal made by the 
Commission of Enquiry tht the cliewinG of coca leaft which was 
prevalent in Peru and Boliviaq was a-dangerous habit with harmful 
effects on the individuals and the nations at large. But in view 
of the inherent difficulties in the abolition of chewing coca leaft 
which was a part of socio-cultural life in the areas concerned, the 
Commission recommended a gradual suppression of this habit and in 
order to achieve success by taking a multiple approach viz. by 
crop subptitution and education, it advocated the need for techni- 
cal assistance from the United Nations. Such a reco: mendation had 
not only been approved by the regional meetings sponsored by the 
'United Nations in Rio de Janeiro in 1961 and in Lima in 1962, but 
had also been adopted in the form of a resolution by the Council 
(see Res- 548E(XVIII)t and. necessary action in this regard had been 
taken in accordance with the resolutlon. (For Report of the 
Commission of Enquiry on the coca leaf: Comments of the members of 
the Commission on the statements made by the representatives of Peru- 
and Bolivia at the fifth session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
(see U. N. Doe. E/1666. /Add. 1. and E/1666/Add. l/Rev. 1). For Report 
of the Commission of Enquiry on the Coca Leaf: Statements circu- 
lated by the representatives of Peru, see U. N. Doe. E/1666/Add. 3, 
and for Report of the United Nations Commission of Enquiry on the 
Coca Leaf- Commentaries from the governments of Peru and Bolivia, 
see V. N. 
_Doe. 
E/CN-7/235- 
- io 
119. Examples of such Regional. Conferencea. are: the Pirst 
Inter-American Meeting on the Illicit Traffic in Cocaine 
and Coca Leaves held in Brazil from 21 to 25 M-3xchv, 1960, 
the South East Asian Regional Conference an Illicit Drug 
Traffic held in Pakistan-from 18 to 23 January# 1960, the 
Third Arab Conference on Narcotic Drugs held in the United 
Arab Republic from 7 to 11 lLsxchr 1960 and the Middle East 
Narcotics Survey Mssion(from September to October# 1959) 
of the United Nations* 
See further 1hilletin on Narcotics, October-Decemberv 1960t 
pp. 29-42; see also H. Nareecklet and C. Vaillo# "Effort to 
Promote European Regional Co-ordination of Action Against 
Drug Addiction"t Bulletin on Narcotiesq vol. XXV, 3.9739 
pp. 1-7. 
iýO. See further Bulletin on Narcotics, op. cit., p. 29 et. ecq*9 
121. A United Nations Consultative Group onf Narcotic' Mission in 
Asia and in the Par East met in Tokyo from 3 to 
12 
Februaryq 
2964- It was organised as a regional project under resolution 
1395(XIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
See f=ther 11 United Nations Consultative Group on Narcotics 
Problems in Asia and the Far East"q Palletin on Narcotics, 
vol. XVIII 1965t pp. 39-46. 
122* In 1964 the government of Thailand requested the United 
Nations to assist them in carrying out a survey of the 
economic and social needs of the opium producing areas with 
a view to abolishing opium cultivation in Thailand and opium- 
smoking amongst its hill tribes. The Economic and Social 
Council(complied with this request and adopted a resolution 
( 1025C XXXVII)C) on the basis of which a U. N. Survey Team 
*as ýsent to Thailand . This survey was carried out in 
1965-66. 
See further 11 The Hill Tribes of Thailand and the Place of 
Opium in their Socio-economic Setting-s Report of the 'United" 
Nations Survey Team on the Economic and Social Needs of the 
Dpium Producing Areas in Thailand'19 Bulletin on Xarcoticsq 
vol. XXj 19689 PP- 7-17- 
123. What however constitutes " drug addiction" is a matter of 
controversy. None of-the drug-conventions including the 
Single Convention defined the term, yet some of them referred 
to it in some form or other. The Hague Opium Convention of 
--1912 described 
it as n the abuse of opium, morphine and 
cocaine as also of the drugs prepared or derived from these 
substances" ( Peamble to the Convention), while the Limita- 
tion-Convention of 1931 did not iýal: e any attempt to define this 
term, although Article 15 contained the term. 
124. infra. 9 ý.. q). r L, -. i 'rt .6DI- S-O, + 
J1) 
U'.. 
125- Although the term "technical assistance" had been used by tho 
Commission sinoe the operation of this programme at its 
eleventh session), it was subsequently changed to Technical 
Co-operation", perhaps to. emphaosise the importance of intorna- 
tional co-operation in eradicating the narcotics evil. Accord- 
Ing to one authority, however, when assistance is granted for 
improvement of the narcotics situation, 11 it Goes not only to 
a given country: it is a-means for the international community 
of improving its own situation which justifies the. name of 
co-operation for such a joint endeavour. 11 The present writer 
however believes that this meaning of the term "co-operation" 
is applicable to all cases of assistance, since assistance to 
an individual country may mean assistance to the international 
community at large. 
See further H. L. Mayp OP- Cit-t P- 48- 
126. See Resolution 62 
127. In its original recommendation the Commission included the 
proposal-for technical assistance to the inter-country 
projects, but this was not accepted by the Socretary-General. 
See also Res. 222(IX) of thc Economic and Social Coancil-in 
which. the principles by which technical assistance should. bo 
regulated have been outlined. 
128,, Twenty-eighth sessiont Resolution 688 
129. General Assembly Resolution 1395(Xrl). * 
130- While the League of Arab. States coxistituted a narcotics bureau 
under itt in the Middle East a Narcotics Survey Mission had 
been establishedt see U. N. Doe. E/CN-7/4719 Pp- 101-102* 
131. Some of these Consultative 
* 
Groups were: the South-East Asia 
Consultative Group on Narcotics Control which met in Bangkok 
in 1960 and the Inter-American Consultative Group on Narcotics 
Control which met in Rio de Janeiro in 1961. 
__, 
See further U. N. Doe. B/CN-7/4719 P- 103* 
132. For example, the Seminar on Narcotics Control Problems of 
Developing Countries in Africa which met in Addis Ababa in 
1963, and the Consultative Group'on Narcotics Problems in 
Asia*and the Far East,. which met-in Tokyo in 1964. 
See further U. N. Doc- E/CN-7/4719 P- 103. 
133. Such officers were sent to 
' 
South East Asia in 1961 and to 
Latin America in 1963-65, 
-See further U. N. Doe, E/CN-7/471i P- 103* 
134- The words 11 all matters" are meant-to include 11 all aspects of 
drugsllq-. ý. e. q the politicalt legal, administrative, economic, 
socialt medical and sciezitific aspects which constitute an 
international problem. 
See also the CoTnentary on the SinTle Convention, op. cit., 
pe 128. 
1- -7 JL ,. j ow 
-135- See terms of reference of the Cornission, p6solution 2(1), 
paragraph 2(6)t see U. N. Doo. E/0-7/471t P- 3- 
It should be mentioned in this. connection that it has 
been decided'to continue the work which the Commission had 
already undertaken prior to the coming into force of the 
Single Conventiong e'. g. the research programmes to develop, 
methods for determining the ecographicorigin of opium ( See ECOSOC's resolutions 1 LL C VII (1948); 246P(IX) (1949)t 
436F(X-IVý71952) and 626H (XXII) (1956 and also U. N. Doc. 
E/CN-7/47-19 paxagraphs'118-130) and also the maintenance of 
the United Nations Laboratory in Geneva for conducting research 
into narcotic drugs ( G. A. resolution 834 (IX)(1954); see also 
ECOSOC's resolution 667C ZEN) (1957). T 
136. See Co-, mentary of the Sinrle Convention, on. cit. p p. 128. Decisions of the Commission concerning changes in the Schedules 
of the SinGle Convention ( Article 3). i. o. 9 changeo in the 
scope of controlf must be communicated to those non-parties to 
the Convention who are Members of the U. N. ( Article 3P paragraph 
7 and paragraph 8p sub-paragraph (c)). 
137. This Article specifies the followingt in particuicx: (a) An annual report on the working of the Convention 
within each-of their territories; 
(b) the text of all laws and regulations from time to 
time promulga-ted. in order to give effect to this 
Convention; 
(0) such particulars as the Commission shall determine 
concerning cases of illicit traffic, including 
particulars of each case of illicit traffic discovered 
which may be of"importance; and (d) -the names and-addresses of the governmental authori- 
ties empowered to issue export and import authorisa- 
tions Pr certificates. 
138. See Article 26 of the International Opium Convention, 1925 and 
-Article 13 of-the 1953 Protocol. Although the previous narcotics 
conventions had not been universally accepted, it was evidenced 
that a non-partyt having failed to carry out the provisions of a drag conventionp subsequently agreed to comply with them upon a 
request of the Commissioh. ' 
139. For copy of the import certificate which is at present in 
, --operation .1 we U. N. Doe, E/NR. FORM/Rev. 2 or Annex of the U. N. Doe. E/CN-7/484/Rev- I- 
140. The safeguards which were recommended by the ECOSOC on the basis 
of the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation 
Organizationt the World Heal-th-Organizationp*the Commission on 
Varcotic Drugs and the International Criminal Police Organi- 
zation may be found in its resolution 770 XXX B, which was 
adopted at its thirteenth sessicn, see U-1-1. Doc. E/3385/-1'-CN-7/ 
395t pp. 39-40. 
-. 22 
141- For obvious reasonsq it is not possible to prepare an 
exhaustive list showing the names of the organisations which 
may be consulted by the Commission in respect of this matter. 
The following are the names of some such organisations which 
are thought to be particularly relevant for this purpose: (l) 
The International Narcotics Control Board (2) The International 
Civial Aviation Organization (3) The World Health Organization 
(4) The International Criminal Police Organization (5) The 
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization (6) The 
International Labour Organization. 
142, Article 7 of the Single Convention. 
14ý - Article 62 of the U. N. Charteru 111. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate 
studies and reports with respect to international, economic, 
socialt culturalg educational, health, and related matters 
and my make reco-, =endations with respect to any ýuch matters 
to the General Assemblyj to the Members of the United Nationst 
and to the specialized agencies concerned. 
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting 
respect fort and observance oft human rights and fundamental 
; freedoms for all. 
3- It my prepare draft conventions for submission to the 
General Assemblyt with respect to mattqrs falling within its 
competence. 
4- It May callt in accoýdance with the rules prescribed by 
the United Kationst international conferences on matters 
falling within its competence. " 
144 ParapTaph 2-of the resolution g(l) of-the Economic-and-Social 
Council has enumerated the terms of reference by the Coznadssion, 
The provisions ooncerning the composition of the Commission had 
been amended by resolutions 199(VIII), --845(XXXII) and 
111. par 
, Lt2h 
I and 1147 (M), parag-rarh 4,, 
145- See Official Records of the ECOSOC9 fo=ty-sixth session, 
U. N. Doe. E/4606/Rev. 19 annex IV, and forty-eighth session, 
supplement No. 8 (E/4785)t. chapter III. 
146. See also ConLmentary on'the Single Convention on Narcotic Dru? 7s, 
op. cit. 9 p. 122. ' 
147. e. g. Halloinogenicsv barbiturates , amphetamines and tranqui- 
Ilizers, See also U*Ne Poe, B/CN-7/4719 PP. 72-76. 
3-48. e. g. ECOSOC resolution 667D(=) in respect of Khat 
149. U. N. Doe. E/4767- 
4 523 
150. Some other such funtional commissions are: Statistical 
Commission, -Population Coipmissiong Commiscion for Social 
Development, Commission on Human Rights and the Commission 
on the Status of Women. 
151. 
-Rule 
5. 
152. Rule 
153. Rule 20. 
154. Rule 28. 
155- According to Rule 67 each sub-commission 11 shall meet once a 
year unless otherwise decided by the Council",, although the 
Uterms of office of members of sub-commiscion shall begin on 
". jairaary following their electiong and shall end 31 December 
following the election of their successors. " See-Rule 69. 
156. Rule 72-has again provided that: 11 The representation of 
any Member thus invited shall not have the right to vote 
but may submit proposals which may be put to vote by request 
of any member of the commission. " - 
157. In factq Article 8 of the Single Convention authorises the 
Commission to perfom these functions ( as treaty*fuentions). 
It formerly performed such functions only on the basis of the 
decisions of the Economic and Social C. ojncil. 
158- See the Pre=ble to the Convention. 
159. 
' 
See also the opinion of the Turkish delegate at the Conference, 
who stated that the important powers conferrea on it would 
have far-reaching implications and would directly affect the 
parties. Twentieth Plenary Mpetingr, U. N. Doe. A/Conf-34/24, 
P. 89. 
16o. The Commission's decisions under Article 3 of the SinZle 
Convention are subject to a different revieq procedure. 
See Article 8.4P 
161. supra. Jq-0 -IL2. 
162. The Single Convention cane into force on 13 December, 1964. 
By Article 45 of this Convention the ECOSOC had been given 
authority to fix the date on which the new Board would enter 
upon its duties. Meanwhile, it was decided that the functions 
of the Board would be provisionally carried out by the 
Permanent Central Board and the Drug Supervisory Body. 
: L63. See Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 
fortieth sessiong supplement No. 2 (E/4140); see also, 
U. N. Doe. E/4158/Rev. 1. (1966), E/4761 (1969) and Articles 
2 and 3 of the Final Act and Protocol Amending the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (Article 9), U. N. Doc. 
E/Conf. 63/9 dated 25 March, 1972. 
-0 rj' ""' 
164- ECOSOC Resolution 1106(XL)lt paragraph 5- 
- 165. Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 9(l) of the 
Single Convention. 
166. Article 10, paragraph 1. It may however be observed that 
although a long term of office is often found helpful in- 
strengthening the independence of members of any office, 
originally a shorter period of office for members wan conai- 
dered necessary with a view to offering newly independ- 
ent states opportunities for membership; see also Commentary 
on the Single Convention, OP- cit-9 P- 143; and RecordO, of 
_Conferenae. # 
vol. IIp p. 233. 
167. Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article g(l) of the 
Single Convention. %i 
168. The nominations on behalf of the World Health Orga'nizzation 
are made by its Director-Generalg see Rpsolution of the 
World Health AsseMýý 1846 ( May 1965)- 
169. According. to the "procedure" adopted by the ECOSOC, the 
Secretary-General of the U. N. invitest a year before the 
'date of actual electiont all concerned to nominate candida- 
- tes for 
the Board in accordance with the requirements of its 
membership which are'also indicatted in the invitation. 
170. U. N. Doc. E/4158/Rev- 1. 
. 
paragraph 13; see also U. N. Doc. 
-E/4761,,, A=ex -II, paragraph 
13- 
171. Even a stateless person may be elected provided that such a 
person, has been nominated. 
172* -Thi-s Committee was set-up by the Economic and Social Co6cil 
and givon responsibility for selecting suitable candidates 
from the nominees of the various governments. This Committee 
prepares two panelsq one containing the nominees of govern- 
ments and the other the nominees of the World Health Organi- 
-zation. -The-S-Ingle Convention has not stipulated any specific 
number of candidates to be recommended under each list, and 
finally selected for the Board, If however a vacancy occurs, 
the position will be filled by the nominating authority 
concernedq i. e. 9 eithei the nominating goverment or the World 
Health Organization. 
See further CommentarT on the Single Conventionp OP-. Ci+.. g P. 134- 
173- Article 9, paragraph 3. The Convention has not envisag-ed any 
situation in which the principle of equitable geographical 
distribution may be disturbed owing to the vhange of nationali- 
ty of a member, or in the event of his becoming a stateless 
person. 
174. In terms of Article 10p paragraph 6, " the members of the 
Board chall. reqeive an-adequate remuneration as dotermined 
by the General Assembly. " No such express provision had been 
made for remuneration or honorarium of the members of the 
Permanent Central Board. 'However, during both the League 
period and the life time of the Permanent Central Boardo tho 
members were paid honoraria or allowances. 
See further Bulletin on Paxootics, Vol. II, p. 69p 
G. A. Resolution 875(IX)t para (0) of 4th December, 1954, 
L. N. Doc. C-760. M. 260,1924 XI9 Vol. It P- 471 and Vol. II, 
P. 139. 
175. Article 6 of the Single Convention. 
176. In terms of Article 15 of the*Convention the Board shall * 
submit to the Council through the Commission an annual report 
on its work9 including an analysis of the estimates and statis- 
tical information etc. 
177- According to Article, 19 of the Internatiohal, Opium Convention,, 
19259 members of the Permanent Central Board were required to 
maintain high standards of L technicalt intellectual and 
moral nature. 
178- Although'Article 19 of the International Opium. Convention 
provided, inter-alial that the " members of the Central 
Board shall not hold any office which puts them in a position 
of direct derendence on their governmerits. " The strict provi- 
whicho inter aliag implied that government employees would. 
not be eligible for membqrship of the'Board, could not be main- 
tained after World War II because of the emergence of many 
socialist countries and also because of the shortage of qualified 
people in sectors other than gove rnm ent ones. The Economic and 
Social Council had therefore adopted a resolution (123D(VI) of 
*2nd March 1948) allowing certain categories of government 
employees with no direct dependence upon their Governments9 viz. 
judgest university professors and medical practitioners to 
become members of the Board without relinquishing their assign- 
ments with governments. The Council also authorised the-. 
appointment of DiYil servants to the Board provided that they, 
during their term of office, had terminated their functions as 
gove==ent officials and had not'taken any instruction from 
their governments* 
italics added. 
179- Similar provisions may be found in Article 19'of the Interna- 
tional Opium Convention of 1925. See also Article 19t para- 
graph 7 of the 1946 Protocol. .I 
el-> a Aj !" 
180, The Rules of Procedure of the Functional Commiscions of 
the Economic and Social Council have been adopted by the 
Council. 
-See resolutions 100(V)t 289 Wv 481(XV)p 1231'(XLII), and 
1393 (XLVI) of the Economic and Social Council, its decisions 
of 2 Augnstq 1968 ( 1561st meetin-) of 3 June 1969 ( 1596th 
meetino and: of 17 November 1969 
Z 1647th meeting) and Article 
68 of the U. N. Charter* 
Article 3 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 10(4) of 
the Single Convention. This provision is in conformity with 
those of Article 14 of the Single Convention# i. e., the 
Measures which the Board has been authorised to take to ensure 
the execution of provisions of the Convention. 
Supra. 2. ro - 
183. The governments are reýuired to inform the Board as to their 
requirements of forms-in order to enable the Board to send them 
a good supply. 'If an esti= te is not supplied on the prescribed 
formlitkay not be regarded as a qualified estimate. 
The Paxties are required -to supply information on the following 
matters: 
(a) (ý=tities of drugs. to be consumed for medical and 
scientific purposes; 
(b) Quantities of drugs to be utilized for the manufacture of 
other drugs, of preparations in Schedule II, and of subs- 
tances not covered by thim Convention; 
''(a) Stocks of drugs to be held an at 31 December of the ydar to' 
which the estimates relate; 
ýdý (ýaantities of drugs necessary for addition to special stocks; 
e The area ( in hectare's) and the geographical location of 
land to be used for the cultivation of the opium poppy: 
Approximate quantity of opium to be produced; 
g The number of industrial establishments which will manu- 
facture synthetic drugs; and 
(h) The quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by each' 
of the estabiishments referred to in the preceding sub- 
paragraph. 
See also Article 9 : df the 1972 Protocol amendinj; A: btiole 
19(l) of the Single Convention. 
185. It refer3 to the population, agn, of the users of drugs, the 
nature of health-'facilities available to the population concerned, 
relevant data on epidemiological and other health matters. 
186. According to the present practice governments are required to 
send theiT estimates by I August of the year preceding that to 
which they refer* See, Porm BIS 7th editiont March, 1971, 
FV 
5 
*21 71 
187. A "country" ih this context means a "State" as a whole. 
188, A "territory" in this context means any'part of a stato which 
will be "treated as a separate entity for -the application of 
special provisions relating to international trade" as enunoia- 
Ud in Article 3i. See also Articles 40,41 and 42. 
189, In examining or determining'estimatesv the Board usually taices 
into account the figures of "consumption" over the precedinC 
three years. These figures may however be allowed to fluctuate 
on grounds of economic dev&lopment. In order to determine the 
most nearly accurate estimatest the Board calla on governments 
to ensure that their estimaten for consumption should not include 
any amount meant for stocks'or for manufacturers, ýholesalers 
and importers, other than*the amount required by rotail 
. pharmacists. In accordance with Article 49 even during the transitional 
period of reservationg the Parties are required to submit, inter 
alia, separate statistics on the production of opium, coca leaves, 
cannabis, cannabis resin ( the Board at present requests the 
Parties to give statistical information on production on form R/S) 
extracts and tinctures of cannabis and the production and manu- 
facture of and trade in the aforesaid drugs for non-medical 
purposes. The Board has also been authorised to obtain an exclu- 
sive account of drugs by means of, different figures for drugs 
coming under different categoriesq viz. (a) quantities required 
to be utilised for th, - substances of other drugs (b) of prop-, 
ration in Schedule III and (c)-the substances not covered by this 
Convention and the releva4t form B/S also contains three different- 
coltimns for this purpose* 
Prior to the coming into force of the Single Conventiong 
only a single figure was given for the estimated amount of each 
drug required for conversion, The quantities required for the 
manufacture of preparations for the export of which export authori- 
z6tions-were not required ( such preparations have been included 
in Schedule III of the Single Convention) were chown in the 
consumption estimates. See Article 6(l)(a)(iii) of the Limitation 
Convention of 1931, Article 8(l)(a) of the 1953 Protocol and 
Article 8 of the International Opium Convention of 1925. ' 
See also infra. s the Section entitled "A Critical Examination of 
thQ Estimates and Statistical Returns Systems". 
The Board will also expect from the Parties separate 
estimates of coca leaves to be used fo r the manufacture of 
flavouring ingredient in accordance with Article 27(2) and the 
amount required fo: 6 its utolization for other drugs in pursuance 
of Article 19(4). Article 19(l)(c) however does not authorise the 
Board to request seDarate*figures for drugs to be held in different 
kinds of stocks. 
190. infra. r ýf. tT3 -ý 41, c.. " rp. tc5 - cyl 
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191, It is necessary for*the Board to-examine the estimates speedily 
especially the supplementary onesq simply because in the event 
of any delay the country may increase its limits and-thus 
obtain drugs which have not been accounted for. In practicot 
-in the case of'oupplementary, estimateng 
if the Board is not in 
session, . the Board's Secretariat take very speedy action 
( oven 
by telegraphic communication) and obtain the formal approval of 
the Board in due course. 
1921, Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 12, paragraph 
5 of the Single Convention. 
193- Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 19, paragraphs 
19 2 and 5 of the Single Convention. 
. 194, - -See 
Article 21p paragraph 1* 
. 
195. Article 31t parzýgraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) and Article'21, 
paragraph 4. 
196. infra, q 624 
197. aý production or manufacture of drugs; ý 
b utilization of drugs for the manufacture of other drugs, 
of preparations in Schedule II and of substances not covered 
by this Convontiont 
, 
-and utilization of poppy straw for the 
manufacture of dxugs; 
0 consumption of drugs; 
d imports and exports'of drugs'and poppy straw; 
e seizure of drugs and disposal thereof; -- 
l 
stocks of drugs as at 31 December of the year to which f 
the returns =elate ; and 
W ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy. 
(Article 10 of the 1972 Protocol). 
198. The corresponding provisions may be found in Articles 22(l) and 
23 of the International Opium Convention of 1925 and in Article 
9(2) of the 1953*Protocol. The "method" includes the "method of 
transmission". e. g. by air mailq where such forms will not be 
transmitted to the Board's Secretariat by a member of a delegation 
of by a messenger. It pay also ask the countries to indicate the 
country of origin of drugs and their destination. 
See Fora. C/S for the Annual Statisti6s of Productiont Manufac- 
tureq Consumptioni Stocks and Seizures of Varcotic Drugsp 
Porm A/S for the Quarterly Statistics of Imports and Exports of 
Varcotic Drugsq and Form-R/S for the Annual, Statistics of ITaxcb- 
tic Drugs. Used for Yon-medical Purposes. All forms sliould be 
completed in typescript. 
3.99. Italics added, infra., 
v ýi 
200. U. 11. Conferenc& for the'Adoption of 4. -Single 
Convention on 
Varcotic Drugs, Recordsp vol. II, p. 287t footnote 33. 
201. Article 21, paragraph 4. The non-parties may also be subjected 
by the Board to measures enunciated in Article 14 of the Single 
Convention and Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol, i. e., the measures 
to. ensure the execution of provisions of the Convention. 
202. See Pom C/S Table I. 
203. Article 21 paragraPh 3- 
204. See also Article 22tiparagraph 2 of the International Opium 
Convention of 1925t Article 9(l)(c) of the 1953 Protocol and 
Form A/S of the International Narcotics Control Board (first 
column of parts I and II of the tables)* 
205- Under the Single Convention a system of quatterly statistical 
Teýorts has also been devised according to which týe Parties 
are required to submit to the Board such statistics on Form A/S. 
The Annual statistics are to be submitted on Form C/S. Such 
periodic checking helps the Board enter a caution to a recalcitrant 
government when, it exceeds its quota of import and /or export. 
2o6. See Form AlSt item II in the first column of Part I of the 
tables. 
207. See Article 20p paragraPh 4. 
208. Form C/S (November 1970 edition), table IIt'coiumn E. 
209. Article 13, paxagraph 1 and Article 20t paragraph 1. 
210. -Article 1 of the, 1972 Protocol amending Article 2(4) of the 
Single Convention. 
211. Form C/S, footn'ote (b) to table II ( 5th edition, 1970); 
see also Form A/Sp instruction 11 ( 6th editionp 1970). 
212. See also Article 209 paragraph lp sub-paragraph(e) of this IF 
Conventiont Article 22, paragraph 19 sul>-paragraph (e) of the 
1925 Convention and Article 9t-paragraph 19 sub-paxagraph(a), 
clause (iv) of the 1953-Protocol. 
See also Form C/S of the Boardt(1970 edition), table Ut column P. 
213o Italics added. 
214. Article 12, paragraph 2 of the 1953 Protocol. 
215. Articles 24 and 26 of the 1925 Conventiong Articles 13(l) and 
14(3) of the Mmitation-Convention, 1931 and Article 12 (2) 
of the 1953 Protocol- 
I 
. 
216. Article 14t paragraph 2tand Article 6,, paraýraph 2 of the 
1972 Protocol. 
217. Article 11, paragraph 1, sub-parag raph (d) of the 1953 Protocol- 
218. Article 149 paragraph 1. sub-p, -=agraph (b)' and Article 6t 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) of the 1972 Protocol. 
219. Article 119 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (c) of the 1953 Protocol- 
220., Article 149, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph Wt and Article 69 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (a) of the 1972 Protocol. 
221t,, In the latter si-hiation, the Board will ask the defaulting 
government either to furnish additional info=ation or to 
comply with its instruction. See Articles 12(4) anýd 13(3)- 
The Board may also give its co-, rnents on a particular case in 
its reports to the Economic-ahd Social Council for ýublication 
under Article 15. 
223. The Secretary-General or the Co-rmission may have reason to believe 
in such failure from the annual reports of Covernmentsp see 
Article 18, paragrapht sub-paragraph (b). 
224- Paragraph 11 sub-paragraph (e). 
225- Paragraph 4P sub-paragraphb (a) and (b) 
226. See Article 19(2) of the Single Convention and Article 9 of 
the 1972 Protocol, and Article 21(3) of the Single Convention. 
_227. 
There are however two--exceptions to this provision which have 
been mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-paragraph (b) of 
aragraph 4 of Article 21, namely, 
1) 11 In the eve"nt of. a supplementary estimate being furnished 
for that country or territory in respect both of any 
, quantity-over-imported-and of theadditional quantity 
requiredg or 
(ii)" In exceptional caseb where the exportt in the opinion of 
the goverrLment of the exporting country, is essential 
for'-the treatment-of the sick. " 
228, Article"29: 1.11 The-Parties shall require that the manufacture of 
of-druZs be under licence except where such manufacture is carried 
out by a State enterprise or State enterprises. 
2. The Parties hall: 
(o) Require 
4a .; licensed manufacturers of drugs obtain 
periodical, permits specifying the kinds and amounts of drugs 
which they shall be entftled to manufacture. A periodical permit, 
however, need not be required for preparationtP 
C; 31 
229. The Board may, ask for a state enterprise system under 
Articles 23,26 and 28 of the Convention. 
230. Article 15: 
111. The Board shall prepare an annual report on its work 
and such additional papers as it considers necessary 
containing also an analysis of the estimates and statis- 
tical information at its disposal, and, in appropriate 
casesp an account of the explanationsg if anyt given by 
-or required of Gove=mentsq together with any observations 
andrecommendations which the Board desires to make. These 
reports shall be submitted to the Council through the 
Commission, which may make such comments as it sees fit. 
2. The reports shall be cornunicated to the Parties and 
subsequently published by the Secretary"General. The 
Parties shall permit their unrestricted distribution. " 
In practice, the present Board ' 
like the Permanent Central 
Board-has-suggested reforms of narcotic laws and regulations in 
many countries on a number of occasions, and the Convention also 
authorises the, Board to do so. see Articles 449 45(2) of the 
Single Convention and Article 11(l)(c) of the 1953 Protocol- 
231. See Article 129 paragraph 3- 
-232. It is doubtful whether the embargo provisions contained in 
Article 21t paragraph 4( which comes into operation in the case 
of an import quota of a country being exceeded) of the Single 
Convention are mandatory. 
233. The Board, may in certain cases where financial , aid would 
be. 
necessary to improve the situation recommend to the competent 
United Nations'Organs ana to the spacialined agencies that , technical or financial assistance or bothq be provided to the 
Government in support of its efforts to carry out its obliga- 
tionsunder this Convention. 
See Article 14 bis. of the 1972 Protocol. 
234. '4$0 "4ktt, '20 ý C, - 
235. Whether or not a country or territory is directly interested 
is to be determined in terms of its involvement in the export 
or import of dxugs with the recalcitrant country concerned. 
236- Article 14, -paragraph 3 
" The Board shall have the right to publish a report on any' 
matter dealt with under the provisions of this article, and 
communicate'it to the 
bouncilq which shall fordard it to all 
Parties. If the Board publishes in this report a decision 
taken under this article. or any information relating theretog 
it shall also publish therein the views of the Goverment if. 
the latter so requests. " 
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237. Article 2 of the 1972-Protogol amending Article 9(l) of 
the Single Convention. 
238. See also Article 3 of the. 1972 Protocol amending Article 
-10(4) of 
the Single Convention. 
239. See also last paragraph of Article 19 of the International 
Opium Convention 1925 and paragraph 3 of Article 11 and 
sub-paragraph (aý of paragraph 4 of Article 12 of the 1953 
Protocol, where a majority had been reco=ended for docisions 
by the Permanent Central Bo*ard. 
240e In terms of Article 11, paragraph 3, " the quorum necessary 
at meetings of the Board shall consist of eight members. ". 
-(Article 
4 of the 1972 Protocol). 
241. Article 19. 
242. Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Single Convention and Article 5 
of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 12t paragraph 5 of the 
Single Conventjoný. 
243- Before the coming into force of the. Single Conventiont the 
limitation regime was applied only to substances which came 
-under the Limitation Convention of ' -1934--and-the 
Protocols 
of 1948 and 1953, i. e. p it was applicable only to manufactured 
drugs ( except extracts and tinctures of cannabis) and to 
opium. It w' as not applicab le to extracts and tinctures of 
cannabis, cannabis resin and coca le4ves. 
244. , (a) The quantity consumedl within the limit of the relevant 
estimate, for medical and scientific purposes; 
4b) The quantity usedv within the limit of therelevant 
estimatet for the manufacture of other drueag of prepa- 
rations in Schedule 1119 and of substances not covered 
by this Convention; 
0ý The quantity exported; 
_ýd 'The quantity--added to the stock for the-purpose of 
bringing that stock up to the level specified in the 
relevant estimate; and 
(e) The quantity acquired within the limit of the relevant 
estimate for special purposes. " 
In terms of paragraph 2 of Article 21t " Prom the 
sum of the quantities apecified in paragraph 1 there shall 
be deducted any quantity that has been seized and released for 
licit use, as well ar. any quantity taken from special stocks 
for the requirements of the civilian population. " 
245- Article 9(2)(a) of the 1972 Protocolt amending Article 19(2) 
of the Single Convention: 
Subject to the deductions referred to paragraph 3 of Article 
21, the total of the estimates for each territory and each drug 
oxcept opium'nnd synthetic drugs shall consist of the sum of the 
amounts specified under sub-paragraphs (a)9(b) and (d) of, para- 
graph 1 of this articleg with the addition of any amount required to bring the actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the precedine, 
year to the level estimated as provided in sub-paragraph (c) of 
paragraph. 
0 
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246. infra. L4f1- 
247- Such statistics are to be sent to the Board by 30 June of the 
year followin that in which the excess has occurred, coo 
Article 20(2)ýa). 
248- See also Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 12(5) 
of the Single Convention, 
249- See Article 42... 
250. Article 14(2) of the Limitation Convention of 1931 and 
Article 8(11) of the 1953 Protocol. 
251. The Permanent Central Board could impose an embargo upon a 
country only in the case of oxcessive imports. 
252, Article 13(2)(c)(i), of the Limitation Convention of 1931 
253. See especially pa7zagraphs 4 and 5 of Article 2 of the 1972 
Protocol amending Article 9 oi the Single Convention. 
254- Article 9(2). 
255- Article g(l) of the Sincle Convention read with Article 2 of 
the 1972 Protocol-and Article 6 of the SinCle Convention. 
-256, --See Reports of'the Board to the Economic and Social Council. 
257- Annex to resolution 1196(XLTI), 
258- infra. Sa 4- 6"0 
259- Týe position of such members of the Board mayt to a certain 
extent, be compared with that of an ad-hoc judge of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice. So fart in all but one case ( The Asvl-um 
. -Caseq I. C. J., Reportsp 1950) ad-hoc judges have found in favour of their own governments. It is argued that for the sane psycholo- 
gical reasons, i. e. 9 the fear of loss of popularity or even of their own assignments on their ret-qrn to their respective countriesp 
such judges feel obliged-to find in favour of their own 
governmentsp see further R. P. Anand, The Compulsory Jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice, Asia Publishing Houseq 
1961t pp. 107-116. 
260. Article 10(6). 
261. See ECOSOC's resolution 1126(XLII), jaraE: rýah 51; see also 
U. N, -Treaty Series, vol. 19 P- 159 A icle VI entitled Experts. on Missions for the United INTations". 
f 
Z; 34 
262. Article 10, raraizraph-2 
11 The term of office of each member of the Board shall. ena 
on the eve of the first meeting of the Board which his successor 
shall be entitled to attend. " 
263- See also Article 2 of the 1972 Protocol. 
264- Article 12, paragraph 2. 
265* Article 12, paragraph 3- 
2 66. Article 219 paragraph 1. 
267- Article 21p paragraph 4 and sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 1 
of Article 31. 
268. Article 59 paragraph 6 
ýf the Limitation Convention of 1931 
and Article 81 paragraph 7 of the 1953 Protocol. 
269. It is however appreciated that until any definite criterion 
of the medical and scientific needs of drugs of various countries 
has been establishedq which is still an impossibility ( infra), 
the determination of estimates by statistical means only will be 
inappropriate. .. -- l'i 
270. supra. 
271 Article 14, paragraph 2: 
11 The Board, when calling the attention of the Parties, the 
Council and the Commission to a matter in accordance with 
paragraph l(d) above, mayq if it is satisfied that such a course 
is necessaryt recommend to Parties that they stop the import of 
drugst the export of druZs,, or both, from or to the country. or 
territory concernedt either for a designated period or until the 
Board shall be satisfied as to the situation in that country or 
territory. The State concerned may bring the matter before the 
Council. " 
This Article is to be read with Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol. 
272. AitiOle 21(4)(b)(ii)* 
273- Article 129 paragraph 3 and Article 13 of the Single Convention 
and Article 21 biff. of the 1972 Protocol. 
274- Article 89 paragraph (b)., 
275- Article 8 Of the Single Convention. 
276. Article 8t paragraph (c) of the Single Convention. 
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277. The W. H. O. Expert Committees concerned with drag dependence 
were known until 1956 as Expert Conmittoe on Drues Liable to 
Produce Addiction# from 1956 to 1964 as Expert Committee on 
Addiction-Producing DruCs. and from 1964 to 1966 an 1-1.11.0. 
Expert Committee on Dependence Producing Drues. 'For historyp 
termsp reference and official obligations of the Expert Conunitteo 
on Habit Forming Druga, see IMO Doe. WIIO/IUM/11 dated 14 Decembort 
1949- 
278. The First Ten Years of the World Health Orranizationg W. H. O. 
publicationt 19589 P- 419- 
279- supra., see footnote 277. 
280.14HO/HPD/11 of 3-4 Decembert 1949, P. 1. 
281. op. cit., P. 4. 
282. Article 119 paxagraph 4. 
283- Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and Co=ittees, see B3nic 
Documents of the W, TT. O, l 1975 
(25th Edition)$ "Definitional' p, 69; 
cee also Resoltition of the Worl(I. Hoalth Assembly 4.1 and amend- 
mcnt made by the Thirteenth World Health Lsseribly (1-tesolution 
WHA 13-49). 
284. Regulation 4.6, see Basic Documents of the W. H. O. p op. cit. p 
285. Relqilatioll 4.5-1. 
286. Rogulation 4-4- 
287. regulation 4.2. 
288. Article 32 of the Congtitution or the World Rpalth Or[-, anization. 
289. Regulation 5.2. 
290, Regulation 5-1- 
Neither the provisions of the Constitution of the W. R. O. nor 
the Rules of Procedure for Expert Committees and their Siib- 
Committees indicate the procedure for determining as to whether 
or not a matter qualifies for receiving spacial instructions or 
opinions from any government or authority external to the World 
Health Organization. However, it may be observed that the word 
"special" indicates that it is a matter which does not fall 
within the ordinary competence of such a comnitteet and that 
special 3. 'nstructions. or opinions-are required owing to the 
tecImUcalities attached to a matter. 
P- 536 
291. Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure for rMert Committees and 
their Sub-Com-mittees as adopted by the First World Health 
Assembly ( OfficiaF-Records, W. H. O., 13999 334) and amended 
by the Second, Fourth and Tenth World Health Assemblies 
(Resolutions WHA 2.849 4.57 and 10,45). 
1 292. Rule 3t paragraphs (a) and (b) of the, Rules of Procedure for 
REpert Cornittees ind their Sub-Comnittees,. 
293. Regulation 2. ý, 
294- A. Lovedayt Reflections on Tnternational Administrationg 
Oxford (Clarendon)q 1956, p. 188. 
295., Regulation 7.2. 
296. Regulation 7-3- 
297. Regulations 2.1.1. to 2-1-3. 
298. This Committeev howeverg believed that there might be some 
situations in which drugs might induce physical dependence 
more significantly than psuchic dependence. See further 
W. H. O. Technical ReLort Series, 363,1967t P- 7- 
299. W. H. O. Technica-1 Report Series, 407,19699 p. 6; see also 
526,1973 (see. 3)t p. 16, According to Dr. D. C. C=-eronp 
this definition "omits cox)sideration of any possible need to 
control the production and distribution of a dependence- 
producing drug. ", See Dr. D. C. Cameron, "Drug Dependence: Some 
Research Issues", Bulletin of the World Health Orranization, 
Vol. 439 No. 49 19709 P. 589. 
300. W. H. O. Technical Report Spriest 407,1969, p. 6.. 
301. OPO citor Pe 180 
-302, This Expert Committeet like all other such committeesp may also 
be assisted by an Expert Sub-Committee or a joint Sub-Committee 
in fulfilling its functiohs. Such committees may be established 
either temporarily or pqrmzýnently by the Health Assembly or the 
Executive Committee at the suggestion-of the-Expert Committees. 
The rules governing the functions, . appointment of the membersp 
election of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairmano Secretaryship and 
agenda shallt mutatis mutandis, apply to aub-committees. A member 
of an Expert Committee may not as a matter of right participate 
in the'proceedings of a sub-committee. 
See Regulations 9.1., 9. P, 9-4 and 9.5- 
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303. The reasons for this, according to the Committeet were: 
11(l) Small changes in chemical 
, 
structure may cause 
great changes in dependence liability; 
(2) Drugs with differ6nt chemical structures may fall 
within the same pharmacological groups and cause 
similar types of drug dependence; and (3) Within any group there is wide variation in 
activity and degree of abuse liability. 
Purthermore, kinds of drug dependence differing 
from those now known may appear in the future*" 
See W. H. O. Technical RePort Seriest 4079 1969# p. 18. 
304- See further W. H. O. Expert Committee on Drug Dependence (1969), 
W. H. O. Technical Report Series, 407,1969, pp. 6-7. 
305 infra. 49-s- 
306o W. H. O. Technical Rerort Series, op. cit., p. 11. 
307- Official Records of the W. H. O. 9 1439 1965P pp. 31-32 (Res. WHA 18-47). 
308. W. H. O. Technical Renort Serien, 312# 19659 P- 7- 
309- op. cit.? P* 10. 
310- ibid., see also Isbell and Chrus"Cielp " Dependence Liability 
of Non-Narcotic D-rugs"t sýpplement to Vol-43 of the Ralletin 
of the World Health-Organization, 1970- 
311- W. H. O. Technical Report Series, 407,19699 p. 18. 
-312. ibid. v 
313- Benzodiazepinea and some lonC-acting. barbiturates. 
314. The Committeeg in 1969t referred to LSD in this. categoryg 
vide W. H. O. Technical Re32ort Series, 407P OP--cit-9 N 18- 
315- op* citet PO 19* 
316. W. B. Eddyý H. Halbach. -H. Isbell and X. H. Seeversý " Drug 
Dependence: Its Significance and Characteristics"t Bulletin 
of the World Health Orranization, 19659 P. 721; see also 
World Health Organization Expert Committee on Dependence 
Producing Drugsp Fourteenth Report, Bulletin 
' on 
Varcotiesp 
vol. XVIII October-Decenberg 19659-Pp. -43-46 and W. H. O. 
Technical Report Series, 273,1964P P. 15 (Annex 1). 
517. U. N. Co=ission on Narcotic Drugs (1966), Doe. E/4294; (1968) 
Doe- E/4455 ( Economic and Social council Official Records); 
see almPermanent Central Narcotics Board and Drug Suporvicory 
Body (1967), Final Report, Doe. E/OB/23--"/DSB/25 ( Fconomic and 
Social Council Official Records). 
318. One of the recommendations made by the W. H. O. Expert Committee 
on Drag Dependence in 1963, which was to include 11 a product 
obtained from any of the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium or 
ecgonine alkaloids of the coca leaf" in Schedule I of the Single 
Convention on Farcotic Druesp 1961, had not been accepted by the 
Narc6tics Commission. The Committee subsequently appreciated 
that the structure of a drag should not be considered to be a 
reliable guide to probable dependence-liability for purposes of 
control. See Commission on Parcotic D=Us (1968), U. N. Doe. 
E/44559 P. 59-E/3648; E/0-7/4321 P. 36. The original recommenda- 
tion of the Committee had however subsequently beeg amended. 
See also W. H. O. Technical Renort Series, 273,19649' P- 8 and 
343P 1966t p. 8. 
319. See Technical Report Seri 
- 
e_s, 57,19529 p. 11 (seo-7); 
95t'1955t p. 12 ( see. 12); 2119 1961t p. 11 (Sao. 3); - 
2739 19649 P. 15; 312,1965# P- '"SOO, 9); -and 478,1971- 
- The Use of Cannabis: Report of a W. H. O. Scientific Gr2yM. This report contains the collective view of an international 
team of experts, and does not necessarily represent the deci- 
iions-of the W. H. O. - 
On coca leaves and cbcainet see W. 11.0. Tochninal Re-port 
Series, 312,19659 P. 10 (sec. 8) and 273,1964P p. 6(seo. 2). 
320, On Methadone Maintenance -the Committee reviewed its previous 
recommendations, and subsequently confirmed that as several 
methods of use had been devisedt and as persons taking it regu- 
larly might have a dependence of the morphine type, it would be 
necessary to kedp in view the question of final withdrawal of 
it-from these patients, 
_. See WHO Technical Report Series, 343,1966, p. 9 
(seo. 6); 
see also Sixteenth Renort of the WHO Fbrnert Committee on Drug 
Dependenýe, WHO Technical Report Series, 407,1969ý pp. 20-21. 
The Expert Committee also reviewed the First Draft Protocol 
and the Revised Draft Protocol an Psychotropic Substances. See 
U. N. International Ilarcotibs Control Board (1968)9 First Report, 
Doe. E/IVCB/l (ECOSOC: Official Records); 1969 Doe. E/4606/Riev. l. j 
P, 71 (ECOSOC: Official Records); and p. 106-(Annex IV). The- 
Expert Committee on Drug Dependence pointed out that " (a) since 
the torm "psychotropic" has come to. be widely-applied to a large 
class of drugs used extensively in medical therapy and (b) since 
many. of-these drugs do not produce drug dependence, there was 
-considerable likelihood that -the use of the unqualified, broad term "psycho. tropiell to designate only the dependence-producing 
members of the larger class would lead to confusion and 
c 
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320. misunderstanding on the part of persons not familiar with the 
details of the Protocol. The Committe'e therefore suggested 
that-consideration be Civen to the addition of-a qualifying 
term, such as ". dependence producing", when speaking of psycho- 
tropie substances to be controlled under the Draft Protocol, " 
W. H. O. Technical Report Series, 437,1970# p. 9 (para 3)- 
321. For examplep regarding the need for control-measures for 
tances not under international controlt certain psy-chotropic subs 
* see WHA Resolution 21-429 Official Records of the W. H. O., 168 
(Twenty-first World Health Assembly, Part I), p., 20. 
322. The Expert Committee on Drug Dependence emphasised once again 
that a qualifying term such as "dependence producýngll would be 
most necessary when control measures for "psychotropic subs- 
tances" under the Protocol would be considered, see W. 11.0. - Technical Rerort Series; 437,1970t P- 9 (see- 3), 071 4460t 1970t 
Pe 7 (sec, 2), - 
323**, W. H. O. Technical Report Series, 460,1970t P- 7 (see. 2). 
324- See also Article 14(l)(b) of the 1972 Protocol amending 
Articla. 36, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Single Convention. 
325- See further W. H. O. Technical Report Series,, 57,19529 p. 11 
(sec-8); ' 76,19549 p, ll. (sec. 8); 116t. 1957t P. 10 (see. 10); 
2739 19649 P- 11 (see- 7); ; ')12# 1965, P. 9(sec. 7), 343P 19669 
pe 11 (sec. 8) and 407t 1969, p* 17 (see. 3). See also ' 
Official Records of the 14HO 1965,1439 31 (WHA Res. 18-47); 
19679 160t 26 (I-MA. Res. 20-42 and WHA 20-43); and 1968,1689 20 
(WHA. Res. 21-42). 
326. W. H. O. Technical Renort Seriest 407P 1969, p. 11 (sece lo4)9 
Op.. Cit-t-P. 94- 
327- op. cit. jýp. 18. 
(see- 3)- 
3280 ibid. 
329o W. H. O. Technical Report*Seriea. 437P 19709'P- 11 (sees 4-1-) 
330* Group (b): 11 Drugs extensively used in medical practicet or with 
the potential for , 
such use, but also presenting a substantial 
risk to public health. This group might include certain drugs 
that produce ýarbiturate * 
or amphetamine type dependence. Such 
drugs would be available under strict control for medical 
practice. " 
W. H. O. Technical Report Series,, 407,1969t pp. 18-19 (see-3) 
331- infra. 9 491 
332. W. 1j. 0. Technical Report Series, 437,19709 P- 11- 
C; 40 
333. IMO, Technical Report Series, 437v 1970t pp. 11-12t and 
407t 19699 pp. 18-19. 
334. WHO Technical Report Series,, 437, op. cit., p. 12. 
335- The data assembled on each of the drugs included information 
on the following: "(a) nane. (b) structural chemical formula., (c) symptoms of intoxication, (d) tolerance (e) psychic 
dependence (f) physical dependence (g) certain pharmacolo- 
gical characteristics (h) maJor dangers of abuse and Wa 
tentative abuse- political rating, together with appropriate 
references in several languages. " 
WHO Technical Report Series, -op. cit. t p. 12., 
336. cit-t P- 13 (italics added), OP* 
337- ibid. 9 
338- slapra. +gt 4gq 
339- WHO Technical Report Serie's, 437t OP. cit-9 P. 18' 
340- WHO Technical Report Seriest 407,1969t p. 19. 
341- WHO Technical Report Seriest 437P 19709 P. 19- 
342. As to the nature of the broad control'to be applied to 
group'(e) preparationsq the bommittee suggested that manu- 
facturers be licensed, &nd that complete records be kept as 
to (1) the amount of the basic drug used in their manufacture (2) the nature of the properties, and (3) the initial disposal 
of such properties. The Committee also suggested that the 
amount of drugs belonging to groups (b) and (c), utilised 
in making group (d) preparationsq be reported to existing 
international organs, 
See WHO Technical Report Series, op. cit. t p. 20. 
343. ibid. 
344. WHO Technical Re2ort series,. 526,1973, p. 7- 
345. op. cit-I P. 8. 
346. infra., 
347- WHO Technical Report Seriest 312,1965t P. 11- 
I 
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348- Drug monitoring is defined. as the systematic reportingg 
recordingo and-evaluation of adverse reactions to drugs 
generally available with or without prescription. " Informa- 
tion on'adverse reactions. may be made available either through 
-voluntary reportingt 
by practising doctors and hospitalog to 
designated centresq or by epidemiological techniques "aimed at 
systematic coverage of separate hospitals, representative 
samples as of the physician population etc. " The former type 
of monitoring is knoum as "spontaneous monitoring" and the 
latter as "intensive monitoring". 
See further WHO Technical Rdrort Series, 425t 1969o p. 6; 
see also Res. WHA 20.51 (Handbook of Resolutions and Decisionst 
Ilth editiong 1971). 
349- WHO Technical Report Series, 312,1965t P- 11- 
350- WHO Technical Report Series, 425,19699 P- 7- 
351- ibid. # 
352. See further WHO Technical Report Series, 498,1972, especially 
at pp. 23-24. 
353- WHO Technical Report Series, 363,1967e 
354- WHO Technical Report Series, 9P 1950- 
355- 'VMO Technical. Ranort Series, 363,1967P PP--7-8- 
356. OP- 0-it-9 PP- 8-17; see also 437, i97'09 p. 8 and 460,19709 P. 8. 
357. WHO Technical Remort Series, 407,1969, P- 14; 
see also P. C. 'Cameron, 11 Abuse of Alchohol and Drugs: Concepts 
and Plannine". IMO Chronicle, vol. 25, Yo. 1. pp. 8-16. 
358- See further U. N. Commission on Narcotic Drugsp Report of the 
Twenty-second 03ssiong ( Economic and Social Council, Official 
ýc. E/4455- 
359- See also WHO Technical Report Series, 273,19649 P- 13 (Annex 1); and N. Eddy, H, Halbaph, H, Isbell and X. Seevers, 
op. cit. 9 Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 19659 P- 721. 
360* The 'Main principle behind the maintenance progranme is to 
determine-vhether some of the pathological effects of drug 
dependence may be alleviated without necessarily achieving full 
recovery on the mart of the addict. 
See WHO Technical Report Series, 460,1970, sec 332; 
see also 437,1970 p. 25 (1 407,1969, p: 2; 
ýsec. 6); 
-and 343,1966, p. 
ý (sec. -6). 
361. See, in generalt WHO Tee'llinical Report Series, 460,1970- 
362. supra., il"", 
a ei 
- 
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363. WHO Technical Report S4riesq 1169 1957t P. 11 
364- WHO Tecbnical Report Sories. 1429-1958t P- 11; 160t 1959t P- 10- 
WAnnex 2); 229t 1962t p. 12; 273t 19649 p. 11 and 312t 19659 
p. 12;, see also Reports of the IMO ExpertCommittee on Mental 
Healtht WITO Technical Report Series, 363,19679 p. 24 et. seq. 9 
365. WHO Technical Report Series, 526,1973t P- 35. 
Of the existing information. storage and retrieval systemst 
mention should be made of the index of the Pharmacology of 
the opium alkaloids, and the U. N. Narcotics Laboratoryq apart 
from such laboratories in Canadaq U. K. and the U. S. A. 
See further H. Kraegerg N. Eddy and 11. Sumwaltq 11 The Pharmaco- 
logy of the Opium Alkaloids"91941t Washing-Lon, D. C. U. S. Public 
Health Service (U. S. Publ. i-- Health Reports, Suppl. 165t 2 vola. ) 
3660ý WHO-Technical Report Seriesq 131,19579 P- 7. 
6 
367- IMO Technical RePort, Serleas 4379 19709 pp. 24-25- 
368. op. cit. 9 p. 25. 
369. ibid. t, 
370. VRO Technical Report Series, 460,1970P P- 15 et- seq., 
371. See further"7/Thai Programme for Drug Abuse Control in 
Thailand. 119 Progress Report No. 1( qcpt. 1972- June 1973). 
U. N. Doc. IIAR/THA 1; See .. also Bulletin on Narcotics 
vol. XXVIt No. 19 1974P pp. 63-64- 
3.72. WHO Technical-Report Series,, 551, -19741 P- 85- 
373o' WHO Technical Report Series, 363,19679 P- 35 et. seq., 
374- OP- Cit-9 P. 36. 
375- See also, Report of a WITO Scientific Group on the Use of Cahnabisl 
reco=endations had been made for multi-disciplinary research 
centres and info=ation resources, WHO Technical Renort Series, 
478,1971t P. 38. 
376. See also IMO Technical Report Series, 425,1969, p, 20; 
and 460,1970P P. 35. 
377. op. cit., pp. 39-41. 
378! 
379. 
380. 
381. 
WHO Technical Report Series, 407, 19699 p. 22. 
14HO Technical Remort Series, 460, 19709 P. 33- 
op. cit-9 pp. 34-37. 
op. cit., p. 64. 
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362o 14HO Technical Report Series,, 551,1974- 
- 383. Ope Citet Pe so 
384. The broad measures suggested by the Co=ittee were: 
To limit the availability of specified dependence-producing 
drugs, to reduce social acceptance off interest ing and demand 
for dependence-producing drug-of to modify the interests and 
attitudes of persons at high risk of using dependence-producing 
drugs in a manner likely to be associated with personal and 
social problems, so as to' reduce the probability of such uset 
and to reduce the incidence and severity of complications (mental, physicalt behaviourialt social eto. ) expprienced by 
persons involved in the non-medical use of depend nee-producing 
drugs. 
op. 'cit., especiallyp at PP- 33-35. 
385- WHO Technical Report Series, 551 1974t PP- 34-359 see also 
11 Problems of Non-Medical Drug i6llf WHO Chronicleg 299 
97-101(1975)o 
386. United Hations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion (1973), Report of MeetinT on Education in More-Develo-ned 
Countries to Prevent Drua Abuse, Paris 11-20 Decemberg 1972 
" ', "V- I. . . 
(Pb/Pff/26) 9 p. 8. _ V 
387- WHO Technical Report 
-Series, 
551,1974, PP. 48-49- 
388. Social control may be either primary or secondary. While 
primary control stems from family br person-to-person 
relationshipsq secondary control derives from the laws, customs 
and mores of the community in which a person customarily livest 
op. cit., p. 21. 
See also T. Asuni, 11 Socio-Psychiatric Problems of Cannabis 
in Nigeri 
' alIq 
Bulletin on ITarcotics, 1964, Vol. XVI9 PP. 17-28 
-and L; N. Robbinsp A Follow-up of Vietngn Drug-Userng interim 
final reportv Washingtong D, C, Special Action Office for Drug 
Abuse Prevention ( Special Action Office Monorrapliq Series A, 1). 
389- WHO Technical Report Series, 5519-1974t P- 51 et- seq., 
390- OP. Cit-t P- 49- 
391- See also Article 8 of the International Opium Convention, 1925- 
392. Articles 8 ana 10 as amended. Incidentally, prior to the 1946 
Protocol the Health Cormýittee of the League had been authorised 
to take decisions in these matters. 
393. Article 119 paragraphs 3 and 4 as amended by the Protocol of 1946. 
Prior--to this Protocol, the Health Committee of the League and 
ad-hoc committees had been authorised to. take decisions in these 
matters. 
r 
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394- 'Article 39 paxagraphs 3(111), 49'5 and 6. 
395. See Article 2t paragraphs 4,5 and 
396. -See further Claude-Henri Viganes, 11 La Convention our les 
Subatances Psychotropes", XII Annuaire Pranýais de Droit 
International, 1971, pp. 641-656, at pp. 644-645. 
397- Certain committees operating. within some of the specialised 
agencies of the U. N. havb a different character from that of 
the W. H. O. Expert Committees, e. g. the Regional Commissions of 
the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations are of a 
political character. 
398-. 
- 
Siricet by nature, it is an ad hoe committee, the'regular 
routine tasks which are relevant to its work are, in its 
substance, performed by the Secretariat of the W. H. O.. Hence 
there seems to be room for argument that an Expert Committee 
may in certain cases form its opinions on the basis of the 
work done by the Secretariat. This situation also gives rise 
to the question whether it is appropriate to give much weight* 
to the opinions rendered by such committee which meets only 
occasionally and for short periods. 
399. For exampleg all advisory committees of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization are composed of goverment 
representatives. 
400- H. G. Schermers, International Inslitutional Law (vol. I)q 
A. W. Sijthoff, 1972, p. 100. 
401- As experts axe selected by the Director-General of the World 
Health Organizationp it may be relevant to point out that the 
selection of such experts may be motivated by the exclusive 
-individual considerations of the Director-Ganeral hims3lf. 
In selecting such experts-9 caution should be exercised 
in approaching a government. In fact, it may not be advisable 
at all for the appointing authority to approach a government 
for an expert, because although a senior official, by virtue 
pf his holding a very high position in his own servicep may 
expect to be nominatedl he may not be the right person for 
such an assignment. His government.. howevert on being approa- 
ched, may be obliged to nominate him. All complications and 
embarrassment can be avoided if the appointing authority has 
the skill " to find the 
* 
right man and inquire whether in the 
event of his services being required on a committee he could 
be released. " 
During the League period,, various rapporteurs submitted 
names of various candidates to the League Council for its 
1 
consideration. On a discussion between the rapporteurs and 
Directors a'tentative list of candidates W-as preparedp which 
when received the Secretary-General's authorication, allowed 
the Director concerned to Cet in touch with the respective 
, government representative(o). The Director-General of the International Labour 
OrCanization also submits names for the expert co=ittees 
directly to the Governing Bodyq which do no. t usually question 
any such proposal. 
402. G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politic. q: A Study of World Society, 
(2nd edition)t Stevens, 1951, p. 683- 
403- H. G. Schermerst OP- cit-t P. 104. 
404- According to Loveday, one way of deciding whether or not to 
appoint gove rnm ent repr9sentatives to a committee is that 
whenever a council 11 in order to save its o%m time or'for any, 
other reason hadoccasion to seek as formal an agreement as 
possible among governments, whether those represented on it or 
others, it is natural that it should appoint a committee of 
governments in preference to an advisory committee of experts. 
The function of such a co----, dttee is to negotiate rather than 
advise. " - 
A. 1oveday. ' op. cit. 9 p. 164. ' The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations was also 
composed mainly of goverhment. representatives for obvious 
-xeasbns. 
Its function was primarily to device methods for 
reducing the burden of d6uble taxation. In view of the complexi- 
ties of the problems, and al-so in view of the immediate finan- 
cial bearing upori various governments, the participation of 
, Government officials in such a committee was found fiec6ssary. 
405. A. Lovedayt OP- cit-9 P- 32. 
406. According to Loveday, the major conditions for the success of 
the work of an international advisory committee. are: 1a) that the committee acquires a corporate sensep a 
pride in itselfg and a consciousness of its respon- 
sibilities; . (b) that its members are. competent to deal with the 
subjects on its agenda; (a) that owing to the personaIities which compose it and/ 
or to the standard of its reports it has sufficient 
authority to induce those to whom its reports are 
submitted ( and in the last instance governments) 
to act on its advice; (d) that the committee members receive in adequate time 
before their meetings carefully prepared memorandav 
. 4hich at once summarize the essential facts relevant to the points on the agenda and constitute a guide to 
their discussions. 
A. Lovedayp OP* cit-9 PP. 154-155. 
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407. All standing advisory dommit . tees shall have the power to 
advance suggestions/advice and, in facto this advisory function 
is a continuing processf in the sense that in many cases advice 
is given in continuation or on the basis of previous suggestions 
or advice, Alsog such a conunittee may keep a matter under 
review and put forward. suggestions regularly. 
408- The ad hoe committee system is very predominant within the 
Intjr-nýtional Labour Organization. 
I 
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CHAPTER VI 
AN EXMINATION OF IM DRUG PROTOCOLS 
CONCLUDED DURING THE U. N. PERIOD 
(PRIOR TO 111E SINGLE CONVENTION 
ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961. ) 
Introduction 
In this chapter the Protocols concerning the suppression 
of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugst which have been concluded 
during the United Nations periodq have been examined, The Protocols 
which have been concluded during this period are the following: 
(a) The " 1946 Protocol"l Amending the Agreementop 
Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs, conclu- 
ded at the Hague on 23rd Januaryq 1912, at Geneva on 
llth Februaryq 1925 and 19th Februaryq 1925 and 
13th Julyq 1931t at Bangkok on 27th Novembert 1931 
and at Geneva on 26th June# 1936, signed at Lake 
i Successt New Yorkt on 11th Decemberg 1946 referred 
to in Article 449 paragraph It subparagraph (f) of 
the Single Convention. 
(b) The 111948 Protocol'19 Bringing under International 
I Control Drags Outside the Scope of the Convention 
of 13th JulY9 1931 for Limiting the Manufacture and 
Regulating tho Distribution of Narcotic Drugst 
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as Amended by the Protocol signed at Lake Successt New Yorkj 
on 11th December, 1946, signed at Paris on 19th Novembert 
1948v referred to in Article 449 Paragraph 19 Subparagraph (h) 
of the Single Convention ; and 
(b)'The "1953 Protocol" Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation 
of the Poppy Plautt the Production ofq International and 
Wholsale Trade in, and Use of Opiump signed at Now York on 
23rd Juneq 19539 referred'to in Article 449 Paragraph 19 
Subparqgraph (i) of the Single Convention. I 
As the Single Convention replaced these Protocolsq only the 
most important aspects of these instruments will be given. 
(a) The , 1946 Protocol"' 
The reasons for concluding this Protocol are meationed in its 
Preamble. The Parties to this Protocolt considering that it would be 
appropriate for the performance of certain duties and functions 
relating to narcotic drugsp with which the League had been investedt 
to be continued even af. ier its dissolutiont found it expedient that 
"these duties and functions should be performed henceforth by the 
United Nations and the World Health Organization or it$ 
Interim Commission. 11 The Parties to this Protocol therefore 
undertook that as among themselves they wouldq each in respect 
of the instruments to which it was a partyt and in accordance 
with the provisions of this Protocolp attribute full legal force to them. 
2 
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As for machinery of operationýof the relevant Conventions, it was 
decided that the Permanent Central Board and the Supervisory 
Board should be continuedq and that the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations should replace the Secretary-General 
of the League of Nations. This Protocol was open for signatýre 
or acceptance by any of the states Parties to the kgreementst 
Conventions and Protocols on narcotic drugs on 23rd Januaryp 
i 19129 11th February 1925,19th Februaryt 1925, -13th JulY91931, 
27th November, 1931 and 26th Junet1936. It was decided that 
the Protocol should come into force in respect of each Party 
on the date upon which it had been signed on behalf of that 
Party without reservation as to approvall or on the date upon 
which an instrument ofacceptance had been deposited. The 
amendments set forth in the Annexe to the Protocol 
were to come into force in respect of each Agreement, 
Convention and Protocol when a majority of the Parties 
thereto had become Parties to the Present Protocol- 
This Protocol did not make any major change in the contdnt 
of the previous international narcotic treaties and agreements* 
It mainly substituted the names of the new institutions for 
the corresponding old onebt and made certain obvious amendments 
which became necessary for making the provisions of a Convention 
applicable under the new situation. It wass in factq a link- 
protocol. 
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(b) The 111948 Protoeol" 
This Protocol was a Protocol of necessity, The progress of 
modern pharmacology and chemistry which had resulted in the , 
discovery of drugsg particularly synthetic drugs, capable of 
producing addictiong but not covered by the Limitation Convention 
of 19311' and also the need for a universal application of this 
agreement by supplementing its provisions prompted the 
Parties to conclude this Protocol. 
4 
This Protocol did not apply 
to raw opium# opiump coca leaf or Indian hemp as defined in 
Article 1 of the 1925 Conventionp or to prepared opium as 
defined in Chapter II of the llagiie Convention of 1912.5 It was 
a timely protocolp and like many other international conventions 
and protocolst its conclusion had been preceded by a lengtb$y 
6 discussion at the General Assembly of the U. N., especially on the 
failure of national governments to undertake obligations in this 
regard and implement them effectively. In addition to thisq 
the existing machinery of control was found inadequate to cope 
with the increasing number of newly manufactured addiction- 
producing drugs which flooded the post Second World drug market. 
7 
The gravity of this situation and the adP-quacy of the existing 
control system had been rightly summarised by the U. N. authorities 
in the follwoing text: 
11 After the Warg these problems were explored. First of allpsynthetic 
5 JL 
narcotics needed to be brou, "rht under international controll but 
as things stood this could be done only by means of Article 
10 of the 1925 Convention. A way had to be found to extend the 
control system of the 1931 Convention to cover them. Secondlyt 
their provisional controlq prior to a decision by the 
World Health Orgainzation, presented a specially difficult 
problem". As yetp there was no way of delimiting these 
drogs in advance and it was often a timo-consuming procedure 
for the governments of drug-manufacturing countries to determine 
definitely whether a new analgesic was addiction-producing, 
or'not*Thirdlyg . the whole c6ncept of convertibility needed 
reappraisal. Modern chemistry could create narcotic drugs 
out of many common chemicals; was it practicable for all 
these to be placed under. narcotics control? From this it 
followed that special control measures might have to be 
devised for these drugst which could or might soon be 
manufactured illicitly with greater eawa than the traditional 
narcoticaq since it w9uld no longer be necessary to smuggle 
8 
opium or coca. leaves over-long, distances for this purpose 
In order to remedy this situationg the Secretariat, in its 
memorandum entitled Study of Heasures to be taken vith 
., under 
international control Narcotic I a view to bringing 
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Drugs not covered by Conventions at present in force'19 
drew the attention of the Commission to the question as to 
which of the two methods9 i. e (a) to amend Article 10 of 
the 1925 Convention and Article 11 of the 1931 Convention 
or (b) to conclude a seperate instrument by which synthetic 
narcotics might be placed under mandatory full-scale 
international control$ would be more appropriate. After 
considering the expert opinions 
10 
of various representatives, 
the Commission decided 11 that it would be more appropriate 
to conclude a separate instrument in this regardq and the 
Paris Protocol was concluded*on 19th Novembert 1948. 
Although the Commission generally agreed to the suggestion 
of the Secretariat that a sepexate instrument would serve the 
purpose of bringing all new substances under it more effectivelyl 
it accepted the Secretariat's memorandum in this regard subject 
to certain modifications. 
12 - Most of the countriesg whose 
opinions on different points had been invited by the Commission, 
appeared to agree vith the views bf the Commissiont and 
recommended the urgent adoption of such a Protocol. 
Most of the important countriest. i. e. l the manufacturers 
and users of drugsp showed an inclination to give more 
powers (viz. in placing new drugs under control) to 
ihe 
Commission rather than to the World Health Organizationg 
as the former could act more rapidly than the latter, 
13 
55. 
The Commission not only decided to retain the power to place 
new drags under a provisional control pending action by -the 
World Health Organizationg but alsa made such power manadatory 
rather than reco=endatorye 
I 
. 
However, owing to itd. importance and timely appearance, 
the Economic and Social Councilt at the proposal of the 
Commissiont adopted a draft resolution to urge all States t3 
to adhere to this Protocol as soon as possiblep and also 
to extend the application of it to territorities for whose 
foreign relations they were responsiblep subject, of'course 
15 
to the' constitutional restrictions. This Protocol came into 
force on Ist December, 1949. 
This Protocol attained satisfactory although not 
extýraordinary success. All principal drug-cumufacturing 
countries became Parties to this Protocol. Many countries which 
did not accede to the Protocolt co-operated in the application 
of its provisions within their territorities, 
16 
and even 
submitted estimates of their needs for synthetic drags to the 
Supervisor. r, Body;. "d placed synthetic drugs of varying 
17 
numbers under national narcotics control regimes* Indeed 
the representative of China evaluated the Protocol by 
describing it as a "turning point in the campaign against-the 
ever present danger of the abuse of narcotic drags and 
drug addiction* 
18 
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Comments The Paris Ptotocol was not devoid of shortcomings. 
Unlike the Limitation Conventiong this Protocol did not require 
governments to place drugs under nqtional control from the time 
of commencement of their manufacture. Consequentlyt the time- 
lag between the commencement of manufacture ana action by the 
Commission or the W. H. O. as the case might beg would have 
contributed to the abuse of drugs*19 
The growing developments in chemistry and pharmacology 
had already proved unrealistic the traditional concept of 
control of all substances convertible into addiction-producing 
drugs.. The 1953 Protocol did not make any attempt to complement 
the provisions of the 1§31 Conv*ention in this regard. The concept 
of 11 convertibility" as. used in narcotic treatiest should 
be given a flexible interpretation because "there are many factors 
to be weighed-the ease with which convertibility can be effectedl 
the usefulness of the substance for sayq industrial purposes, and 
the feasibility of controlling it from the adminstrative or 
technical standpoints., In this connectiong toog the possibility 
of further scientific advances has to be borne-in mind. n2.0 
Indeedq'the World Health Organization# at its Seventh Assemblyp 
confirmed that a substance would be considered as convertible 
"where the ease of-conversion and the yield obtained constitute 
a risk to-public healthq and that in cases where there is 
uncertainty as to whether a substance will fall under this 
'U 
definitiong the substance will be considered as 'convertible' 
21L 
rather than as not convertable". 
This Protocol was by no means an exception to the 
general attitude prevailing among nations in binding themselves 
under an international instr ent. This Protocol also 
evidenced the general lack of desire of nations to bina 
themselves by an international instrument and this found 
expression in their hesitancy in accepting the "territorial clause" 
which had been ado. pted by a vote Of 33 to 8, with 12 abstentions* 
22 
This Protocol follows the usual pattern of most of the 
conventions concluded during the League period in that it 
maintained a "denunciation clause" according to which, "after 
the expiration of five years from the date of the coming into 
force of the Protocolp any State Party to the present Protocol 
mayt on its ovn behalf or on behalf of any other territories for 
which it has intornatinal responsibilityv denounce this 
Protocol by an instrument in writing deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations ... It. 
23 The Paris 
Protocol should be taken only as a step forwardp rather than. 'as 
a final answer to the drug problem. 
The 111953 Protocol "24 
The titleýof this Protocol suggests that it was concluded for 
limiting and regulating the cultivation of the opium plantp and 
the international andwholesale trade ing and use oft opium. 
This Protocol was a revelation of the gaps left by the provious 
. . t5"" 
narcotic agreements, protocols and conventions in the limitation of 
the production of raw materials for the manufacture of narcotic 
drugs- and this found expression in the third paragraph of the 
Preamblep which stated that " it is essential Ao limit to 
medical and scientific needs and regulate the production of 
the raw materials from which natural narcotic drugs are obtained" 
andt-therefore the. Contracting Parties emphasised that the most urgent 
problems were those of the control of the culiivation of the poppy and 
of the production of. opium, The other purposes of the Protocolg 
vhich had been expressed bý the Contracting Parties in its 
first and second paragraphal wereq to continue their efforts to 
combat drug addiction and illicit traffic in narcotic substances by 
25 
close collaboration among all states, and to strengthen the system 
of narcotics control at both the national and international levelsp 
vhich had been established for and directed towards this end. -- 
A Critical Examination of the protocol 
27 
It appears that the Protocol made references to "poppy" and 
"opium" onlyq as raw materials, and did not make any mention of the, 
other two raw materials, viz. coca leaf and Indian hemp ( marihuana, 
hashish and cannabis) and indeedg the term It production" in so 
far as this Protocol was egneernedo meant'only " the cultivation of the 
. poppy witk a view to harvesting opium. " For the purpose of this 
Protocolt "poppy" had been defined as 11 the plant papaver somnifer= 
L., and any other species of Papaver which may be used for the- 
S5? 
production of opium",. w The expression ". any other species of Papaver 
indicated that control would be extended beyond the ordinary opium 
poppys 
Apart from a Chapter on "Definitiou'll-this Protocol consisted 
of four other Chaptersq Viz. 
Chapter II Regulations of the Production and use of opiump 
and Trade in Opium. 
Chapter III Information to be Supplied by Governments 
Chapter IV International Supervision and Enforcement Measures 
Chapter V Final Articles (e. g. means of implementationq disputes 
signaturep ratification ate. ). 
It may be observed that in drafting this Protocol the usual 
pattern of the-previous narcotic conventions-(e. g. the 1925 and 
1931 Conventions) was followed. It is appropriate howevert to give 
a brief survey of the major. provisions of this Protocol. 
ReW Cha]2ter. -Ilý _ation of 
the Production and Use of Opium, 
and Trade in Opium. 
In Article 2 the ]Parties had undertaken to use opium 
exclusively for medical and scientific needs. 
For the purposes of 
control in the producing, states, 
this-Protocol laid emphasis on the 
establisbme nt of national agen6ies or other similar 
competent 
government authorities. Such 
institutions were given the right 
even of purchase of-ppium crops from all; 
. cultivators in their 
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respective designated areas as soon as possible, and of importationg 
exportation and wholesale trade as regards such crops. The 
Parties also undertook the obligationýto cultivate and use the 
poppy for the purposes'of production of opium poppy only., 
and to ensure that the manufacture of narcotic substances 
from . poppy straw was adequately controlled. 
28 Provisions for 
the, usual accountability to the Permanent Central Board were 
maintained., In order to strengthen the control systemt the 
Protocol made provisions for the limitation of stocks of 
opium very much along the lines of those aaoptea in the 
Limitation Conventiong in respect of the limitation of the 
manufacture of synthetic drugs,, The Board had been entrusted with 
-the task of determining the requirements of opiun in a country. 
In order to enable the Board to give consideration to thisý 
matter, the Parties were required to supply the required information 
and details of their requirements to the Board by certain 
time. In the event of the failure of a country to comply with 
this conditiong the Board was authorised to determine the 
requirements of such a country without furthor communication 
with that country. but after giving due consideration to the 
information at its disposal, to the-aims of this protocol and to 
the interests of the'Party. 
29 Where a rediietion in the stock of 
opium of a country in excess of the maximum level permitted by this 
Protocolt vas found . necessary, the Board in the exorcise of 
its discretion, was authorised to take economic realities 
30 ýinto-qonsiderýtionq where necessaryg and in exceptional 
C ircum tances it could exempt a country from compliance with 
the requirements as to the ma imum, level of oplun sto, cks. 
31 
In Article 6 tho"Parties uiidertook to limit the import and 
export of opium exclusively to medical and scientific 
purposes. The same Article provided that the import and 
export would be permittedg"'of-'opium produced in certain 
designated countries, viz. Blulgarial Greecog India, Iran, 
Turk-eyt U. S. S. R. and-Yugoslavia., Not only was the importing 
and/or exporting country required to be a*party to the Protocoll 
--but the Parties also would xift permit the import of opium 
from any state which was not a Party to the Protocol. 
The Parties not only agreed to apply the-system of import 
certificates and export authorisations provided for in 
--cha'pter'V of tho-International Opium Convention, 19259 but also 
left the door open for conditions more restrictive than those 
required by''chapter V of this Conventiont should any of them 
so-desire'. " This Protocolq' howeverg excluded the application 
of Articl e 18 . of the International Opium Convention, 11 925- 
32 The 
Protocol"p'rovided for the destruction of all opiUM'seized in the 
illicit traffic or for the conversion by a Party, in whole or in 
partt under government'control, of the narcotic substances contained ir 
such opiun into non-narcotic'subs-tancesp or for the appropriation 
in vhole or in partgof such opium or the alkaloids manufactured 
therefrom for medical or scientific use by or under the control 
33 
of the government. Seized opium which could be identified as 
having been stolen from a government or licensed warehouse had to 
be retumed to its lawful owner. 
Chapter III Information to be Sunplied by Governments 
This Protocol required the governments to supply the 
Permanent Central Board with'information on estimates of their 
requirements of opiump and statistics showing the extent of the 
area on which poppy had been cultivated with a view to harvesting 
opimi and the amount of opium harvested thereon ; the amount of 
opium consumed; 
34 the amount of opium u. sed for the manufacture 
of alkaloids and opium preparationsp including the quantity 
required for the manufacture of preparations for the export of 
vhich authorizations were not required, whether such preparations 
were intended for domestic consumption or for export, in accordance 
with the International Opium Convention of 1925 and the Limitation 
Convention of 1931; the amount of opium seized in the illicit 
trafficq the amount disposed of, the method of disposal and the 
statistics showing the stocks held on the preceding 31 December. 
Ja this regard, this'Protocol basically followed the system which 
had been adopted in the Limitation Convention of 1931, The provi- 
sions concerning both the usual and the supplementary statistics' 
basically followed the pattern established in the Limitation 
Convention. This Protocol included the quantity of opium that 
would be required for the manufacture of preparations which had 
N 
been excepted under Article 8 of the International Opium Convention 
35 
of 1925. The rules regarding exports of opium were meant-to be 
relaxed where such relaxation would be necessary It in the interests 
of humanity or for the treatment of the sick. " 
36 The responsibility 
of examining estimates and acquiring . any information concerning 
this matter lay with the Supervisory Body, whereas the overall respon- 
sibility relating to 11 estimates and statistics" rested upon the 
Permanent Central Board . The Parties were required to submit 
annual reportsp in accordance with the form prescribed by the 
Commissiong to the Secretary-General, on the measures adopted by them 
for the*proper implementation of the Protocol in their respective 
territories*37 The Parties also undertook to furnish the Secretary- 
General with additional information regarding any important'changes 
concerning the implementation of this Protocol in their respective 
territories. 
Q22ter IV International Supervision and 
Enforcement . Measures 
This Protocol made detailed provisions regarding international 
'supervision and enfo. rcement measures, International supervision, 
under this Protocolp consisted of certain administrative measuresp 
viz. t 
(a) request for 'Informationt (b) request for explanationg 
(c). proposal of remedial measures and (d) local inquiry. 
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All these measures were aimed at the most extensive and effective 
im-plementation of the provisions of this Protocoll not by coercive 
measuresp but by co-operation- by making appropriate suggestions 
to the Parties concerned ( Article 11(l)(a)), by requesting a 
confidential explanation from the Party concerned (Article 11(l)(b))t 
by calling upon the governments to study the possibility of adopting 
such remedial measures as the situation might require (Article 11(l)(c))t 
and even by means of a local inquiry Ln collaboration with officials 
designated by thý goverrment concernedp where such an inquiry would 
in the opinion of the Board appear to contribute to the elucidation 
of the situation and if the government concerned expressly-consented 
to such an inquiry (Article 11(l) (d)). - 
it 38 It mayt howeverp be observed that the "enforcement-measures 
as enunciated in this Frotocolt presented an innovation. These 
measures co nsisted of public declarationst recommendatory embargo, 
mmndatory embargog procedural safeguards and universal application. 
Public-declar'ation was to be operative if the Board found that the 
failure of a Party to carry out provisions of the Protocol was 
seriously impeding the control over narcotic substances in any 
territory yhether that of ýt Party to-be Protocol or not.. It consisted 
of tw6 stages, vize p 
(aý public notif icationt Le. 9 by a notif i-, 
cation of the Board calling the attention of all Parties'and of the 
Council to the matterf an& (b) public statements, in the event that 
the action taken by the Board by means of public notification p -did 
not produce-the desired effect* If however the Board had made a 
public statementv it would also publish the views of the government 
14 563 
concerned if the latter so requested, The provision for the 
imposition of an embargo in two stages, i. e. 9 recommendatory and 
mandatory, introduced a new feature in that the process of sanction 
was made cumulative. A situation of-Ilreco=endation of embargo'? 
pre-supposed (a) a failure of a Party to fulfil its obligations 
under Articles 8 and 9 of the Protocolq or the irresponsible beha- 
viour of any other state which was seriously impeding the effective 
administration of statistics and estimates by the Boardp or (b) wheng 
in the light of the information at the disposal of the Boardq it 
appeared that excessive quantities of opiun were accumulating in any 
country or territory or that there was a danger of any country or 
territory becoming a centre of illicit traffic. In the event of any 
of theve situations the Board vas authorised to recommend to the 
Parties an embargo on the import of opium, the export of opium, or 
both from or to the country or territory concerned 9 either for a 
designated periodt or until the Board was satisfied that the opium 
situation in that country or territory had been improved* The state 
concerned however was given the right to bring the matter before the 
Ec. onomic and Social Council in advanceg in accordance with the 
31 
relevant provisions of Article 24 of the International Opium 
Convention of 1925. 
The mandatory embargo consisted of three parts, viz., 
(a)'announcement of and imposition of embargot (b) appealt and 
(c) execution of the embargo. The mandato ry embargo again was 
devised to be cumulative in its applicationt sincet in accordance 
. 
with Article 12 (5)(a)(i) of the Protocol, the Board mightt on the 
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basis of the findings made under sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) of 
paragraph 2 of this Articlet announce its intention to impose an 
embargo on the'import of opium or the export of opium or both from 
or to the country or territory concerned. Shouldp however, this 
action fail to produce any effeetv the Board, on notifying the 
state concerned and the Secretary-General of its decisiong could 
impose an embargo, either for a definite periodt or until it was 
satisfied as to the situation in the country or territory concerned. 
The decision of. the Board in this regard was to remain confidential 
and would not take effect before sixty days after its arriving at 
this decisiong unless notice of appeal was given by the state concernedq 
and the event of such a noticep the embargo would come into force 
thirty days after the withdrawal of the appeal or after a decision 
of the Appeals Committee upholding the embargo in -*hole or in part. 
40 
The novelty of the mandatory embargo Jay in its provisions 
for an appeal. In terms of Article 12 (3)(b)(i)p a state in respect 
of which a decision to impose a mandatory embargo had been'takenp might, 
within thirty days of receipt of such decision, notify the Secretary- 
General confidentially, in writingt of its intention to appeal. The 
accused state was allowed to adduce its grounds of appealt in 
vritingf within another thirty days. Such an appeal was to be heard 
by an Appeals Committee appointed by the Secretarý-Generalq and the 
decision of this Committeewas to be taken as final and binding. The 
decision of this Committee was required to be forwarded by the 
Secretary-General to the appellant state and to the Board. The time 
by which the embargo would take effect wasp thereforet dependent upon 
/ 
Sao 
vhether or not the state concemed had appealed, 
Decisions of the Board concerning matters relating to. 
Article 12 were to be made by a majority of the whole Board. The 
state concerned was granted the right of hearing before the Board 
decided to impose an embargo, One 'of the remarkable features of this 
Protocol was that it made a provision for its universal application. 
Article 13 of the Protocol provided that the "Board may algog if 
41 
possiblet take the measures referred to in this chaptert in respect 
of States which are not Parties to this Protocol, and in respect of 
territories to whichr under article 20, this Protocol does not applý. " 
I 
Chapter-V Final Articles 
The Final Articles provided for the usual concluding provisions 
of a multilateral convention. - Howevert as far as the measures for 
implementation of the provisions of this Protocol were concemedp it 
was left to the Parties to adopt legislative and administrative measures 
necessary for the purpose of making the provisions of the Protocol 
42 
fully effective. Unless the Parties agreed to another mode of 
settlementv all disputed be. tifeen two or more Parties relating to the 
interpretation or application of this Protocol vere to be referred to 
the International Court of Justice. Accession to the Protocol was open 
to the Members of the United Nations, and also to any non4lember 
state whicht in accordance with the instruction, of the Economic and 
Social Council, had been invited to participate in the Conference 
Z60 
(i. e., the conference which drew up this Protock) and any other 
state to which the Secretary-General, at the request of the Economic 
and Social Councily had sent aý copy of this Protocol. 
43 Article 19 
of the Protocol provided tor " Transiti onal Measures" by any Party on 
special groundsp vi2. t indispensability of opium for quasi-medical 
purposesl and on an undertaking that, the use, pr6duc, tionj import and 
export of opium for quasi-medical purposes would not be extended beyond 
a certain period of time etc. 
(ii) Comments 
The 1953 Protocolwas concluded with a view to taking the 
"Opium War" a step further. This-Protocol was of limited scope in 
that it poncerned itself only with combating the illicit traffic in 
opium and other related matters, and it was characterised by the basic 
traits of-the other existing drug conventionst and especially the 
Limitation Convention. Howevert this Protocol, made a renewed 
effort to deal with the opium problem, and in indeed, the Preamble to 
the Protocol referred not only to limitation, but also to regulation, 
vhich in addition to quantitative limitation meant government control 
over cultivationg production, traAe in and use of opium. 
44 110piw3i" 
within the meaning of the Protocol included-"poppy" alsoo The terms 
"narcotic substances",, "narcotic alkaloids" or other similar expres- 
sions were used to denote the drugs derived from opium. The expression 
illicit traffic in narcotic substances". as used in the Preamble, 
.mý. V67 
must have been used to include rawq medicinal and prepared opiuml 
vhereas the expression " natural narcotic drugs" stood for 11 raw 
materials from which natural narcotic drugs are obtained"y i. e., 
manufactured drugs. 
The undertaking of the Parties in Article 2 of this Protocol to 
01 limit the use of opium exclusively to medical and scientific needs was 
a" loose undertaking" since a precise dete=ination of the medical 
45 
and scientific beeds of a country was fraught with difficulties* 
In Article 4 of the Protocolq howeverg the Parties made a direct 
attempt to control the cultivation of the poppy plant for purposes other 
than the production of opium. This,, the writer observesp was the 
first'attempt of its kindt and the provi6ions of Article 4 indirectly 
implied that even at the time this Protocol was draftedt cultivation 
of the poppy plant for-purposes other than the production of opim 
was permissible in some countries. Although international trade in 
46 
opium had been limited to that produced in seven countries$ such 
restrictions were applicable only to the Parties to the Protocol. The 
possibility of a universal application of this Protocol, as envisaged 
in Article 13Pwas remotel especially in view of the existing nature 
of-the contemporazy international legal orderg and indeed, this Article 
47 
provided that the Iq3oard miy alsof Lf possible, take the measures 
referred to in this chaptert in respect of states which*are not 
Parties to this Protocol. "* Ihe succeis of the embargo provisions, 
which re&esented a new feature in the Protocol very much depended 
upon the degree of co-operation of the Contracting Pa rties. The 
primary purpose of imposing an embargo would seem to have been 
48 
defeated by the'delaying procedure of its actual execution. The 
V68 
measures required to be adopted for theAmplementation of the 
. Protocol had been left to the Parties. 
49 In other words, the Parties 
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were given a certain ficedom of action as was clear from the expressionp 
... shall adopt all legislative and administrative measures necessary 
for the purpose of making fully effective the provision of the 
Prot6col., " The adoption of such a provision at a- time when a consi- 
derable lack of understanding prevailed between the producing and the 
manufacturing countries only added to the uncertainty of success in 
attaining the desired limitation. 
This Protocol was the first international instrument of its kind 
which dealt with the use of opium for quasi-medical purposes. The 
reasons for this are not far to seek. When the United Nations Confer- 
once considering this Protocol adopted the pricniple that opium might 
be used only for medical and scientific purposest it had also to deal 
with opium-smoking which was not a medical or scientific use of opiump 
52 
and hence the transitional measures had been devised. Under the 
transitional measuresp opium-smoking was to be abolished by a maximum 
period of fifteen years after the coming into force of this-Protocol. 
The "use of opium for quasi-medical purposes" obviously included the 
eating of opium to cure diseases or to relieve pain- a very native 
"medical" practice- which was prevalent as a customary practice 
iii, certain countries# mainly those on the Asian, Middle Eastern and 
52(a) 
Sou6 American regions* The provision of transitional measures 
in the protocol 
53 
was an expression of the real understanding of a 
deep-seated problem on the part of the Contracting Parties. Yet the 
Protocol merely made provisions of, control by the usual methodsp e. g* 
control of productiont submisslon of statistics and estimates to the 
r) 69 
Permanent Central Board andfailed to. make any provision for the 
cure of the habit of opium-eating. This was left entirely to the 
Parties concerned*54 
This Protocol also followed the pattern of all narcotic 
and opium conventions concluded daring the League period in so far 
55 56 57 
as denunciations, termination and reservation were concerned. 
A Party might denounce this Protocol after the expiration of five 
years from the date of its coming into force. The provision of 
"termination" was a necessary follow-up of the "denunciation" 
provision. Such provisions merely impede the creation of an 
58 
international legal order. That the nations were not willing 
to be so bound by an international obligation, in so far as this area 
of international law is concernedq can easily be established by the 
fact that this Protocol came into force about ten years after its 
59 
adoptiong even though the ratification or accession of only 
twenty-five states,, including three producing and three manufacturing 
statess was necessary* 
60 
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POOTNOTESI' 
11 U. N. Treaty Seriest vol. 12, p. 179- 
2. See also U. N. General Assembly 3rd Sessiont Plenary Meetingst 
Official Records, 1948t vol. 6, Pp. 348 et. seq., 
3- Article VII. 
,I 
See Preamble to the Protocol. U, N, Treaty Series, vol. 449 
p. 277. This Protocol is also known as the Paris Protocol 
of 1948- 
Article 4 of the Protocol. 
6. See, in particularg U. N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR, 88 2 Octobert 1948p 
Summary Records of-the 88th Meeti., g, A/PV--149,8 Octoberp 
1948, verbatim record of the 150th Meeting, 
1). 
It was at this time,, that Pethidine 9 which is a, powerful., '.. 
synthetic analgesic, was manufactured. 
8. Bulletin on I'larcotics, Vol. VIII# No. 1. janu'ary-March, 1956. 
See also the Memorandum of the Secretariat on the terms of 
reference of the Commission on Narcotic Drursq- 1119 5. in Annex I 
of the Renort of the Cozimission on Narcotic Druzs on its First 
Sessiong P- 30 (Economic and Social Council, -Official Recordsl, 
. 
Second Yeart Fourth Sessiont Supplement No. 1). 
9. E/CN. 7/80. 
10, For the*expert opinions of various representatives, see LeMort 
of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs on its Second Session, 
E75751 PP- 13-15. -- The motion to prepare a seperate instrument 
had been proposed by the representative of China. U, N. Doe. 
E/CN-7/106, p. 12. 
The reasons that the Commission did notýfavour the idea of 
amending the existing conventions were: (a) that, amendment of a 
multilateral treatý would require the unanimous consent of all 
Parties to the origina1treatyt which might have proved 
difficult to achieve and (b) that an amendment of either of 
the conventionsp i. e. 9 the International Opium Convention of 
1925(which contained no provision for its amendment) and the 
Limitation Convention of 1931t would not have produced the 
desired result because of their inherent limitations in extending 
the required coutrol measures tp the increasing number of 
manufactured drugs. 
. 11, E/57ýv P. 15. 
12. eog. (a) it preferred to use the term I'd-rugalt instead of ' 
'Ina-rcotic drugs"tin order to bring all addiction-producing 
drugs under the scope of this Protocol. See E/0-7/106, 
pp. 16-17. 
(b) it found it advisable that the decision as to 
whether a drug came under the control regime of Group I 
or II of Article 1 of the Limitation Convention should 
rest with the W, H. O. instead of the Commission; 
(c) it also advocated that notifications of drugs', by 
the Secretary-General should be transmitted simultane? usly 
. 
to the Commission and the World Health Organization. 
See further B/CN-7/106, Pp. 42-45 and 89-90* 
13- For the text of these, observations, see UJI. Doca* E/798t 
pp. 7-18 and E/CN-7/1159 Adds 1-2. 
14- Article 2 of the Protocol; see also U. N. Doe. E/798P PP. IN 
12-13. Sweden urged that this power of the Commission should 
be recommendatoryp and the Netherlands also. seemed to prefer 
this ideaq see D/1056. 
15* E/SR-189v P- 14 (No- 159 I(VII) in the Council Series. 
16. Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. VIII, No. lt January-Marcht 1956t 
p. 9. See also E/CN-7/260p Pp- 5-9 and 21-25. 
17. E/OB-DSB/ W. 66. PP. 3-4. 
1. 
18. A/SR. 150v pp. 1-26. 
In fact, * the Single Convention, as a measure of improvement of Ip this situation, has taken this point into consideration, see 
below. 
However, according to a U. NeReport, this unsatisfactory situation 
which had been left unremidied by this Protocol, had not been exploited 
by traffickers . probably because governments and most drug manufacturers were aware of the problem and had a genuine 
desire to protect public health. Bulletin on ITarcotiesp 
vol. VIIIi Wo. lt-January-Marchq 1956, p. 9. 
20. Bulletin on Narcotics, op. cit., p. 
21. WHA07-7o 17 MaYp 1954o 
22. A/C-3/SR. 879 pp. 5-6., 
41 572 
23- Article 9. 
24. U. N. Treaty Series, Vol- 456p 1963- 
25- Paragraph lo 
26. Paragraph 2, 
27- For a detailed. account of the work of the Conferencet see 
U, N, Does. E/CONF-14/6.2 dated 5 MaYq 1953t E/COVP-14/-SR. 2 
dated 28 May, 1953, E/COIT-14/SR-3 dated 29 I-lay, 1953, 
E/COTNF. 14/SR-5 dated 16 June, 1953, B/CO14P. 14/SR. 8 dated 
25 Junet 19539 E/CONF, 14/SR, 10, dated 30 Juneq 1953 and 
E/COITF. 14/SR, ll dated 1 July, 1953- 
28. Article 
29, Article 5(3) (d). 
30. Article 5(5) (b), 
31- Article 5 (5) (a). 
32. Article 18 of the International Opium Convention of 1925 
If 
any Contracting Party finds it impossible to apply any I provi'Sion 
of this Chapter to trade with another country by reason of the 
fact that such country is not a party to thd present Convention, 
such Contracting Party will only. be bound to apply the 
provisions of this Chapter so. far as the-circumstances, permit". 
33- Article 7(2). 
34- This included the amount of opium delivered for retail trade, or 
to be dispensed or adminstered by hospitals or by qualified 
and duly authorized persons in the exercise of their professional 
or medical functions. 
Article 8(l)(a) of the 1953 Protocol. 
35- Article 8 of the International Opium Conventiono 1925 "In the 
event of the Health Committee of the League of h7ationsg after 
having submitted the question for advice and, report -to the 
Permanent Committee of the Office international d' Hygiene 
publique in Pariso finding that any prepartaion containing any 
of the., narcotic drugs referred to in the present Chapter 
- cannot give rise to the drug habit on account of the medicaments 
with which the said drugs are compounded and which in practice 
preclude the recovery of the said drugst the Health Committee 
. shall communicate this finding to the Council of the League 
of Nations. The Council will communicate the finding to the 
Contracting Partiesp, and thereupon the provisions of the present 
Convention will not be appliodble to the preparation concerned". 
r 
I.: 
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36. Article 8 (11) (b) 
37. Article 10. 
38- Article 12.. 
39- Article 24 : 
1. "The Central Board shall continuously'watch'the couxse of 
the international trade. If the information at its 
disposal leads the Board to conclude that excessive 
quantities of any substance covered by the present 
Convention are acemulating in any countryt or that there 
is a danger of that country becoming a centre of the illicit 
traffict the Board shall have the right to ask, iiirough 
the Secretary-General of the League, for explainations from 
the country in question. " 
2. "If no explaination is given within a reasonable time or 
the explanation is unsatisfactory, the Central Board-shall 
have the right to call the attention of the gove = ents 
of all the Contracting Par-ties and of the Council of the 
League of Fations to the matter, and to recommend that no 
further exports of the substances covered by the present 
Convention or any of them shall be made to the country 
concerned until the--Board reports that it is satisfied-as 
to the situation in that country in rega=d to the said 
substances. The Board shall at the same time notify the 
government of the country conderned of the recommendation made 
by it. 11 
3* The country concerned shall be entitled to bring the matter 
before the Council of the League. " 
4- "The government of any exporting country which is not 
prepared to-act on recommendation of the Central Board shall 
also be entitled to bring the matter before the Council of 
the Le. ýLgue. 11 
4- "The government of-any exporting country which is not 
prepared to act on the recommendation of the Dentral'Board 
-shall also be-entitled-to bring the matter before the, Council 
of the League. 
If it does not do so, it shall immediately inform the Board 
that-it is not prepared'to act on the recommendation, 
explainingt if possible; why it is not prepared to do so. "- 
"The Central Board shall have the right to publish'a =epo--t 
on the matter and communicate it to the Councilý which 
-shall thereupon forward it to the governments of all the 
Contracting Parties. 
66 "If in any case'the decision of the Central'Boa=d is notý 
unanimous, the views of the minority shall also bb stated. " 
7# 11'Any. couht=y shall - 
be invited to be. represent&d at a meeting 
of 'the qentral ]Boa-xd at which a question directly interesting it 
*is"considerýd. ", 
40. Article 12(3)(0)(i)o 
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41. The title of this chapter is "Enforcement Measureall. 
Article 20 of the Protocol: Title: Territorial Application 
4 
"This Protocol shall apply to all the non-self-governingg 
trust, colonial and other non-metropolitan territories 
for. the international relations of which any-Party is 
responsiblet except where the previous consent of a 
non-metropolitan territory is required by the Constitution 
of the Party or of the non-metropolitian territory, or 
required by custom. In such case the Party shall endeavour 
to secure the needed consent of the non-metropolit4n 
territory within the shortest period pos-tible and 
,I 
,, _when 
that consent is obtained the Party shall notify 
the Secretary-General. This Protocol shall apply 
to the territory or territories named in such notification 
from the date of its receipt by the Secretary-General. 
In those cases where the previous consent of the non- 
metropolitan territory is not required, the Party concerned 
shall, at the time of signaturet ratification or accessiong 
declare the non-metropolitan territory or territories to 
which this Protocol applies". 
, f, ý - .* 
42. Article 14: Measures of Tm-plementation 
" The Parties shall adopt-all legislative and adminstrative 
measures necessary for the purpose of maýing fully 
effective the provisions qf this Protocol". 
43- Article 16: "This Protocolp of which the Chinese, %. glishg 
French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally 
authentic, shall until 31 December 1953 be 
open for signature on behalf of any Member of 
the United Nations and of any non-member State. 
invited, in accordance with the instructions of 
the Councilt to participate in the Conference 
. which drew up this Protocol, and of any other State to which the Secretary-General at the 
request of the Councilt has sent a copy of 
this Protocol", 
Article 18: "This Protocol may be acceded to on behalf of 
any Mýmber of the United Nations or any non- 
-member State referred to in article 16 or 
any other non-Member State to which the 
Secretary-Generalg at-the request of the Council 
has sent a copy of this Protocol. The 
instruments of accession shall be deposited 
, -with--the 
Secretary-General". 
44. B. A. Renborgr "Analysisof the Preamble to the protocol and of 
thq Recommendations -Embodied in the Final Act'19 
Bulletin on Narcotics, July-September, 19539 P-31 
IN .. - 
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45- Supra. t 
46. See Article 6. Bulgaria, Greece, Indiat Irant Turkey, ' 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia. 
At the-time this Protocol came into force, Bulgaria was 
not a party to it. 
47. Italics added. 
48- Article 12(3) (0) W and (ii)- 
49- Article 14- 
50- See'the opinion of Renborg who was an observer from Sweden 
at the Conference ad9pting this Protocol. U. N. Doc. 
E/CONF-14/SR-199 P-15- 
51- See also the opinion of the Dutch Delegate at the Conference. 
., U. N. Doe. E/CONF-14/SR-4-t P- 12. 
52. See also B. A. Renborgj op. cit., Bulletin on Varcotics, 
July-Septembert 1953t at P- 36. 
5? (a) Siipra. 
53- Article 19. 
54- One of the'problems that-nust have been encountered 
during the transitional period was how a licensed vendor 
would determine whether or not prospective buyer was 
buying opium for quasi-medical use. 
55- Article 23- 
56. Article 24- 
57- Article 25* 
58- Supra. 17-t*- 
59, This Protocol came intb force on 8 March, 1963- 
60. Article 21. 
Ratification by three of the following producing states 
was necessary: 
Bulgariag Greece, Indiag Irant Turkey, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republic and Yugoslavia. 
Ratification by three of-the following manufacturing states 
was necessary&* 
Belgiumv Prancet Federal-Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlandsp Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America., 
r 
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CHAPTER VII 
AN EMIDUTION OF THE SINGLE. 
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 
D61 I- 
Introduction 
The international control systemp as appears 
from the foregoing discussiont had become complicated by the 
introduction of nine conventionst agreements and protocols. 
A single convention . -embracing'all necessary and enforceable 
aspects of contrqlq to replace the existing treaties vas found 
essential with a viewp inter alia# to simplifying the interna- 
23 tional control system. By two resolutions 9 the Economic and 
Social Council authorised the Commission on Narcotic Drugs to 
work on the codification of this Convention. With the co-opera- 
tion of-various goveramentsp international and inter-governmental 
bodies the Commission prepared a draft convention, and a Plenipo- 
tentiary Conference for the Adoption of a Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drug's was convened at New York from January 24 to 
Ilarch 25t 1961. The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 
was adopted and opened f. or. signature by the Conference on Harch 309 
1961, and it came into force on December UP 1964. 
A 
/ 
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Objectives of the Convention 
The lacunae of the existing agreements and conventions on 
drugs offered an opportunity to the drafters of the Single 
Convention Convention on Narcotic Drugs ( hereinafter callea 
the "Single Convention") to fomulate its objectives. Some of 
these objectivest as it will appearg were newq while others were 
merely repetitive, or an extended version of the objectives of 
the previous drag conventions and protocols. These*objectives - 
whicht although not comprehensive49 embraced a considerable number 
of areasp namely: 
(a) codification of the existing multilateral conventions 
on arugs; 
(b) simplification of the international control machinery; 
(c) extension of the control system to the cultivation of 
other natural products in addition -to opium and poppy 
straw which produce narcotic effects, e. g. cannabis, 
cannabis resin and coca leaves (except idien such leaves 
are used for the purpose of flavouring beverages) ; and 
(d) adoption of appropriate measures for the treatment and 
rehabilitation of drag addicts. 
I 
(t) The Scope of Control 
The scope of control of the Single Convention is much wider 
than that of any previous drug convention. 
5 The drafters of this 
Convention mainta, ined a certain flexibility, which is essential 
in such matters, in order that the scope of control may be extended 
78 
or limitedt as and when necessary, and in doing so they had the 
benefit of experience from the previousýconventions. A change 
in the scope of control under the qingle Convention meant 
brin., Y-ing an uncontrolled substance into the control regime; 
I changi= 
the regime applicable to a drugg cancellija such 
g regime in respect of a preparationg and. removinp- a drug 
completely from its control regime. 
6 
The first drug-treaty 
which had a procedure for changing the scope of controlp 
i. ej to place additional drugs under control, if necessaryt 
was the 1923 Convention* 
7 
By the 1946 Protocol the task 
of. changing the-ScOPO of control was entrusted to the 
World*11ealth Organizationt but the opinion and action. 
of this organization were only recommendatory, and thereforep 
binding only upon those states which expressly accepted them 
as "obligations". This Convention also authorised 
the World Health Organization to exempt certain preparations 
from the control regime if it found that the preparat ionj 
could not "give rise to the drug habit". Unlike the 1925 
Conventionp any extension of. the control regime under the 
1931 Convention was automatically binding upon its Partiesq 
and the authority for such a decision had Wen conferred upon 
8 
the World Health Organization. In certain casesq the decision 
as to the. "addiction-producing" capacity of a drug was taken by 
an ad hoc Expert Committee of the World Health Organization, 
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and such decisions were binding upon the Parties to the 
1931 Convention. In addition to thisq the 1931 Convention 
made provisions for provisional controlq i. e., the extension 
of the control regime to a drug which was suspectq although 
a notification from a governmentp presumably end(nred with 
a strong sense of co-operationg was necessary for making 
such a provision operative. 
9 The limitation in scope 
of the 1931 Convention 
10 led to the adoption of the 
1948 Protocol, which extended the control regime to 
synthetically manufactured drugs. In order to make the 
control provisions of this Protocol effective in this regard, 
one of its Parties was required to notify the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations of the harmful effects which 
the drug, concerned might produce. Although the final decision 
as to whether the control regime should be extended to such 
a drug lay with the World Health Organizationg the Commission 
on Narcotic Drags was empowered to take interim measures by 
putting, the drug under provisional control. 
. 
Under the Single-Conventiong however, an attempt has 
'been made to assimilate all the operative parts. of the 
previous agreements and conventions, although in certain cases 
amendments to and extensions of provisions have been madet 
as ana when necessary. Like the 1948 Protocol, the 
" el- "so 
Single Convention also provided that in order to have any of the 
Schedules amended, if, is-necessarr to. onsure that such a drug 
is liable to the same kind of abuse and is productive of the 
same kind of harmful effects as the drugs already under control. 
12 
As under the 1925 Convention and the 1948 Protocolq the 
Single Convention extends 'to a. substance of any chemical 
structure. 
13 Like the 1925 Conventiong the Single Convention 
has also provided that the initiative to amend any of the. 
Schedules ( i. e. t by bringing the matter to the attention 
of the Secretary-General) may be taken either by a Party to it 
or by the World Health Organization. However, any initiative 
to amend a Schedule will obviously be directed to one of the 
f ollowing: 
. (a) Brinain a substance under international control by 
placing it under Schedule I or II or by placing it 
simultaneously under Schedule I and IV, and consequentlyp 
makiag it subjedt to a much stricter regime'of control; 
(b) Chanizim-tz the regime applicable to a drug ; i. e. 9 by 
transfering it from Schedule I to Schedule II or 
vice versa; or by simultaneously placing a drug 
in Schedule IV which is already in Schedule I; 
(c) Bringing a preparation under Schedule III or cancelling 
such a preparation from Schedule II; and 
1% Is, sI 
0 
(d) Freei a drug completely from the control regime 
by deleting it from Schedul eI and/ or IV or 11.15 
The responsibility of making a final decision in this 
matter lies with the Commission and such decision "shall become 
effective with respect to each Party on the date of its 
receipt of such communication, and'the Parties shall thereupon 
take such actio4 as may be required under this Convention" . 
16 
All decisions of -the-Commission aret in practicep based upon 
the recommendation of the World Health Organization and during 
the pendency of a reoommendation by the said organizationg the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugi may direct the Parties to apply 
provisionally to that substance all measures of control applicable 
to drugs in Schedhle Ip and the Parties shall apply such 
measures provisionally to the substance in question*17 
Such decisions of the Commission shall not be subject to the 
Is 
retriew procedure provided for in Article 7 of this Convention. 
Howeverp not all newly produced or manufactured drugs 
need to be placed under the international control regime. 
In other words, the question of placing a drug under the 
international control regime will only be considered if the 
Anitiative to this effect is taken either by a Party to the 
Sin,,, Y, le Convention or by the World Health Organization. 
Paragraph I of Article 3 hýs excluded non-parties to the 
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Convention in this matter, and inaeod, the whole machinery of 
the transmission of information and notifications conderning 
amendment to any of the Schedules been confined to the Parties 
to the Convention and the World Health Organization. 
19 
Howeverp under the Single Conventioni the Scope of 
control in respect of a substance haa, two aspectsq viz. (a) Provisional 
and (b) Mandatory. when a notification relates to a substance, 
not already in Schedule I or in. Schedule II, "the Parties". 
in terms of paragraph (i) of Article 39 "shall examine in the 
light of the available information the possibility of the 
provisional application to the substance of all measures of 
control applicable to drugs in Schedule Ill. Thereforep under 
this paragraphp it is left to the judgement of a Party whether 
or not there is a possibility of applying the provisional 
control measures to a drug. The mandatory aspect is the' 
graduated version of the provisional aspect, i. e, it comes 
into play when the provisional measures of control have 
received confirmation as to their compulsory application 
in the future. Mandatory measures are, thereforep preýeded 
by provisional measures. 
20- The merits of such provisional 
measures can hardly be. over-emphasisedi, and the machinory 
of control may be put into operation on the basis of information 
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received not only from the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations but also from the World Health Organization, the 
Secretariatp gdvernnents and even from the observers who 
participate at various levels in the control measures 
, 
adopted by the Co=ission on Narcotic Drugs, 
The mandatory measures of control eonsist of ivo 
stages: firstlyp it is for the World Health Organization 
to find that the "substance is liable to similar abuse 
and productive of similar ill, dffects as the drugs in 
Schedule I or-lSchedule II or is convertible into such 
a drugg and secondlyo in the-event of its finding it 
the affirmativep it shall communicate accordintg9ly to the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugsp upon which the Co=iasion may 
decide. that "the substance shall be added to Schedule I or 
Schedule II% Although the technical work of the first stage . 1'ras 
be discharged by the World Health Organization. alone, the 
Office of the Legal Affairs of the United Nationsq at one 
stage of the drafting of the Single Conventiong pointed 
olit to the Commission 6n Narcotic Drugs the anomaly vhich 
persisted over the expression "the substance is liable to 
similar abuse and productive of similar ill effects as the 
drugs in Schedule I or Schedule II ... "I and which, in effect 
imposed a restriction upon the discretion of the World Health 
Organization. The term "similar" embraces a wide area of compari 
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As barbituratesp tranquillizers and amphetamines were outside 
the scope of the Single Conventiong presumably on the prosumption 
that they were neither liable tq "similar" abuse nor could they 
produce "similar" ill effects as the drugs in Schedule I or 
Schedule 119 it was pointed out by the Legal Office that the 
effects of amphetamines have some degree of similarity to 
cocaineg and those of barbiturates and tranquillizers to morphine'19 
and this found some degree of support from the Co=ission. 
21 The 
not result has been that the dru,, ms which are likely to produce ill 
effects or are-liable to abuse have been made subject to a more 
severe test in order to ascertain whether or not they should coma 
under the international control regime. As the control regime is 
under constant examinationg and as the character of the Schedules 
may be changed and/or amended by inclusion or exclusion of drugag 
it may be observed that the scope of control under this Convention 
is flexible, and hence may be adjusted as the circum tances require. 
Unlike the Limitation Conventionj 22 the Single Convention does not 
justify the "convertibility" of a substance by reference to its 
chemical formula; in other words, it does not require that the 
substance concerned has a particular chemical formulas 
23 The 
"convertibility" on a substance is determined in accordance with 
its propertiesp rather than its chemical formula. This wider 
interpretation of the "convertibility" of substances has a deterrent 
effect upon the illicit traffickers in that their attempts to 
to transform a substance into one which falls under the category 
of controlled dangerouB druis will meet with failure. 
24 
Article 3# paragraph 11 has made provisions for the exemption 
of preparations from certain measures of control, according to uhichp 
if the World Health Organization finds that a preparation is not 
liable to abuse nor can produce ill effects and that the drug 
I 
therein is not readily available, the Comission may add that 
preparation to Schedule III. " Exemption", in this context,, means 
exemption from the regime of Schedule I and Schedule II. It may, 
howeverp be observed that the Commission is not bound by the reqornen- 
dations of the World Health Organization in this matter; and indeedp 
the provisiong that 11 the Commission mayq in accordance with the 
recommendation of the World Health Organizationt add that preparation 
to Schedule 111119 authorises it even to refuse to accept the recom- 
mendations of the World Health Organization. Again, the expression 
al 25 that the drug therein is not readi available"t amounts to 
an escape clauseq because what is not "readily" recoverablet may 
be re'coverab 
. 
1e in the course of timel especially in an age when the 
progress of chemistry is unbounded. Incidentally, that the provisions 
of Article 3t paragraph 4 might not help produce the desired result 
of this Conventionp has been made explicit in Article 39 which 
statesp inter aliat " Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Convention, a Party shall not bet or deemed to beg precluded from 
adopting measures of control more strict or severe than those 
provided by this Convention and in particular from requiring that 
preparaiions in Schedule III or drugs in Schedule Il be subject to 
all or such of the measures of control applicableto drugs in 
Schedule I However, in all fairness it should be stated 
13 fw oso 
that the area of exemptions under Schedule III of the Single 
26 Convention is much narrower than that of the correspondin. y 
provisions of the previous narcotic. drug agreements and conventions. 
The Single Convehtion has devised anew Schedulop namelyp 
Schedule IV, and the substances in it are those: 
(a) Having strong addiction-producing properties or 
a liability to abuse not offset by therapeutic 
advantages which cannot be afforded by some other I 
drug; and/or 
(b) For wýich deletion from general medical practice 
is desirable because of the risk to public health. 1 
27 
Article 3p paragraPh 5t if read. with the above classificationg 
makes it clear that drugs in Schedule IV shall also be included in 
Schedule I. The question arises whether a drug included in Schedulp I 
should simultaneously be included in Schedule IV also# and if so, 
on whose recommendation. Although in Article 3, the discretion 
of the Commiss-lon as to whether or not to accept a recommendation 
of the World Health Organization has been maintained, the use of 
the word "may" gives in practice much importance to the recommenda- 
tion of the World Health Organization. It also appears to be 
appropriate that a drug included in Schedule I should be simulta- 
neously placed under Schedule IV, and that also at the recommenda- 
tion of the World Health Organization. This procedure seems to be 
more appropriate in view of the nature of substances that fall under 
Schedule IV. 28 Incidentally, the standards set out by the Technical 
I" ro 47 
Committee of the Plenipotentiary Conforence are similar to those 
29 
set out in Article 3,9 paragraph 5, and both the World Health 
Organization and the Commission on Narcotic Drugs considering the 
grouping of a substancet are generally guided by social and public 
--health motives. 
Article 3t paragraph 6 has given the Comission on Narcotic 
Drugs a wide power to amend any of the Schedules by: 
" (a) Transferring a drag from Schedule I to Schedule II 
or from Schedule II to Schedule I; or 
(b) Del, eting a drug or a proparation as the case may 
be, from a Schedule. " 
However, this the Commission may do " in accordance with the 
recommendation of the World Health 
I Or . ganization. 1"30 This provision 
does nott however, apply to measures provided for in paragraph 5 of 
this Article. It may be observed in this connection that in the 
event of the transfer of a drug from Schedule I to Schedule Up it 
should also be deleted from Schedule IV; similarly, the transfer of 
a drug from Schedule II to Schedule I will generally involve inclusion 
of the same drug in Schedule IV. Again, if a drug listed in Schedule I 
or Schedule II is deletedg its preparation will automatically be 
deleted from Schedule 1119 assuming, of course, that the preparation's 
having passed all tests has established that it would not consti- 
tute a risk to public healthp-if de-controlled. 
The scope of control under the Single Convention extends to 
the cultivation of opium poppy, -coca bushq cannabis plant"' and 
93-2-and the respdnsibility for effecting 
- the control regime poppy straw 10 
f- 8 
in this regard rests upon the Contracting Parties. By Article 22p 
the Parties have obligated themselves to prohibit the cultivation of 
the opium poppyp the coca bush or the cannabis plant whenever the 
prevailing conditions in their countries or territories concerned 
I 
render the prohibition of their cultivation the most suitable measurer 
in their opiniong for prqtecting the public health and welfare and 
preventing the diversion of drugs into illicit traffic. The success 
of such measures entirely depends upon the co-operation'of the Parties 
concerned. In practical terms, in the absence of an effective enfurce- 
ment measuresp prohibition of the cultivation of such plants may not 
be possible* 
For Article 22 to be meaningfulp seeds and straw of poppies 
should also be included in the international control regime, and 
indeedp Article 25 of the Convention has specifically provided for 
the control of poppy straw and opiun poppy. The Parties shall also 
apply to poppy straw the system of im1port certificates and export 
33 
au. thorizationsp and they are also required to furnish statistical 
34 information on the import and export of poppy straw. One of the 
compelling reasons for the inclusion of the opium poppy in the 
control regime is that it is cultivatea not only for straw but also 
for opi-um or its seeds or both. Poppy straw is not longer a waste 
produatp and is usually sold by cultivatbra for the manufacture bf 
morphine, 
The Single Convehtion has not only extended its scope of 
control to coca bush and coca 16avest35 but also made additional 
provisions for control relating to . coca leaves. 
36 Both Articles 
/ "1 B9 
26 and 27 permit a Party to cultivate the aforesaid itemog but in 
restricted manner. The production of coca leaves shall be limited 
only to medical and scientific purposes. The Convention also requires 
the Parties to enforce the uprooting of all coca bush growing wildg 
and to destroy it9if illegally cultivated. 
37 Both coca leaves and 
coca bush will have to be made over to the National Opiun Agencies 
in accordance with Article 23. The'Singlo Convention is the first 
multi-lateral convention to make prohibitory provisions concerning 
the cultivation of the coca bush. Coca leaf has been listed as a 
"drug" in Schedule I of the Convention, and thereforev Article 27 
1 
permits a Contracting Party to use coca leaf for the preparation 
of a flavouring agent-which does not contain any alkaloids. In 
other wordsp if they retain any amount of their alkaloidst they should 
be described as "coca leaves" and therefore be subject to the regime 
of control applicable to-drugs in Schedule I. Indeedt the Parties. 
are. required to furnish separately estimates and statistical informa- 
tion in respect of coca leaves for preparation of the flavouring 
agent, except to the extent that the same coca leaves are used for 
the extraction of alkaloids and for the flavouring-agontt and this 
38 is so explained in the estimates and statistical information. 
Cannabis and Cannabis resin have also been made subject to the 
same regime of control that is applicable to opiura. 
39 Save the 
temporary exception allowed wider Article 499 cannabis and cannabis 
resin shall not be produced for purposes other than medical and 
scientific. The control regime shall notq however, apply, it cannabis 
is cultivated for industrial -( fibre and seed) or horticultural purposes. 
44 
In discussing the scope of control under tho Single Convention, 0 
it is necessary to mentiont in briefp the nature of the substances 
vhich have been brought under the cont rol regime of this Convention. 
All drugst their preparations and narcotic substancest whiL are 
already in existence havep under the Single Conventiong been included 
four Schedules. The substances which have been included in these 
Schedules are shown below: 
40 
Schedule I: the substances. which have been included in this 
Schedule are those: 
. 
"(a) Having addiction-producing or addiction- 
sustaining proper-ties greater than those. 
of codeine and more or less comparable to 
those of morphine; . 
(b)- Convertible-into substances'having addic- 
tion producing or addiction- sustaining 
properties with an ease or yield such as 
to constitute a risk of abuse greater than 
coaoine; or 
(c) Having a liability to abuse comparable to 
that of cannabisp cannabis resin or cocaine; 
or 
(d) Convertible into substances having a 
liability to abuse comparable to that of 
cannabist cannabis resin or cocaine*" 
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Schedule II.: Thd'substances which have been included in 
this Schedule are those: 
"(a) Having addiction-producing or addiction- 
sustaining properties not greater than 
those of codeine but at least ýs great as 
those of dextropropoxyphene; or 
(b) Convertible into a substance having 
addiction-producing or addiction-sxistain- 
ing properties with an case and yield such 
as to constitute a risk of abuse not 
greater. than that of codeino. " 
42 
Schedule III: This Schedule contains those preparations which: 
(a) Are intended for legitimate medical use; 
and 
(b) Have a specified drug content and are 
compounded with one or more ingredients 
in such a way that the preparation has not 
or a negligible risk of abuset and in such 
a way that the drug cannot be recovered by 
readily applicable means or in yield which 
would constitute an risk to public health. " 
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Schedule I-V The' substances which have been includea in 
this Schedule are those: 
"(a) Having strong addiction-proaucing pro- tp 
perties or a liability to abuse not offset 
I by therapeutic advanta . ges which cannot be 
afforded by some other drug; and/or 
(b) For, which deletion from general medical 
practice is desirable because of the risk 
to public health. " 
The guiding principle behind the narcotic r9gime of the 
Single Convqntion is to limit the use of narcotic drugs and/or 
narcotic substances to medical and scientific purposes at all- 
stagest e. g. manufacturep trade wholesale and retail), possession 
etc. In preparing, the Schedules of drugsp the Technical Committee 
of the Plenipotentiary Conference applied two criteria, viz. 
(a) the 11 degree of liability to abuse" of the substanceg 
and 
(b) the "risk to public health and social velfarell which the 
substance in question poses or might pose. 
Upon a further analysis, it may be stated that the subs- 
tances which have been taken into account in preparing Schedules I 
and II arep morphinet codeine,, cannabisg. cannabis resin, cocainý 
dextropropoxyphene. The Single Conventiont howeverp does not 
indicate what it considers to a significant 11 degree" of liability 
to abuse and of risk to public health and social ifelfare" It is 
presumed that such a lapse has been maintained ddliberately with a 
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view to adopting a flexible policy according to the demands of the 
circumstances. In fact, the World Health Organization has been 
allowed a considerable amount of discretion in interpreting the above 
two criteria. 
The Single Convention uses the tem "drug" to mean any'of the 
substances in Schedules'I and 119 whether natural or synthetic, 
45 
and 
indeedq in this thesis the term "narcotic drug" has been used synony- 
mously with the term 11drug"q unless otherwise specified. The idea is 
to, pliminate the distinction between these two terms# from the point of 
view of their abuse, as far as possible. Drugs in Schedule IV must also 
be in Schedule Iv and a Party shall "adopt any special measures of 
I 
control which in its opinion are necessary having regard to the parti- 
cularly dangerous properties of a drug so included"946 and shallp "if 
in its opinion the, prevailing conditions in its country render it the 
most appropriate, means of protecting the public health and welfaret 
prohibit the productiong manufacturep export and import ort trade in, 
possession or use of any such drug except for amounts which may be 
necessary for medical and scientific research onlyq including clinical 
trials therewith to be conducted under or-subject to the direct super- 
vision and control of the Party. " 
47 
The opium poppyg the coca bush, 
the cannabis plantt poppy straw and cannabis leaves are subject to some 
special measures of control. 
48 
The provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Convention are by no means exhaustives but covering provisions may 
be found in the other parts of the Convention. 
49 
Although Schedule II corresponds to Group II of the Limitation 
Conventiong-trade in Group II did not have to be validated by a ', -- 
licenceg nor did they require any medical prescription for their 
supply. The Single Convention has placed the drugs in Schedule II 
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under a stricter regime than the previous narcotic treaties in 
that these drugs are subject to the same regime of control as drugs 
in Schedule 1.50 Trade in-such drugs is permissible only under a 
licence , except where trade or distribution is carried out, by a 
government enterprise* 
51 It is also obligatory for the Parties to 
furnish quarterly statistics concerning imports and exports of these 
drugs. 52 Drugs in Schedule II are subject to the same control as 
drugs in Schedule Iq with the exception of the measures prescribed 
in Article 309 paragraphs 2 and 5 t53 but they are not excepted from 
the application Pf Article 34 (b). 
The Single Convention has devised. a stricter regime of control 
fo r*fhe preparations in Schedule 1119 than that applied to "prepa- 
rations for the export of which authorizations are not required" under 
the earlier treaties. 
54 Preparations in Schedule III areg save for the 
55 
proviso at paragraph 4 of Article 2, as amended by the 1972 Protocol# 
subject to the same control regime betifeen Schedules II and IIIV the 
preparations in Schedule III are subject to the following measures, 
vhich are also applicable to substances in Schedule II. 
(a) licensing of manufactur*e and trade except itheA carried 
56 
out by a staie, enterprise, 
(b) control under licence in establishments and promises 
in which such manufacture may take place; 
57 
(c) control of all persons and enterprises carrying on or 
engaged in the manufacture, trade or distribution of 
drugst import or export of dru., ffs; 
58 
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(d) limitation of drags exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes in productiong manufactureg 
exportp import, distribution of, trade in, use and 
possession of drugsp and also tho rules conedraing 
package or vrappers; 
59 
and 
. 
(e) keeping of recQrds concerning the manufacture and 
sale or drugs by manufacturersp traders etc .. 
60 
The Commission may, in accordance with the recommýndation of 
the World Health Organization place a substance under Schedule IVt if 
the latter organisation finds that It a drug in Schedule I is parti- 
cularly liable. to abuse and to produce ill effects ( Article 39 
paragraph 3) and that such liability is not offset by substantial 
therapeutic advantages not possessed by substances othet than drugs 
in Schedule IV. " 
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The drugs in Schedule IV shall also'be included 
in Schedule I and . 
be subject to all measures of control applicable 
to drugs. in the latter Schedule# in addition-to certain special 
measures to be adopted by Parties 9 as have been indicated in Article 
2t paragraph 5- 
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It appears that the question of including a drug 
in Schedule IV is to be initiated by the Wbrld Health Organizationg 
although the final authority in this matter rests upon the Commission 
on Narcotic Drugs. In considering the suitability of placing a drug 
under Schedule IV, the World Health Organization will take the following 
points into accouht: 
-(a) that 11 a drug in Schedule I is particularly liable to 
abuse and to produce ill effects"; and 
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(b) that " such liabilitY is not offset by substantial 
therapeutic aavantages not possessea by substances 
other than drugs in Schedule IV. " 
Schedules I and IV are interwoven. Alsotthe second point 
(b) is closely related to Article 2f paragraph 5(b), i. c. 9 protec- 
tion of public health and wolf are would be the guiding principle in 
putting a drug under the control regime envisaged in Schedule IV. 
Howeverg the danger6us properties which will warrant the inclusibn 
of a dmg, by the application of paragraph 5 are of the same character 42 
as those defined in paragraph 3(iii). " The difference between the 
. 
harmful effects required by paragraph 5 and those defined in para- 
graph 3, sub-paragraph (iii) is one of degree and not of kind. " 
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The findings of 'the World Health Organization in this matter may or 
may not be accepted by -the Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Indeed, 
uhile the Co=ission may accept the recommendations of the World 
Health Organization to include a drug in Schedule I, it can refuse to 
include the same substance in Schedule IV. Wheret howeverp the 
Commission decides to place a drug in Schedule IV, its decision to 
do so must be preceded by a recommendation of the World Health 
Organ#atiýn. 
: Comrnonts 
The Single Conventiong as explained above, has made attempts 
to extend the scope of the international control of narcotic drugs 
by various means. In po far as the provisiona under Article 3 are 
concernedv the Convention has accorded the Commission on Narcotic 
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Drugs authority over the Iforld Health Organization. In other 
words, the expe 
. 
rt opinion of the World Health Organization on the 
medical aspects of drugsp which previously 
64 
was bindingt not only 
upon the Commissiont but also upon the Parties to the drug-conventions 
prior to the Single Convention, has now lost its foreog although 
e'> 
the Commissionp in taking any measure of control, still takes the 
recommendations of the World Hea16 Organization into account. The 
Commission can even reject a recommendation made by the World Health 
Organization. 
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One of the gaps which persists in Article 3 is that it has 
made no provision for accepting, from a non-party 
I to the Convention 
any notification concerning dmendment to any of the Schedules. It 
may be observed that if a specific provision -- to this effect had 
been-madep it would perhaps have been possible or easier from the 
psychological point of viewt to impose some of the directives of the 
Commission upon the'non-parties to this Conventiont among whom. illicit 
traffic usually thrives. 
Equallyt the scope of control in respect of cannabis, poppy 
straw etc. has been confined to the Parties to the Convention. In 
many casesq the judgment as to whethýr or not a particular kind of 
plant should be cultivated has beeii left entirely to the Parties 
concerned. 
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However, one of the notable*characteristics of the 
"scope of control" as designed by the Sin,,,,, le Convention is its 
flexibility, and potentiality to cov6r a wider area of the drug-world. 
Alsog this Conventiont in devising its control regimet has indirectly 
made provisions so as to make the Parties more responsible in their 
behaviour as far as this area of international law is concerned. 
I VA 9 
(cf) General Obligations 
The Single Convention hast in Article 4# fomulatea certain 
general obligations for the Contracting Parties. This means that 
the Contracting Parties have undertaken a double pledgep viz. 
(a) the usual pledge of pacta sunt sery nda and (b) some 
additional pledges'in the form of-obligations, the two parts 
being complementary. However, the Parties have undertaken'to 
"take such legislative and adminiýtrative measures as may be 
necessary: ' 
(a) 'To give effect to and carry out the provisions of this 
.. Convention within. their min territories; 
(b) To co-operate with other States in. the execution 
of the provisions of this Convention; and 
(c) Subject to the provisions of this Conventiong to 
limit exclusively to rýedical and scientific purposes 
the productiont mpmufacturep exportp import distri- 
bution, of I trade ing use and possession of drugs. " 
The term "territory" has been used in the Single Convention 
in two different senses: 
67 (a) to mean any p art of a State which 
is treated as a separate entity for the application of the system 
of import certificates and export authorizations provided for in 
68 
Article 31 and (b) in the sense other than it is 'used in 
Articles 42 
69 
and 46 
70 Therefore . while "territory" 
in the former case stands for an "administrative" or "functional" 
areat in thelatter it stands for a "political" area. 
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In applying the provisions of the Single Convention, 
these different meanings of "territory" should be maintained 
I 
as they have a further bearing upon the effective implemen- 
tation of the treaty provisions in their respective adminis- 
trative limits. It is for this reason that the Contracting 
Parties are required to inform. the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations as soon as possible of any changes in their 
administrative limits. For a fuller meaning of "territory" 
under the Single Conventiong certain other provisionst namely 
-those concerning eq timates of drug re4uirements ( Article 19 
of the Single Convention and Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol)f 
statistical returns (Article 20 of the Single Convention and 
Article 10 of the 1972 Protocol)9 limitation of manufacture 
and importation ( Article 21 of the Single Convention and 
, 
Article 21 bis of the 1972 Protocol)# special provisions appli- 
cable to cultivation (Article 22 of the Single Convention and 
Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol)p designation of areas of culti- 
vation of poppy straw Article 25- Single Convention), coca bush 
and coca leaves Article 26- Single Convention), preparation 
of flavouring agent from such leaves ( Article-27- Single Conven- 
tion) and control of caniiabis (Article 28 - Single Convention) 
should-also be taken into account. 
11 
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On the other handl in order to implement the United 
Nations directives on the control measures, a determinate 
territory over which effective adminstrative control is 
I 
exercised willp no doubtq be necessary. In addition to the 
legislative authority of the Parties over their respective 
territoriesp they are also required to exercise effective 
adminstrative authorityt especially in view of the obligations 
undertaken by them in Article-17 concerning special 
adminstration for the purpose of applying the provisions 
of this Convention. Yet, in Article 35, the Parties have 
undertaken to take action against the illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs having due regard to "their constitutional't 
72 legal and adminstrative. systems". - 
The Convention has rightly emphasised the importance of 
the Conrtacting Parties), - adoption of such 
legislative 
and adminstrative measures, as may be necesaarrg to 
co-operate with other states in the execution of its provisions. 
The necessity of such co-operation has been re-iterated 
especially in Articles'35 and 36'(2)(b), 
73 in addition to the 
recognition given to it by the Contracting Parties in the 
Preamble to the. Convention. 
The tem "co..; operation", it is observedp should be 
interpreted and observed in its legal senset iset a 
contractual obligation. Othervisep the ordinary meaning 
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of the uord, 11 working together to the same end" or "concur 
in producing an effect", 
71k 
will be*more honoured in the 
breach than in the observance, "It is in this sense of the 
I 
word that "co-operation" in the convention will be meaningful. 
Indeedv the co-operation whichIs nedded. 9 especially in the 
case of punishment of. illicit traffickerst or prevention 
from use of a territory, for the purposes of illicit 
traffic etc. p even if it means enacting now laws and/or 
setting up new administrative procedures, should not only 
be viewed seriouslyp but also taken as6-legal duty, for a 
breach of which the Contracting Party concerned can be 
taken to task. 
. 
In Article 4(c) the Contracting Parties have undertaken 
the usual obligations to take such legislaiive and 
adminstrative measures as may be necessaryi "subject to the 
provisions of this Conventionp to limit exclusively to 
medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacturet 
exportq import,, distribution ofv trade int use and 
possession of drugs". IL&Hague Opium Convention of 1912t 
the International Opium Convention of 1925 and the 
-1953 Protocol contained -a very similar provision. 
75 
The difficulties in defining the scope of the expression 
"medical and scientific pruposes" are, many. 
76 There must 
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also be taken into consideration the sociological and religious 
importance attached to certain drugs in certain parts of the 
world. The term "medical purposes" includes -the use of 
authorised drugs for veterinary and dental purposes. 
77 
The expression 11 medical and scientific purposes" 1.7ill 
have different meanings at different times. Howeverp it is 
an encouraging sign that the Single Convention has made attempts 
to widen the area of its gpplication. The areas of exemption 
have been embodied in Articles'2(9), 27 and 49- 
78 That the 
provisions of Article 2(9) are of no immediate prqctical 
importance has been best sir=arised by Mr. A. Landeg Deputy 
Executive Secretary of, the U. N. Secretariat at the Conference 
when he stated that " the paragraph was of no immediate 
practical importanceg-but had been inserted to anticipate 
possible future developments. In the past, c ertain chemicals 
used in manufacturing dyes had been found to have important 
medical properties, In the aam& wityp some substance commonly 
used in industry might be found at some timoAn the future to 
have addiction-producing properties and thus fall within 
the scope of the Convention". IE6 further added that this 
paragraph "had been. included to reconcilethe wide use of a 
substance in industry with obligations to control the substance 
under the Convention, % 
79 Although certain chemicals which are 
used in industry for non-medical and non-scientific purposes 
are thought to. have contained some medical propertiesq 
80 
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it is thought, to be yery difficult to restore the dangerous 
properties of those drugs which remain unused in the 
industrial process. To prevent any illicit use of those 
propertiesp if any# the co-operation of governments by 
way of enacting new laws. an regulations under/or implementing 
adminstrative measures should impede any development in this 
direction* 
Article 27 envisages the inapplicability of the 
control regime of the Single Convention in respect of 
coca leaves when such leaves are used for the preparation of a fla- 
vour . ing agentp and do not contain alkaloidsp and "to -the extent 
necessary for such use'19 the Parties may permit the 
productiong importv exportp trade in and possession of 
such leaves". Apparentlyq if all the alkaloids have 
been removed from coca leavesl they cease -to be coca 
leaveslal and hencet the application of the control 
regime under the Single Convention seems. to be pointless. 
yet, an abuse of this priviledge may not be ruled out 
and in factp as the precise quantity be used for the 
preparation of a flavouring agent is difficult to 
ascertain beforehand, such a privilege might well be 
exploited. However, a stringent national policy for the 
1 004 
ýrevention of such abuse may be the only remedy. 
The reservations under Article 49 are' transitionalf - 
4w I and they may belshorter periods than those provided for in 
the Article, 
82 Yett it appears that by an application 
of Article 50P paragraph 3P such reservations can take 
a different characterv e. g. the periods of reservations 
may be longer than those provided'in Article 4-9.83 It may, 
howeverp bd observed that the obligations undertaken by the 
parties in Article 4 (c), "to limit exclusively to medical and 
scientific purposes productiong manufacturepexportp importp 
distribution off trade. 
84 in, use and possession of 
drugs"85 will equally apply to Article 49. In addition to. 
this provisiont in the event of their making reservations, 
the Parties required to observe the control measures as 
enunciated in Articles 23p24926928(l)p29t3O (except paragraph 
2(b) )p 319 33 9 34 v 35p and 36, provided of course 
no exemption has been allowed under Article 500). The 
expression "possession of drugsll in Article 4(c) stands 
for possession both for personal coxisumption and illegal 
distribution of drugs, as well as authorised 
possession. In so far as the foxmer situation is concernedg 
it is for the Parties to take appropriate measures by means 
legislation and/or admix; ztrative methods. ' Appropriate measures 
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in this contextt will-also include the punishment of 
offendersp and the confiscation of drugs illegally possessed. 
Drugs in Schedule II (including their preparations) as well 
as the preparations in Schedule III are notp howeverp outside 
the scope of Article 41 paragraph (c). 
Comments 
A special article in a treaty enunciating certain "general 
obligations" appears to be unusual and redundant. Like A 
contractf a treaty also implies that the Contracting Parties 
have undertaken the obligations enumerated in that treaty. 
Moreoverg a treaty should be interpreted as a whole, and 
thereforet the obligationsp whether general or special by nature, 
may eaýily be ascertained. Perhapop owing to 6e not-so- 
successful accomplishment of the previous drug-conventionsq 
the authors of the Single Convention wishecl to emphasise in a 
novel way the obligations.. It is from this point of view that 
the "general obligations" in the Single Convention may be 
taken as "special obligations". Yetv however rigorous the 
obligations in a treaty arep their effective performance 
depends entirely upon the co-operation of Contracting Parties. 
Such obligations are real when they have been undertaken 
in good faith; in its absence all obligations will result 
in a pseudo-undertaking. 
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On the other hand, in certain cases, treaty obligations, 
however honestly they have been-undertakent may not be performed 
owing to the inherent inability of the parties concerned. Such 
in ability may relate to inadequate legislative and/or admiiiis- 
trative machinery in the countries of the Contracting Parties 
or in certain other casest even a dearth of qualified personnel 
to discharge those obligations satisfactorily. Nowhere in the 
Single Convention has been mentioiýed the necessity of having 
trained personnel in the countries of the Contracting Parties 
to ensu*reýthe proper implementation of the treaty provisions. 
Incidentallyo the lack of adequate personnelg including the 
police forcep may be partially responsible for the unsatisfactory 
results produced by the previous dru,,, r, conventl'ons* 
86 Fortunatelyp 
some of the Contracting. Parties are taking advantage of the 
training given at the U. N. laboratory, the World Health Organi- 
87 
zation and the International Criminal Police Organization. 
Although the provisions of Article 4 appear to be unnecessaryp 
they may be interpreted as a constant reminder to the Contracting 
Partiest and also as a "covering clause" in order to prevent them 
from finding a plea of breach of obligations. 
r . 1, 
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CHAPTER VII 
FOOTNOTES 
11 520 U. N. Treaty Seriest P. 151- 
2. As one single Convention has been concluded replacing the 
existing nine treatiesq it is called a Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs. See also R. Gregg, 11 The Single Conventionllý 
16 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law joinmal, 1961, p. 187; 
. 
L. Goodrichq 11 Now Trends in Narcotics Control", 53P Tnterna- 
tional Conciliationg 1960, *and A. Lande, 11 The Singýe Convention 
, -on 
Narcotic Drugs, 196111,16 Tnternational Organization, 1962, 
P. 776* 
3- '159 IID(VII) and 246D (IX). 
It, may be observed that such a lack of comprehensiveness in 
the objectives of the Single Convention played a great role in 
the conclusion pf the Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 
5* 'See also Article 9 and Article 21 bis of the 1972 Protocol. 
6. infra. v PP. 144-162. 
7* -Both the Limitation Convention and, the 1948 Protocol had 
provisions to this effect. 
8. If the World Health Organization found that a preparation was 
not "addiction producing"t but was convertible into an "addic- 
tion producing" drug, the decision as to whether the regime for 
a drug in Group I or Group II would be applied, was taken by an 
ad. hoc bxpert committee. 
9. Under Articles 8 and 10 of the International Opium Convention of 
1925P this procedure could be initiated by the World Hralth Orga- 
nization ( by the Health Committee of the League of, 11ations 
prior-to the 1946 Protocol). Howevert under the 1948 Protocol 
the World Health Organization could not act without a notifica- 
tion by a Party. According to Article 3(l) of the Single Conven- 
tion, 11 where a Pa3zty or the World Health Organization has infor- 
mation which iij its opinion may require amendment to any of the 
Schedules, it shall notify the Secretary-General and furnish him 
with the information in support of the notification. " 
10, The application of Article 11 of the Limitation Convention 
did not extend to drugs which could be produced from phenan- 
threne'alkaloids of opium or ecgonine alkaloids of coca leaf. 
G08 
ill See Axticle 1, paragraph 1 of the 1948 Protocol. 
12. Ariicie 3 of the Single Convention. 
13. The scope of the Limitation Convention of 1931 was not 
extended to this extent. 
14. Under the 1931 Convention, such initiative could be taken 
only by the Parties to the Convention; 
15. See also Commentary on the Single Convention on Narcotic 
DruFsq 1961, op. cit., p. 80. 
16. Paragraph 7 of Article 3. 
17- Article 3(3)(ii). The 1948 PrA6col contained the same 
provision (Article 2). The 1925 Convention did not provide 
for any, provisional measures, but the 1931 Convention designated 
certain-drugs to which such provisional meaau=es automatically 
applied, see Article ll. -paragraph 1. 
It may be aprropriate to me ntion in this connection 
that lf, anyxacommendation as-to amendment to any of the 
Schedules is made by the World Health Organizationt at 
a time when the Commission on Narcotic Drýigs is nct in 
session or will not within a period of three months be 
in sessiong a decision in connection with-that substance 
should be taken by the Commission before its next session; 
see Resolution I(XX) of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
Report on the Twentieth Session. Official Records of the 
Economic and Social Council# Fortieth Session, Supplement 
No. 2, paragraphs 60 and 61. 
In such a situation, the Commission may wish to take a 
decision by postal or telegraphic vote (see paragraph 2 of 
the Resolution); or may defer the decision until a full 
discussion en the matter-has been held at its next session. 
Presumablyq a decision by postal or telegraphic vote may 
be made only in respect of non-controversial matters. 
3.8. 
. 
Article 7 reads as'follows: "Except for decisions under 
Article 3, each decision"or recommendation adopted by the 
Commission pursuant to the provisions of this Convention 
shall be-subject to approval or modification by the Council 
or the General Assembly in the same way as other decisions 
or recommendations of the Commission". 
19. See Aýticle 3(2). 
20. A similar provision had Izeen made in-Article 2 of the 1948 
Protocol. 
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21, The Commission on Narcotic Dragsq Report on the twenty- 
third session, Official Records of the Economic and Social 
Council, fourtyý-sixth sessiong paras 351-357. 
The Permanent Board and, the Drug Supervisory Dody also, 
in their final report, gave a similar opinion, see U/CN-7/L-306 
and E/OB/23- E/DSB/25 Paras 131-142. See also Cortnontary on 
the Single Convention on Narcotic DruFS, 1961, -p. 87* 
22. In terms of A7ýticle 11 of the 1931 Convention, a convertible 
substance when could be placed under international regime had 
to be a product "obtained from any of the phenanthrene 
alkaloids of opium or from the eogonine alkaloids of the 
coca leaf". 
23- The 1948 Protocol also recommended the same procedure. 
24. The terms "conversion" ana "convertibility" have often been 
used in different senses. While "conversion" stands for a 
"process", "convertibility" pr-supposes a transformation 
of a product into a completely product, i. e., it loses its 
original identity, and cannot be conv6rted again to its 
original description or identity. 
25. Italics added. 
26. The substances-in Schedule III of the Single Convention 
include the preparations which: 
N Are intended for legitimate medical use; and 
b Have a specified drug content and are compounded with 
one or more other ingredients in such a -way that 
the preparation has no, or a negligible, risk of 
abuse, and in such a way that the drug cannot be 
recovered. by readily applicable means or in yield 
which would constitute a risk to public health% 
U. N. Conference for the, Adoptjon of a Single-Convention 
on Parcotic Drugsp op. cit., vol. II, p. 264. 
27. This standard had been set out by the. Technical, Committee of 
the Plenipotentiary Conference for the Adoption of a, Single 
Conventiong op. cit. vol.. II, p 264- 
28. Týe Commission seems to be in agreement with this, procedureq 
see Official Records of the Rc. onomic and Social Councilq 
Fortyý-second Sessiont Supplement h1o. 2, paragraphs 61-64. 
29, Although paragraph 5 of Article 3 does not refer to the ý 
provisions as at clause (b) of the criteria set out by thet- 
Technical Committee of the Plenipotentiary Conference, i. e. t 
"For which Aeletion from 6heral medical practice is desirable 
because of the risk to public health", it may be mentioned that 
r 
ý 
10 
the cases covered by clause (b) will generally fall under clause 
(a) ("Havinc strong addiction-producing properties or a- 
liability to abuse n9t offset by therapeutic advantages which 
cannot be afforded by some other drug"), and hence covered 
by paragraph 5, especially because in the consideration of the 
ill effects of a substancef whether by the World Health 
Opganization or by the Commi-ssion7 oA Narcotic Drug's*t* 11 the 
risk to public health" is always taken into account. 
30. Article 3(6). 
31- Articles 229(Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol)j 269 27 ýnd 28, 
32. Article 259 The Single Convention has not described the above things 
as "raw materials" since with "the progress in synthetic 
chemistry and the developmen-b of "synthetic" narcotics, the 
raw materialsy which are at present used for the manufacture of 
drugs include substances which are commonly used in chemical 
synthesisq and which are not dangerous substances whose abuse 
the international narcotics regime is intended to combat". 
See the Commentany on the SimZle Convention on Parcotic EMTsp 
1961, op. cito P 304- 
33- Article 25(2). 
34- Article 25(3)- 
35- Article 26(3)- 
36. Article 27- 
37- Article 26(2). 
38- Article 27(2)* 
39. Article 28 and Article 12 from 1972 Protccolt amending Articlo 22 
of the Single Convention. 
40- Schedule I of this Convention-corresponds to Group I of the 
Limitation Convention of 1931 (Article lt paragraph 29 Article 
11, paragraphs 394 and 6, Article 13t paragraph 1 and Article 18) 
and the 1948 Protocol Qirticle 19 paragraph 2 and Article 2). 
Drugs under Group I of the -1931 Convention were divided into 
two sub-groupsg viz*. (a) and (P). Sub-group (a) included those 
drugs which were considered to be "capable of producing addiction" 
while sub-group (c) included those drugs which were not capable 
of producing addictiong but were convertible into such addictive 
drugs as were-not much in use in medical practice. Drugs under 
the latter category mostly came under Group II. 
In the 1948 Protocolq no disýinction had been made'between 
sub-groixps (a) and (b) of Group I. 
41- Schedule II corresponds to-Group, II of the Limitation Conventionp 
1931 (Article 1, paragraph 29 Article 11, paragraphs 3t 4 
and 6 and Article 13, paragraph 2) and the 1948 Protocol 
(Article 1, paragraph 2). Group II of tho Limitation Convention 
included those drugs which were considered not to be capablo 
by themselves of producing "addiction", but were convertible 
into such drugs as were in wide use in medicine. 
42. Preparations in Schedule III correspond to "preparations 
for the export of which export authorizations are-not required" 
in the 1931 Convention. (Article 5P paragraph 21 sub-parigraph (a), 
Article 6, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a)9 Article 13, paragraph 
13, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph ýb P Article 14, paragraph 3, 
sub-paragraph 3. sub-paragraph kgýq Article 17, last aragraph 
of Article 19 and Article 22). See also Articles 4M, 8 and 
9 of the 1925 Convention. 
43- All these Schedules had been prepared by the Technical 
Committee of the Plenipotentiary Conference. See further 
Records of the Conference, vol. II,,, pp. 263-264 
44. 
, 
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs freed Dextropropoxypeno from 
controlq but the Technical Committee of fhe Plenipotentiary 
Conference included it in Schedulo II. See also Official Recordo 
of the F,. C. O. S. O. C., Thirty-seventh Sessfon, Supplement 
No. 9, paragraph 157- 
45- Article 1. paragraph (j). 
The French text of the Convention does not use the term I'drogue", 
which is the equivalent of týe English term "drug"; instead ' 
it has employed the torm "stupefiant", which corresponds to 
the English pharase "narcotic drugull. The term "natural" refers 
to those substances which are obtained from the'opium poppy, 
coca bush or cannabis plant, while the -11. -erm "synthetic" includes 
those drugs which are manufactured by a chemical process., On the 
other handt the same drug may be either "natural" or I'synthetic'19 
e. g. morphineg which may be manufactured from opium or poppy 
straw or may be prepared by process of chemical synthesis. 
46. Article 2t Paragraph 5(a). 
47. Artie le 2, paragraph 5(b).. 
' 
48- Article 2p paragraph (6) and Article 1 of the 1972 Protocol 
see Articles 22-24; 229 26 and 27; 22 and 28; 25 and 28 
respectivelyg and Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol. 
49, e. 6, Article 149 paragraph 2 (Article 6 of the 1972 
Protocol), 
Article 18,7paragraph 11 sub-para ap (e)v-. Article 21 bis 
of the 1972 Protocolg,, Article 22 Article 12 of the'1972 Protocol)v 
Article 25, 'paragraph lp sub-ýaragraph. (b) and Article 369 
paragraph 1 (Article 14 of the 1972 Protocol). 
%'i2 
50- The cases where such rýgime has been expcepted-have been 
detailed in Article, 2, paragraph 2. See also Article 309 
paragraphs 2.5 and 6. 
infra., p,! F)4 ; g,, 4so 
51- The regulations which the Parties are obliged to pursue in 
regard to trade and distribution have been detailed in 
Article 30. 
-52. Under the Limitation Convention the Parties were required only to submit annual statistics on drugs in Group II, and 
it was not necessary for them to supply figures on actual 
consumption of such drugs. It is for this reason that the 
provisions of, Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Limitation 
Convention were only applicable to these drugst and not 
those in paragraph 2 i. e., the embargo provisions), 
5 3- Article 2(2). Drugs undeý Schedule II are subject to the 
embargo provisions of Article 21, paragraph 4. 
54- The factors which are taken into account for the inclusion of 
a preparation in Schedule III are: 
a Drug content of the preparation; 
b Potency of the drug; 
0 11ature of the admistures, their degree of effectiveness 
in conteracting the dangerous properties of the drug; (d) Practicability of recovery of the drug by illicit 
traffickers or, personp desiring*tO* abuse it; 
(e) Therapeutic value and'extent of the legitimate use of the 
preparation". 
See also Commentaa on the Sinpl Convention on Narcotic Dru 
op. cit,,,, p, 92, 
55- Article 1 of the 1972 amending Article 2f paragraph 4 of the 
Single Convention. "Preparations in Schedule III are subject 
to the same measures of control as preparations containing 
drugs in Schedule II except that Article 31 paragraphs 
1(b) and 3 to 15 and as regards their acquisition 
. ýind --retail, distributiont irticle 349 paragraph 
(b) 
need not ap ly , and that, for the purpose of estimates (Article 
M 
and statistics (Article 20) the information 
required shall be restricted to the quantities of drugs used 
in the manufacture of such preparations". 
See also Article 31v paragraph 16, which states that "Nothing 
in this Article other than paragraphs 1(a) and 2 need apply 
in the case of preparations in Schedule III". 
56o Article 29, ýparagraph 11 Article 30, paragraph 19 sub-paragraph 
(a) and ArtýLcle'31v paragr-ýph 39 sub-paragraph (a). 
c 
11 13 
57. Article 299 paragraph 21 sub-paragraph (b). 
58---, Article 299 paragraph 2t sub-paragraph ýaý, Article 30t 
paragraph li sub-paragraph ýb)t clause 19 Article 31P 
paragraph 3, sub-paragraph ýb). 
59- Article 4t paragraph c, and Article 30P paragraph 4- 
6o. 
61* 
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63* 
Article 349 paragraph (b). . 
Paragraph 5 of Article 3- 
Paragraph 5. of Article 2. 
"(a) A Party shall adopt any special measures of c1rol which 
in its opinion are necessary having regard to the 
particularly dangerous properties of a drug so included"; 
and 
11(b) A Party shall; if in its opinion the prevailing 
conditions in its country render it the appropriate 
means of protecting the public health and welfaret 
prohibit the production, manufacturet export and 
import of, trade in, possession or use of any such 
drug except for amounts which may be necesz; a-ry for 
medical and scientific research only,, including 
clinical trials therewith to be conducted under or 
subject to the direct supervision and control of the 
Party". 
See further Comment-ary on the Single Convention on 
It. p 1961, P . 21 - 
95- 
tic Drugst 
64. The decisions under the 1925 Convention werýd tak&A by-the 
W, H, O. (Articles 8 and 10). Prior to the 1946 Protocol, 
the 
' responsibility 
for final decisions lay with the Health 
Committee of the League of Nations. 
In the case of the Limitation Convention 1931, such decisions 
were taken by the W. H. 0 and by the ad hoc Expert Committees, 
see Article 119 paragraphs 3 and 4 (as amended by the 1946 
Protocol) and Article 11, paragraph 4 respectively. 
The 1948 Protocol gave theW. H. O. the ultimate authority for 
rendering final decisions ýArticle 1, * patagraphs 2-4), and the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs authority for provisional control 
only (Article 2), 
65- s; unr. a S-o I- SD 
66. infra., 
67- Article 1 (1) (Y)* 
68. Article 31 details the special provisions relating to international 
-trade-in narcotic drugs. 
lp C14 
69. Article 42 provides for . the application of this Convention 
to all non-metropolitan territories whose previous consent 
is not neededl and even where. prior consent will be necessaryp 
the Convention can be applied on securing such consent. 
70. Article 46 refers to provisions concerning denunciation 
of this Convention by a Party on behalf of a territory for 
which it has assumed international responsibility, and 
which has withdrawn its, conse. nt given in accordance 
with Article 42. 
71- Incidentally, the 1953 Protocol emplyoyed the term "territory" 
in the adminstrative sense only ( See Article 1) 
72, See also Article 13 of the 1972 Protocol.. 
7 3- Article 36(2) (b) deals with the extradition of illicit 
traffickers. See also Articles 13 and 14 of the 1972 
Protocol. 
74- See also Concise Oxford Dictionaryl fifth edition, for the 
ordinary meaning of the term. 
75- Article 9 of the 1912 Convention employed the expression 
"medical and legitimate purposes"; * 
while Article 5 of the 
1925 Convention employed the expressiong''Imedical and 
scientific purposes". See also Article 13 (1) of the 
1931 Convention, 
76. See supravpp. 24. ajSee also Chapter IVp pp. 2ý4-209 
77- United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Sinpl 
Convention on Narcotic Dnigrs Official Records, vol, II, 
pp. 123t 267t 280 (footnote"8ý and 285(footnote 27) 
78- Article 22. paragrarh 9 
"Parties are not required to apply the provisions of this 
Convention to drugs which are commonly used in industry for 
other than medical*or scientific purposes, provided that: 
-(a) They ensure by aPPrODriate methods to denaturing or by other means that the drugs so used are not 
liable to be ýbused or have ill effects(Article 3t 
paragraph 3) and that the harmful substances cannot 
in practice-be reovered; and 
(b) They include in the statistical information (Article 20) 
furnished by them the amount of each drug so used". 
See also Article 10 of the 1972 Protocol. 
Article 21: Additional Provisions Relating to Coca Leaves 
oil, The-Phrties may permit the use of coca leaves for the 
preparation of a flavouring agent, which shall not 
contain any alkaloids, and to the extent necessary for 
r, Iv. 
11 G 15 
such use, may permit the production, import, exportt trade 
*in and possession of such leaves. 
2. . The Parties shall furnish separately estimates (Article 19) 
-and statistical information (Article 20) in respect of coca 
leaves for preparation of the flavouring agent, except to 
the extent that the same coca leaves are used for the 
extraction of alkaloids and the flovouring agent, and 
so explained in the estimates and statistical information". 
See also Articles 9 and 10 of the 1972 Protocol. 
Article 49: Transitional Reservations 
Paragraph 1 ý-fthis Article which is more relevant in this connection# 
states: 
111. A Party may at the time of eignaturet ratification or accession 
reserve the right to permit temporarily in any one of its 
territories: 
a) The quasi-medical use of opium; 
b Opium-smokine; 
c Coca leaf chewing; 
d The use of cannabis, cannabis resing extracts and tinctures 
of cannabis for non-medical purposes; and 
(0) The production and manufacture of and trade in tý, e drugs 
-. _____referred 
to under (a) to. 
_(d) 
for the purposes mentioned 
therein". 
79.. U. N,.. Conference for the Adoption of. a Single donvention on Narcotic 
- Official Records, Vol--II, P. 
80. e. a. morphine is thou&iit to be used in certain processes of , 
photography. The Commission 6n Narcotic Druesp Report of the 
tenth Sessiont Official Records of the ECOSOC9 Twentieth Sessiont 
Supplemont Ko. 89 para. 111. 
E/2768/Rev 1) (ýICN- 7/303/Rev 1. ) 
81, supra. iý- rr) 
82. The maximum periods within which the follwoing must be abolished 
a quasi-medical use of opium, 15 years. 
b coca leaf chewing, 25 Years. 
0 use. of. cannabis for other than medical and scientific purposes, 
25 years 
83- See also Article 509 Paragraph 3- 
84- 'The term "trade" prbsumably includes I'distributionlIp "import" and 
"exportst. 
65- Article 49P paragraph 1 does not refer to "use and possession of 
drugs". 
41 
Gi6 
86. Article 34 only mentions, inter alia, that all persons who 
. 
have-managerial or supervisory positions in a State enterprise 
established in accordance with this Conventiont shall have 
adequate qualifications for the effective and faithful 
execution of the provisions of such laws and re&ulation3 
as are'enacted in pursuance thereof". 
87- infra. t 7-Tz 
a 
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CHAPTER VIII 
LDIITATION ON CULTIVATION 
The General Provisions Concerninjý Limitation 
on Cultivation 
The scope of limitation on cultivation will be examined 
in respect of poppy strawq coca busht coca leaves and cannabis. 
Article 22 of the Single Convention contained special provisions 
applicable to cultivation. According to this Article, whenever 
Of the prevailing conditions in the country or a territory of a 
Party render the prohibition of the cultivation of the opium 
poppyt the coca bush or the cannabis plant the most suitable' 
measurev in its opiniong for protecting the public health and 
welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit 
traffic, the Party concerned shall prohibit cultivation. " 
I 
The principal reason for adopting these special provisions 
is that effective suppression of the illicit traffic in products 
of the above plants is dependent upon a successful programme of 
limitation of cultivation of the plants. On an analysis of this 
Articlej it is observed that these provisions of limitation of 
cultivation are applicable only to the Parties to the Single 
Convention. Secondlyq such limitation by prohibition of the 
cultivation of the plants concerned should appear to be the 
"most suitable measurelý for the country concerned. Thirdly, 
vhether or not it is the "most suitable measure" under the 
-A 18. 
prevailing conditionsq will be judgea by the country concerned. 
Fourthlyq such measures should be found suitable only if they are 
necessary 11 for protecting the public health and welfare and prevent- 
ing the diversion of drugs into the illicit traffic., ' Therefore# 
a Party is not obliged to prohibit cultivation if the product is 
diverted into the illicit traffic in a smaller quantity than would 
endanger public health and welfare to a large degree. 
One of the prositive aspects of this Article is that if the 
Parties act in good faitho they are obliged to prohibit cultivation 
for the avowed p-arposes. It is thereforej expected that the Contract- 
ing Parties will take the necessary measures in earnestp especially 
because any illicit traffic in drugs will hava a bearing not only 
upon the " public health and welfare" of the local populationg but 
2 
also that of foreign countries. Under the conditions of Article 22, 
not only cultivation of the poppy for the production of opiumq but 
3 
also that undertaken for the seeds and straw, must be prohibited. 
Although Article 28, paragraph 2 provides that this n Convention shall 
not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant exclusively for 
industrial purposes ( fibre and seed) or horticultural purposes'19 
Article 22, according to the U. N. expertsp amounts to a covering 
clause as it would apply to cultivation authorised only for indus- 
trial or horticultural purposesp if such cultivation should prove 
to be a significant source of cannabis or cannabis resin in the 
illicit trafficq since it would in this case not be vndertaken 
"exclusively" for the authorized purposes. 
4 
On the other handt this 
would not cover a situation in uhich the leaves of the cannabis plant 
619 
( not accompanied by the tops) are diverted into the illicit 
traffic. 5 The special provision of Article 22 has also been made 
applicable to Article 49t according to which the Contracting Parties 
have been allowed to reserve their rights to permit temporarilyl 
inter aliat " the use of cannabist cannabis resin, extracts and 
tinctures of cannabis for non-medical purposes. " 
This Convention has made specific provisions for the control 
6 
of poppy straw. In terms of this Article the Contracting Parties 
are allowed to cultivate opium poppy only for purposes other than the 
production of opium, and then only ýmaer adeqnate measures of control* 
For more stringent control, the Parties are obliged to apply the system 
7 
of import certificates and export authorizations to poppy straw and 
shall furnish statistical information on its import and export. 
8 All 
kinds of poppy straw contain morphine in varying degreesq and there- 
forep warrant control. The regime of control applicable to poppy 
straw under the Single Convention corresponds to that of the 1953 t2 
Protocol. 9 Control of the production of poppy straw will, ipso facto, 
mean control of the production ofýopium. "Poppy straw" not being 
considered a I'drug'19 the Single Convention has not envisaged the 
incidence of illicit traffic in itp nor has it made the provisions 
of "action against illicit traffic" 
10 
applicable to it. 
Article 26 of this Convention proscribes the measures of 
control in respect of coca bush and coca leaves by restricting their 
cultivation. It has been left to the judgment of the Parties to the 
Convention whether or not they would deem it appropriate to cultivate 
62 0' 
the coca bush; but once they have decided in the affirmative, the 
system of control as provided in Article 23 respecting the control 
of opium poppy shall be applied to both coca bush and coca leaves* 
Coca leaves are considered to be "drugs" under this Convention, 
11 
and are subject to the regime applicable to Schedule I. The provisions 
. 
of Article 269 paragraph lp are applicable to all Parties that permit 
cultivation of coca busht irrespective of the purposes for which it is 
12 
produced. Howeverg the coca leaf preparationsp e. g. extracts and 
tincturesq are not subject to the provisions of Article 26, paragraph 19 
e. 
13 
and consequentlyp coca leaves may be stocked by manufacturrs 
Howeverv the national opium agencies are required 11 to take physical 
possession of such crops as soonas possible . 00 after the end of the 14- 
harvest. " Article 26, paragraph 2 has obligated the Parties to enforce 
a# far as possible the uprooting of all coca bushes growing wild. The 
Parties shall also destroy the coca bushesp if illegally cultivated. 
Indeed the Convention has not indicated at what stage a Party should 
reckon that the coca leaves have grown wild. Despite these apparent 
gaps, the Parties are expected to observe the general obligations 
undertaken by them in Article 49 in their attempt to fulfil the 
avowed purposes of this Convention. 
This Convention has made certain special provisions relating to 
coca leaves ( Article 27)t in view of their other use, viz, use for the 
preparation of a flavouring agent, provided that such leaves do not 
contain any alkaloids. It is for the Parties to judge whether or not 
such use of coca leaves should be permittedg but if permitted, they 
shall furnish separately estimates (Article 19' and Article 9 of the 
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1972 Protocol) and statistical information (Article 20 and Article 
10 of the 1972 Protocol) in respect of such leaves. 
15 Such a 
procedure will enable the International Narcotics Control Board 
to ascertain the correct quantity of leaves available to the Party 
16 by prodictiono import and/or seizure. . The question of submitting 
separate estimates of coca leaves held in stock for preparation of 
af lavouring agent arises- only when such quantity will be utilized 
exclusively for -. '. his purpose, and not also for the extraction of 
alkaloidsol7 
One of the important contributions of the Single Convention 
has been its concern for the control of cannabis. In terms of 
Article 28, paragraph ly the control regime is applicable to the 
cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis or 
cannabis resin. Paragraph 2 of the said Article provides that this 
"Convention shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant 
exclusively for industrial purposes ( fibre'and seed) or horticul- 
tural purposes. " This implies that the system of control as provided 
in Article 23 of the Convention is applicable only to the firsi situ- 
ation# i. e. j when such plants are cultivated for the production of 
cannabis or cannabis resing and not to other situations, i. e. p for 
industrial or horticultural purposes. In terms of Article 4(c)p the 
production of cannabis and. cannabis resin should be undertaken only 
for medical and scientific purposes. 
18 The drafters of this Conven- 
tion had borne in mind that in certain parts of the world, cannabis 
and cannabis resin are liused for purposes ithich are quasi-medical or 
not purely meaical in the Western senset yetp it, seems that such use 
G22 
of the above substances is considered to be a medical purpose. 
Howeverp the application of the provisions of Article 49 has been 
tied up with those of Article 23- Under the Single Conventiong 
"cannabis" has not been defined as a "drug" although the extracts 
and tinctures of caimabis have been included in Schedule I as 
drugs. 19 For obvious reasonsp the manufacturerar of the extracts and 
tinctures of cannabis have to possess stocks of cannabis and cannabis 
resint but since the manufacturers of opium preparations have also 
been authorised to possess stocks of opium, it was perhaps thought 
to be fair to grant the manufacturers of the extracts and tinctures 
of cannabis the, same privilege. 
20 The provisions of Article 23 are 
equally applicable to the wholesale and international trade in, and 
stocks'ofq cannabis and cannabis resin. Cannabis and cannabis resin 
are subject to-he regime of Schedule IV, whether or not their produc- 
tion is permitted by the Parties to the Convention. 
In terms of Article 28v para, -, raPh 3p the "Parties shall aaopt 
such measures as may be necessary to prevent the misuse off and 
illicit traffic ins the leaves of the cannabis plant. " "Illicit 
traffic" in this'paragraph has a different meaning from the usual* 
21 
Articles 35-379 i. e. 9 the Articles concerned with action against 
illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, will not usually come into force 
in rrspect of cannabis leavesp as "illicit traffic", in this context 
means 11 trade in these leaves contrary to domestic legal provi- 
sions intended to combat their misuse, or to foreign laws governing 
such trade. 11 
22 The Parties are not required to sapply to the 
Secretaxy-General and to the Boara information on seizures of cannabis 
leavest as they are required to do in respect of drugs under Article 18, 
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paragraph lp sub-paragraph (e). The Contracting Parties are not 
obliged to prohibit the consumption of leaves for non-medical 
purposeso although they are expected to take necessary measures to 
prevent their misuse. It may be observed that the reason sor such 
a provision lies primarily in the fact that the consumption of cannabis 
leaves is still a part of social life in many countries. The provi- 
sions of Article, 23 of the Convention aret however, applicable to the 
cultivation of the cannabis plant, if necessax-y. 
B. A Critical Examination of the Provisions fv, ýý 
Limitation on Cultivation 
The Single Convention has brought a considerable nunber of 
narcotic substances under its control regime. It has advocated a 
stricter regime of control, yet in many casesp its machinery of 
control has overtly been flexible., On the one handq many of iis 
provisions arep for obvious reasonst repetitive of the existing 
provisions of control (i. e. t the provisions which had been devised 
by the previous drug-conventions)p while on the othert the new 
provisons devised by it have not been effective enough to fill in 
the apparent gaps in the area of control. Hence it is necessary to 
(; 
examine critically the provisions of control under this Convention. 
When isn't "Changed" the Converse of "Unchanged" ? 
Article 3 of the Convention details the "changes in the scope 
of control". Although the Single Convention may be extended to a 
substance of any chemical composition, it has in most cases repeated 
the provisions of the previous drug-conveations. 
23 The novelty of 
including certain drugs in a Schedulet namelyp Schedule IV, has not 
met with much appreciation owing to tho fact that the appropriateness 
of some of the substancesp e. g. cannabis and cannabis resin, being 
placed under this Schedule has been questioned, and indocdp perhaps 
these substances could not only be deleted but also be tranferred 
24 from Schedule I to Schedule-Il. It also appears that while some 
drugs have been included in Schedule IV9 vithout Imowledgme of their 
effects on buman beingsp 
25 
some othermore potent hallucinogenics have 
not been brought under the control of regime of the Single Convention. 
26 
Like the Limitation Conventionp the Single Convention has not made any 
express provision concerning preparations of drugs in Schedule II 
It adapted to a normal therapeutic use. " Alsop this Convention does 
not contain any express provision as to the inclusion of preparations 
of drugs in Schedule 11 11 adapted to a normal therapeutic use 11p in 
Schedule IIIv although subsequentlyg preparations of most drugs have 
been incoudea in the latter Schedule. It is only by. implication that 
these preparations are in fact 11 adapted to a normal therapeutic use". 
The Single Convention provides for-the same regimet i. e. 9 both 
provisional and, mandatory, for narcotic substances incouded in 
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Schedule I only; a provision which is similar to those in the 
Limitation Convention'27 and the 19118 Protocol 
28 in respect of 
substances included in Group L In other wordsq this Convention 
has not extended its provisional regime to narcotic substances 
included in Schedule II even though one of the criteria of deciding 
whether a drug should be included in Schedule II is to consider 
whether the property in question is 11 convertible into a substance 
having addiction-producing or addiction sustaining properties with 
an ease and yield such as to constitute a risk of abuse not greater 
29 than -that of codeinen, a criterion which cannot be ignored in 
determining whether a substance should be included in Schedule I. 
despite the fact that the second criterion for a drug coming under 
Schedule I is whether it is "convertible intombstances having 
aadiction-producing or addiction-sustaining properties with an ease 
or yield such as-to constitute a'risk of abuse Rreater 
30 than 
,, 31 codeine. Owing to the fine difference between "greater" and 
"not greaterlip it is observed that provisional measures in respect 
of drugs in Schedule II should have been subject, to provisional 
40 
control, 
The regime which is applicable to poppy straw under the 
Single Convention corresponds to that in the 1953 Protocol. 
32 Like 
the International Opium Convention of 1925 and the Limitation 
Convention of 19319 this Convention also brings poppy straw under the 
system of import certificates and export authorizations. 
33 poppy 
straw is notq howeverg considered to be a "drug" under the Single 
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Convention, although some parts of the capsuleand the upper part of 
the stem are thought to be a source of "drugs". This means that 
S+ 
poppy straw is not included in "raw materials'll no statistical 
reports on the quantities used for the manufacture of drugs would 
have to be submittedt but reports-only. on the quantities of poppy 
straw used for the manufacture of drugs. 
35 This aspect of control 
has certainly ignored the ever-growing development in the synthetic 
process of the manufacture of narcotics* in which poppy straw also 
plays a role*36 Poppy straw comes under the control regime of the 
Single Convention only after it has arrived in a drug factory or 
entered international commerce. 
37 No single Article in this Conven- 
tion has been devoted to the limitation of the production of poppy * 
straw for international trade as has been done' in the case of bpium. 
38 
Regarding coca bush, ýnd coca leaves, in. terms of Article 26t 
paragraph 19 if a 11 Party permits the cultivation of coca busht it 
shall apply thereto and to coca leaves the system of controls as 
provided in arti, ý; le 23 respecting the control of the opium poppy". 
but'the national opium agencies are only required " to take phisical 
possession of the crops as soon as possible after the end of the 
harvest. " In terms of paragraph 2 of this Articlev the"Parties shall 
so far as possible enforce the uprooting of all coca bushes which. 
grow wild. They shall destroy the coca bushes if illegally cultivated*" 
This provision implies that production of coca bush is not prohibited, 
and once it has been cultivatedt the limit will be set by the Parties 
concerned. It is doubtful how it would be possible to set the limit 
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after they have started growing. Nor does the provisi. on imply that 
the Parties are obliged to uproot the illegal cultivation. 
39 The 
provisiont It so far as possible" has lef, t open the door to illicit 
trade and traffic in coca leaves, and such activities will thrive in 
a country in which the national administration is rather weake 
Any high expectation of the performance of the "general obligations" 
as undertaken by the Parties in Article 4 of the Conventiong may meet 
with disappointmentp especially when the behaviour of some nations 
has not shown them to be responsible 
The additional provisions 
40 
relating to coca leaves are of 
little practical importance. 11 The Parties may permit the use of 
coca leaves for the preparation of a flaVouring agent, which shall not 
contain any alkaloidsp and to the extent necessary for such uset nay 
permit the production, import# exportq trade in and possession of such 
leaves. " 
41 
The phrase " to the extent necessary for such use'19 pre- 
supposes that the cultivator of the coca bush will know whether his 
product will be used for the extraction of the flavouring substance 
when he collects his crop of leavesq which is not tho case. 
42 
The 
Convention has also failed to take into account that not all kinds of 
coca leaves are suitable for the preparation of the flavouring agent; 
consequentlyt illicit cultivation of coca leaves will take place. 
Cannabis leaves# according to this Convention, are not drugs, 
although they are consumed by way of smoking., t or as an ingredient of 
bevera'-es or sweets. In terms of Article 289 paragraph 2p this %7 
Convention " shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis plant 
exclusively for industrial purposes ( fibre and seed) or horticultural 
purposes. " The application of this Convention exclusively to the 
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cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of cannabis 
or cannabis resing presumably for the production of drugs, has 
helped maintain-the dangers which various types of cannabis plant 
poset because of their containing varied amounts of the psycho- 
active agent. 
43 To prevent any abusep it would be necessary to 
prohibit removal from the fields of any parts of the cannabis plant 
except the mature stalks and the seedst and to bum the remainder; 
but such a measure would be very difficult to enforceq and would 
render harvesting for the fibre or seeds uneconomical. 
114 
It vas 
for this reason that the question of replacing the cannabis plant by 
other fibre-yielding plantsp or of breeding drag-free plants has 
been considered, but to no effect. 
45 
(ii) When ''Stringency'' Stnnds for It Leniency''. 
The Single Conventiont for obvious reasonsq has not prohibited 
the cultivation ok the production of plants containing narcotib 
substances; it has only attempted to restrict their cultivation or 
production. Such restrictions are sometimes direct, vhile at times 
they are indirect. 
46 " Restriction" implies "limitation", and for 
a successful operation of stringent measures restriction must imply, 
that no loophole or discretion is provided. Given this interprota- 
tiont it may be worthwhile to examine how the Single Convention 
fares in fulfilling its function to restrict cultivation or 
production stricto sensu. 
6,29 
Article 22 of the Convention details some special provisions 
applicable to cultivation . 
47 
The effective exercise of the prohi- 
bitory aspect of this Article depends entirely upon the discretion 
of the Party concerned. It may be observed that #e difficulties 
in implementing this provision, especially in the remote parts of 
a country may not only be contributory to its non-fulfilmentf but 
also may promote illicit production of and traffic in certain narcotic 
commodities. Indeedp ac 11situatign may arise in which the government 
concerned might come to tho*conclusion that it cannot possibly suppress 
a significant diversion into the illegal'traffic without prohibiting 
the cultivation of the plant, a mcLasure which it could effectively 
enforce. " 
48 
The phrase, 11 for protecting the public health and 
welfare and preventing the di-version'of drugs into the illicit 
traffic" does not appear to be sufficiently stringent to stop produc- 
tion or diversion of a relatively small quantityp despite the fact 
'that any amount may pose a threat to public health and welfaret and 
lead to illicit traffic. 
49 Article'22 does not stipulate whether 
the seed and straw shall come under its scope. This Conventioln 
controls poppy straw after it has arrived in a drug factory . or 
found its way into illicit traffic. - Also Article 28 has made no 
provisions for preventing illicit traffic in the cannabis plant150 
vhen not accompanied by the tops. Once, howevert leaves are allowed 
: Lnto illicit'trafficp it is probable tha-t the cannabis resin and 
cannabis would also find their way in the same direction. ' 
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Although in Article 25 certain measures of control of poppy 
straw have been devised, they appear to be rather feeble. "Poppy 
straw" has not been regarded as a "drug" under the terms of the 
Single Convention; it has been categorised under 11 raw materials" 
which are used for the manufacture of drugs, and hence h6s escaped 
from the international narcotic-s control regime. Under the Single 
Conventiong no statistical report needs to be submitted on the 
quantities of raw materialst unless such materials ( which include 
poppy straw) have been used for the manufacture of drugsp and in the 
latter cventv the submission of reports only will suffice. This 
situation has further been aggravated by the fact that the estimates 
system of the Single Convention does not apply to poppy straw. It is 
feared that owing to the unhindeýed progress of chemistryp such raw 
materials urhich have some use in the manufacture of drugsp directly 
or indirectlyp might very quickly find their way into illicit trafficl 
if not under effective controlq and indeedl the absence of control 
in this regard means the veakening of the whole control machinery, 
In so far as the control of coca bush and coca leaves is concerned 
(Article 26), it may bo observed that the effectiveness of the whole 
provision has been made dependent upon the sense of obligation of the 
Parties to the Cinvention. Article 269 paragraph 2 provides# inter 
aliag that the " Parties shall so far as possible enforce the uprooting 
of all coca bush which grow wild. " The expression 11 so far as 
possible" pre-supposes that the abiiities of the Parties concerning tz 
this matter will vary in extent, and so will the effectiveness of 
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this provision. In addition to thisp since coca bush often 
grows in areas which are isolated and difficult of accessp 
51 the 
prospects of exercising effective controll especially when resort 
to flexibility has been allowed are rather dubious. 
52 
As regards tho control of cannabis, Article 28g paragraph 2 
stipulates that this Convention It shall not apply to the cultivation 
of the cannabis plant exclusively for industrial purposes ( fibre 
and seed) or horticultural purposes. " In other words, this Conven- 
tiont shall apply exclusively to the cultivation of the cannabis 
plant for non-industrial purposesp i. e. 9 production of cannabis or 
53 
cannabis resin. Such a provisionp it appears, was made on the 
presumption that the cultivators would not misuse cannabis leaves 
or any part of the plant containing a potential drug elementt so 
that they would find their vqy into illicit traffic. Unfortunately, 
this presumption is ill-founded and deserves immediate attention 
however difficult this may be. 
54 It may not be out of place to 
mention that the time lag between the period after the end of the 
harvest and the taking over of the crop from the cultivators ýy the 
national cannabis agenciess should be curtailed from the stipulated 
period of four months. No stýictness is exercised with regard to 
cannabis leaves in that when such leaves are not accompanied by the 
tops of the plantp they are not "cannabis"p and consequentlyp not 
listed in the first two Schedules. It is not necessary for the 
Parties to supply to the Secretary-General and to the Board any 
information on the-seizures of leaves of cannabis plant, although 
the normal provisions concerning action against the illicit traffic 
55 
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apply to these leaves also. In terms of Article 28# paragraph 39 
the "Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
prevent the misuse ofq and illicit traffic in, the leaves of the 
cannabis plant. " The Convention has not precisely defined what 
would be deemed as "misuse" of the plant , This implies that a 
Partyq in -the name of "medical use" may -take the privilege of using 
these leaves in a large quantityq although they are supposed to take 
necessary measures to prevent thejr use in areas other than medical. 
This situation may become seriousp especially in those parts of the 
world where production of cannabis and cannabis resin is permitted 
for medical purposes. 
C., Coments . 
The control of certain drugs or substances that act as 
ingredients of drugst by restricting their cultivation is only one 
aspect of the total control machinery. The Single Convention'has 
made a considerable contribution to the restriction of cultivation 
of various such substancesl yet, it cannot be denied that a total 
control of cultivation tothe desired level, is rather too ambi- 
tious an expectation. The success of such a progra=e is fraught 
with difficultiesp visible and invisible. When the consumption of 
drugs becomes a part of social and religious life, it poses diffi- 
culties of a multiple nature. 
55a To this must be added the 
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inevitable cultivation of those plants for economic reasons, which 
certainly, under a not-so-efficient national control system promotes 
the illicit traffic in that commodity. 
In evaluatMg -the machinery of control, in respect of culti- I 
vations it is essential to see vhether the positive or the negative 
aspect of this control-structure has greater effect. No doubtv there 
are negative aspects of this control-machineryt i. e. t the gaps left 
in this Conventionp yet it may be observed that in certain cases these 
gaps have been left owing to lack of far-sightednessi while in othersp 
they are inevitablep i. e., unless there is a uniformity of the 
structures of national administration and a thorough change in the 
outlook-of the peoplest they willq unfortunatelyp prevail. In addi- 
tion. to this, the absence of any means of control in respect of the 
cultivation of the drug-plants in the territories of non-contracting 
parties will always leave open the door to free production. 
The positive aspects of this control machinery may be found 
in the attempts made by the Contracting Parties to bring as many kinds 
of plant as possible under the scope of the Single Conventiongland in 
56 
their pledges to produce them in a restrictive manner. Any evalu- 
ation in this regard should be directed not only to negative criticism, 
- but also to a critical appreciation of these efforts in the perspective 
of the difficulties they must encounter. 
f 
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CHAPTER VIII 
POOTNOTFIS 
See also Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol amending-Article 22 
of the SinCle Convention. 
2. See further Connentary on the Sinzle Convention, op. cit., p. 275. 
3* op, ' cit., p. 276. - 
4- ibid. t 
I 
5-* Such leaves are not considered to be "drugs" underithe provisions 
of the Single Convention, infra., 
6. Articlo 25. * 
7- See also Article 31, paragraphs 4-15- 
8 See also Article 20t paragraphs I(d) mid 2(b)o 
9. Article 4 of the 1953 Protocol- 
10. Articles 35-37; see also Articles 13 and 14 of the 1972 Protocol. 
11. Article l(l)(j) and Schedule 1. 
12. Incidentallyp the regime of Article 23 applies only to a 
11 Party that permits the cultivation of the opium poppy for the 
- production of opium". Th other words, such a regime is not 
applicable to a Party that permits the cultivation of opium 
poppy for purposes other than the production of opium, 
13- S ce als o the Comment= on the Single Conventiono OP. cit. -t P. 307- 
14- In the case of the opium poppyt physical possession will be taken 
by the national opium agencies " as soon as possibleg but not 
later than four months after the end of the harvest. " (Article 23)- 
Thb flexibility of thispolicy in the case of coca bush and coca 
leaves was mostly due to certain technical difficulties involved 
in the collection of the crop, e. g. the isolation of areas where 
they are usually cultivated and hence the difficulty of access 
to them; see futther Recoyýdst vol. It P- 153 and vol. II9 PP. 172-173 
15. Article 279 paragraph 2. 
16. Article 209 paragraph 1; see also Article 10 of the 1972 Protocol. 
17. Article 19(l)(c); see also Form B/S of the International 
Narcotics Control Board. 
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18. This however will not prejudice the temporary exemption allowed 
under Article 49- 
19. It is however believed that the extracts and tinctures of 
cannabis are 11 preparations". and not 11drugs".. See further 
CommenteEL on the SinRle Conventionj OP* Citot Pe 3ý4- 
20. - ibid. 9 
21. Article lt paragraph 1. 
22. See further Commentary on the Sinqle Conventiont OP- Cit-p P. 315.,,. 
23-- supra. 
24. See further Commenta= on the Single Conventionp OP- Cit-9 P- 95- 
With the-coming into force of the Vienna Convention of 1971P 
cannabist cannabis resin, and extracts and tinctures of cannabis 
may be placed under its regime if 11 they are removed from the - 
Schedules of the. Single Convention. Article 28, para. 1 of the 
Single Convention would# however I continihe to apply unless this treaty is revised to prevent this. (The same must also be stated 
in respect to article 22).. The effect of reservations under 
article 49 concerning these cannabis drugs would be restricted to 
the application of article 28t para. 1. It is however admitted 
that this legal possibility of transferring cannabis and cannabis 
resin from the scope of the Single Convention to the regime of the* 
new treaty may be disputed. Some may hold that in view of the 
continued application of axticle 28, para. 1. cannabis and 
cannabis resin are not substances., 11 not-yet under international 
control" within the meaning of article 2t para. l. of the Vienna 
Convention.. " ( For the Vienna Convention see E/Conf-58/6). 
Commentary. OP;. cit-P P, 95- 
25. e. g. Etrophine. 
'and 
aectormhine. See also Report on the twent" 
second session'of the Commission on ITarcotic Drugz, Official 
Records of the Economic and Social Council, forty-fourth sessionp 
supplement No. 2f paragraph 43- 0 
26. e. g. Amphetaminesp harbiturates and tranquillizers. These 
hallucinogenics haveg h6weverg been brought under the control 
regime of the Conventioh on Psychotropic Substancesq 1971. 
27- Article lt paragraph 29 Article'llt paragraphs 3,4 and 6, 
Article 13t paragraph 1 and Article 18. 
28. Article 1, paragraph 2 and Article. 2. 
29. U. N for the AdoDtion of a Sinzle 
ope cit. 9-voi. ii ( Official 
nvention on 
2ords), p. -264. Narcotic DMjýTsq 
v 
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30. Italics added. 
31- See Official Recordst op. cit., Vol. II, p. 264- 
32. Article 4- 
33- Article 31- 
34.11 Raw materials" in this Convention covers only danprous 
substances from which d-rugs are. made. 
I 
35. The Contracting Parties, according, to Article 290), are Q. 
required to prevent accumulation of poppy straw in,, excess of 
the quantity required for the normal conduct of business. The 
estimates system of this Convention does not apply1to poppy straw. 
36. Not an insignificant quantity of codeine may be found as a 
byý-product in the manufacture of, morphine from poppy straw. 
37- See the opinions of the Dutch and Hungarian delegates at the 
Conferencep Official Records, op. cit-, vol- IIP P. 150. The 
Indian delegateg howevert suggested, that since poppy straw 
contains substantial quantities of phenanthrene alkaloids and 
sometimos finds its way into the illicit traffic, it should be 
treated on the same footing as opium. However, he subsequently 
agreed with the other delegates on this point., ibid., 
38- Articles 24 and 25, 
39- See further the Report of the Commibsion of Enguiry on the 
Coca Leaf (May 1-9-5: )UT. Official Recordi of the Economic and 
Social Council, twelfth session, special supplement, No. 1 
'CE71666)o 
40# Article 27- 
41- Article 27, paragraph 1. 
42, See also go-, nentary on tho Sin! Tle Conventiong OP- eit-P P. 309,, 
43- U. N. -Doc. E/CN-7AC-3/4/Aev-l-9 paragraph C-358. 
44- Commentary on the Sinele Conventiont QP- Cit-t P- 313- 
45- Regarding breeding see G. Bredemann, F. Schwanitz and R. von 
Sengbuscht 11 Pýoblems of ýýOdern Hemp Breeding with particular 
reference to the Breeding of Varieties of Hemp Containing Little 
of no Hashish"q Bulletin on Narcotics, vol. VIII, NO-3t 1956, 
pp. 31-34 
As ; egards breeding or replacement, see U. N. 'Doc. E/CIT/7/2ý7 
(prepared by the Secretariat of the Food and Agriculture Organiza- 
tion in consultation with the Secretariat of the U. N. ); see also 
U. N.. Doc, -E/CN-7/324t Paragraphs 49-56. 
637- 
46. In such a case the general obligations of the Parties as 
envisaged in Article 4 will be referred to. 
47- See also Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol. 
48. Cýmmentary on the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 275- 
49- See also'Article 12(2) of the 1972 Protocol. ' 
50- See Article l(l)(b) and Article 28(3),, 
51- See also Records,, vol. II, op. cit., pp. 172-173- 
52. As regards additional provisions relating to coca leaves (Article 27). see previous section entitled "When isn't 
tchanged' the-converse of-lunchanged', 11 pp. 
53- U. N. Doe. E/CN-7/324 (1957)9 paragraphs 49-56. 
54- See Report of the Marihuana'. -Investiration of the U. S. Buroau 
of Narcotics. Summer, 1937t Pp- 9-12; see also Commentary on the 
Single Conventiont OP- cit--9 v- 313. 
55- Articles 35-37- 
55(a) supra., -U--pkm r. r. CA-). .I 
56. The Single Convention is the, first multilateral drug convention 
which contains provisions governing the cultivation of the coca 
bush.. 
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CHAPTER DC 
MITATION OF TIM PRODUCTION'Or, OPIM 
The General Provisions Concernin! j Limitation on 
Production of Opiwn 
As opium was one of the original drugs to be brought under* 
an international control regimej it is appropriate to deal with 
this drug separatelyp in order to determine the present state of 
the control programme designed for it. Opium in the Single Conven- 
tion has been classified under. two categoriesy viz. t medicinal opium 
and opium. While the former means It opium which has undergone the 
9 the latter means processes necessary to adapt it for medicinal use" 
the coagulated juice of the opium poppy. 1f 
1 However, the Single 
Convention has brought all kinds of opium under the same regime by 
placing them in Schedule L2 The term 11 medicinal opium" has found 
expression in the Single Convention only once, in Article 23t Para- 
graph 29sub-paragraph (e)p3 wherein it has been provided that 
medicinal opium and. opium preparations may be excluded from. govern- 
ment monopoly. 
In drafting this Conventiont the drafters appear to have 
taken special care in respect of the control of the production of 
opium. Article 1 (1)(t) specifies that 11 production" means 11 the 
separation of opium. "" from the plants, i. e., opium poppy from which 
it is obtained. opium poppy is subject to the special provision 
applicable to cultivation under the Single Convention, 
4 
i. e. 9 it 
i 
Cýý, 
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shall not be produced if its production endangers the public health 
and welfareq and allows the diversion of drugs into the illicit 
traf f ic. 
Article 24 of the Convention restricts international trade in 
opium and consequently the production of it. According to paragraph 1, 0 
13ub-paragraph (a) of this Articlep a Party intending to produce opium 
or to increase existing production shall take into account the prevail- 
ing world need 
5 for it, which will be determined by the International 
Narcotics Control Board. 
6 
This is primarily to the end that such 
production should not be allowed to result in over-production of 
opium in. the world. In addition to this provisionq the Convention 
has imposed an obligation upon the Parties to decide for themselves, 
whether or not such production or increased production in their terri- 
toties would result in illicit traffic in opium. 
7 The question of 
the limitation of production of opium is necessarily linked with that 
of the production of opium poppy. 
8 The provisions of Article 24(l)(b) 
have emphasised that the re8ponsibility of limiting or not-limiting 
the production of opium lies primarily with the Parties to this 
Convention*9 Sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 and paragraph 3 
determine the eligibility of the Parties which should be allowed to 
produce and export opium. - Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 allows 
a Party to produce and. export, opium not exceeding five tons annually, 
if it was not producing and exporting opium on 1 January, 1961. Sub- 
paragraph (b) allows "a Party other than a Party referred to in 
paragraph 3" 
10 to produce opium for export exceeding five tons 
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annually. Paragraph 3 allows a Party to continue producing and 
exporting opium without any limitation upon productiont had it 
been doing ýo during ten years prior to 1 Januaryp 1961. The 
criterion of eligibilityp'as it appe arst has been determined by a 
date only. Againt while in the firstýcase ( i. e. q'sub-paragraph 
(a) of paragraph 2) there is a positive restriction limiting produc- 
tion and export to five tons annually, no such restriction has been 
imposed in the latter two cases, ( i. e. t sub-paragraph 
(b) or para- 
graph 2 and paragraph 3)- While in the first two cases Parties are 
required to notify the Board and the Economic and Social Council 
respectively furnishing them with certain specific informationt e. g. 
the nature of control 'enforced by the Parties, the names of the 
receivin- countriesp amounts of opium etc. 9 in the latter case, no 0 
such obligation has been imposea upon a Partyp although such a Party 
is supposed to honour the general obligation which has been under- 
taken by it in Article 4 of the Convention. 
11 On the other handp 
in considering whether or not to allow a'Party to engage in the 
production and export of opium, the Board shall take into account 
s the controls in force as, required by this Convention. " 
12 Ihi. 
necessarily implies that a Partyp prior to its notifying the Board 
of its desire to export opiun which it produces, must ensure that 
adequate control measures have been adopted by it. 'The Board will 
also ensure that 11 the production of opium by such Party does not 
result in over-production of-opium in the world. " 
The use of the phrase " may reco=cnd" in clauses (i) and (iii) 
of sub-paragraphs (a) and 
(b) respectively, of paragraph 2g has 
I 
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apparently weakened the positions The word 11 recommendation! ' has 
no legally binding effectq yett the e'stimate system and the general 
obligations of the Parties under the Single Convention promote such 
recommendations to a higher levclq giving rise to binding effects. 
The provisions of paragraph 3 will be applicable to a 
non--motropolitan territory. which, on attaining independencep becomes 
a Party to the Single Conventiong provided of course such an area 
exported opium during the ten years immediately prior to I Januaryq 
1961. A Party shall not import opium from any co. untry or territory 
except opium produced in the territory of: 
(i) a Party referred to in paragraph 3, i. e., a Party that 
during ten years immediately prior-to '1 Januaryl 1961 
exported opiun which it produced; 
(ii) a Party that has notified the Board as provided in sub- 
paragraph (a) of paragraph 2, i. e. 9 a Party that was not 
an opium-producing countryp but since 1 Januarn 1961 has 
desired to export opium vhich it producesp but not exceed- 
ing five tons annually; or 
(iii) a Party that has received the approval of the Economic 
and Social Council'as provided in sub-paragraph (b) of 
para, r, r, raph 29 i. e. t not a Party that during ton years 
immediately prior to 1 Januaryt 1961, exported opi= 
13 
vhich it produced. 
Yett It a Party may import opium produced by any country which 
produced and exported opium during the ten years prior to 1 January, 
1961, if such country has established and maintains a national control 
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organ or agency for the purposes set out in article 23 ana has in force 
an effective means of ensuring that the opium it produces is not 
diverted into the illicit traffic. " 14 The expression 11 produced by 
any country" includes a non-party to the Convention. This does nott 
howevert mean that the non-parties to the Convention will be in a, 
privileaged position in so far as'import and export of opium are 
concernedt because a Party to t#e Convention may take the advantage 
of importing opium from the territory of a non-party ( whether or 
not such a non-party ha's itself produced that opium)t in addition 
to its authori6ation to import opium from a Purty that had been 
exporting its harvested opium to that Party during the ten years 
prior to 1 Januaryq 1961. 
However, the importing and exporting countries have undertaken 
similar-, obligationsp and -this finds support in paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
Article 24. In terms of paragraph 4p the exporting countries are 
required to limit their exportsp which automatically sets limits for 
the importers. Opium in this Article includes opium preparations, 
and Parties are not &lowed to import opium preparations under'this 
Article. On the other handq export of such opium preparations 
as are made from opium that will be authorised for international 
tradep is not prohibited. Article 24p paragraph 5 has not only'alloved 
a Party to the 'Conventioii to produce opium suffIcient for its own 
requirementsp but also to export opium seized in the illicit traffict 
to another Party in accordance with -the requirements of the Conventiont 
i. e. t such import and export will be governed by the import certificate 
J) 
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and export authorization system. 
15 The export of seized opium is 
16 also restricted to medical and scientific purposest and it must 
also be within the limits of the total of the estimates of the 
importing country. 
17 On the other hand, any import of seized 
opium is subject to the limits . set by Article 219 paragraphs 1-3- 
Restrictions as to import and export are equally applicable to seized 
opium preparations ( including seized medicinal opium 
18). 
The machinery of control has further been strengthened by 
making provisions for the establishment of a government agency o'r 
agencies in the countries of those member states who permit the 
cultivation of the opium poppy for the production of opium. 
19 From 
the general intention of the Parties, as embodied in this Conventiong 
may be stated that the provisions of Article 23 are applicable to 
all "territories" that are under the supervision o. f a supervisory 
authority. 
20 Such provisions are equally applicable in respect of 
a Farty that tem. porarily pemits -the cultivation of opiuu f or the 
production of opium for quasi-medical purposes or smo4ing. 4 
A Party whose law has authorised the production of opiua only 
on licence need not set up such an agency. Howevert where such an 
a,,, Y, ency has been establishedp it -. shall be its duty to designate the 
areas in which, and the plots of land on whichq cultivation of the 
opium poppy for the purpose of producing opium shall be permittod*21 
This is followeaby certain other procedural functions -of the opium 
agenciesq e. g. certain details on the licence coikcerning identifica- 
tion and demarcation of lands etc. This agencyl on the basis of 
past statisticst shall determine the amount of the opium crop which 
I 
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it shall obtain from that designated areal and allocate lands/ areas 
accordingly. In practicet_ officials of the agency inspect from time 
to time the areas in which poppy has been cultivatcdv in order to 
ascertain the approximate amount of crop to be availablel and also 
to take action for effective control of the poppy, if necessary. 
A record of such inspectionst together with the details of the pros- 
pective producto including its approximate amountq name of the culti- 
vator etc. is maintained by the agency. 
In terms of Article 23(2)(b), only cultivators licensed by the 
agency shall be authorised to engage in the cultivation of opium 
poppy. The procedure for issuing such licences is simple. Me 
applicant is required to indicate verbally or in writing the area of 
land on which he wishes to cultivate opium po ppyp and on an enquiry 
as to the suitability of the person 
22 (,. e .9 th 
, 
at he has not been 
convicted of any offence connected with narcotic drugs) and also as 
to the purpose of such cultivationg a liccncep indicating the usual 
particularsp 
23 
will be granted to that person. Firms also need 
24 
authorisations to cultivate opium poppy. The issue and revocation 
of licences is'at the discretion of the National Opium Agencies, and 
thereforej they cannot be obtained as a matter of right. 
25 All 
licences are non-transferable. 
In order to centralise the national control over opiumf all 
cultivators of the opium poppy in a given area are required to 
deliver their total crops of opium to their national opium agency* 
26 
This agency shall_purchase and take physical possession of such crops 
as soon as possible, 
27 but not later than four months after the end 
IVG45 
of the harvest. 
28 Since the harvesting periods vary from country 
to country the Convention could not prescribe a definite date by 
vhich time the crops should be delivered to the agencyv and conse- 
quentlyp the Convention, by implicationt imposed an obligation 
upon the national governments to sot such-dates as they-would doom 
appropriate. The maxiimim time-limit of four months29 by which an 
agency is required to purchase and to take physical possession of L 
the crop does nott however, preclude the agency Afrom requesting a 
farmer to deliverthe crops to it at an earlier datet and in the 
latter eventp opium retained after such a requect had been made will 
be considered as illegal and will be confiscated irrespective of the 
final date stated in the licence. Howevorp it is believed that the 
system of purchase, of such crops by the national agencies will give 
an incentive to the farmers to deliver crops promptly for an immediate 
cash payment against them. 
The Convention has also given the national agencies "exclusive 
right of importing, exportingp wholesale trading and maintainingr . 
stocks other 'than 
those held by manufacturers of opium alkaloids, 
mddicinal opiun or opuum preparations.,, 
30 In other wordsq in so far 
as business in opium 
( except opium alkajoidst medicinal opium or 
opium preparations) and maintenance Of Opium stocks are concerned, a 
government monopoly has boen-enforcedby the Convention. Conversely, 
private manufacturers in opium-producing countries may bd allowed 
by their respective governments to manufacture and stock medicinal 
opiun and opium preparations. 
31 "Special stocks,, 
32 
and stocks held 
by 11 retail phannacists or other auhtorized retail distributors and 
by institutions or qualified persons in the duly authorized exercise 
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of therapeutic or scientific functions". 
33 
are alsop ipso factol 
excluded from the scope of the obligatory government monopoly. 
Howevert from the provisions of Article 23, it appears that the 
national opium agencies are required to purchase the total supply 
of opium other than opium alkaloidsp medicinal opium or opium prepa- 
rationsg irrespective of its size. Thereforet the accumulation of 
opiumq if anyp owing to unfavourable market conditionst will be under 
the control and supervision of the national guvernmentst and indeedt 
Article 23P paragraph 3 has provided for a single government agencyt 
as opposed to multiple agenciesp for the disc! Large of such govern- 
mental functions in order to avoidýpossible diversities in ac+. ion in 
this regardy if of coursep the " Constitution of the Party concerned 
permits it. " Should however the establishment of more than one 
agency be found necessary on constitutional grounds, the national 
governments must ensure that adequate administrative arrangements 
have been made for co-ordination in their woek:. 
34 
The restrictions upon -the production of opium have furtlker 
been strengthened by the penal provisions enurnerated in Article 36, 
paragraph 1 of the Convention. 
35 B. V this Articler obligations have 
been imposed upon the Parties to adopt such measures as will ensure 
that cultivationt productiong manufacture# extractiong preparation, 
possessiont offeringt offiring for salet distribution, purchaseq 
salet delivery on any terms vhatsoevert brok eragep dispatch, 
dispatch in transit, importation and exportation of drugs are not 
contrary to the provisions of the Convention. The Parties have 
also undertaken that any other action vhich in t4eir opinion may 
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be contrary to the provisions of this Convention, shall be punishable 
offences when committed intentionally, . and that serious offences 
shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly by impriso=ent 
or other penalties of deprivation of liberty, Yet, all these provi- 
sions are subject to the constitutional limitations proscribed by 
the Parties, 36 and this situation has further been weakened by the 
provisions of the new sub-paragraph (b)'(ii) of paragraph 2 of 
this Article ( as amended by the 1972 Protocol), according to which: 
If a Party which makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty receives a request for extradi- 
tion from another Party with which it has no extradi- 
tion treaty, it may at its option consider this 
Convention as the legal basis for extradition in res- 
pect of the offences enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2 
(a) (ii) of this article. Extradition shall be subject 
to the other conditions provided by. the law of the 
requested Party. " 
Consequentlyt it is obsorved that all the problems associa- 
ted with "extradition" in international law will ensue. 
37 More- 
overl the provisions of this Article are obligatory -to a Party only 
in so far as they are compatible with the principles of its 
38 ' 
criminal lawp and the offences to which it refers shall be 
defined, prosecuted and punished in conformity with the domestic 
law of a Party. 
39 
In so far as the control of the traffic in opium is 
concernedq the Single Convention has made certain novel provi- 
sions. Yetv like all other provisions of this Convention, the 
fulfilment of the provisions concerning the control of 
traffic in opi= is dependent upon the degree of co-operation 
vhich the Parties are prepared to extend. 
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B. A Critical Examination of the Provisions 
Concernin, g, Limitation on Production of 
. 
opium 
(a) When 11 Prohibition" Ifeans " Restriction" OnlX 
A prohibition of the cultivation of opium poppy is a 
condition precedent to cessation of the production of opium. 
In terms of Article 22 of the Conventiong a Party is required to 
prohibit the cultivation of opium poppy if it considers that such 
a step -would be the "most suitable measure ... for protecting the 
public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs . 
into the' illicit traffic. " Converselyp a Party will not be 
required to take such a step if the above two conditions do not 
prevail. Therforep a Party is not obliged to prohibit the culti- 
Vation of opiumv if it is diverted only in minor quantitiesy thus 
not presenting an immediate threat to the public health and 
welfare* 
40 
The wra "prohibition" means 11 forbidding", "forbidding by 
law ... 11 
41 In other words, it signifies an order einnnating from 
" superior authority. According to Article 22 of the Convention, 
" Party, shall prohibit the cultivation of the opium poppy, if 
in its opinion such a measure is necessary for " protecting the 
public health and ifelfare and preventing the diversion of drugs 
into the illicit traffic*" Since trade in opium may contribute to 
the economy of a country, and since the effectiveness of control 
very much depends upon the administrative machinery-which a country 
has preferred to adopt in this regard, "prohibition" in this context 
should not be taken in its absolute sense. Technically spoakingo 
. lq G49 
"prohibition" hore takes the form of "restriction" only* Indeed, 
: Ln the Commentary on the Single Convention, it has been observed 
that a "Government which, for many yeaysq despite its offortag has 
been unable to prevent large-scale diversion of drugs from culti- 
vation can hardly be of the opinion that prohibition of such culti- 
vation would not be the most suitable measures... for protecting 
public health and welfare and preventing the diversion of drugs 
into the illicit traffic. " 
42 
It is submittedg howeverg that this 
applies only 'to areas uhich are under the effective control of the 
dovernmental authoritiesp and not to those which are not so controlled. 
.., 
Without Organisintr (b) Controlling 
The Single Convention does not prohibit private farmers from 
cultivating opium poppy; it only makes such cultivation subject to 
the provisions of Article 23. The national opium agencies wilit 
thereforet not only find it difficult to ascertain the exact 
quantity of such plants and consequently drugs producedt but will also 
lose control over such cultivators especially those engaged in 
business in the remote parts of a country. The Convention has no 
application ' to those non-metropolitan areas that have refused 
to give their consent to be bound by it. 
43 
Article 23 has also no 
application to those countries that permit the-cultivation of the 
poppy for the seeds and for the straivg as by-products. The drafters 
of -this Convention, "it may be olservadq have failea to envisage the 
dangers involved in allowing the cultivation of the poppy for such 
6-00 
purposesp over which control may not be exercised institutionally or 
otherwise, so that illicit traffic ih seeds or straw inight thrive 
vith a view to iitilising U ., 
them as agents for the production of drugs. 
The Single Convention has provided for national opium agencies 
with a view to establishing government monopolies through which the 
wholesale import-and export trade ing and maintenance of stocks or 
opium can be regulated; yet medicinal opium and opium preparations 
have been excluded from the scope of such monopolies, although opium 
used for such purposes must be obtained from the national opium 
agencies. 
44 "Special stocks" and "retail stocksIt ( i. e. t stocks 'Of 
opium held by retail pharmacistso institutions, authorised retail 
distributors and other authorised persons engaged in therapeutic and 
scientific work) are not subject to the control regime of the Single 
Convention. 
45 The institutionalisation of the opium business under 
the Single Convention cannot prevent a retail trador or distributor 
from obtaining medicinal opium and opium preparations from private 
sourcesq domestic and/or foreign. 
According to the Convention, the national op-Im agencies are 
to act as national buyers of the opium crop irrespective of the 
size of the harvest, in order to sell such stock at the most appro- 
priate time in the future. In other ifordsq, such stock will be. 
accumulated until the timQ is deemed appropriate for its sale. The 
Convention has not set any limit to the quantity of such stock iihich 
may be accumulated by national opium agencies, 
46 
and theroforeq the 
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following consequences may ensue: 
(a) that there will be a mountain of opium stock posing 
a potential risk of illicit traffic in this commodity 
until it is disposed of; 
(b)' 'that a vigilance force may therefore be necessary to 
guard the stock; and 
(c) that it may disturb the total world balance oý opiua 
crop-stock and the price level of opium crop. 
Also., the estimate system of the Single Convention does not 
apply to poppy strawl which is directly related to the production 
of opiun. The Convention also does not make it necessary for the 
Parties to furnish any reports on the stock of poppy strawq which 
may or may not be used for the manufacture of drugs. 
lj'7 
Indeedq the 
incidence of traffic in poppy straw and opium could perhaps have 
been restricted, if these apparent loopholes had been avoided, 
(c) UprootinU, the Evil 
The question of controlling the manufacture of and illicit 
traffic in oPium is closely interwoven with the question of res- 
training the cultivation of opium poppy. The drafters of the 
Single Convention did not lose sight of this fact, and indeedg the 
regime of this Convention applicable to poppy straw is very similar 
to that of the 1953 Protocol- Howeverg while the -1953 Protocol 
provided-for annual statistics 
. of poppy straw, 
49 
the Single Conven- 
tion requirqs statistics of the international trade in the straw on 
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a quarterly basis. The system of import certificate and export 
authorisation has been extended to poppy straw under the control 
regime of the Single Convention. 
50 
The manufacture of opium and the cultivation of poppy straw 
being dependent upon each othert the prospect of uptooting the evil 
of illicit traffic in either, of these productst is remote. It is 
a question of restricting the possibilities of illicit traffic in 
these substances by regulatory mcýns. Unfortunatelyp the Single 
Convention has not strengthened the control regime in respect of 
poppy straw to a desirable extent. Poppy straw is not considered to 
51 be a "drug". natural or synthetiep under the Single Convention. 
"Drug" according to-his Convention means " any of the substances in 
Schedules I and 119 whether natural or synthetic. " While natural 
substances refer to those substances in the Schedules which are 
obtained from the opium poppyl coca bush or cannabis plant, synthetic 
substances refer to drugs -manufactured 
by a process of chemical 
synthesis. Yetq there are certain drugs that may be produced either 
naturally or syntheticallyt e. g. morphinep which may be manufactured 
from opinn or poppy strawt or by a process of chemical synthesis. 
Thereforep in view of the growing progress in Chemistry, the 
exclusion of poppy straw irom "drugs" in this Convention, has left 
wide open the door to illicit production of, and traffic in, poppy 
straw. Indeedp this Convention does not provide for - statistical 
reports on the quantities of raw materials used for the manufacture 
of drugs; instead such reports are necessary only on the quantities 
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of other drugs and of poppy straw used for drug manufacture. 
52 
Since poppy stralf under this Convention is not an object of illicit 
trafficq the provisions of Articles 35-37 ( the penal provisions 
aganist the illicit traffic) do not apply to it*53 
It appears that the appropriate control regime of the Single 
Convention would be applicable to poppy straw only after it had 
entered either the manufacturing process or international commerce. 
54 
Hence the "concentrate of poppy straw'19 which 11 forms only an 
intermediary stage in a continuous process of manufacture of morphine 
from pop& strawn 
55 does not come under the control regime of this 
Convontion. 
In view of the above, it may be observed that so long as these 
gaps in the control regime of the Convention are left unattended, the 
propspect of uprooting the evil of traffic in pop-, V straw and opium 
I 
out of the question* Although the cultivation of poppy exclusively 
for its straw would be uneconomicalp the straw can be sold by the 
farmers for the manufacture of morphina. 
56 
(d) The Improbabilities of Lim'itation of Production 
The Single Conventioxt not only emphasised the need for 
57 limiting the production of opium to medical and scientific needst 
but also made provisions for W prohibition of the cultivation of 
the opium poppy for protecting the public health and welfare and 
preventing the diversion of drugs into the illicit traffic; 
58 
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(ii) establishment of adequate machinery by opium-producing 
countries for the control of the production of opium and regu! - 
lation of tradeq wholesale and internationalt through govcr=cInt 
monopolies; 
59 
and (iii) limitation of the production of opium for 
international trade* 
60 
The Single Convention did not envisage the total prohibition 
1 61 
of the production of opium because of the medical and scientific 
need for it. Yetv its attempts to limit the production of opi= 
have not been totally satisfactory. The prohibition of trade is nnt 
applicable to f-hose countries whichp before the adoption of this" 
Conventionp used to export opium which they produced, or which 
obtained export authorisation, from the Economic and Social Council 
of the U. N. Other countries may export annually up to five tons 
of opium produced by them provided they comply with the 
procedure laid down in Artielp 24.62 Howovert this Article does not 
prohibit a Party from cultivating opium poppy,; it only makes attempts 
to restrict the production of opium ( i. e. 9 the separation of opium 
from the poppy 
63). 
Therefore, by implicationg such a provision 
(Article 24(l)(b)) would mean that a Party is not required to 
prohibit the production of opium or increase the existing production 
thereof if such production or increased production does not threaten 
its licit use or so long as it does not create illicit traffic in it 
to a significant Cegreo* The decision whether or not to permit the 
production of opium, or to increase the existing production thereof, 
rests upon the Parties to -this Convention, and the non-parties are 
not affected by the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 
G5 
of Article 24. The provisions of Article 24 have also application 
to opium preparations and medicinal opiump and consequently, it may 
be assumed that the production of substances from opium popPY9 other 
than these twov is permissible under'the Single Convention. 
64 
Againg this Convention has, it may be observed, adopted a 
very ambitious plan for the limitation of the production of opium for 
international tradep without foreseeing the impracticability of its 
implementation by the comparatively poorer opium-producing countries, 
on economic grounds. In other wordsp such countries would be reluctant 
to enter the international market of opium with such a limited scopo 
65 - 
.., 
h an opium-exporting country of busineis. On the other handq althoug 
is required to inform the Economic and Social Council of the U. N. of the 
estimate of the amount of opium it intends to produce for export and 
the names of the. countries to ... rhich it expects to sell opimt the Party 
concerned is not legally bound by those data even after it has received 
the Council's approvalp'let alone by the latterts rocounendation to 
the Party concerned not to enCage in the production of opi= for export. 
In realityt such a Party may even export opium to countries other than 
those named in the notificationj including no - n-parties. 
66 
Article 24, pwagraph 3. has given certain countries an unfettered 
right to export opium which they produce ifp during the ten years 
immediately prior to-I Januaryp 1961 they exported opium. Two inter- 
pretations may be given to this proviso, viz. (a) the countries concerned 
may continue exporting opium iihether or not they themselves produced 
any opium daring the ten years immediately prior to 1 January, 1961 for 
the purpose. of exportationg and consequently, it they were exporting 
opium on importationt they are directly encouraged -to produce opium; 
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and (b) that the countries. concerned exported the opium which they 
themselves produced during the aforesaid period. Whichever interpre- 
tation is given. to this proviso, by coincidencog the following 
countriesy in which the production of opium has posed considerable 
problemsp have been , the beneficiaries of this right: Afghanistanp 
Bulgariap Burmap Indiat Iran, North Viot-Namq Palcistang Turkoyq 
U. S. S. R. and Yugoslavia. 
67 
Article 24(4)(b) has created an anomaly.. in respect of the 
importation and exportation of opium andq consequentlyq it will have 
" bearing upon the production of opium. In terms of paragraph 
(b)p 
" Party may "import opiun produced by anv count= 
68 
which produced 
and exported opium during the ten years prior to 1 January 1961.. . 11 
Prior to the coming into force of the Single Convention, it is uniikely 
that the importing countries maintained a record of whether or not 
the exporting countries actually produced that quantity of opium, 
even though assuming that certificates of origin were necessary for 
the exportation of goods, and therefore some cowitries, in order 
to gain an advantage under this sub-paragrapho will start producing 
opium. On the other hand, assuming that certain countries had 
maintained records of their opium trade prior to the coming into 
force of this Conventionp theng while certain countries will be 
entitled to export opium under Article 24, certain others will not, 
and the countries in the latter category 
( perhaps non-parties 
to this Convention ) may engage in illicit traffic in opium, and 
indeedg the expressiont 11 by any country" in sub-paragraph (b) 
includes non-parties to this Convention . In order to avoid this 
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incidence of the illicit traffic in opium, it may be advisable 
that the Parties, when importing opium from non-partiesl insist 
on their producing certificates of origin to the effect that the 
opi= in question has been produced in their respective territories, 
69 
vhether or not such countries maintained any records of transactions 
during the ten years prior to 1 January, 1961. In any eventt non- 
parties are not bound by the obligations of the Convention to the 
same extent as the Parties. 
Comments 
The Single Convention has devoted three . Articles 
70 
exclusively to the progrannno of controlling poppy straw and the 
production of opuum for international tradeq in addition to the 
general obligations of the Parties to the Convention, 
71 
and special 
provisions applicable to cultivation. 
7ý This Convention has in many 
respects followed the pattern adopted by the previous conventions 
in respect of the control of the production of opium* Although 
the functions of the national opium agencies have been considerably 
extended ihthe present Conventiong their practical implementation 
depends largely upon the co-operation extended by the nations, whether 
or not Parties to the Convention. As in many other areas of interna- 
tional lawt in respect of the control of poppy straw and the production 
of opium for international r trade, the Convention has greatly reliedq 
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for the fulfilment of the treaty obligationsl upon the good faith 
of the nations. 
Howevert it is to be approciated. thatt being the oldest kind 
of drugt the influence of opium upon various societies has not only 
been far-, ýreachii4; 9 but also - varipd. *. With this, should be taken 
into account its use for medical73 and scientific purposes. The 
production of opium cannot totally be stopped because of the obvious 
useful purposes its serves; on the other handq its abuse is occasioned 
by various factors- economico social and cultural. Unless a suitable 
substitute is devised, especially to counteract the economic necessi- 
ties which prompt its production and gradually lead to illcit traffic$ 
and an effective programme of educationt directed towards uprooting 
the evil from the minds of the peopleg is implemented, all weapons 
of law are bound to meet only limited success* 
-0 65,9 
CHAPTER IX 
POOTNOTES 
See Article lt paragraph 1, sub-paragraphs(O) and (P). 
The Hague Opium Convention of 1912 ( Introductory paragraphs 
of chapters II and III) and the International Opium Convention 
of 1925 ( Article 1) classified "opium" under three categoriest 
viz. 11 raw opium"t "prepared opium" and 11medi6inal opium". and 
they provided separate control regimes for each of them. The 
1953 Protocol, however, abolished these differences and broucht 
them under one control regime, In the 1953 Protocol "opium" has 
been defined as 11 the coagulated juice of the poppy', in whatever 
'form including raw opiump medicinal opium and prepaýed opium ... (Article 1). 
2. Opium preparation and manipulated opium are also subject to the 
control regime of the Sin6le Convention, see Aiticle 2, para- 
graphs (1) and (3); 
3- Article 23t paragraph 2. sub-paragrýph (e): 
11 The Agency ( i. e. t the Vational. Opium Agency) shall, in respect 
of opiumt have the exclusive right of importingg exportingg whole- 
sale -trading and maintaining stocks other than those held IV manu- 
facturers of opium alkaloidsq medicinal opium or opium preparations. 
Parties need not extend this exclusive right to medicinal opium and 
opium preparations. " 
4- Article 22; see also Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol. 
5- For an account of the estimates systemg infra,, 
6. Estimated World Requirements of Narcotic Drugs and Estimates of 
World Production of opium are published, by the International 
NArcotiqs Control Board annually. 
7- Article 24t paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b). 
81 See Article 25. 
Sub: -p6ragraph 
(b): 11 A Pýrty shall not. permit the production of 
opium or increase the existing production thereof if in its 
opinion ( italics added) such production or increased production 
in its territory may result in illicit traffic in opium. " 
10, Paragraph 3: Notwithstandine the provisions of sub-paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of paragraph 2, a Party that during ton years imme- 
diately prior to 1 January 1961 exported opium which such country 
produced may continue to export opium which it produces. " 
'G5-O 
The countries that produced opium f or export as of lot Janu, =T, 
1961 were: India, North Viet-Namq Turkey, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia-; the countriec that during 9 ten years imtediately prior to lst Januýz7,1961 exported opium 
which they produced were: Afghanistanj Bulgariat Burmai India, 
Iran, North Viet-Nam,, Pakistanp Turkeyt the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. 
Reports of the Permanent Central Board E/OB/17, table 19 pp. 12- 
and table IX. 1.9 PP- 44-45 and E/OB71-8, table I, pp. 12-13 and 
table IX. Ip PP. 44-45; see also information furnished by the 
Secretariat of the International Narcotics Control Board. 
12. Article 
13- 'See Art, 
14- Article 
15- Article 
3.6. Article 
24P 
icle 
249 
31t 
49 
paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a)q clause, (i). 
24, paragraph 4# sub-paragraph (a). 
paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (b). 
paragraphs 4-15. 
paragraph (d), 
17. Article 31 9p aph 1; see also Article 9. paxagraph 2. 
sub-paragraph (b of the 1972 Protocol. 
18, Article 24t paragraph 59 sub-paragraph (b), 
19. Article 23t paxagraph 1, 
20. Vowhere , in Artiele-23 has. the term "territory" been used. 
21. Article 23# paragraph 21 sub-paragraph (a). 
22. "Person"-in this context includes an individual or a corporatior 
23.. Such particulars include the identity of lands ( sub-paragraph 
(o) of paragraph 2), conditions of delivery of the crop to the 
agency and the name of the person who should be responsible for 
the control of production of poppy under the licence. 
24. Such authorisationg in factt amounts to the grant of licence. 
25*., UJI. Doc. E/NT/9 ( November 1955), paragraphs 26t 27 and 29. 
26. Article 23t paragraph 2, sub-paraeraph (d). 
27. See also Article 3t paragraph 5 of the 1953 Protocol- 
28.. Article 23, paragraph 2t sub-paragraph (d). 
29. The 1953 Protocol did not provide for such a maximum time-limit, 
30- Article 23, paragraph (e). 
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31. Under the 1953 Protocol, the manufacture of or wholesale trade 
in medicinal opium by pri-vate manufacturers was not allowed in 
opium-producing countries (Article 3); see also U. N. Doe. E/ITT/9 
(Bovember 1955)9 paragraph 38- 
32. Article 19 paragraph lp sub-paragraph (w). 
33- Article 19 paragraph lt sub-paragraph (x)t clause (iv). 
34- U. N. Doe. E/NT/9 ( November 1955), paragraph 24- 
35- See also Article 14(l)(b) of the 1972 Protocol. 
36. Article 36(2). 
37. infra. ,*-7 31 1-3"f 4 -T4 s*. 
38- Article 36(3)- 
39- Article 36(4)- 
40- See further Article 12(2) Of Va 1972 Protocol amen. ding Article 22 
of the Single Convention. 
41. See Concise Oxford Dictionaryt fifth edition, p. 977*' 
42. Comment. = on the Sinrrle Convention, op. pit. t p. 276. 
43- Article 42; see-also Article 46(l). 
44- Under Article 3 of"the 195ý*Protocolt private manufacturtof and/or 
wholesale trade in medicinal opium allowed only under the autho- 
risation of the government concerned. See U. N. Doe. E/NT/9 (November 1955)9 paragraph 38- 
45- See also Article 1(l)(x). 
46. Article 5 of the 1953 Protocol provided that-the opium stocks of 
Parties should not exceed certain limits. 
47- Such reports are necessary only on the quantity of opium straw used 
for the manufacture of drugs; infra'.. 
48- Article 4 of the Protocol, 
49- Article 4(c)- 
50- Article 31, paragraphs 4-15 and Article 25t paragraph 2. 
51- supra. t f. 412 ot,? --4 P. 1623 
52. See also 
_CoLmentary. 
on the 8ingle Convention, v op. cit-9 P- 304- 
G62- 
53. See also Article 14 of the 1972 Protocol-, Since no evidence of 
illicit traffic in poppy straw'had been found, the rermanent 
Central Board had no strong views on the'matter. See further 
Official Records,. vol. -II, op. cit-9 P- 
151- 
54- See-further Official Records, vol. IIi P- 150. 
The Dutch delegatet however, pointed out that poppy paste should 
be subject to the same provisions as opiumq including those 
regarding the limitation of stocks , ibid. t 
55- Commentary on-the Sinirle Convention, op. cit., p. 249. 
See also Article 20(l)(b). 
56. Although the third draft of the Single Convention provided for . 
poppy straw the-same regime as applicable to opiumt this proposal 
did not find support at the Plenipotentiary Conference on the 
grounds that it would neither be justifiable nor practicable. 
Official Recordst vol. III OP- cit-9 PP- 11-13 and 23- 
57- Article 4(c) ; supra. , ". 
43ir- 44: 1 4t" ". Cr3 - &S f. 
58. Article 22; see also Article 12 of the-1972 Protocol, 
59- Article 23. 
60. Article 24- 
61. For a discussion on the difficulties of aicertaining the quantity 
of opium required on medical-groundsgsee supra., 
62. Paragraph 2(a) and paragraph 4(a)(ii)o 
63- - Paragraph I(b). 
For an. account of the dangers involved in such a provision, 
supra., 9 pp ý3 
64- See also Commentary on the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 290. 
65- See also Official Recordsq'vole 119 op. cit., pp. 161-163o 
66. In the Commentary on the Sinsle Convention it has been emphasised 
that the recommendation of- the Council under paragraph 29 sub- 
paragraph (b) not to engage in the production of opium for export 
is legally binding upon the notifying party involvedq p. 293- 
The author of this thesis wishes to disagree with this 
observation Thearrase 11 notwithstanding the provisions of 
a sub'-paragra; hs and (b) of paragraph 211 as found expressed in 
paragraph 3 of Article 24 does not necessarily imply that the 
provisions of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 are legally 
binding. 
67. See further Official Recoýdsq vol. II, op. cit., p. 162. 
063 
6s. Italics added. 
69. See also Cowmentary on the Single Convention, op. cit., p. 297- 
70- Articles 23,24 and 25- 
71- Article 4. 
72. Article 22; see also Article 12 of the 1972 Protocol. 
'73- supra. 9 Since for a long time, opium has been accepted as a multi- 
purpose drugp in the medical sciences particularly in the 
Asian and Latin American countries, difficulties are usually 
encountered in ascertaining the amount required for a certain 
period of time. 
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MAPTEn X 
IMNUPACTURE AND DMORTATION OF DRUGS: 
LDIITATION TIMLEOF 
A. The General Provisions Concerning Limitation 
of Manufacture and Importation of 
Drtw-s, 
Manufacture of drugs by the Parties to the Single Convention 
shall be under licence except where such manufacture is carried out 
by a state enterprise or state enterprises. 
1 Such licences are 
required for tw6 purposes: (a) for authorisation to engage in the 
manufacture of drugs; and (b) for. the use of establishments and 
2 
premises in which such manufacture may take place. Manufacture 
of drugs under licencep includes basic drugs9 their salts and 
3 
preparationst. including preparations in Schedule III. The state 
enterprises will notq for obvious reasons, need a formal licence 
in this regard, yet they are not allowed to manufacture drug'st salts 
and preparationsp other than those for which permission may be given 
4 
to a private manufacturer. However, a licence will detail the names 
of drugst their quantities and the period for which the manufacturer 
concerned will be allowed to use itp and similarlyt where a state 
enterprise is authorised to manufacture drugs, the aforesaid procedure 
shall also be observedp in order to ensure th&-t the manufacture of a 
particular drug in a given country or territory does not exceed the 
limit permitted by the Single Convention, The licensing authority 
will enjoy the discretionary power to revoke or amend the licencet 
both in respect of a private manufacturer and a state enterprise, 
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although in the former case such discretionary power would have 
to be limited to the extent necessary to facilitate the economical 
conduct of business by a law-abiding manufacturer. " 
5 
6 
Like the Hague Opium Convention of 1912 and the International 
opium Convention of 1925 
79 this Convention has also entrusted the 
Parties with the task of controlling all persons and enterprises 
carrying on or engaged in the manufacture of drugs. 
8 The establish- 
ments and premises must conform to the conditions required to ensure 
controlp9 and no alteration to the conditions of licence, including 
the conditions el safeguards. of control on the establishments and 
premisest will be allowed without the authorisation of the licensing 
authorities concerned. The Parties are also required to ensure that 
the licensed manufacturers of drugs periodically obtain permits 
specifying the kinds and amounts of drugs which they shall be 
entitled to manufacture* 
10 Such periodical permits are not, howeverp 
necessary in respect of preparations. While the system of allocation 
of quotas of drugs in this Convention is very similar to that in the 
Limitation Convention of 19319 the system of periodic permits applies 
in respect of territories that may be administered by a Party to this 
Convention. 11 The provisions of sub. , rparagraph 
(c) of paragraph 2 of 
Article 29 abolish the supplementary estimates system which was 
followed under the narcotics regime preceding the Single Convention, 
12 
and require the Parties to implement legislation so as to conform to 
the system of periodic pormitstl3 thus offecting the quota system. 
Such periodical permits will necessarily enable the governments 
concerned to modify the quota allocatedt if necessary, owing to 
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changed circumstances; on -the other hand, they will also enable the 
governments to detect within a short period if the Parties have 
produced more or less than the quantitj allowed to them. In terms of 
Article 29# paragraph 21 the "Parties shall prevent the accumulation 
in the possession of drug manufacturersq of quantities of drugs and 
poppy straw in excess of those required for the normal conduct of 
businesst having regard to the prevailing market conditions. " The 
scope of this paragraph which -, basically corresponds to Article 160 
paragraph 2 of the Limitation Convention of 1931, is much wider, 
and more precise in that it has used the expression 11 drugs and 
poppy straw" instead of "raw materials", which appeared in the 
latter Convention. 
The Parties to this Convention have specifically undertaken 
the responsibility for preventing the accumulation of drugs in the 
possession of drug manufacturers. Article 16, paragraph 2 of the 
Limitation Convention did not make it obligatory for the Parties to 
prevent the accumulation of drugs in'the possession of man ufacturers, 
although Article 16, paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (a) provided tor 
strict supervision over the amounts of "raw materials and manufactured 
drugs in the possession of each manufacturer for the purpose of the 
manufacture or conversion. of any of the drugs or othervise. 11 It may 
also be observed that the estimates system introduced by the Limitation 
Convention imposed certain limitations upon the stocks of drugs iihich 
the manufacturers were allowed to hold. 
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Article 21 of the Convention has enunciatea rules for dotermining 0 
the limits of manufacture and importation of drugs in a given country 
and authorised the Board to take appropriate action it It if appears 
from the statistical returns on imports and exports ( Article 20) that 
the quantity exported to any country or territ(;:. 7 exceeds the total of 
the estimates for that country or territory... " 
14 This regime of 
Article 21 applies to all substances listed in Schedules I and 11.15 
Article 21, paragraph 1 proscribes the rules for computing the maximum 
amount of drugs a country may obtain in a year, by manufacture and/or 
import. The countries are bound by their own estimatesp and if they 
fail to include the estimate in respect of a drugg this will mean that 
the country is not in need of that drug. In determining the quota of 
drugs for a couutry, the quantity t1hat has been seized and released for 
licit uset as well as any quantity taken from special stocks .... for 
the requirements of the civilian populationg shall be deducted. 
16 In 
order to make the above provision operativep the governments are 
required to report in their annual reports the quantities of drugs 
seized and released for licit use 
17 in a particular year. 
18 Any 
surplus from one year will be adjusted to the estimates for the next 
yeart including the stocks of drugs to be held for the year concerned, 
in order ti regulate the manufacture of drugs in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention. The Convention has also authorised the 
International Narcotics Control Board to request the non-parties to it 
to discontinue exports of drugs should this be found necessary 
by the Board. 
19 This Convention has also - authorised 
the Board 
to apply the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 4 to all drugs included 
in Schedules I and 11.20 
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In so far as the question of limitation of manufacture and 
I 
importation of drugs is concdrned, the provisions of the Single 
Convention are vider than those of th6 previous narcotics conventions. 
To this must also be taken into account the general obligations of 
the Parties to fulfil the aims of the Convention. 
21 Howeverv the 
methods which this Convention has devised with a view to limiting the 
manufacture and importation of drugsp are intorviroven with the system 
of estimates of drugs which the Parties to the Convention would 
require for a given period. It is therefore appropriate to examine 
the estimates system adopted by this Convention in the following 
-, section. 
Before doing sog however, it is necessary to examine critically 
the provisions of the limitation regime unaer this Convention. 
(a) A Critical Examinatio'n of the Limitation Mogrime 
The limitation regime of Article 21 of the Single Convention 
applies to all drugs and substances listed in Schedules I and II, 
vhereas this regime under the Limitation Convention of 1931,1948 
Protocol and 1953 Protocol, applied only to manufactured drugs other 
than extracts and tinctures of cannabist and to OPium- 
22 In other 
wordsp the limitation regime of Article 21 of the Single Convention 
has also been extended 
io extracts and tincturest cannabist cannabis 
resin and coca leaves. Yetq this regime does not govern poppy straw 
and the leaves of the cannabis plant 
( when not accompanied by the 
2k 
tops 23). nor has it any application to "production". In so far as 
tLe system of determining the limits of manufacture and import of drugs 
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is concernedt the regime of Article 21 does not apply to imported 
preparations listed in Schedule 1119 and indeed they are not 
to be taken into account in establishipg the export figures 
under sub-paragraph (c) of this article. 
25 
On the other handt in certain situatiousp the provisions 
0 
of this Convention appear to be too ineffective to prevent a, 
country from exceeding its limits of manufacture and import, 
even if it applies them appropriately. This may occur ifq 
near the end of the year, the consumption of a coimtry or 
territory is unexp"tedly higho or if at the time it receives 
., 
s manufactured unforeseen large orders for the export of drug, 
from other drugs, or of substances made from drugs and not 
covered by the Single Convention. In such q situation hardly 
any time is left for preparing the required supplementary 
entimates and for their proper examination by the Board. 
The quantities by which a country or territory would, in 
such a casep exceed its limits of manufacture and import 
might not be "available" for its requirements in the 
following year. Such "paper" excesses would not be C2 
deducted under Article 21p paragraph 3.26 
The Board is also not required to deduct all excesses 
on account of manufacture and import in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 21p paragraph 1 and 2; it will do so 
only in respect of those quantities which remain in stock at 
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the end of the year. The amounts of drugs which were 
manufactured and imported in excess of the limitst but were 
consumedv even in excess of the consumption estimates pursuant 
to Article 199 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (a), are not to be 
treated as "stocks" at the end of the year. This may also be 
the case if larger quantities of drugs than that estimated under 
Article 19, paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) were used for the 
manufacture of other drugsp of substances not covered by the 
Single Conventiont or of preparations listed in Schedule III. 
The manufacture and import of the drugs employed for this 
purpose may have been in excess of the limits of Article 21, 
paragraphs 1 and 2.27 By following the formula enumerated in 
28 . Article 19t paragraph 19 it may be said that an excess of 
manufacture and import at a given year is the amount which 
exceeds the quantity of stocks to be held at the end of the 
same yearg but the Board deducts only that part of the excess 
which is not necessary for bringing the existing stocks to 
the estimated level for the following year. The quantity 
deducted under Article 219 paragraph 3, is not greater than 
the amount which should be deducted from the 
existing stocks at the end of the year to reduce 
671 
them to the estimat. ed level for the following year. 
29 The 
Convention does not contain any compulsory rules demanding 
an explaination 
30 from a government in the event of any 
excess in the manufacture and/or import of drugs, and consequentlyt 
there is hardly any means of deterring a government from 
exceeding the limits of its manufacture and/or import. 
The non-ar. plicability of periodical permits to 
"prepara'tions,, 
31 has opened another route to the illicit 
manufac. ture of-narcotic substancesp as certain praparationsq even 
before their being transformed into I'drugs'19 are independently 
dependence-producing substances and hence gain marketability 
There is no provision in the Convention which limits the 
manufacture of these preparations. 
32 Indeedg Article 29 
paragraph 3 provides that "preparations other than those in 
Schedule III are subject to the same measurev of control as the 
drugs which they contain". The provisions of limitation of 
manufacture do not legally bind the non-partiest even though 
the Board may request them to comply with certain provisions 
of this Convention. 
33 
It may therefore be observed that 
"limitation" in this context stands for "extension". 
11 
. 
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(b) Comments: 
The plan for the limitation of manufacture and importation 
of drugs under the Single Convention is laudable, although not M 
novel. This plan has brought under control a few more drugst 
substances and preparations than the previous control plans, 
yet it is not. remarkably ambitious. The constant progress 
especially in chemistry produces new discoveries in the 
narcotic worldg and thereforej aAy plan, which aims at the sup. - 
pression . of 
the illicit traffic in narcotic dru,,, Ysv should 
be more flexible especially so that it may embrace the 
new preparationsp substances etc. as and when necessary. 
On the other hand# the need for drugst especially for 
medical reasonsl poses a problem, in thatq unless the belief 
in the efficacy of certain crude drugs and preparations, eg. 
opium andLmar17=a has been destroyed, the constant demand 
for themp will keep the supply of them alive, The more the people 
suce, ximb -- to this prejudice as to the necessity of these 
drugs9 the moreq concomitantlyt will grow the efforts to 
supply themt even by means of illicit production, manufacture 
and import. Hence the conclusion that the problem of limitation 
of manufacture and importation of drugs shoua be considered 
along with the question of implementing plans for eradicating 
the evil of drug-ad#ction and medical superstition. 
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In finet it may be. observed that an international control programme in 
this regard can only be successful when it is coupled with national 
co-operationt especially in the areas 9f. policing, administrationg law 
and education. 
(B) Estimates of drugr requirements under -the Sinrple 
Convention as-kmeans of limiting mnnufacture nnd 
iMportation of drugs 
According to Article 19t paragraph I of the Single Conven- 
tion, Parties shall furnish to the Board each yeart for each of their 
territoriest estimates on forms supplied by it in respect of the drugst 
preparationst substances and opium they may require 
34 
as well as the 
number of individual establishments which will manufacture synthetic 
drugs. 35 Such estimates will include the following: 
"(a) Quantities of drugs be consumed for medical and 
scientific purposes; 
(b) Quantities of drugs to be utilized for the manufac- 
ture of other drugsp of preparations in Schedule III, 
and of substances not covered by this Convention; 
(c) Stocks of drugs to be held as at 31 December of the 
year to which the estimates relate; and 
(d) Quantities of drugs necessary for addition to special * 
stocks; 
(e) The area ( in hectares) and the geographical location 
of land to be used for the cultivation of the opium 
POPPY; 
(f) Approximate quantity of opium to be produced; 
(g) The number of industrial establishments which will 
manufacture synthetic drugs; and 
(h) The quantities of synthetic drugs to be manufactured by 
each of the establishments referred to in the preceding 
sub-paragraph. it 
36 
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Article lp paragraph 2 of tbia Convention has nade it clear 
that for the purpose of this Convention 11 a drug shall be regarded 
as "consumed" when it has been supplied to any person or enterprise 
for retail distributiong medical use or sci entific research; and 
)consumption" shall be construed accordingly. " The term "consumption" 
was not defined in the drug, treaties preceding the 1953 Protocol, t2 
Generally speakingo prior to the 1953 Protocol this term stood for 
the use of drugsq other than for government purposes. 
36(a) The 
term 11 consumed" under the control regime of the International 
Narcotics Control Board stands not only for 11 the amounts supplied 
for retail distributiont medical use or scientific researchv to any 
persong enterprise or institute ( retail pharmacist, retail distri- 
butorsq institutions or qualified persons duly authorized to exercise 
the therapeutic or scientific functions: doctors, dentistst veterina- 
riansg hospitalsp dispensaries and similar health institutionst both 
public and private, scientific institutes)", but also for quantities 
dispensed through a national health scheme, regardless of the fact that 
the system is administered by the sitate. 
37 Preparations listed in 
Schedule III are considered as "consumed" under the Singlo Conve'ntion. 
38 
Thereforep the estimates to be furnished under Article 19t paragraph 1 
relate to the drug content of drugs9 crude drugst saltst preparations 
other than preparations listed in Schedule 111.39 Article 19, 
paragraph 1, sub- paragraph 
(a) provides for the estimates 6f 
drugs required for domes*tic consumption. 
40 
Such estimates must not 
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include the amounts of drugs required for the ifholesale manufacture 
of preparations in Schedule III. The expected consumption of opiumt 
coca leaves and cannabis drugs ( cannabisp cannabis resing extracts 
and tinctures of cannabis) for non-medical purposes should be submitted 
to the Board under Article 499 paragraph 3P sub-paragraph (b)* 
Article 19p paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) of the Convention 
has'to a certain extent adoptod a negative approach to the total 
estimate of drugs. In terms of the provisions of this paragraph, the 
Parties are required to furnish to tho Board quantities of "drugs to 
be utlized for the manufacture of other drugso of preparations in 
Schedule IIIv and of substances not covered by this Convention. " 
Estimates relating to the above kinds of drugsp preparations and 
substances are to be submitted separately, 
41 
and they must represent 
the total amount of drugs to be utilizedp irrespective of whether 
the obtainable products uould. be used for domestic consumptiong export 
or renewal of stockst 
42 
or it they would be transformed into other 
drugs by a chemical process. An estimato of "concentrate of poppy 
straw" to be utilized for the manufacture of morphine must be includedp 
if the concentrate is to be made available in trade. 
43 
If coca leaves 
are to be used for both manufacture of a flavouring agent and extrac- 
tion of alkaloidsq their quantity should be included in the estimates* 
The amo-unt of cannabis needed for extracts and tinctures to be used for 
medical and scientific purposes should be included in the estimates6 
45 
In terms if Article 19P paragraph 11 sub-paragraph (b) only estimates 
concerning the final products are to be furnished . Paragraph 1. 
sub-paragraph (c) of the same Article sets the limit as to estimates 
1 076 
relating to stocks of drugs to be hold by the Parties. According to 
this sub-paragraph, Parties are under an obligation to give an osti- 
mate of the stocks of drugs which they wish to hold up to 31 December 
of the year to which the estimates relate., Under the Single Convention 
"stock" means " the amounts of drugs hold in a country or territory 
and intended for: 
(i) Consumption in the country or territory for medical and 
scientific purposes; . 
(ii) Utilization in the country or territory for the manu- 
facture of drugs and other substancesp or 
(iii) Export. " 46 
According to the International Narcotics Control Boardt drugs 
held by governments for the normal needs of the civilian population 
are covered by the term "stocks" as used in Article 19t paragraph 1, 
sub-paragraph (c). 
117 Estimates of drug 
48 
gs to be held in stock during 
a transitional period for non-medical purposes ( e. g. opiwnq coca leaf t 
cannabisp cannabis resin and extract and tincture of cannabis) should 
be submitted separately in accordance With Article 49 of the Cbnvention. 
Estimates of stocks in relation to 11 other substances" ( Article 1, 
paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (x)) refer to those, held for the compounding 
of preparations in Schedule 111.49 Coca leaves which will be held by 
governments for the manufacture of flacouring agent and extraction of 
alkaloids should be taken into account in determining the estimates 
under Article 19# paragraph lp sub-paragraph (OP but the Parties' shall 
inform the Board of the method used to determine the quantities shown 
in the estimatesq and of any changes in the said method. 
50 
lp 
As regards stocks to be held for export, 
51 the Parties are 
required to indicate their estimates for the following year. Article 
19, paragraph 19 sub-p-aragraph (c) does not require a Party to give 
separate figures for the drugs to be held in stock for different 
purposesl although the Board may ask a Party to give figures separately, 
should it appear to be necessary for examining the methods by which 
such estimates have been prepared. 
52 
Howeverp. 11stocks of drugs" in Article 19t paragraph 19 sub- 
paragraph (c) includes stocks to be hold in bonded warch'ouses, free 
ports and free zones of the country or territor '53 In terms y concerned 
of Article 199 paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (d), the Parties are required 
to furnish estimates in respect of tt quantities of drugs necessary f or. 
addition to special stocks. " This provision has been made in order to 
meet exceptional circumstances. Special st6oks" under this Conven- 
tion means 11 the amounts of drugs held in a country or territory by the 
government of such country or territory for special Government purposes 
and to meet exceptional circumstances"; and the expression 11 special 
54 
purposes" shall ba construed accordingly. Therefore, "special stocks" 
are those stocks which are held by government purposes" is inteipreted 
by the Board to "include in particular the requirement of the armed 
forcesIlp and the words "exceptional circumstances" to cover such 
disasters as major earthquakes or epidemics. Drugs which are held by 
a government in a free port or free zones, or in a bonded wharehouse 
for suci-, purposes 
I also fo .m part 'of'its , Special stocks.,, 
55 Druggs not 
held by goverment authoritiesg although destined for "special govern- 
ment purposes" and 11 to meet exceptional circurn tances" should be 
excluded. 
56 Article 19# paragraph 10 sub-para 
- 
graph (d) does not 
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prohibit a government from obtaining drugs from any legitimate 
source ( i. e. p by importationt from domestic sources or even from 
the stocks of drugs seized from the illicit traffic), for the purpose 
of adding to special stocks. 
Howeverp Article 19, paragraph 2p sub-:, paragraph (a) 
57 has 
given the Parties a guideline for estimates of drugsq according to 
vhich subject to the deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of 
Article 21t 
58 the total of the estimates for each territory and each 
drug except opium and synthetic drugs shall consist of the sun of the 
amount specified under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of paragraph 1 
of this-Articleg with the addition of any amount required to bring the 
actual stocks on hand at 31 December of the preceding year to the level 
estimated as provided in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1. This 
Convention has also provided for supplementary estimates by the 
Parties in certain compelling situations. 
59 As the Convention has 
not detailed the circumstances necessitating such estimates, it may 
safely be presumed that the responsibility for justifying such circums.; 
tances lies with the Parties. Supplementary estimatesq as thq phrase 
suggestsp are meant for supplementing the estimates during the currency 
of a year for which estimates have already been furnished. Yet, any 
estimates which will be submitted to alter the original estimates for 
a yearg even prior to the coimuencement of the year ( for the purpose 
of estimates) to which they relatel may be called supplementary esti- 
matest but in all cases the necessity for such estimates must be 
adequately justified. Unlike the Limitation Convention of 1931,60 
the Sing e Convention does not specify whether any separate rule t2l 
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should govern supplementary estimates. In the practice of the 
Boardv howevert the same rules govern both -the regular and supple- 
mentary estimates '61 and this has not yet met with any objection from 
any goverment. The Parties have also made the pledge fhatp subject 
to the "deductions referred to in paragraph 3 of article 219 and 
account being taken ifhere appropriate of the provisions of article 
21 bis, the estimates shall not be exceeded. , 
62 
Like the previous drug conventions, 
63 
the Single Convention U 
has also provided for a statistical accounting systemp which is 
complementary to the estimates system under this Convention. 
It is therefore. necessary to examine the provision for statistical 
returnss including their function as a means of restraining the 
manufacture and importation of drugs by governments* 
(C) HS-tatistical Returns" of Govermments as a 
Complementaiýy Method to the IT, stimates Sys- 
tem" under -the Sinfy-le Convention 
The statistical returns reveal whether a goverment has 
exceeded its limits of manufacture and import. 
64 
According to 
Article 20 of the Single Convention the " Parties shall furnish 
to the(Intemational NaFcgtics) Board for each of their territories, 
in the manner and form prescribed by the Boardq statistical returns 
-9 680 
on forms supplied by it in respect of the following matters: 
(a) Production or manufacture of drugs; 
(b) Utilization of drugs for the manufacture of other 
drurrsp of preparations in Schedule III and of subs- 1, 
tances not covered by this Conventionp and utiliza- 
tion of poppy straw for the manufacture of drugs; 
(c) Consumption of drugs; 
(d) Imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw; 
(e) Seiz-ares of drugs'and disposal thereof; and 
(f) 'Stocks of drugs as at 31 December of the year to 
vhicb the returns relate. " 
Such statistical returns will also reveal# ifter aliap 
(a) whether drugs have been unnecessarily ammulated in the 
possession of manufacturerap traders and state enterprises in a 
country or territoryg 
65 
and/or (b) whether there is any possibility 
of diversion of drugs into illicit traffieg and/or (c) the nature of 
the use of drugs2 ie. 9 whether there has been a medical abuse of 
drugs in a country or territory. 
Under the Single Convention, the Doard has no authority to 
compel non-parties to furnish statistical returns; it can only 
request them to do so. However, the Board must supply forms to 
66 
both Parties and non-parties to the Convention, in order to enable 
them to furnish the requ#ed statistical information. Statistical 
information under Article 20 must be expressed in terms of the pure 
., 
sl salts and preparations drug content of the crude drugs; refined drug 
-0 81 
67 
are also to be taken into account. As regards preparations 
in Schdule III only information on the quantities of drugs used in 
the manufacture of such preparations is required to be supplied. 
In the case of opium preparations ( including medicinal opium)l 
extracts and tinctures of opimt coca leaf and cannabis and other 
coca leaf preparationst instead of considering the actual content of 
the basic drug in the determination of statisticst a special method 
detailing'the preparations and their uses, is employed. 
68 
In terms of 
Article 209 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (a) governments are required to 
famish statistical information on 11 production or manufacture of 
drugs'19 but not on bothp should a Party be engaged ; in both. 
However# under the Single Conventiong whereas It production" means 
the separation of opiump coca leavesq cannabis and cannabis resin 
from the parts from which they are. obtainedIIq-%c9 "manufacture" means 
all processest other than production, by which drugs may be obtained 
and includes refining as well as, the transformation of drags inta 
other drugs. " 
70 Thereforeq if " manufacture" is the counterpart of 
"Production"t then all drugs that are not produced are obtained by a 
process of manufactureq and consequently, should come under the scope 
of the Single Cbnvention. But even though the separation of poppy 
straw and cannabis leaves from their plants is neither "manufacture" 
nor "production" according to the Single Conventiong statistical 
information on all uncontrolled substances and poppy straw is obtained 
71 
by the Board. Governments are also required to furnish figures on 
the pure drug content of the drugs whicy they manufacture 172 -v. thether, 
in the form of their bases or their salts. Statistical information 
also includes information on the quantity of drugs oC tained by 
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manufacture and their transformation into other drugs, if any, 
although 11 no data need be furnishe4 on the manufacture of a drag 
which appears only as an intermediary stage in a continuous process 
of manufacturing of a drug or a substance not covered by the Single 
Convention.,, 73 
In term*s of Article 200 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) govern- 
ments are required. to furnish separately statistical information on 
I 
the utilization of the following: 
(i) drugs for the manufacture of other drugs; 
(ii) preparations in Schedule III; 
(iii) substances not covered by the 
'Single Convention; 74 and 
(iv) poppy straw for the =nufacture of drugs. 
The quantities of drugs used in industry, in addition to those 
used for medical and scientific purposesq are also to be furnishea 
to the Board. 
75- "Drugs" under Article 29 paragraph 91 sub-paragraph 
(b) should include "crude drugs" which will be used for the manufac- 
ture of 11 other drugs", and the term should also include "refined" 
drugst since "manufacture" includes 11 refining as well as the trans- 
formation of drugs into other drugs*,, 
76 It is for this reason that 
governments are required to furnish to the Board the quantities of 
"concentrate of poppy straw" ( which is crude morphine), utilised for 
the manufacture of morphine, provided of course that such concentrate 
has-been 11 made available in trade.,, 
77 The inclusion of "poppy straw"t 
which is 
- 
not a drug, 
78 for the purpose of statistical 
I 
returnst although a 
in a limited way ( i. e. 9 only that quantity uhich has been utilized 
for the manufacture of morphine or for its "concentrate'll the latter 
683 
only being made available in trade) is noteworthy. Howeverv the 
amounts of drugs used for the purposes mentioned in Article 20, 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) are to be reported only in''terms of 
79 the pure drug content. 
The term 11 consumption" in Article 209 paragraph lp sub-para- 
graph (c) has to be interpreted in the same way as in Article lt 
paragraph 2.80 The tem "consumption" is used in the Single Conven- 
tion means 11 the transfer of drugs from the manufacturing or wholesale 
level of the drug economy to its retail level, Drugs acquired by 
retail pharmacists for the compounding of preparations in Schedule III 
are therefore to be considered to have been "consumed" for the purpose 
of statistical reporting, under'sub-paragraph (c), and vhen so utilized 
are not to be taken into account in compiling, the figures wider sub- 
81 
paragraph (b) on drugs utilized for the manufacture of such pýeparations. 
Consumption under sub-paragraph (c) stands for consumption for medical 
and scientific purposes only. Statistics on consumption of drugs for 
non-medical purposes should be furnished under Article 499 paragraph 3P 
sub-paragraph (b), 
82 The phrase "consumption of drugs" in Ar'ticle 209 
83 
paragraph lp sub-paragraph (c) stands for consumption of all drags 0 
C. onsumption of drugs under this provision also must be expressed in 
terms of their pure drug content. 
"Im-ports" and "exp? rts" being complementary to each other, 
Article 20p paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (d) of the Conventiong has 
justifiably made a provision for the submission of statistical returns 
on "imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw. " Statistics on 
both imports and exports. ifill enable the Board to verify the authen- 
ticity of the statistics by comparing the import figures with 
684 
corresponding export figaresl and advise the government(s) concerned 
to explain any discrepancies between the two sets of figures* It 
also enables the Board to examine if any goverment has exceeded its limit 
of imports and exports for the previous yeart and indeed the Single 
Convention has, -with, a view to keeping close vigilance over this 
mattert provided for quarterly statistics 
84. 
on those drugs which. 
have been chahnelled into international trade, 
85 Statistics on 
imports and exports of drugs used for non-medical purposes mayp 
however, be submitted annuallyp although the Board reserves the right 
to ask a government to submit such statistics on a quarterly basis. 
Proceduýrallyf for the purpose of statistics in this. contextg " the 
time of actual movement of the drugs across frontiers" is important 
and not the date of the, import and export authorisation nor that of 
86 
customs clearance* In calculating the statistics for the purpose 
of imports and exports of drugs and poppy strawp the pure drug content 
of dru,, Ysl whether refined or crudej and preparations involved should 
be taken into account; but no consideration should be taken of inter- 
national shipments of preparation 
.s belonging to Schedule 111.87 
"Poppy straw"-in this context not only refers to the straw including 
that which is not intended for the manufacture of dragsq but also 
its concentratet if it has been made available in tradet and thereforep 
figures concerning both have to be furnished. 
88 Drugs imported for 
"special purposes" into a: country or territory should also. be included 
under this provisiong 
89 in addition to their inclusion separately in 
accordance with Article 109 paragraph 3 of the 1972 Protocol. 
f 
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The function of statistical returns is not only to give an 
account of the drags put into transactionp but also to make a decla- 
ration of the drags in handl whether by production, manufacture, 
seizure and/or in the form of stocks. Accordingly, in terms of 
Article 20t paragraph lp sub-paragraph (e) governments must also 
furnish statistical returns in respect of "seizures of drugs and 
disposal thereof. " "Seizure" in this context includes both domestic 
and intprnationalg i. e. p the amount of drugs seized on 4cdount of 
their illicit import and export,, Disposal of seized drugs includes 
use of duch drugs for "licit" purposes ( ioe. 9 consumptions manufac- 
tares addition to stocks other than special stocks)9 and special 
purposesp export and even their destruction. Statistics on the 
disposal of seized dragsýshould be submitted separately. Such 
information is especially importantg since the amount of drugs seized 
should be deducted from the total amount of drugs which a government 
may wish to produces manufacture'and/or import, The figures. on 
disposal of seized drags should include the quantities seized in 
previous yearsq but only disposed of during the year to which the 
statistics relate. 
90 
In terns of Article 200 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (f) govern- 
ments are required-to furnish statistical information in respect of 
"stocks, of drugs as at 3i December of the year to which the returns 
relate*" The tem "stocks" means ( Article 19 paragraph 19 sub- 
paragraph (x) of the Single Convention) the amount of drugs held in 
CBS 
a country or territory for any purpose excepts 
the quantities held by retail pharmacists or other 
authorised retail distributors and by institutions or 
qualified persons in the duly authorised exercise of 
therapeutic or scientific functions ( e. g. doctorst 
dentistsp veterinariansp hospitalst dispensaris and 
similar health institutionsp-both public and private;, 
scientific institutions); and 
"special stocks" held by, a gover=ent. 
The expression "special stocks" is defined in Article 1. 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (v) of the Convention to mean It the 
amount of drugs held in a country or territory by the Government of 
such country or territory for special Government purposes and to meet 
excePtional, circumstances. " 
91 Stocks held by a government for the, 
normal needs of the civilian population are not to be considered as 
"special stocks". In terms of Article 19 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph 
(x)q stocks held for consumption in a country or territory for purposes 
other than medical or scientific are not to be taken as nstocks". 
92 
The data of stocks unaer Article 20, paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (f) 
" should include the quantities in bonded vbtreh7ousesg free ports and 
free zones; but if a-consignment passing in transit throurrh the 
countryg accompanied by a proper export authorization (Article 15 of 
the International Opiun Convention of-1925 and Article 31 of the 
Single Convention) is placed temporarily in a bouded warehousel free 
port or free zonat pending its further shipmentv such consigmment 
11 G *a '17 , 
should not be included in the figures of stocks. n 
93 In terms of 
Article 2, paragraph 49 statistical returns need not contain any 
94 information on preparations in Schedule III, 
The statistical returns inrespect of matters ref6rred to 
in Article 209 paragraph 1 0( except sub-paragraph 
(d)- statistics 
on imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw) 'shall be prepared 
by governments annually and furnished to the Board not later than 
30 June following the. year to which they relate. 
95 The statistical 
returns in respect of imports and exports of drugs and poppy straw 
41 ., 96 -I shall be prepared quarterlY and furnished to the Board within one 
97- 
month after the end of the quarter to which they relate. 
The Parties are also required to furnish separatelyp statis- 
tical'returns in respect of drugs imported into or procured within 
the '., country or territory for special purposesp as well as quantities 
of drugs withdraw from *. special stocks to meet the requirements of 
98 the civilian population. 
The expression "special purposes" stands for exceptional 
circumstancesy and should be construed in the light of those circums- 
tances which includeq for examplep such catastrophic events as large- 
99 
scale epidemics and major earthquakes* This Convention however 
maintains a difference between "special purposes" in its ordinary 
meaning and "special government Purposes". Quantities of drugs held 
by a government for the latter purposes include in particular the 
requirements for the armed forces, and a gover=ent is not required 
to furnish statistical information on drugs utilised on this account. 
Howeverg a government is subject to the statistical accounting system 
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of the Single Convention ifýa quantity of drugs is withdrawn from 
upecial stocks to meet the, requirements of the civilian population# 
and such withdrawalsp it appearaq should be reported both under 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (c) and paragraph 4 of Article 20. Statis- 
tical. returnsp under paragraph 4 Of Article 20 areq it is presumed, 
to be submitted quarterly since they involveginter aliag statistical 
data in respect of drugs imported into a country or territory, 
100 in 
practicep the Board requests the governments to furnish figures on 
imports under paragraph 4p separatelyt even though they should be 
101 
reported in pursuance of Article 20, paragraph 19 Sub-paragraph (d). 
Statistical information on druggs procured within the country or 
territory for special purposes-f under Article 209 paragraph 4t shouldq 
it is presumedg be submitted annually in accordance with Article 20, 
102 
paragraph 20 sub-paragraph 
(a) 
.I 
Both the estimate and statistical returns systems -under. 
the 
Single Convention are fairly elaborateg although not totally satis- 
factory. The difficulties in making such systems entirely satisfac- 
tory are appreciixtedg although certain apparent gaps in these systems 
it is believedl could have been avoided . An attempt has therefore 
been made to examine critically both these systemsq to arrive at an 
appropriate evaluation. 
Iff tic's 9 
D. A Critical Examination of the Estimates and 
Statistical Returns System 
_ 
Estimatina Grossly 
The. Single Convention has extended the e3timates system to 
cannabisl cannabis resing extracts and tinctures of cannabis and 
coca leavesq in adaition, to those drugs which are already. subject 
to such a system under the'previous drug conventions. Article 9 
of the 1972 Protocol ( amending Article 19 of the Single Convention) 
has taken over the provisions of Article 189 paragraph 3 of 
Ihe 1953 Protocol, according to which the Parties are required to 
furnish estimates of the area on which they intend to grow opium* 
poppy for the production of opium, and ofIthe expected opium harvest. 
Yett according to Article 9(l)(f) of the 1972 Protocolp, the Parties 
are required only to give an estimate of the "approximate" quantity 
of opium to be producedt and therefore the predictable consequences 
owing to this lenientprovision will ensue. 
Alth. ough the Single Convention has not allowed any "margin" 
in calculating the estimates of drugs, the practice of making 
estimates of "consumption" on the basis of average annual consump- 
tion during a period of three years preceding that in which the 
estimates are computedg hýs virtually'amounted to a grant to "margin" 
for the following reasons: (a) although, in practicep the average 
figure is allowed to be increased by lWo to justify an increased use 
of drugs on the groundsp inter aliap of population growthq break out 
of diseases etc*p there may be. certain kinds of drugs in respect of 
vhich a higher range of marging i. e. 9 more than lVio may be necessary; 
690 
for examplep codeiner which has manifold uses in a country which is 
in the process of social and economic development; 
103 
and (b) in 
certain casest statistics on"past consumption may not be available, 
especially for the reason that such drugs have come into use recently. 
The practice of relying upon the judgment of the health authorities 
in such a situation may give rise to over-estimation or under- 
estimation ( in the latter situation it will obviously be necessary 
to, 'meet the pent-up demand on special grounds). Unless týe health 
authorities have established a highly integrated and developed control 
systemp the indefiniteness in estimates may give rise to further 
problems'even leadingg in certain casesq to illicit traffic in 
drugs. It is, thereforeq suggested that in such a situation the 
International 'Narcotics Control Board should be allowed to determine 
the estimates in consultation with the national health authoritiest 
and that the latter authorities should be permitted to put forward 
their estimates quarterlyq and not annually. 
The non-applicability of the estimates system to certain drugs 
has made it achieve only partial success. The estimated quaxýtities 
of drags to be utilized for the manufacture of other'drugs, ýhich 
are'to'be furnished in accordance with Article 199 paragraph lt sub- 
paragraph (b)t should include the amounts of the drags to be trans- 
formed by a chemical process into other drugs9 b ut not the quantities 
of drags to be'transformed into their salts or to be compounded 
into preparations* The quantities of drugs needed for refining, and 
for preparations for u. 9e in the form of tablets or ampoules etc. p 
104 
should also be excluded. The practice of taking into account the 
691 
final productst md not the drugs or substances which are at interme- 
diary stages of a manufacturing processp presents a further problem 
in determining estimates of drugs, since some drugs and substancost 
even passing through such intermediary stages may not only produce 
considerable narcotic effects, but also may Ie treated as "drugs" 
independently. 105 
Parthermore, it is feared that-,, the absence of any system of 
showing separate figures . '' for the drugs to be held in siocks for 
different purposes, 
106 
may give . rise to an over-accumulation of a 
particular kind of drugg without the. 1mowledge of the Boardq and 
consequentlyp illicit traffic in that drug may be caused, Although 
in accordance with Article 12t-paragraphs 1 and 4 and Article 19 
paragraph 19 the Board may call for separate figuresy in reality, the 
time-lag between the submission of estimates and the calling for 
separate figures by the Board may be sufficiently lengthy for the 
purpose. of accumulation of certain drugs, and unless governments have 
adopted very effective methods of preventing unnecessary stockst the 
necessary consequences of accumulation may ensue. Indeedp in esti- 
mating stocks, governmentaq rather than the manufacturers and whole- 
salers, should take the predominant decision-making role .. in 
the light of the circ-um tancest i. e. q. in terms of the actual ' need of 
. 107 drugs to be held in stocks. This argument finds justification in 
that the conditions which usually determine the size of stocks vary 
from country to country, and therefore, either the Board should devise 
certain guide-lines especially regarding stock- estimates for govern- 
mentsp'08-or an even more effective method would be to instruct the 
692 
governmentd to ensure that the stock-estimates as calculatea by 
manufacturers and wholesalers are genuine. 
So long as the present system of determining estimates of 
drugs and substances for medical and scientific purposes remains 
109 
unchangedp and so long as the habit of drug-taking has not been 
eradicatedg 
110 the estimates system cannot be fully successful. These 
situations become further aggravated by the absence of stringent 
pharmacy laws in various countries. In addition to this, under the' 
Single Convention the Board does not receive information on the stocks 
of drugs held by retail dealers; governments are required to furnish 
figures-on "consumption" of drags, which includes the amount of drugs 
which have been transferred from the wholesale to the retail level. 
The amount sold to retail level ih a particular year may differ 
considerably from the quantity used for medical purposes ( i. e. 9 from 
actual consumption)l and the practice of determining the estimate for 
retail sale on the basis of average annual sale during three to five 
years produces only an approximate estimateg and thus open the door 
to further accunulation of drugs. in the hands of retailers, 
, 
Although according to the provisions of Article 219 paragraph 3. 
in the event of any excess manufacture and import by a governmentt 
such excess amount shall be deducted from the total of the estimates 
('as. -defined, in Article 19g paragraph 2)111 submitted by that govern- 
ment in the following yearp in practice t the statistical data on the 
stocks-available as at 31 December of a given year are due to be 
furnished to the Board only by 30 June. 
112 
after the end of -the year 
It to which they relatep whereas annual estimates of requirements of 
Iq C93 
narcotic drags and opium should reach the Board. by I August and 
4 30 June respectively of the year preceding that to which they refer. 
Consequentlyp the Board can determine the excess manufacture and import 
in a country or territory only late in the year for which the deduc- 
tions have to be made, The Board's publication containing the 
figures to be deducted ( i. e. 9 the-actual total of the estimates) 
comes out in its third and fourth quarterly supplements to its 
Annual Statement of the Estimated World Requirements of Narcotic 
Drugs and Estimates of Wor . ld Production of Opium9113 which proves 
t6 be too late for many countries, ad especially the exporting 
countriesl to take these deductions into account for the purpose of 
implementing Article 31t paragraph lt sub-paragraph (b). indeed, 
the fact -that Article 319 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b) uses the 
phrase 11 the total of the estimates" in another sense than Article 
21, paragraphs 3 and 4 so as to cover also the deductions referred 
to in paragraph 3of article 21 may therefore be of very little 
1 11 114 practical importance* 
The effectiveness of Article 199 paragraph 5115 in relation 
to the estimate of drugs is rather doubtful. In order to make the 
provision of this paragraph effective, it is necessary that a country's 
or territory's actual coxýsumptionq and utilization for the manufac- 
ture of other drugsp of the substances or preparations belong ging 
to 
Schedule 1119 the actual stocks and "special stocks", shall not 
usually exceed their respective estimates which had been originally 
submitted to the Board, including their modificationg where necessaryt 
14 094 
by supplementary estimatesp 
116 
or as established by the Board. 
117 
Uhfortunatelyt more often than notp such estimates prove to be 
inaccuratep especially because of thenecessity for extra consumption 
of drugs owing to unforeseen eventst and consequently, the previous 
estimates are required to be exceededl sometimes even without any 
prior intimation to the Board of the requirements of supplementary 
estimates for the increased consumption. 
(b) Incompleteness of Statistics 
One of the reasons for pursuing the "statistical returns" 
system is to determine the extent of the illicit traffic in drugs, 
and to evaluate the effectiveness of the administrative machinery 
designed to operate this system.. In order to make the system success- 
fulp it is essential that no gap has been left in so far as the 
procedural aspect of the statistical returns is concerned, Theare- 
ticallyq a study of the figures relating to consumptiong manufacture, 
stocks (both ordinary and special) should reveal if any discrepancy 
y much like balancing out the debit in the figures has occurredt ver t: 3. 
and credit sides of an account, and thus determine the drug-situation 
in a country* 
Regrettablyq the Single Convention itself has produced certain 
.U- 
anomalies in so far as the statistical return system is concerned, and 
thus prevented the system from attaining total success. In terms of 
Article 209 paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (a)q statistical returns must 
IN G95* 
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be submitted on the production or manufacture of drugs. 
According to this Conventiong "produqtion" means "the separation 
of opiump coca leavesq cannabis and cannabis resin from the plants 
118 
from, vhich . they are obtained", whoroas "manufacture" 
means "all processest other than productiont by vhich 
drags may be obtained and includes refining as well as 
the transformation of drugs into other drugs". 
119 At present, 
Schedules I 9nd II contain no substance other than opium 
coca leaves, cannabis and cannabis resin, which is obtained 
by separation from a plant. Since the scope of "production" 
in the Convention has been confined to these four substancesq 
any other substance which may be produced in a similar way 
will be known as a "Manufactured substance" unless of coursop 
the present definition of "production" is changed. The 
separation of poppy straw and cannabis leaves (when not 
accompanied by the tops of the cannabis plant) from their 
plantst in terms of the Single Convention # is neither 
"manufacture" nor "production", and consequentlyq governments 
are not obliged to show the statistics relating to their 
use in their statistical returns. 
In so far as the manufacture of drugs is concerned, the 
governments are not required to furnish any statistical 
return on the manufacture of base drugs and their salts. 
696 
(They are required to supply figures on the pure drug content 
of the drugs which they manufacture. 
) The tenn "manufacture" 
as used in the sub-paragraph 
(a) of Article 20 does not include 
the transformation of base drugs into their salts. In addition 
to thist the Single Convention excludes from statistical retumsq 
any substance which is in an intermediary stage in a continuous 
process of manufacture of a drugg e. g. concentrate of poppy 
strawq which is an intermediary stage in the manufacturing 
120 
process of morphine. This has in fact opened a floodgate 
-to the illicit traffic in certain narcotic substances which 
can produce incalculable harmful effects, e. g. heroin forms 
only an intermediary stage in the process of manufacture of 
nalorphine; yet heroin itself is a harmful nartotic substancb. 
It may be observed that the regime to which poppy straw 
121 
is subject should have been made applicable to many intermediary 
substances which produce dangerous narcotic effects. 
As regards statistical returns on "seizure of drugs", 
Article 20t Paragraph 19 Sub-paragraph (e) does not oblige the 
Parties to furnish any information on their statistical returns 
on the, seizure of cannabis'leaves when not accompanied by the 
topst although the Commission may rhquest the Parties to supply 
-this information to the Secretary-Generalp should it find it 
122 
necessary for them to do so- The Convention has also 
*A t11)e 
provided thatq for the purpose of statistics, 11 the information 
required shall be restricted to the quantities of drugs used in 
the manufacture of such preparationsg" 
123 j. 'e., the preparations 
in Schedule III; in other wordsp governments are not required to 
supply statistical information on the amounts of drugs contained 
in preparations-'in-Schddule IIIp which they may seize, It is also 
not necessary for governments to furnish information separately 
on how the seized drugs have been appropriated by them for licit 
purposeso even though such information is of particular importancev 
in that those amounts of drugs'must be deducted from the amounts 
which the country or territory may obtain by manufacture and 
121k 
import in the year in which they are so released. The Conven- 
tion has indirectly exempted small countries or territories on 
stocks of drugst if they do not manufacture nor engage in the 
vholesale trade in drugs, but only obtain their requirements through 
imports by retail phamacists. 
125 
Under the 1953 Protocol, the Parties were required to 
furnish statistical information in respect-of areas ( in hectares) 
cultivated for the production of opium and in fact, this provision 
caused much controversy at the plenary meeting concerned. The 
Indian delegatet howevert suggested 
126 
an amendment to replace C) 
the word "may" in Articlý 20p paragraph 3 of the Single Convention 
by "shall"t but to no effectp the primary reason for not accepting 
698 
Ws amendment being that it would serve no useful purpose 
and therefore should not. appear in an international convention., 
127 
The 1972 Protocol is an improvement upon the 1953 Protocol in that 
Article 10 of the latter Protocol has provided, inter alia, that 
the"Parties shall furnish to the Doard for each of their torritoriebt 
in the manner and form proscribed by the Boardl statistical returns on 
forms supplied by it in respect of the following matters 
Ascertainable area of cultivation of the opium poppy. " 
Furthermore, according to Article k2 200 Paragraph 3 of the 
Convention, 
128 
the "Parties are not required to furnish 
statistical returns respecting special stocks". "Special stocks" 
in this connection stands for "the amounts of drugs held in a 
country or territory by the goverment of such country or 
territory for special Government purposes and to meet 
exceptional circumstances". 
129 The expression "for special 
government purposes" includesq especially, the use of drugs 
for the armed forcest and the expression "exceptional circumstances" 
includes catastrophic eventsp such as large-scale epidemics 
130 
and major earthquakes. One of the reasons behind such a 
provision is presumably that government authorities are supposed to 0 
be responsible enough to sde that the amounts of drugs vhich 
have been released in these cirewastances do not find their way 
I 
into the illicit traffic. On the other hand, it may be argued 
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that governments should not experience difficulties in maintaining 
statistical accounts of such supplies of drugsl and informing 
the Board of the actual amount of supply. Unless all governmnets 
authorities behave in an equally responsible wayt it may also 
be pointed out that in the case of any surplusp owing to 
over-supply or return of the normal situation much earlier 
than expectedp advantage may be taken of this surplus amountp 
i. e. p it may find its way into the illicit trafficq in the absence 
of any system of submitting statistical returns to the Board. 
&)- Comments: 
As stated beforep the systems of submitting estimates 
(before the use of drugs) and statistical returns(after the use 0 
of drugsp and narcotic substances) are complementary to each 
other. Needless to say that they would be uniquely complementaryp 
if no gaps had been left in no methods of their calculations. 
The Single Convention has mainly followed the 1931 Convention 
and the 1953 Protocolp in so far as submission of estimates of 
drugs to the Board and the Statistical returns are concerned; 
yet this Conventionj despite. its wider scope than the previous 
drug conventionst has in many cases left certain apparent gapst 
which have been detailed in the previous Sections. Howeverp the 
success of the estimates and statistical returns systems depends 
1700 
very much upon the co-operation the national governments are 
willing to extend. In addition to thisp efficient and effective 
pharmacy laws governingt in particular, the retail sale, 
including the maintenance of comprehensive records of amounts 
., s and substances 
bought and soldt are the of narcotic drug 
pre-requisiteB of the success of the above systems. 
I 
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FoorlITOTFIS 
Article 29. Licence in this context refers to a written govern- 
ment authorisationg whatever name may be given to it in a 
municipal legal system. 
2. Article 29(2)(b). A separate licence is necessary for each 
establishment and promises on which manufacture of drug(c) may 
take place. 
Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the single Convention and 
Article 1 of the 1972 P%, otocol. I 
A private manufacturer may mean a firm or even an individual. 
5- Co=entary on the Sinnrle 
ýonvantionq 
OP- cit-9 P- 318- 
6. Article 10(l) 
Articie 
81 Article 29(2)(a). 
9. This is chiefly with a viow to preventing divarsion or theft 
of drugs. See further U. N. Doc. E/CI, 1/7/519, pp. 33 and 93. 
10. Article 29(2)(c). 
11. Article 219 paragraphs 1-3. 
12. Aýticle 3 and Article 5(5) of the Limitation Convention, 1931. 
q 
13- These permits should not be confused with licneces, Whereas the 
former is an anthorisation of a limited nature allowing a manufac- 
turer to manufacture drue-s until further noticeg the latter is a 
general authorisation certifying the eliCibility of a manufac- 
turer to manufacture drugs under certain conditions. 
14- Article 21(4)(a). 
15. Prior to the con-ting into force of the Single Conventiong the 
limitation regime applied only to substances falling under the 
Limitation Convention of 1931 and the 1948, and 1953 Protocols, 
i. e., manufactured drugs other than extracts and tinctures of 
cannabis and opium. It was also not applicable to cannabis, 
cannabis resin and coca leaves. 
16. Arýicle 21(ý). 
V -1, 
12 
17. Drugs released for "licit use" not only includes the drugs which 
have been released for commercial purpose. -,, but also tho3e which 
have been released to the non-profit distributors. 
18. Form CIS ( 5th edition, Yovember 1970) table II, column P9 p. S. 
19. Article 21 -(4); see also Article 14(2) of't4e Single Convention 
and Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol. 
While, under the previous Conventions, the Permanent 
Central Board had an obliCation to impose an embargo in the 
event of excessive imports, the Single Convention authorises 
the International Narcotics Control Board to exerýise its dis- 
cretion as to whether or not such an embargo shouýd be imposed 
upon a country. 
20. Under the Limitation CorIvention the Parties were only required to 
submit annual statistics and not qi; arterly statistics in respect 
of the drugs inciuded in Grouý II ( Article 13(2)(c)(i) of the 
Limitation Convention of 1931 - 
21. Article 
22. See Articles 6p 7p 89 12 and 14(2) of the Limitation Convention 
of 1931 and Article 80 paragraphs. 10 and 11 of the 1953 Protocol. 
23. These substances are riot'listed in Schedule I or Schedule II, 
and are therefore not "d-rugs", 
24- Production" under the Single Convention means " the separa- 
tion of opiumv coca leavesq cannabis and cannabis resin from the 
plants from which they are obtained. See Aryiele l(l)(t)o 
25. See instructions 3 and 4 of Forms CIS and A/S of the International 
lzarcotics'Control Board ( 17ovember 1970 edition), 
26. See CommentarV on the Sim-le Convention, op. cit.; see also 
U. N, Doe, B/CN-7/484/Rev. 11 paragraph 88 , and the Commentaa 
on the Limitation Convention of 1931, paragraph 89. 
27* S6--'the Commentary on & Sinrle Convention, op, cit., p. 269. 
28. See also Article 9 of the 1972 Protodol. 
29. See U. N. Doc. *B/II; CB/W-7'( May 1968), paragraph 12-, 
see also-Com-mentary on the Sinj, -, le Convention, op. cit., p. 269. 
30- The Board Ma only request such explanations under Article 13(3); 
see also Article 6 of the 1972 Protocol amending Article 
14, paragraphs I and 2 of the Single Convention, 
31- Article 29(2)(c). 
10 '4ý7,43 
32. Official Records? vol. I,, p. 27 and vol. II, pp. 124-125- 
33- Article 14, Article 21 and Article 31(l)(b). 
34- "-The Board shall fix the date or dates by which and the 
manner in whichp the estimates as provided in article 19 shall 
be furnished and shall prescribe the forms therofor. 11 
Article 129 paragraph 1; see also A. Aicle 12, paragraphs 4 and 5 
of the Single Convention concerning supplementary estimates of 
drugs. Article 12t paragraph 5 (of' the Sin, -, le Convention) 
should be read with Article 5 of the 1972 Protocol. 
35. Article 19 of the Single Convention; see also Article 9 of th. e 
1972 Protocol, 
36. Article 19 of the Single Convention and Article 9 of the 
1972 Protocol. 
36(a) Prior to the 1953 Protocol, the governments were advised by the 
Permanent Central Board to supply their "consumption" ctatistics 
alorig-the following line: 
11 Unless a Government has established that in column I ("Consump- 
tion other than for Government purposeý") shou-7. dbe reported the 
quantities supplied to pha: Lmacistst doctors, dentistst veterinari- 
ans and to hospitals, dispensaries and similar health institutions 
both public and private that have authority to supply narcotic 
drugs. Quantities of &miSs dispensed throneh a national health 
scheme would also figure in this column, regardless of the fact 
that the system is administered by the-state. The figures in 
column I should not include amounts consumed in the form of 
exempted preparations". Form 0/1 of the Permanent Central Board 
( Title: Annual Statistics of Consumption, 9th editiong Novemborg 
1959, Instruction 1110-4). 
37- 1.3 ee Form C/S of the International Narcotics Control Board, 
5th editiont Yovemberl 1970t Instruction 110.3. 
38- The drugs. contained in such preparations arep however, separately 
shown in the statistics by governments. This is necessary for the 
purpose of ascertaiiiing the drugs used in the manufacture of 
prepaiýations in Schedule III- Article 2, para&=aph 4 and Article 
20, paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (b). Governments are also obliced 
to furnish estimates of the quantities of drugs which they requirc 
for the manufacture of such preparations ( Article 2(4) and 
Article 19(l)(b)). 
4. 39. In co far as the estimates of "consumption" are concernedo the 
Board advises that such estimates should be established on the 
basis of the features of past consumption. An average calculated 
on the basis of consumption over the period of the past three years 
may be a u4eful guide. The Single Conventiont howeverv hao not en- 
couraged the system of I'margIn" lor adjustment of demand in the 
ý ýV" 14 44 
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39. case of contingenciesq which was a feature of the Limitation 
Convention of 1931. (The 1953 Protocol also did not support 
the policy. of "margin" in estimating the requirements of drugs). 
The absence of, the "margin" system in the Single Convention lion 
in the fact that the stocks of drugs which the Parties are 
supposed to mainatin presuppose a consideration of such "marginal', 
40. According to the corresponsing provisions of the Limitation 
Convention and the 1953 Protocol ( Article 5(2)(a) and Article 8(l) 
(a) respectively) the estimate for "consumption" included the 
amounts needed for the compounding of "preparations for the 
export of which authorizations are not required. " The consump- 
tion of drugs whether for domestic or other purposes had no 
relevance. 
Howeverg in so far as the Single Convention is concernedt 
the Board requests the Covernments not to include the amounts 
needed for the stocks of m=ufacturersq wholesalers and importers 
other than the retail pharmcists, Yetq should thacircumstances 
req, gire an increase in the "stocks" of retail distributorsq ( the 
stocks of retail pharmacists are not s±ocks under the Siný71c 
Convention; see also Article l(l)(x)), such a quantity may be 
taken into account in computing the estimates of connumptiont 
whether it in to be obtained by ranufacture or by import. 
See further Corunentary on the_SinZ: lr-. Convention, op. cit. p p. 225- 
41- See Form B/S of the International 11arcotics Control Board, 
-iont Marchq '971- 7th edit 
Under the regime preceding the Single Convention, a conso- 
lidated figL=e had to be given in respect of each drug needed for 
conversion ( see Article 1(4) and Article 5(2)(b) of the Limita- 
tion Convention, 1931). Article 8(l) (b) of the 1953 Protocol 
however required information on the estimated quantities of opium 
required for the manufacture of alkaloids. 
42. Sce Form B/S,. C;, Qneral Instruction 10; see also Estimated World 
Requirementsq 1970Y paragraph 28, the "Yellow List" ( Annex to 
the statistical forms) and the Multilingual List of Narcotic Drugo 
under International Control. 
43 See further Commentarff on the--Sinale Convention, op. cit. 9 p. 227- 
44. ' Coca leaves to be used for extraction of alkaloids in pursuance of 
'. Article 27(2) axe subject to estimates and statistical information. 
4ý- The amount of cannabis required for the rmiifacture of dru, -:, s for 
non-medical purposes would be subject to estimates pursuant to 
Article 49(3)(b). 
46. Article l(l)(X). 
47- See also Form B/S of the International Varcotics Control Board 
Oth editiong Narcht 1971). General Instructions 14 and 13; see 
also Commentarv on the Sing., le Convention, op. cit., p. 229. 
qq 17 05 
48- Such "stocks" are not "stocks" in terms of Article 1, 
paragraph 19 sub-paragraph (x). 
49- According to the Commentary on the Sinple Convention , howevert 
such estimates will include an account of the stocks of drugs 
which are intended for use in industry for other than medical 
and scientific purposes under Article 29 parigraph 99 whereas 
the aforesaid Article provides that 11 Parties are not required 
to apply the provisions of this Convention to drugs which, are 
commonlyýused in industry for other than medical or scientific 
purposes provided that: (aý They ensure by appropriate methods of denaturing or 
by other means that the drugs so used are not liable 
to be abused or have ill effects (article 3# para- 
graph 3) and that the harmful substances cannot in 
practice be recovered; and 
(b) They include in the statistical informaýion 
(article 20) furnished by them the amount of each 
drug so used. " 
The inclusion of the amount of each drug after use by the 
Parties in the statistical information, and the submission of 
estimates of such drugs before use are'two different things. 
The ab6ve provision does not imply that the Parties are obliged 
to include such drugs in their estimates. 
See Con-nentary onthe Single Convention, op. cit., p. 230. 
50- Article 499 paragraph 4- 
519, Article l9paragraph lt sub-paragraph (x). 
52, Article 12(l), Article 19g paragraph it sub-paragraphs (a)-(c) 
and Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol. See also Estimated World 
Requirements of Narcotic Drugs and Estimates of World Production 
of Opium in 1970t paragraphs 6-32 of the narrative part (U. N. 
Doe. E/INCB/6) and Estimated World Requirements of Narcotic 
Drugs and Estimates of World Production of Opium in 1971, para- 
, graphs 
20-22 of the narrative part (U. N. E/II74CB/10), 
53- Form C/S of the Board 5th editiong 1970), footnote (b) to 
table IIp p. 9. 
54-* Article l(l)(w). 
55. See the. Commentary on the Sim-le Convention, op. cit., 232. 
56. Article l(l)(w) and W; and also Article 19(l)(c). 
57. This Article should be read with Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol, 
I 
C, 
IV. 
it Id 1 '100 
58- Article 212 paragraph 3: 
11 If the Board finds that the quantity manufactured and-imported 
in any one year exceeds the sum of the quantities specified*in 
paragraph 10 less any deductions required under paragraph 2 of 
this articleg any excess so established and remaining at the 
end of the year shall, in the following year, be deducted from the 
quantity to be manufactured or imported and from the total of the 
estimates as defined in paragraph 2 of article 19.11 % 
See also Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol. 
59- It is for this reason that decisions on supplementary estimates 
receive the urgent consideration of the International Narcotics 
Control Board and in the event of its not being iý session, oven 
by telegraphic consultation with its members, if necessary. 
6o. Article 19 paragraph 4P third sub-paragraph of the Limitation 
Conventiont 1931; -see also Article 8, paragvýph 6 of tho 1953 
Protocol. 
61. It is to be. noted that the same form is used for both "regular" 
and "supplementary" estimates; in the case of the latter however 
a goverrzaent is required to indicate to which headinr, of the form 
(form B/S) each of the drugs belongs or state to which the variou3 
quantities of drugs mentioned in Article 190 paragraph 1, the - 
new figure relates; see also Estimated World Requiremcnts, 19719 
paragraph 3 of the narrative part. 
62. See Article 9 of the 1972 Protocoll'amending Article 19(5) of 
. the Single Convention. 
63. Article 21(b) of the Hague Opium Convention, 1912; Article 10 of 
the Geneva Agreement, 1925; Articles 22 and 23 of the International 
Opium Conventiong 1925; Article 13(2)(c) and Article 22 of the 
Limitation Convention# 1931 9- Article 4(c) and Article 9 of the 
1953 Protocol- 
64- See also Article 14(3) of the Limitation Convention 1931, 
Article 12(2) of the 1953 Protocol and Article 15M. Of the 
Single Convention. 
65- See also Article 29(3) and Article 30(. 2)(a). 
66'0 Usually three different kinds of forms are used for furnishing 
statistical informationt viz. (a) form CIS for annual statistical 
information; (b) form A/S*for qu---trterly reports to be made under 
Article 20; and (c) form R/S for annual statistics on narcotic 
drugs used for non-medical purposes temporarily authorised under 
Article 49- 
67. See Form CIS (4th editioýa)- irrtruction 3, and Form AIS 
(6th edition) instructions 3 and 5. 
v. 
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68o See further Form C/S- instruction 4i see. also Form AIS- 
instruction 4- 
69. Article l(l)(t).. 
70. Article l(l)(n). 
71. infra. t S4, - 
jvti-t- T+ 
72. Manufacture, as used in Article 20(l)(a) does not include the 
transformation of base drugs into their salts. 
73- See further CommentaIX on the Single Convention, opý cit., p. 247, 
74- See form C/S ( 4th edition, 1970), colirnn C of table 1, 
sections lf2 and 3- 
75- Article 2(9)(b). 
76. Article l(l)(n). In this connection see the Commenta= on tho 
Single Conventiont according to which 11 the Board may not under 
the sub-paragx-, -ph under consideration require information on the 
quantities of crude. drugs utilized for the riahing of rofined druCs. " 
p. 249. 
77- See the definition of the "concentrate of poppy straw" in 
Schedule I. 
78- See Axticle l(l)(r), 
79- Form C/S9 instruction 3- 
80. Article 1, r, -r-ar. --aph 2: " For the purpose of this Convention 
a. drug ýhall be regarded as 'consumed' when it has been supplied 
to any person or enterprise for retail distributiont medical use 
or scientific research; and '-consumption" shall be construed 
accordingly. " 
81. See the Cormenatryon the. Single Convention, op. cit., p. 250- 
82. Form R/S. 
83. Drags belonging to Group II in the limitation Convention, 1931, 
which had a similar legal position to those belonginj; to Schedule 
II of the Single Convention, were excluded from consumption 
statistics. 
84- See Form 
- 
AIS, first column of Parts I and II of the tables 
(6th editiong Novemberg 1970) which is different from that which 
is used-for annual statistics (Form C/S, 5th edition, Yovemberp 
1970)- 
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85. The Limitation Convention of 1931 only provided for annual 
statistics of imports aný exports of drugs belonging to Group II. 
Article 13(2)(c)(i), 
86. See Form AIS9 instruction 10; see also the Conmenta. = on the 
Single Convention, op. cit., p. 252. According to the Single 
Conventiong "import" and "export" "mean in their respective 
connotations the physical transfer of drugs from one state to 
another statep or from one territory to another territory of the 
same state'19 see Article l(l)(p). 
87. See Form A/S, instruction 5. 
I'. Figures regarding morphine and concentrate of poppy made avail- 
able in trade should be supplied separately, Form AIS, columns 6 
of Part I and Part II of the tables. 
89. Form A/Sq item II in the first column of Part I of the tables. 
go. Form C/Sp table II, footnote (e). 
91. See Form CIS ( 5th(editiong-Ilovemberg 1970). Notes to Table 119 
footnotes (b) and d). Quantities hold: for "special government 
purposes" include. in particular the requirements for-axmed forces, 
The phrase "exceptional circumstances" is meant to cover such 
catastrophic events as large-scale epidemics and major earthquakes. 
92. Statistics in respcct of such st. -cks which will include opium, 
coca leavesp cannabisq cannabis resin-and extracts and tinctures 
of cannabis (except the stock held for retail outlets or as"Ispecial 
stocks" by government) should be furnished separately in accordance 
with Article 49P paragraph 39 sub-pa--agraph (b). See also Form R/S. 
For provisions of earlier treaties regarding statistical returns 
on stocksg see Article 22, paragraph lt sub-paragraph (c) of the 
Intornational Opium Convention, 1925 and Article 9p parac7raph 1, 
sub-paragraph (b) of the 1953 Protocol. 
93- See further Form CIS, table II, footnote (b), 
94- Parties to the Single Convention however have to furnish , in 
addition to the amounts of drugs refined and/or crude actually 
used# such other data reiýarding preparations in Schedule III as 
the Commission may requestp as and when necessary* 
See also Article 180 paragraph 1. 
95. Article 20, paragraph 2# sub-paragraph (a); see also Form C/S, P. 4. 
96. See also Article 22(2) of the International Opium Convention, 1925 
and Article 19(l)(c) of the 1953 Protocolt It appears that the 
Single Convention has followed the provisions of the previous 
narcotic t: ýeaties in this matter. 
97- Article 20(2)(b), 
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98. Article 20p ParagraPh 4. 
99. See Form CIS, table 119 footnote-a, and Form A/St instruction 12; 
see also Article l(l)(w). 
100. See also Article 20(2)(b). 
101. See Form A/S, Part I of the tables, first column, line Ut PP. 4-6. 
102. Form CIS9 table II, column D. 
103- See further Com. -mentary on the Sin, -le Convention, op. cit., p. 224- 
104. Form B/S, footnote It General Instruction 11; see also the 
I 
-, 
CommentMon the Singl. p Convention, op. cit., p. 227- 
105- For example, heroing which is an intermediary product in a conti- 
nuous process of the manufacture of nalorphine, an uýcontrolled 
substanceg from morphineg However, if after obtaining the heroin 
the process of manufacture of nalorphine is interrupted (eg. in 
these cases where heroin made by one manufacturer is to be deli- 
vered to another manufacturer for transformation into nalorphine) 
the anount of morphine should be included in the estimate of the 
amount of that drug to be utilized for the manufacture of other 
drugst heroin being such an "other drug'lp and the amount of heroin 
should be included in the estimate of this quantity of heroin -to be 
utilized for the manufacture. of substances not covered by the 
Single Convention. 
See the Com. mentary-on the Sin! 71e Convention, op. cit., p. 228. 
106. Article 19(ý)(c). Article. 27(2) and Article 49(3)(b) are however 
exceptions to the above system; seo also Form B/S, column 4. 
107- See Commentary on the Linitation Conventiong 19319 OP* Cit., 
paragraph 52t and-L. N. Doe. C-521.1-T. 'z62. . 1) 
193 
-XI. 
108. In factt the toard discussed this matter at its session in 
Autumn *of 1970- 
109. See Comments on the Limitation Convention and the 1953 Protocolp 
supra. pp. 2. &L - 2. &) Sty 
110, supra . ýp - 42 9, S'o I 
ill. See further Article 9 of the 1972 Protocol, amending Article 19 
of the Single Convention, 
112, Form CIS. Article 20(l)(f) and paragraph 2 (a). 
11 3- For examplet see U. 11. Doe. E/INCB/6, Add 19 2. 
on the Sinf-le Convention, op. cit., p. 236. 114. See further Corn en-Icary 
, 4; " Is . 410 
. 
115. Article 19, paraf, 7raph 5: "SubJect to the deductions referred 
to in paragraph 3 of article 21t an account being taken where 
appropriate of the provisions Of article 21 bis, the estimates 
shall not be exceeded. " 
See also Article 9 of the 1972, Protocol. 
116. 
_ 
Article 19, Paragraph 3. 
117. Article 12, paragraph 3- 
118. See Article l(l)(t). 
119. See Article l(l)(n). 
120, ' Concentrate of poppy straw will, howeverp be taken into account 
for the purpose of statistical return, if it has been made- 
available in trade. 
121. Article 20(l)(b). 
122. According to Article l(l)(b) "cannabis" means 11 the flowering or 
fruiting tops of the cannabis plant ( excluding the seeds and 
leavos when not acco. -i-oanied by the tops) from which tho resin - has not been extractedg by whatever nane they may be design#ed". and 
thereforet leaves of the cannabis plant when not accompanied by 
the tops are not "cannabis" and'hence not a "drug". 
123- Article 2, paragraph 4P see also Article 1 of the 1972 Protocol. 
124. Lrticle 21p paragraphs 1 and 2; see also the CommentM on the 
Sinnle Convention, op. cit., p. 255- 
125- Stocks held by retail pharmacists are not considered as "stocks" 
under the Single Convention, and therefore, returns on them do 
not have to be furnished. 
126. See Official Records, vol 119 OP- cit-t P. 41 and vol. I. P. 137. 
127- See especially the view of the British delegate who, in fact, 
abstained. Official Recordst vol. Ip op. cit-t P. 137. 
128, See also Article 10 of-the 1972 Protocol. 
129. Article 1(l)(w). 
130. See Article l2v paragraph 49 Article 13t paraeTaPh 4f Article 19p 
ýaragraph l(d) and Article 20(l)(f); see also Form CIS9 notes 
b)f (c) and (d) to table IIf and Form AIS, instruction 12. 
CMPTM xi 
COMMOL OF ILLICIT TIME AM) TRAFFIC 
IN NARCOTIC DRUGS 
I, Introduction 
The Single Convention has made elaborate provisions for the 
control of trade and traffic in narcotic drugs and substances. 
Trade in such drugs and substances cumot be eliminatedg 
especially because of medical. and scientific needs. The 
essential uses of these commodities increase their marketabilityp 
and consequentlyl a regular supply to meet the demands for them 
becomes necessary. As in the case of other co=oditias subject, to 
gover=ental control, the suPply of narcotic dru, ". s and substances 
is also illicitly participated in by illeg4 traffickers Illicit 
trafficking in such commodities becomes possible because of over- 
production /manuýacturo of the co=odity in question, or by 
diversion of the licit traffic into the illicit traffic, whether 
in part or in fullt or by production/ manufacture idthout any 
government authorisation. The control of trade and traffic in 
,s and substances entails 
two thingst viz. (a) control narcotic drug 
of tradeq i, e. p prevention of surplus trada in these commodities; 
and (b) regulation of traffic in them, i. c. 9 transportation both 
domestically and/or internationally through authorised routes or 
channels. To put it in another way, trade andtraffic in narcotic 
drugs and substhnces may be divided into two categoriespviz. "licit" and 
C. 
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"illicit". Illicit trade and traffic is the converse of licit- 
trade and traffic but not vice versa. In addition, in so far 
as the Single Convention is concerned, a licit trade and traffic 
in anreotic drugs and substances has to. fulfil two conditions: 
(a) that throughout its entire course it is legal and (b)-that it 
has received prior authorisation from the authorities. concdrned. 
Therefore, it is from these points of view that the question of 
I. . 
licit trade and traffic in narcotic drugs and substances has 
to be examined; 
Tin C-ý, n, 2-rnl Provisions Concernin,! ý TrnOlo iyl nml 
Distribution of Narcotic Drýrrs and Substinces 
under the Sinp_le ConVention 
The general provisions relating to trade in and distibution 
of narcotic drugs 'and substances are enunciated in Article 30 of 
the Single Convention. Trade and distributiongin Article 30t stand Cý 
for both domestic and international trade in and distribution of 
narcotic drugs and substan I ces. 
1 ýaragraph lt sub-paraffraph (a) of t3 
-this Articlev in confomitywith the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
Article 29p provides that'the 11 Parties shall require that the trade 
in and distribution of drugs be under licence 
2 
except where such' 
trade or distribution is carried O. ut by a state enterprise or state 
' licence of a manufacturer should cover the right enterprises. " The M 
to buy those substanceswhich he would require for manufacturing the 
authorised drugsq and should cover their sales. Such a licence, howevert 
should not i nclude the right to trade in those drugs, which he is not 
authorised to-=nufacturet nor substances he could need for the 
'AM A 
manufacture of such drugs. The' authority to grant or to rovolco 
a licence lies with the grantor of such liconces*3 
Howeverg in Article 30, the Partica undertook the folloidrig 
obligations: S 
to control all person's and enterprises carrying on or 
engaged in-the'trade in or distribution of drugs; 
I, 
and 
(ii) to control'under licence the establishments ýnd premices 
in which such trade or di3tribution may take place. 
5 
Obligations at clause (i) covers medical practitioners, 
dentists and veterinary surgeonsg and also scientists using drugs 
in their c--parimcnts. The -promiaes cr establishments in which a 
retail pharmacist or modical practitioner compounds preparations# 
or on which the distributioý ofdrugs takes place, or whero duly M 
6 
authorised persons perform therapeutic or scientific functionsg do 
notp howeve 
. 
r, require a licence. 
7 
In Article 3dr paragraph 29 sub-paragraph (a) the Parties t2 
have also undertaken-to pre'vent the accumulation in the possession 
of tradersp distributors, state enterprises or duly authorised 
personsg of quantities of drugs and poppy straw in excess of those 
required for the normal conduct'of businessl having regard to the 
prevailing market conditions. The provisions of -this sub-paragraph 
have no application to the retail trade in arugs9 lis , ted in Schedule 
II and the preparations listed in Schedule III. The requirements of 
drugs for the normal conduct of business'will'vary not only according 
to the nature and uses of the dru,, rs concerne I dq but also according to 
the socio-economic and/or s0ciQ-cultural background of Vae countrics. 
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The phrase 11 having regard to the prevailing market conditions" has 
brought some flexibility into the provisionsp i. e., these provildons 
may be applied to different conditions and places. It is howovor 
interesting to note that "poppy straw". has been included in this 
stb-paragraphp despite the fact that tradorsq distributors, state 
enterprises and fully authorised persons will hardly hold any poppy 
strawt and that vhen not in international trade, it is not covereý by 
the statistical control system of the Single Convention. 
8 This Q. 
provision has, however, *a close relationship with the estimates 4 
system of this Convention in that the Parties are required to exer- 
ciso control over the stocks of'dru, (rs' held by wholosale traders. 
9 
The narcotics regime preceding ihe Single Convention did not make a 
provision corresponding to that- contained ia Article 30, paragraph 2, 
sub-paragraph (a), although it -containo4 certain provisions 
concerning the limitation of stocks by wholesalers, and the control 
of drugs hold by. retailers. 
10 
In order to impose restrictions on distribution the Parties 
also undertook to supply or dispense drugs to individuals only on 
the authority of proscriptions 
11 by registered doctors. But the 
Convention does not require medical proscriptions for drugs in 
Schedule 11 
12 for their prebarations, or for preparations in 
Schedule 111.13 Those drug swhich individuals may lawfully obtaing 
use, dispense. or administer in connection with their duly authorised 
therapeutic functions are also exempt from the requirement of medical - 
prescriptions. - 'The tem " individualit howeverl as used in*Article 30, 
paragraph 29 sub-paragraph 19 clause M admits of two interpretations: 
v 
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(a) "ifidividual" as used in the first 'sentenco of the clause refers 
to patients who will use drugsp or ouners/ possessors of animals for 
which drugs may be needed and to persons obtaining drugs on behalf 
of patients and/or animals; (b) "indidvidual" as iised. in the second 
sentence of the clausel refers to persons duly authorised to perform 
Vaerapeutic functions, viz. medical practitionorsq veterinary surgeons 
and dentists. Sc'ientistss who will use and/or administeý drugs on 
animalsp as a function of their scientific research, need not obtain 
a medical prescription; 'they will however be under the control regime 
of Article 349 paragraph (b) of the Single Convention. The provisions 
of clause (ii) ire not mandatory for the Parties to the Conventionp 
although the introduction of a system requiring that proscriptions 
for drugs in Schedule I should b*e written on official formsq should 
maintain uniformity in the maintenance of-records of distribution of 
drugs. The provisions of Article 309 paragraph 3 also do not impose 
any legal obligation upon the Parties to indicate the international, 
n6n-proprietary name 
14 
co, -municated by the World Health Organization, 
in respect of written or printed offers of drugst advertisements in 
every kind of descriptive literature relating to drugs and used for 
commercihl'purposest interior i; rapping or packages containiDg drugsl 
and labels under which drugs are offered fot sale. Yett Article 31P 
paragraph lip sub-para. -raph 
(b) 6akes it obligatory for the Parties to 10 
indicate the international non-proprietary names of drugsp if anyq 
in import certificates and export authorizations. 
15 Therefore, it 
appears from paragraph 3 that-the use of non-proprietary names, if at 
aliq is to be limited to commercial purposes only. 
M *7 1 
The provisions of Article 30; paragrap4 4 concerning the identi- 
fication of consignments of drug s are p it may be lobservedt of little 
practical importance, because such provisions are no deterrent top and 
on the contraryp may even be compiled with, by illicit traffickers. 
Indeedp the earlier narcotics treaties did not contain any such provi- 
sion. The provisions of Article 30p paragraph 5, are howoVerp in 
conformity with the estimates system operated by the Singlo Convention 
in thatq in practice, the Parties are required to show on the labolsl 
whether used on bottles or packagest the exact drug content in them, 
by weight or percentage, and whether -sold on a retail or wholesale 
basis. 
16 This requirement of label information need not, howevar, 
"apply to a drug dispensed to an individual on madIcal prescription, 
17 
although in terms of Article 39f a Party, notidthstanaing llanythincgr 
contained in this Conventiont shall not be, or be deemed to be, proclu- 
ded from adopting measures of control more strict or severe than those 
provided by this Convention. " If, is uorth notingt howeverg that in 
so far as the retail trade in drugs belonging to Group II of the 
Limitation Convention was concerned, -the control regime of the Conven- 
tion was of almost no application to them, 
18 
It appears, therefore, that the Single Convention did not provide 
for. much restriction on the distribution of drugs to individuals, 
provided that they obtain-them on the strength of L. 31 appropriate medical 
prescriptionst nor did it impose much restriction upon trade in and 
distribution of "preparations". 
19 Ilowevert besides its restrictive 
provisions concerning trade in and distribution of narcotic drugs, the 
Single Ponvention has introduced some innovations by making, "licences" 
compulsory for establishments and premises used for tho trade in drags. 
Although the prov-isions of Articlc 30 aPPlY to both kinas 
of tradep i. e. 9 domestic and intetnationalt this Convention, in; 
Article 319 has devised certain llsýec , ial" provisions relating to, 
international trade in narcotic drugs. It may be observed that the 
term "exclusive" instead of "special" would have been more appropriate 
in this contextv since Article 31 exclusively deals with international 
trade in narcotic drugs* However, as Articles 30 and 31 are c0mplýmen- 
tary to each othe r, it is appropriate to examine Article 31 in the 
following Section. #I 
(b) The SRecial Provisions Relating to International 
Trade in Narcotic Druas 
Trade in narcotic drugs and substances, whother domestic or 
international, must have a close'relationship with the'estimates 
system under the Single Convention, It is for this reason that the 
provisions concerning estimatesq cultivutiong manufacture otc. in 
this Convention precede those relating to trade. It may not be 
out of place to mention that the successful effect of the provisions 
concerning trade will ve*rY much depend upon the effective operation 
of the estimates system under-this Convention. 
Article 31P paragraph 1 of the Single Convention has introduced 
certain innovations concerning international trade in that it has 0 
made attempts to make the Parties more responsible in their behaviour 
by providing tha-t they shall not Icnowingly permit the export of drugs 
0-t i 14 48 
f, o any country or territory except: 
In accordance with the laws and regulations of that 
country or territory; and 
(b) Within the limits of the total of the estimates for 
that country or territoryl as defined in pargraph 2 
of article 19, with the addition of the amounts 
intended to be re-exported. 11 
20 
This provision, howeverp asswaos that the relevant laws of all' 
the importing countries will be known to all the exporting countriest 
or at least will come to Vicir 1mowledge prior to the actual expor- 
" the tation of a coýsignment of drugs, -and also that the limits oA 
also be Imoi estimates f or the importin" couhtry ., rill .n to nn exportinf; 
country. This may certainly be mada possible through the effective 
operation of Article l8v paýagraph 19 sub-paragraph 
(b) and of Article 
19 , and especially 
by pursuing the Estimated World Requirements 9 an 
effect of the latter Article. -Whatever might be the effectivness of 
these theoretical provisionso 
21 
governmentsp in practiceg may not, 
by deliberately violating, each however, ondangger their relationships 
other's legislation. While the provision of Article 31t paragraph 1, 
sub-paragraph 
(a) applies to exports of preparations in Schedule III, 
that of sub-paragraph (b) does not. 
22 Paragraph 2 of Article 31 is 
more concerned with the control of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs 
than international trade in same. However, the Parties may exercise 
their discretion as to iihether or not to apply more c1rastic measures 
of supervision and control in other parts of their territories, than 
they do in free ports and free zones. 
In so far as international trade in narcotic drugs is concernedl 
the Single Convention made provisions which are sirailar to those in 
the previous conventions. - International trade under this Convention 
shall be regulated by licence except where such trade Is carried out 
by a state enterprise or enterprises. This system of licensing'will 
not only limit the-number of importers and exporters in a given 
country, but also enable the. 
government to act as a watchdog of interna 
tional trade in drugs in that country. TILis Convention has made dotailed 
provisions concerning international trade in dru,,,, -s. most of which will 
6 
be operated by the national authorities according to the circumstances 
prevailing in their countries. Such provisions includeq inter aliat 
control of all persons and enterprises carrying on or enga,, ed in 
international trade in narcotic drugs, 
23 
13suing import certificates 
and export authorizations in respect of each import and/or export, 
uhether it consists of one or mbro drugs, 
91., 
and even prevention of the 
passage of a consignment of drugsq by a transit country or territory, 
if necessaryo 
25 However, prior to examinintff, the provisions of intcrna- 
tional trade in narcotic druggs, it is appFopriato to difell briefly 
upon the machinery for import and export designed and made operative 
by this Convention. 
_Star, 
e 
Importer applies to his national 
authority for a non-transferable 
import gthorisation and a certý-7 
ficate for each consignment. 
Exporter applies to his national 
authority, for a non-transferable 
export authonsation for each 
consignment. The application 
for an export authorisation must 
be accompanied by the correappgd- 
ing valid import certificates 2 
10 .. `70 2Q 
Star. r, e 
Such authorisationg if granted, 
shall state the name of the drug, 
the international non-proprietary 
namev if anyp the quantity to be 
imported, the names and addresses 
of the importer and exporter and 
the period by whiab the importation 
must be effected. *) 
( The Parties shall follow as 
closely as possible the form of 
import certificate approved by 
t! IL. Co-waission on Narcotic Dnigs. 
Article 319 paragraph 5; see also 
U. N. Doc. E/N14FORII/Rev. 2) 
Such authorisationg if granted, 
shall state the name of the drugg 
the international proprietary names 
if any, the quantity to be exported, 
the names and addresses of the 
exporter and the importerp the 
period by -ýýIiich VUe oxportýtion 
must be effected, the nuuber and 
date of the inport certificate and 
the aut4irity by whom it has been 
issued. -). The issuing authority 
shall send n copy of the autho- 
risation to V45 importing country 
or territory., -) 
Stage III 
The importing authority shally 
alter importation : i, -, s becn affec- 
ted, or when the period fixed for 
irroortation has expiredq return 
the export authorisaiion with ail 
endorsement to that effect 
(also 
Showing the amount of drug impor 33 C' 
ted) to the exporting authority.. 
In practice, however, a number of 
, roverr=ents require -Uhat ti.. ro wA 
copies of the export authorisation 
should accompany tile consignment, 
on one of which the custoras autho- 
rities at the port of the ox-port-ing 
country confirm. the shipment of the 
drug'q and in the event of a smaller 
quantity being consigned than that 
permit ' 
ted by the export authori- 
sation, g ,, 
note to V, at effect will 
be made. - The custorns authorities 
return this copy to the national 
authorities concerned with the 
control of the international trade 
in narcotic drugs, and the other 
copy will accompany the consigi=ont. 
Some Extra Neasures Coneerning n. -c2 ort of Drii 9 
The Sin., glc Convention has provided for these prohibitory 
measures vith a vievp inter alia, to operating the import-axport 
machinery solely through the im-port-export authorisation system. It 
is believed that a strict observance of these measures will automa- 
tically bring intornational trado in drugs Within the machinery 
C 
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devised by the Convention. Paragraphs 6-13 Pf Artiele 31 enumerate 
those prohibitory measuresq according to which: I 
(i) "Exports of consig=ents to a post office boxt or to 
a bank to the account of a party other than the party 
named in the export Authorization, shall be prohibifed.,, 
35 
This appears to be as a "double-safeguard provision" in that, 
the Universal Postal Union Conyentiont 1964 ( Article 2ýt paragraph 10 
sub.. -paragr6ph 
*(c) and paragraph 3) aild the Universal Postal Convcn- 
tion, 1969 ( Article 29p paraý, raph lt sub-paragraph (c)p paragraph L* t3 
and paragraph 4) have made similar provisiens prohibiting interna- 0 
tional shipments of drugs -by mail. International. shipments of narcotic 
drugs by insured letters or insured boxes are also Sorbidden, except 
if such boxes are sent for scientific and riodical purposes j and the 
rcceiving 
. country may admit them onlý 
36 
y on this condition; the 
despatch. of narcotic dru,,. Fs by Postal parcels is also permitted only 
on the aforesaid condition, 
37 In view of commercial considerationst 
slApments of drugs to banks are, howeverg parmitted provided tha ,t 
the account number of the party is indicaied on both the import and 
export authorisations. 
(ii) Export of consiggnýlents to'a bondecl wharehouse is 
prohibited unless the government of the importing CD 
country certifies on the corresponding import certi- 
ficato to this effectl and the export authorisation 
specifies that the consignment is exported for such 
a purpose. Each withdrawal from the bonded warchouso 
shall require a warehouse receipt or a warehouse warrant 
-V 722 
from the authorities concerned; and in tho event, of 
a foreign destination such a withdrawal shall be 
treated, as-a withdrawal for a now export. 
38 
Bonded varehouses'are not subject to the licensing system 
established by the Single Conveýitioa, and indeed, storage of drugs 
in a bonded warehouse is inconsistent iAth the provisions of Article 
30, paragraph lp sub-paragraph (b) of the Conventionp alcordina to 
whiqh the Parties shall control under licence the establishments and 
premised in which such trade or distribution may take place. . 
However, 
storage of drugs in'a bonded warchouse may be permitted if the govern- 
ment of the importing country gives its confirmation to this effect 
- Vie name and address of f-'lc on the import certilicate statino 
warehousof and the exporter must submit to his natiomil authorities 
this certificateg at the time of maki 
I ng an application for an export 
authorisation It is implied tha-t in the absence of any provision 
to this effect in the Conventionp the national authorities before 
allowing storage in a bonded uarehouse, must ensure that such permis- 
Sion 1.7 ill no t be prejudicial to the provisi Ons of the Convention 
and that the -warehouse concerned is adequately equipped, i. e., with 
personnel and safety measures. ateo The Single Convention does not 
preclude private warehouses for the storago of druggs, but such 
-trarchouse. 4 Ifill have to -be authorised by the gove rnrnent'-c once riled 
for this purposee 
14 110,23 
(iii) "Consignments of-drugi entering or leavingr the 
territory of a Party not accompanied by an export 
authorization shall be detained by the competent 
authorities.,, 
39 
The tam "detained" suggests that in such a situation g 
the goverment concerned is allowed to take interim measures only. 
The legitimacy of,. tho consignment may be established by furnishing 11. ý 
the export authorisatio4 granted by the exporting country. Me 
absence of any provision in the. Convention as to tho disposal of 
tile "detained drugs" in the case of their ownership not being 
determined# after exhaustion of. al.,. possible meanst has lea to onc 
possibilityp that is, t. lic provision of Axticle 37 should bo brought 
into operationg in other wordsq such dot-tined dnigs shall be liable 
to scizure and confiscation. It may also be observed in this 
connection that once "detained-drugs" are seized, they should 'be 
8 ubjec t to the statistical return system of the Convention. 
11 
,0 
(iv) "A Party shall not permit any drugs consigned to 
I 
another country to pass throu., frh its territory, whe- 
ther or not the consignment is removed from the convey- 
ance in which it is carried, unless, a copy of the 
export authorization for such consignment is produced 
to the'compatent authorities of such Party. " 
1. The above provision pre-supposes that the carrier or the 
Haster/Captain of the ship will carry a copy of -the export autho7 
risati6np althou,,:, rh the Convention has not made any provision to 
this effect* This provisiong it may be observed# has rather become 
a matter of academic interest; it should be sufficient if a 
copy of the export authorisatio n is attached to the 
consig=cntp which is the usual practice. 
,, 
(v) The government of the-transit state or torritory 
shall take all due. measures to prevent the diversion 
of the consignment to a destination other thaý that 
named in the export authorisation. Should, however, 
any diversion be auihorised by the government of 
the transit state or territory. it will be treated 
as a "new export" and the provisions of paragraph 
7(a) and (b) shall apply between the country or 
territory of transit and the country or territory 
42 
originally exporting the consignment. 
In the event of a diversion being authorised, the 
competent authorities in the transit state or territory must 
issue the necessary export authorization, a copy of which 
should'be sefit to the authorities who had originally issued tIIO 
import certificate and another copy should be sent with the 
consignment to the now destination. The copy of the original export 
authorisation should be retained by the authorities of the 
country or territory, of transit, and sent to the government of"the 
original export-erg on endomementg as required by paragraph 7, 
sub-paragraphs (a) and (b). 
"3 
Indeed, in such cases, the 
government granting the diversion is under an obligation to 
1" 
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complete the exchange of communications concerning this matter 0 
as provided for in Article 319 Paragraph 6 and 7. 
(vi) "No consignment of drum gs while 
in transit, or whilst 
being stored in a bonded warehouse, may be subjected 
to any process which would change the nature of the 
drugs in question. The packing may not be altered 
without the permissi. on of the competent authorities" 
The reason that a donsignment of drugs whether in transit 
or in a bonded warehouse, may not be subjected to any process 
whicli would change the nature of the drucgr in question, is that 
in the event of such interference beintcr allowed, it would be 
difficult for the supervising authority to identify the drugs for 
which import and export authorisations had orginally been LP 
issued. Morcoverl in certain casest Jhe possibilities of their 
being transformed into substances which are not covered by the 
Sin, -, le Convent'ipn (e. re. salts and preparations) may not 
be ruled out. The packing of a consignment of drugs may, 
however, be changed only under special circumstancesq viz. 
considerable damage to the existing packing or where diversion 
0. f 'a consigment will necessitate division of a consignment into 
t%jo or more parts; but in riost cases such changges may have to 
be done by the government of the transit state. A change in the 
packing of a consignment of drugs may be alloved only under the 
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strict supervision. of the competent authorities of the government 
concerneap-whatever may be the circun tances be warranting 
such a change. The precautions which a transit-state is 
required to take do not obviously apply where the consignment 
in question is transported by aircraft; but if the airc raft 
lands in any such country or territory, those provisions 
shall be applied so far as circumstances require. 
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However, 
accotding to Article 299 Paragraph (g) of the Chicago 
Convention of 191149 
4-6 
aircrafts engage d in international 
civil aviationg should carry authenticated documents 
concerning the cargo they carryp and thereforot the transit 
state should not find difficuýty. in observing the provisions 
of-the Single Convention in the case of re-transporting 
drugs (which amounts to re-cxportý 
7. 
even when they are 
being transported by air. tý 
The provisions in the Sin=-lo Convention relating to 
international trade, although not novel in most respectd, 
are very elaborate. Such provisions can primarily be made 
operative with the co-operation of the parties to this Convention. 
Also adequately equipped adminstrative machinery at national 
level is indispensable to an effective operation of these 
privisions. Howeverl the general obligations4S undertaken 
by the Parties in this Convention, in adaition to their authority 
to apply stricter control measqres than those required by this 
(-. 
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Conventionp in addition to their tuthority to apply-stricter 
control measures than . those required by this Conventiong 
119 
only buttress th6 provision of Article 31- 
As "illicit" trade and traffic ofteh thrive in the 
course of "licit" trade and traffic in narcotic drugs, it seems 
to be appropriate'to examine in the following Section the 
provisions concernin4 action against the illicit traffic in this C, 
Convention. 
The -Provisions Concerninrý International Action A! ýnlnst 
the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Druýj. S 
ro The narcotic regime of the League devoted the 1936 Convention: ' 
entirely to inis'problen. It was primarily the rigid provisions 
I of this Convention which made it rather unacceptable to many 
states. Yet the 1936 Convention was considered to be ideal, 
in terms of the efforts of*the Len'gue to sulfress the illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs, and thereforet even though the 
Single-Convention has made more flexible provisions concerning 
this'probleml its authors appreciated that the states which had 
alieady adhoied to the 1936 Convention would be allowed to 
continue enjoying the benefits accruing from it. Consequently, 
the 1936 Convention (with the exception to Article 9)51 
is the only pro U. N. Convention which is not terminated by 
r 
the Single Convention as between Parties thereto. 11owevert in 
so far as the Single COnyention is concernedl Article 33 of itt 
en=orates the provisions for action against the illicit traffic 
in narcotic drugs. Like the 1936. Convention, n1l provisions con. 
co. raing. suppression of illicit traffic under this Convention, 
have ensured due regard to the constitutional,, legal and 
admiriýtrative systems of the Parties to the Convention. 
Iloweverp, in Article 35t Paragraph (a), the Parties have 
undertaken to make arrangements at the national level for 
co-ordillation of preventive and repressive action against 
the illicit traffic, and to this and they may designate an 0 
appropriate avency in their respective areas, 
52 
The success 
of this provisionp depends to a considerable extentp upon. 
co-ordination at the national levell that ist. co-ordination 
between tho national police and excise authorities and the 
local police and excise authorities. U"here such co-ordination 
exi9tso I, is entirely at f -the discretion of the Parties to 
designate an "appropriate agency responsible for such 
co-ordination. 11' Howevert aiPAppropriate agency" does not 
necessarily imply the creation ofa new body for this 
, purpose; on 
the contaryl. in many countries such 
iunctions are entrusted to one of the existiag government 
departments. 'Such an appropriate agency or a government 
53 department may or may not be endowed with enforcement functions. 
The phraset "co-ordination of'preventive and repressive action" 
lot 
iAp -- - 
does, presumably, admit of various methods of co-ordination 
dependiiib upon the circumstances prevailing in a given country* 
The provisions of paragraphs(b) (c) raid (d) of Article 35 
have a close relationship with those of Article lit 
in which the Parties have undertaken certain obligations to 
implement, the provisions of the Convention as a wholo 
effectively. The 'racanings of the phrases "assist each other" 
and "co-operate. 0 with each other" 
(paragraph (b) and (c))aro 
similart and it is aifficult to understand why the n"thors of 
this Convention have used such synonymous pbyases in one Article. 
Howevert the expression "international orgunioutions" Liplies 
interna'tional inter-. ýgrovernmental and non-rovernmontal 
or-aniza tionS, 
54- 
and the term lfcbnTetent" therefore implies 
"the rele I vant institutions'19 including the U. N. as'a wholo, 
since the * Co=mission on -. Narcotic Drugs and tbo International 
Narcotics Control Board are only subordinato -bodies of the 
Economic and Social Council. If paragraphs (a) and (d) are 
read togethert it will appear that the Parties are required to 
en6ure international co-operation between the institutions 
OLnt 
/concemedp i. e. 9 whether they/government departments or 
separate agencies established in execution of the ti 
provisions of Article 35- Paragraph (e) of Article 35'is 
concerned with the offenders, that is the illicit traffickers, 
rather than the illicit traffic of narcotic drugs itself* 
,A6 
I 
The provisions of paragraph (o) do not creato any legal 
obligation for the Parties; they arq only oxpected to ensure 
that idierc legal papers are transmitted internationally for the 
purpose of a prosecutiont the transmission be effected in an 
expeditious manner to the bodien desif; nated by the rarties. This 
does notq howeVer, prejudice the right of a Party to trapsmit 
these papers through the diplomatic channel. The implementation 
of the provisions. of paragraphs (f) and (g) is again dependent 
upon "good faith" of the Contracting Parties. It is entirely 
for the Contracting Parties to provide whether or not any infor- 
mation renting to illicit druZ activity etc. within their C2 
borders in addition to that required by Article 18 would be 
supplied to the Board. 
As stated abovet the success of international action 
ppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs largely for the su- 
depends upon the co-operation of national governments. Such 
co-operation*may take various forms, e. g. establishment of now 
agenciesq and effective administrative functions in relation to 
the implementation of the Convention, Effective supervision 
of the, machincry of implementation of the Convention is a part 
of the administrative functions of a govcn=ent concerning 
'this matter, and the'Conventiont in Article 54, has provided, 
inter aliag that all persons idio have a uanagerial or supervisory 
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positions in a state enterprise " shall have adequate qualifi- 
cations for the effective and faithful execution of the provi- 
sions of such laws and regulations as are enacted in pursuance 
thereof. " 55 Although this provision is equally applicable to 
the prevention of the illicit traffic within a country or territoryp 
it is thought that the illicit traffic in drugs internationally 
being more financially lucrative# the above provision is even 
more important in respect'of international action against the 
illicit traffic in drugs across national boundaries. 
The Convention has also privided for certain penal 
provisions in its efforts to suppress the illicit traffic in 
drugst and it is necessary to examine these provisions In order 
to evaluate their deterrent effect. 
(d) The Penal Provisions concerning Suppression of_ 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
Article 36 of the Single Convention enumerates the p enal 
provisions designed for punishing any illicit act committed in 
the name of licit trade and traffic in narcotic drugs. According 
to paragraph 1(a) of this Articleg 
56 
not only certain specified 
actsp but alsop any other acts which in the opinion of a Party 
ate contrary to the provisions of this Conventiong shall be 
57 
punishable offences when committed intentionallY- The decision 
as to whether or not an act is contary to the provisions of the 
Convention has been entirely left to the judgement of the 
Parties. kmain, it is for the Parties to determine whether 
or not an offence is a "serious" orie,, and hence liable to 
punishment by imprisonment or 6ther penalties of deprivation 
of liberty. The phrase. 11deprivation of liberty" implies 
confinement not only in an institution, but also in other! places 
puch as labour or re-education camps. 
53 
While paragraph 1 of Article 36 refers to the "constitutional 
limitations" OnlY, paragraph 2 of the same Article refers to 
"the constitutioiLal limitations of a Party, its legal system 
and domostic law,,. 
59 From the pragmatic point of view, no 
difference between these -hro phrases seems to be tenable, since 
constitutional limitations presumably preclude any consideration 
of a Party's legal system and domestic law; and in the case of a 
federal constitution, the units shouldo in implementing their 
oi-m domestic laws, be guided by the directives of the 
constitution and of the central goverm-aent. In any caset a. 
government is not required to take into account foreign 
convlctýon(s) of an alleged offender if its o-um penal laws do not 
provide for doing so. 
In the light of the above interpretation, the provision of 
paragraph 29 sub-paragraph (a). clause W 
60 
that "each of the 
offencei 6nmerated in paragraph 1, if comitted in different to 
countriest shall be consideredas a-distinct offence"t seems 
Such a provision on the one hand admits of the interestinrc, 
principle of territorialityg and on the othert gives various 
criminal activities a universal recognition, Yet, the consider- 
ation which led to the inclusion of the provisions of paragraphs, 
1 and 2'of Article 36 found expression in the statement, of tile 
Canadian delegate at the Conference-for the Adoption of a Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs. The Canadian delegate empha sised that 
the difference was in fact international and the reasons uvre: first 
the parties should be requirýd to regard as punishable all offences 
coming under the general heading Such *offencesi whatever 
fom they mirht take, should autonatically b'c punishable and that 
was the object of paragraph 1. Secondly, in order to tahe into accomit 
the fact that certain actst ýuch*as attempts to committ participation 
ing or financial operation in co. nnexion withi an offence vere not 
considered as offences under certain legal systems or domostic laws# 
a different wording had been used in paragraph 2. The Ganadian 
government would itself have no dif f iculty at all In meting out I=P 
punishment in the case of any of the acts enume'rated in that paragraphq 
but an international convention had to take account of the various "' 
legal systems and try, tt the same timepto ensure that all types of 
offence yOuld be punished in all countries, If too imperative a 
form of words vere adoptedt certain States would be unable to 
accede to the Convention, The vordingr of paragrq t- _ph 
2 did not 
weaken the Convention but actually strenrrthened it. Therewas 
nothing'to obligý a State to punish any of the offences listed 
in sub-paragraph 2(a)(ii) if its laws did not provide for that, 
v tv. 
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but if its laws did so provideg then it would be able to punish 
61 62 
them. " This sub-paragraphp in effect, contains those offences 
which had been included in sub-paragraphs (b)q (c) and (d) of 
Article 2 of the 1936 Convention. The contents of this sub-para- 
graph((a), clause (ii)) cover all kinds of instigation to commit 
crimes, accessory acts including attempts to con-=it criMCs9 and 
all activitiesp short of crime'stricto senan although p4ishable 
by law'. The'effectiveness of this sub-. paragraph depends to a e5 
63 
considerable extent upon the attitude of a country towards a crime. 
The provision of paragraph 2v sub-paragraph (a) t'. clause 
(iii) that 
foreign convictions for such offences shall be taken into account 
for the purpose of establishing recidivism"# bears considerable 
similarity to that of Article 6. of the 1936 Convention. This provi- 
sion has, in essencey made attqmpts to consider certain types of 
crimes and criminals horizontally. Inaceds in paragraph 2, sub- 
pI aragraph (a)q clause (iv)q it has been provided that serious offences 
oommitted either by nationals or by foreigners shall be prosecuted 
by the Party in whose territory the offence was coiauitted, or by the 
Party in whose territory the offender is found if extradition is not 
acceptable in conf omity with 'the law of the rarty to -which applica- 
tion is made, and if such an offender has. not already been prosecuted 
'and 
judgment given.. Although the majority of nations in the interna- 
tional comnunity still believe in the extradition of their subjectst 
in the event of their committing alleged serious criminal offencesp t3 
the Partiesý in this sub-parqgraph, have taken a rather bold step 
64 
Vaich proved to be unworkable in the 1936 Convention. yett a 
i 
recurrence of*similar provisions in the subsequent conventions does 
imply the intention of. the Parties to'concretise the idea and t-9 
'give international recognition to'certain types of crimes, A succes- 
sful enforcement of the provisions of paragraph 29 sub-paragraph 
(a) clause (iv) will mean that where-an illicit trafficker in drugs 
has been extraditedp or if extradition be not possiblep', deported or 
expelledt the receiving country should still punish him in recog- 
nition of the administration of justice. I-Mat however is even more 
importani is to employ an effAiept police and/or intelligence force 
in order Aot to allow a territory to be used as a base of operation 
for theIllicit traffic in other countries. 
Although the third draft of paragraph 2p sub-paragraph (b) t2 
65.1 
o Single Convention, ims drafted ill a binding foIT-1 the authors of th 
in appreciationýof the difficulties'involved in attaining . unanimity 
about the extradition of offenders, let alone a universal recognition 
of certain crimesv made the provision-of paragraph 2t sub-paragraph 
(b) 66 reconmendatory. 
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It is for tLe same reason that the p'rovision 
includest-inter alia, that the 11 ]Party shall have the rigWto, refuse 
to effect'the arrest or grant the extradition in cases where the 
competent authorities consider. that the offence is not sufficiently 
serious. " Article 36t paragraph 2ý sub-paragraph (b)p however, will 09 
have no relevance'to those Parties who have notified the Secretary- 
General that they wish to continue to be bound by the provisions of 
Articl ,e9 of the 1936 Convention* The 1972 Protocol has modified 
sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 36. Yet, whereas 
clause (i) of paragraph (b) has provided that each of the "offences 
v Y, 
enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 2(a) (ii) Of this article shall be 
deemed to be included as an extraditable offence in any extradition 
treaty existing between Parties" and that Parties undertake to 
"include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition 
treaty to be concluded between th. em"t-clause (ii) of the same paeagraph 
has provided# inter alia, that if, a Party which "makes extradition 
conditional on-the existence of 4 treaty receives a reque't for 
extra, 4ition from another Party ifitIh -which it has no extradition treaty, 
it may at its option 
68 
consider this Convention as the legal basis for 
extradition in respect of the offences-enumerated in paragraphs 1 and 
2(a) (ii) of 'this article. 11 Miether * or not a Party makes extradition 
conditional on the existence of a treaty, both the recognition of an 
extraditable offence and extradition itself shall be subject to the 
conditions established by the law of týc requested party. A Party 
is required to implement the'provisions of Article 36 only in so far 
as they would be compattble with the principles of its criminal law. 
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The provisions of Article 36 are also to be transformed into national 
law by a Party through its apýjropriate legislative method in order to 
70 
make thex-a effective under its national penal lave Incidentallyq 
the French-text of paragraph 4 of the Articlep practically repeats 
71 the substance of paragraph 3- A genuine mistake appears to have 
occurred in this'matter in the compilation of the French text adopted 
by\ the Plenary which was prepared by the Draftin, -, - 
Conuittee for the 
Plenary's filial reading* 
72 It has instead? erroneously incorporated 
in-slightly_mo. dified from the French text of the Chilean re-draft of 
Article 459 paragraph 4 of the"Third Draft of the Single Conventiont73 
a7 
which corresponds to Article 369 Paragraph 3 of the final text 
of -Lhe*Single Convention. 
The provisions of Article 36 largely correspond to 
those in the 1936 Convention. The effectiveness of punal N 
provisions depends considerably upon the attitudes of nations 
towards, crimes. The'repetitive provisions of Article 36 '1 , 
only confirm two things, viz. (a) either the nations are'not 
willing to change their attitudes towards'crime including the. 
extradition of criminals. or (b) they are emphasising the 
! necessity'of taking action by penal measures, despite apparent 
differenec-i in their attitudes towards crimes of an international 
character. Whatever may have. been the psychological motive 
behind these provisions, both international awareness of the 
dangers of the illicit traffic in drugs and effective co-operation 
tbetween nations areAndispensable t6the success of this 
Convention. 
II A Critical rxamination of the Provisions of the Sin! Tle 
Convention Concerning Control of Trade and Traffic in 
Narcotic Drivys 
After detailing the. principal provisions concerning trade 
ýnd traffic in narcoiie drugs, it is necessary to reflect upon 
their effectiveness in the international movement for the suppre- 
. ssion 0. 
f the illicit traffic in the aforesaid commoditiesq 
and this has-been done under the following headings: 
(a) The limits of control of domestic trade in and distribution 
of narcotic dMrrs. 
One of the means of controlling the illicit-trade in narcotic 
Ar 
dru, gs would be to prevent the excessive accumulation of drugs 
and poppy straw in the hands of traders and distributors; 
unfortunately the Convention has not prpscribed any method 
for such prevention. In many countriesq scientists and 
medical practioners ( the latter may be categorised under retail 
distributors) are not under any obligation to report periodically 
on the quantities of drugs in the-ir possession. In consequence,. 
the possibilit* of excessive holding of drugs may not be ruled 
out. In terms of Article 30t Paragraph 21 Sub-paragraph (a) 
t1ic Parties -re required io prevent accumulation in the 
possession of traders, distridutorst state enterprises or 
duly authorised persons; ofinter alia, poppy straw in excess of 
that required for the normal conduct of business; therefore, the 
I Convention does not prevent other traders in agriculture 
products from accumulating poppy straw in excessive amounts. 
In addition to this, poppy straw not in the possession of drag 
manufacturers and not in international trade, is not covered 
by'the statistiCal reports sYstems of the Singlo Convention. 
Sub-paragraph (a) has' no applidation to preparations in 
Schedule III held by wholes. ale traders or distributorsq nor has 
it"any application to s tocks of drugs hold by a state enterprise 
for special government pruposes and to meet exceptional 
74 
vircum tances" 
The restrictions upon distribution of drugs, on a retail basist 
73.9 
the pharmacists have been weakened by. the fact that, in certain 
countriesodrugs are distributed on the strength of "oral" pros- 
criptions-without verification of the validity of the medical 
practitioners or of the persons to whom such drugs are distributed* 
Unless an appropriatemothod of identification of the parties, i. e., 
medical practitioner and patient ( by whatever means appear to be 
su*. table or appropriate), and unless tome uniformity in the pharmacy 
laws of various countries concerning these procedural means have 
been achieved, all efforts towards control of trade in drugs will 
meet with only partial success.. To this should be added the practice 
of physicians in many countries of acquiring drugs for their personal 
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use without any appropriate prescription for themselvesp and indeed 
the incidence of drug addiction is quite high aniong physicians in 
many countries. It may also be pointed out that the provisions of 
Article 309 paragraph 2l sub-paragraph (b)q clause (ii) concerning 
the issue of prescriptions for drugs in Schedule I. on official forms, 
by the competent governmental authorities or by authorised associa- 
tions, should be made legally bindin-9 instead of leaving it to the 
discretion and good : faith of the Parties* 
The non-obligatory provision of Article 30# paragraph 5 
which allows a pharmacist to supply drugs to an individual on medical 
prescriptions without showing the exact drug content on the labelv is 
fraught with dankrrerq especially in those cases where ad (r has been 
or will be supplied on the strength of an oral prescription. As no 
appropriate records*of such piescriptions are maintained by pharmacists 
in many countries q illici. t distribution may tahe place even within tI: CC 
I 
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precincts of a pharmacy. 
76 Illicit trade and, distribution in narcotic 
drugs are much easier to conduct than licit trade and distribution 
in the said commodity. It may therefore be pertinent to observe 
that the Single Convention should have made some more obligatory 
provisions especially in respect of procedural matters, and also where 
such provisions would not encroach upon the sovereignty of the Parties. 
The Limits of Internationnl Action Aganist th_a 
Illicit Trade ih blarcotic Dru! Ts 
Ilic term "jiLiitst, is synonymous idth "narroumass". Narrov. -noss 
of international action in this field may be caused either by limiting 
the scope of its operationg or by*excluding. Vie items over which 
international action cannot be exercised. Unfortunately, both Ahese 
causes have contributed to the limitation of international action 
against the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. 
The scope of OpOration of the Single Convention has been limited 
by Article 31t paragraph 159 according to which the Parties are under 0 
no obligation to observe those provisions of control of the transit of 
international drug consignments through their territoriest uhich are 
incompatible with their obligations under other treaties limiting their 
rights Of control over goodst including drugs in transit. Although 
paragraphs 10t 11 and 12 of the same Article have been devised vith a 
Vie, wp inter aliat to close this gapq it is observed that the increasing 
inclination of natio ns to guard their sovereignty jealously only 
: .  
introduces doubt about tho overriding effects of those provisionsp 
unless occasions warranting the withdrawal of the right of innocent 
passage arise, This situation has further been aggravated by the 
provisions of paragraph 14, according to which -the "provisions of 
paragraphe'll to 13 relating to the passage of drugs through the k: 7 
territory of a Party do not apply where the consig=ont in question 
is transported by 'aircraft which does not land in the country or 
territory of transit. " Such a provision does not discourage the 
illicit traffickers from dropping narcotics at different places 
according to'their convenience. In addition to this, the s=e para- 
graph provides that if the aircraft lands. in any such country or 
territoryj those provisions ( i. *e., the provisions of paragraphs C2 
11-13) shall be applied so far ns ciremnstnnees require. 
77 Paragraphs 
12'and 13 chiefly enunciate rules concerýdng the transportation 
fron one country to another of drugs ivhich require appropriate export 
authorisation an4 all necessary measures concerning,, legal routing 
and prevention of attempts to subject a drug to any process which would 
change its original naturc. Such provisions are equally applicablo 
to all countriosy transit or othervise. Yet, it is difficult to 
understand why the above provisions havq not been made obligatory for 
transit states when an aircra-ft carrying consignnents of drugs is 
passing throu,,.,, h their territories. One of the far-rcaching effects 
is to exonerate a transit state from the legal responsibility to 
take every preventive measure restraining a carrier from altering the 
packing of the consignment of drugs, with a view to diverting them 
into illicit traffic. 
(' 
The usual practice in the commercial world, of extending 
extra privileges to free zones and free portsp has affected this 
Convention also, in that very little or no supervision is exercisea 
over shipments of drugs from foreign countries into free zones and 
free ports, and consequentlyq illicit trade and traffic are stimu- 
lated. Mercantile practice has been so deeply rooted that the provi- 
'0 .I 78 1 sions of Article 39 which is a covering Article, may, turn out to 
be too flexible to change the attitude of nations in this regard. 
In so far as excludion qf certain items from the scope of 
international action is concerned, it may be mentioned that this 
Convention does not provide for import and pxport authorisations in 
the case of shipments of prepardtions in Schedule III. Although in 
0 
practice some governments insist on such authorisations, absence of 
any regulatory provisions in this regard precludes the possibility of 
bringing any government to task'in the event of its failure to observe 
the required formalities. Moreover, the practice of a fon--ality by 
some does not necessarily create a norm. 
Secondly, the general drawback of the estim3tes system has 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the provisions for international 
action against illicit trade and traffig in narcotic drugs. According 
to the Conventiong tile statiý-tical data on seized drugs released for 10 
licit use and the amount of druga taken out of "special stocks" for 
civilian use, are required to be furnished to the Board by governments 
bY 30 June folloirin, ý; the year to which they relate. 
79 Thereforeq in 
making their estimates of drug require'llentsg in accordance with 
Article 31P paragraph 19 sub-plragraph (b), the Parties will not Imow 
74 
vhat deductions are required by Article 219 paragraph 2.80 Indeed, 
considerable difficulties may also arise from the application of the 
provision of Article 319 paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b), accoraing, 
to which " the amounts intended to be re-exported" should be added. 
It will very often be extremely difficult for an exporting country 
to know-what amounts the importing country or territory intends to 
re-export. It w6uld therefore be very helpful if the authorities. of 
the importing country or territory indicated in the import certifi- 
cates, the quantities of drugs and substances they intend to re- 
export. 
81 
Thirdlyq although Article 31', paragraph 8 prohibits exports 
of consigrunents to a post office box or to a bank to the accotmt of 
a Party other-han the Party named in the export authorisationg such 
pr . ohibition. applies only to international and not to domestic trado 
in narcotic drugs. 
The-scope of international trade being wider than that of 
domestic tradeq the possibilities of unlicensed international trade 
are much greater and more varied than in'respect of domestic tradc. 
Coamercial intercourse between different countries necessarily demands 
effective co-operation b. etween national authorities not only for 
flourishing tradet but also for prohibiting the incidence of illicit 
trade. International commercial law does not imply a uniform co=ercial 
law. for the whole world; what it does imply is an attempt to create 
a climate of the most favourable, legal conditions. 
N 
I -It is not by law only that limitations of international trade 
in narcotic druggs can be rectified; national co-operation with the 
United Nations in its goal to su'ppress. the illicit trade in the said 
commodity is equally-essential* 
744 
(c) The Limits of Infernntionnl Action Agninst 
t 
the Illicit Trnffic'in Narcotic Drtir,, s 
In view of the growintg incidence of the illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugst illicit traffic has become as common as licit . 
traffic in them. The Single Convention has chiefly provided some 
regulatory measures for licit trade and traffic onlyt on the assump- 
tion that perhaps the control of licit trade and traffic in narcotic 
drugs would automaticilly suppress the illicit trade and1traffic in 
them. Consequentlyq some apparent Caps have been left in the 
Conventiono which may encourage the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. 
First, the contro, l arran, "ements recormendcd by this Convention 
in respect of the storage of drugs in bonded warcho-tizost may turn 
out to be a pious hope oving to-the financial and technical 
appropriate equitpment etc. ) implications of such arrangements. Hany 
governments may not be willin, -,,. or able to give priority to such 3 
progra. =. es owing to other pressing needs in their economies, and 
indeed, in many cases' it -will prove difficult to justify such addi- 
tional expenses, In addition to this, the system of transferring 
title' to drugs stored in bonded warehouses by means of endor6ements- 
only ( that is, endorsement of the warehouse warrant) can hardly 
be reconciled with the rules of the narcotic regime goveminr,; trade I 
in ruLfrs. 
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graph 11 prohibits transpor- Secondlyl, although Article 31, para., 
tation. of a consignment of clrugs from one country to another unless 
a copy of the export authorisation for such consignment is produced 
to the competent authorities of-such party, in practice, however, it 
"- 745 
is understood that a different procedure is followed. It It is consi- 
dered sufficient if a copy of the export autborisation is enclosed 
in or attached to the consigninent, like other co., =orcial papers 
required for-customs clearance". 
83 
and in factq no particular person 
as "competent authorities of such party" is made available for the 
necessary examination 'of the export authorisation on the spot. 
De, pite the fact that this practico'has been followed since the 
International Opium Convention of 192 5P 
81, it is feared that it may 
encourage the traffickers to exhibit false export authorisationst t-- 
or pose difficulties for national authorities in tracing the diverted 
consig-mments owing to the absence of scrutiny at various check-posts 
by a competent pqrson. 
Thirdly, in so far as preventive action against the illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs is ooncerned, the plans of the Single Conven- 
tion are neither more ambitious. nor effective than those of the previous 
drug conventions. A Party is under no legal obligation to implement t: ý 
any of the-provisions of Article 35, if it is incompatible with its 
constitutionaly legal and/or administrative systems*85 It is not so 
much a question of compatibility uith the aforesaid national Eystemsp 
as it is of making such systems adeqiiate and efficient enough to CO, 
implement the provisions of the Convention. Lack of an adequate and 
effective police system and of co-ordination among various related 
organs of a government contribute to the flourishingg of the illicit 
traffic in narcotic drug's. I In the circums: tances it is feared that 
the pledges taken by the Parti es in Article 35 will turn out to be 
pious vows only, which have further been weaken'ed by their unpreparedness 
-i 
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to take the action designed by the. ConTrentio'n for the suppression 
of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs if, it is not compatible 
with their constitutionalg legal and administrative systems'* 
Fourthly, in exxtension of the above argumi-mt,, it may also be 
observed -that the prospects of international co-operation of an 
organised character from such governments are not very encouraging. 
The scope, of their co-operation has further been limited by the 
prIvisions of Article 35# paragraph (c), according to which the 
Parties are required to "co-operate closely with each oth 
: 
or and with 
the competent a international organisations of which are 
86 
members with a view to maintaining a co-ordinated campaign against 
the illicit traffic, '' 
Although membership of one international organisation, it is 
believedt brings a member into relationship with other international M 
organisations . 
87 
whether or not a member of the latter organisatiozi(Or 
such a deliberate attempt to lirlit their responsibility to co-operate, 
where -unlimited co-operation is essential 9 indicates the possibilities 
of non-co-operation.. ." 
(d) The Limits of Penal Ifeasures 
I The penal measures envisaged in this Convention are limited 
by the difficulties which are involved in the establishment of general 
international rules coacerning national penal laws. The definitions 
of crimes differ in different national. penal systems; and the grounds 
on which countries-assume jurisdiction in criminal matters are, also, 
"it 74 7 
not uniform'. The penal pro-trisions of this Convention, which are 
4. 
primarily based on the 1936 Conventiong are also subject to the- 
constitutional limitations of the Parties. Indeedq the self-execu- 
tion of any of. the provisions of Article 36 is an exceptionp rather 
88 than a rule. 
In addition to the aboveg the drafting of Article 36 has to 
a considerable extent limited the scope of the penal provisions. 
Only those criminal activities which are 11coumitted internationally" 
fall within the purview of Article 36. Consequentlyt criminal acts, 
resultant of negligenceg will not be deemed to be punishable offences 
under Article 36. - Article 36(l)(a)89 providesp inter alia, that 
"serious offences shall be liable to adequate punishment particularly 
by imprisonment or Other penaltieB of deprivation of libertyllp but 
the seriousness of an offence may be interpreted and viewed differently 
by different national legal systenst 
90 
and consequently, the severity 
of punisl2aent 'will also, be dif f erent. Itideedo attitudes toiý. -ards 
punishment i-irere revealed to differ so radically that the Conference 
finally decided to use the phrase "adequate punishment" instead of 
Ilse vere punishment". 
91 The scope of ponal'measures in this Convention 
has further been limited by the use of very sirailar phrases like 
"conspiracy to coiwait" and "attempts to c0l"mit" any Of such offences, 
92 
ieaich clouded the prospects of launching an effective fight against Cý _ r, 
the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. 
93 
- 
The traditional conflict-amonrr, nations concerning the principle 1=0 
of extradition of cirminal, offenders has endangered the effectiveness 
of the provisions of t-'e Denal measures in t:,, e Convention. ludecdo 
14 
Article 36t paragraph 29 sub-paragraph (a), 'clause (iv) provides, 
inter alia, that serious offences of illicit traffic committed-abroad 
should be prosecuted 11 if extradition is not acceptable in conformity 
Ik 
with the law of the Party to which application is made. " 
9. This 
provision does not appear to include 11 cases in which application 
. 
is made to A non-partyg or in which the country -to which application 
is, made, refuses to accept the extradition of the offender althou, (. rh 
extradition is -acceptable in confor-nity Iji-th its lawyor finally 
those cases in which the Party in whose territory the of fender is, 
found does notl for whatever reasonsl offer other countries the 
extradition of the offender, e. g. because the offender is its 
national and it does nots on consitutional or other groundsp extradite 
its min citizens. " This situation has further been worsened by 
Article 149 paragraph 2t sub-paragraph (b)j clause (iv) of the 1972 
Protocol 
96 
which has providedq inter alial that "notwithstanding - 
sub-paragraphs (b)(i)j(ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, the Party' 
shall have the right to refuse to grant the extradition in cases 
'uhere the cOrlpetent authorities consider that the offence is not 
'Sufficiently serious. " 
97 Article 36 omits the case of Parties 
-1.7hich'are willing -to be unilaterally bound by the principle of 
extraditiong although not on a treaty-basis, but with or vithout 
any condition of reciprocity. This provision does not cover the 
extraditicn to non-parties. 
93 
Article'36 has also no application to illicit traffic in 
leaves of-the ca=abis plant. when accompanied by the -topsl because 
the lc; aves are not considered to be drurrs. 
99 
Z-- 
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(o)? I,. -Provisions concernin! z Settlement of Disputes 
According to Article'48 of the Single Conventionpif 
there should arise between two or more Parties a dispute relating 
to the interpretation or application*of the Convention, they shall 
"consult together with a view to the settlement of the dispute by 
negotiation Iv investigationg mediationt conciliation, arbýtrationllq 
and'ahall have recourse to regional bodiesp judicial processp or 
other peaceful means of. their 
ýwn 
choice. Should however theýr fail 
to settle any such dispute by any of the aforesaid meansp it shall 
be referred to the International Court of Justice. 
In so far as the-drug conventions concluded durinc,,, the 
League period were, concerned, the usual provision was that if there 
shoulU have arisen between the Contracting Partlies a dispu-'Ve of any 
kind relating to the interpretation or application of these conven- 
lions, and if such a dispute could not be satisfactorily settled by 
d4plomacyg it was to be settled in accordance with any applicable, 
agreements in force between the Parties providing for the settlement 
of international (lisputes. In casot howeverp there was no such 
agredment in force between the. Partiesq the dispute vas to be 
referred to arbitration or judicial settlement. In the absence of 
agreement-on the choice of another tribunalp the dispute vasp at the 
request of, any one of the Parties, to be referred"to the Permanent 
Court of International Justicev if all -the Parties to the dispute 
were Parties-to the Protocol of December 16,1920 relatin,, Cr*to the 
Statute of that Courtt and if any Of the Partie's to the dispute 
vas not a Party to the Protocol of December 16,1920, to an arbitral 
tribunal cbnstituted in accordance with the Hague Convention of 
C 
.. i7"O 
October 18,19079 for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes. 100 It may also be stated that in making this provision, 
the absolute good faith and good behaviour of the nations had been 
presmaed because many nationsp whether or not members of the univer- 
sal organisationg were reluctant-to riefer disputes to arbitration 
or judicial settlement in compliance with the usual provisions 
I 
of settlement of disputes in such multilateral treaties. 1 
& The striking difference between the provisions of Article 48 
of the Single Convention and the corresponding provisions of the 
Limitation Convention ( Article 25) 101ý and the Convention for the 
Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugst 1936 
(Article 17) 102 is that uhareas the former requires. the Parties to 
make attempts to settle a dispute by means of negotiationp interpro- 
tationg mediation, conciliationg arbitration, rccourse to regional 
bodiesq judicial process or other peaceful means of their choicet 
prior to their going to the International Court of Justicep the latter 
only required the Parties to make attempts to settle a dispute by. 
diplomacyt before its being referred to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. It became rather a fashion to make a 
provision in the multilateral treaties for submission of a dispute 
concerning interpretation and application of such treaties to the 
World Court. The Pcnaanent Courtts observation in the case concerning 
the ElectricilT Coml2aiiy of Sofia and Bi-Llrrnria that 11 ... the multipli- 
city of agreements concluded accepting, the compulsory jurisdiction 
is evidence that the Contracting Parties intended to open up new 
itrays of access to the Court rather than to 'close old vays or to 
, allow 
them to cancel each other out with the. ultimate result that 
no jurisdiction IfOuld remain, 
103 
would be justif ied only when 
more and more parties had willingly M entered 
into special aogreements 
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 
However, the provisions of Article 48 of the Single Convention 
do not oblige the Contracting Parties to accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Moreoverp the 
Cýntracting Parties are free to make reservations pursuant -to 
Article 509 paragraph 2. It would be. partinent to mantioý that in 
the last analysis it is the cormnon will of the parties which is the 
basis of the Court's juri sdiction. 
101, The justification for not 
mal--in. g L', 'rY Provision f or acceptance oz vi-, - jzrisdiction c Ccý Imllsarý 
of the International Court of Justice may be found in the prevailing 
scepticism of nations about the compulsory adjudication of disputes 
by means of the International Court of Justice. On the other hando 
Advisory Opinions of the Court-9 owing to psychological reasons havet 
in cortain casesq produced results as effective as the decisions 
r. endered by the Cou: ýt iinder its Contentious jurisdiction* 
105 
So fart no case of breach of treaty obligations concerning 0 Cý 
drug mitters has, been referred to international arbitration 6i- 
judicial settlement, nor has any dispute arisen as to the interpre- 
tation of the Convention.. This may be due to the fact that licit 
trade in drugs and the regulations thereto do not present a great 
problemg nor do the Signatories to the Conventions show any unwilling- 
ness to be bound by treaty obligations as far as'the'licit trade in 
drur, s is concerned. 
Cononents, 
The problems of the illicit trade and illicit traffic in 
drugs are as*old as the problems of, licit trade and licit traffic 
in them. ' The indispensibility of drugs for medical and scientific 
I 
reasons justifies trade in them. It is also for these reasons that 
production and manufacture of drugs and/or narcotic substances cannot 
be banned. The nature of the coiniodity has contributed to the 
incidence of the illicit traffic in it. Consequently, stringent 
measures have been found neceseary to operate the "licit" trade 
in drugs. On the other hand, measures should not be so stringent as t3 
to restrict or to prohibit the licit trade. -Againt there are certain 
areasp'where the carrying of drugs, not for trade but for emergency 
medical reasons, as in the first'aid kits of ships and aircrafts, 
is essential. 
106 In' the face of these problems it of ton becomes 
difficult to devise a balanced formula which will preserve the licit 
trade in drugs, and, at the same timej suppress the illicit trade and 
traffic in them. 
I From the above study it appears that the problem of the illicit 
trade and traffic in narcotic drugs cannot'be controlled without the 
co-operation of the national gove=ontsb "Co-operation" in this 
context will have tuo facetst viz. positive and negative, * While 
positive co-operation stands for direct action to further the programme 
of the United Nationsl negative co-operation stands for abstention from 
doing something, ivhich will retard the progress of the United Nations 
in its plan to silippress the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. In so far 
N753. 
as the suppression of the illicit trade and traffic in narcotic 
drugs is concernedp the Single Convention attempts to secure direct 
co-operation from its Parties. Whatever the nature of that co-opara- 
tion, a: successful co-operation between the U. N. authorities and the 
parties to an international convention pre-supposes the existence of 
the following: (a) ability of the parties concerned to co-operate; 
(b) willingness of the Parties to co-operate; and (c) the'belief 
of the par-ties in the United Nations. The ability of a party to 
co-operate again depends upon various factors viz. existence of 0 
adequate and effective administrative and legislative machinery, 
understanding of the importance of the matter, and other conditions 
uhich promote its ability to co-operate, e. g. educational enlighten- 
ment. The willingness of a-party to co-operate pro-supposes its 
preparedness to surrender its niitional sovereignty to a certain dogroep 
instead of jealously guardin-,, -, it. 107 In fact, the attitude of the 
parties to the Single Convention as expressed in Article 36 (penal 
provisions) -103 is, mýrely indicative of their pretence at co-operation 
vith the U. N. progra=e, in respect of the extradition of drug 
offenders. Lastlyp the belief of a party in the United Nations will 
emanate from its "international a-w-areness". In realityt the last two 
conditions, i. e. v the iiallingness of a party to co-operate and its 
belief in the United Nations are interrelated. 
, 11 limited in scope, the progra--. ne envisaged in the Althou, (,,, 00 
Single Convention to combat the illicit trade and traffic i: n narcotic 
gh an 
drugs, is both curative and preventive by nature. Althoug 
international prograrme, it is operative only the Parties to 
7.4 
the Convention generally. It is hori. zontal by natureq but vertical 
in operation. This prograr=e is not totally condemnablet yet it' 
does not deserve unreserved appreciation. On the-- other handt in 
view of the prevailing attitudes of the nations towards crime and 
criminal punishment, any stringent progra=e in this regard i-rill meet 
with failure. In order to transf6m the fundamental rules of the 
in+. ernational narcotics re-ime into rules of customary international 
ght 
the illicit trade and traffic in narcotic law, which will help fi, - 
., 
s, it is necessary to create the conditions of "international dru, ". 
awareness"o 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See also, Official Records, vol. It op- Cit-t PP- 71-72. 
2. This licence should expressly state whether it authorises the 
licencee to engage in wholesale or retail trade or both. 
3- supra., 
4- Article 30(l)(b)(i). 
The term "Persons" includes all physical persons engaged in this 
trade and the technical personnel, office workers and manual workers. 
The term Ilenter-prisell includes the buildinCs or parts of building 
(premises) and their appurtenances and equipment used in the trade; 
it includes "state enterprises" also. See further the Commentaxy 
on the Sint-le Convention, op. cit-Y P- 331. 
5- Article 30(l)(b)(ii). 
6. Article 30(l)(c)- 
7. Medical practitioners and scientists have been exempted from the 
requirement of a licence for their premises only in order to enable 
them to carry out their experiments; they are otherwise subject to' 
the control regime of the Single Convention. See also Article 4(c) 
and Article 311 paragraphs 4-15- 
8. See Article 20(l), sub-paragraphs (b) and (d), 
9. See further Article 19(l)(c) and paragraph 5 (as amended by the 
1972 Protocol); and Article 21, paragraph 1, -especially sub- 
paragraph (d). 
10. Article 5, paragraph 2t first sub-paragraph, clause (c), and 
second sub-paragraphq Article 6, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (d) of 
the Single Conventiont and Article 5 of the International Opium 
Conventiont 1925. 
See also Article 6(2)(c) and'Article 19 of the International 
Opium Conventiong 1925. 
12. Article 30(6); see also Article 13 (2)(a) of the Limitation 
Convention of 1931 and Article 1(4) of the 1943 Protocol. 
,. w 
13. Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4; see also Article 1 of the 1972 
Protocol amending paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the Single Convention. 
e 
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14. The chief idea behind non-proprietary names is to prevent a state 
from acquiring proprietary rights in a dxug. The Sinele Convention 
does not prescribe any procedure for establishing non-proprietary 
names by the world Health Oremnization. It is, howeverg difficult 
to-oblige states to accept non-proprietary names for various drues 
owing to differences in langaages, and consequentlyg this may cause 
confusion. See further Resolution of the Executive Board of the 
World Health Organization, EB 15-R-7 (January, 1955) and Official 
Records of the W. H. O., No. 609 Annex 3; EB 37. R9 ( January, 1966) 
and Resolutions of the World Health Assembly WHA 3.11 ( May 1950) 
and of the lIxecutive Board EB, 12, R, 24( MaY 1953)o 
15- Article 19 of the Limitation Convention# 1931 provided-that the 
label under which a drug had been controlled should 
0ýt 
the time of 
i its sale have indicated the name of the drug an pro ided for in 
, -the national legislation; see also Article 1, paragraph 4 of the 
1948 Protocol- 
: L6. This paragraph doeý not apply to the retail trade in drugs in 
Schedule II, and their preparations, and therefore not to any 
preparation (or retail trade) in Schedule III. The provisions of 
this paragraph relate only to drugs in Schedule I( whether or not 
listed in Schedule IV) and to their preparations other than those in 
Schedule III; see also Cormentary on the Sin. 7, le Convention, op. cit., 
P. 345. 
-17. Article 30(5) of the Sirigle* 
'Convention. 
18. Article'13(2) of the Limitation Convention, 1931; Article 1(4) 
of the 1948 Protocol. Article 19 of the Limitation Convention 
applied however to the retail trade in drugs belonging to Group II. 
Article 19-ofthe Limitation Convention: 
11 The Iffigh Contracting Rarties will require that the labels under 
which any of the dru,. -, s or preparations containino,, those drug-8.9 
are offered'for sale, shall show tha percentaga- of the drugs. 
These labels shall also indicate the na-me of the drugs as provided 
for in the national legislation. " 
19. see e. g. Article 30 (1)(b)(ii). 
20. The'drug conventions prioý to the SinCle Convention did not impose 
any such obligation upon Parties, except when a directive to this 
effect had been issued by the Perrianent'Central Board under Article 
14t paragraph 2 of the Limitation Convention, 1931. 
21. supra. , 
22. Article 2(4), (see also Article 1 of the 1972 Protocol) and 
Article 31(16). 
r" f1l., 
. I" ? '. ' 
23. Article 31(3)(b). 
24. Article 31(4)(a). 
25. Article 31(12)., 
26. An import authorisation is a document stating the amount of drugs 
which an individual person, a business or state enterprise may 
import; an import certificate is a document certifying to the 
government of an exporting-country or territory that an indivi- 
dual, a business or state enterprise is authorised to import a 
Civen quantity of drur, 3. Where importation in consignment is 
authorised, the authorisation can take the place of a certificate 
also. Where importation in more týan one consignmýnt is allowed# 
the government concerned may issue to the inrorter the required 
- number of copies of the import authorisations involved. 
L. N. Doc. C-760.14.260.1924-XI-vol- 119 p. 254, and vol. I, p. 291; 
see also U. N. Doc. E/ITR. FOa`T/Rev. 2. 
27. Such certificates are to be obtained not only by state enterprises 
and licensed traders for trading, but also by non-licensed 
scientists for research purposes. 
28. Whereas an import authorisation indicates the sum. total of 
drugs an importer is allowed to importt an export authorisation 
indicates the amount of drugs an exporter, is allowed to export 
by Pach consignment. Onlione. exporter can export drug-s against 
, an 
import authorisation, conversely all the import certificatcs 
relating 
., 
to the same impo3ft authorisation may name as exporter 
only the one designated in the import authorisation. 
29. Article 31(5). 
30-. Article 31. (4(b). 
31. Article 31(b) and 
32. Article 31(6)o 
33- Article 31(7) (a) and (b).. 
34. Article 31 (7)(c). 
35. Article 31(8)- 
The drug converr. ions praceaing, the Single Convention did not 
contain a corresponding provisiong although the League of Nations 
Model Code recommended such a provision in respect-of international 
shipmentst see ýart II, chapter III, rararTaph ý1, second sub-para- 
graph, 
36. Article 5(l)(b) of the Agreement Concerning Insured Letters 
and Boxes (Vienna)l 1964; see also Article 5(l) (b) of the 
Insvred Letters and Boxes Agreement (Tokyo), 1969. 
37* Article 24(a) of. the Agreement'Concerning Postal Paxcels (Vienna), 
1964; see also Article 19(a)(ii) of the Postal Parcels Agreement 
(Tokyo), 1969, 
380' Article-31(9)- 
39. Article 31(10), 
401. Article 20(l)(e). The drug conventions preceding the Sin; ýlt 
Convention did not-contain a provision corresponding to para- 
graph 10. However, see Article 15(l) of the International Opium 
Convention, 1925- 
41- Article 31 (11) ; see also Article 15(l) of the International 
Opium Convention, 1925. 
42. Article 31(12); see also Article 15 (2) of the International 
Opium Convention, 1925- - 
43. See also Commentarv on the Sinrle Conventiong OP. cit-t P. 380. 
44. Article 31(13); see also Article 17 of the International Opium 
Convention, 1025. 
45. Article 31(14);, see also Article 15(3) of the International Opium 
Conventiont 1925- 1 
46. U. N. Treaty Seribsl vol- 15t P- 316. 
47. supra., f4.122- : ý2+ 
46. Article 4- 
49. Aiticle 39. 
50. The title of this Convention was: The Convention for the 
, Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dan, -,, ero*us Drugs. LearLie of hýations Treaty Serien, vol, CXCVIII, p, 299. 
51. The provisions of Article 9 MY still continue to be in force 
if a Party has made a notification ýo this effect to the Secretary- 
General of the U. N. See Article 44(2), 
52. See also Article 11(l) and paracraph 2, sub-par-agraphs (a) and 
(b) of the 1936 Convention, according to which such function3 
had been entrusted to a "central office". 
According to Article 17 of the Single Convention, howevert 
the Parties 11 shall maintain a special administration fo. -C the 
purpose of applying the provisions of this Convention. " 
53o It is for'this reason that the Plenipotentiary Conference preferred 
to term "dppropriate a6ency" to "enforcement agencyllp see further 
Official Records, vol, II, op., cit., P. 41. 
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54o infra, , Q-tf,,, vil 
55o Article 34(a). 
56. See also Artield 14 of tho 1972 Protocol, 
57. See also Article 2(a) of the 1936 Convention. 
58. See CorLmentary on the Sinrle Conventiong OP- cit., P. 429 
59- See also Article 14 of the 1972 Protocol. 
60. See also Article 4 of the 1936 Convention. 
61. Official Records, vol. II, op. cit., pp. 236-237. 
62. International participation in , conspiracy to conmit and 
attemDts to co. mmi. t any of such offences, and prepaxatory acts 
and financial operations in connexion with the offences referred 
to in this Article. 
63. infra. , pp - 7-4 -W- 
64. See Articles 7 and 8 of the 1936 Convention; see also 
supra .p ýp. 2-) 1 
65. Article 45(3). Of the Third Draft, Official Recordst vol. II, 
OP- Cit-P P- 17. 
66. See also Article 9 of the 1936 Convention. 
67- See also the opinions of the representatives of Indiat 
Mexico, and U. K. who criticised the recomendatory nature of 
this paragraph, Official Records. vol. 119 opt cit*j ppe 24? -243, 
-see also vol. It P. 146. 
6a. Italics added. 
69. Article 36(3)- 
70- Article 36(4); see 41so Article 15 of the 1936 Convention. 
71. PararraDh-3: Aucune disposition clý pre'sent article ne portera 
atteinte aux dispdsitions. du droit penal d1une Partie en matiere Z 
de JuridictimY. " 
Parap-Tarh 4: " Les dispositions du present article seront 
limit6es en, matiere de compAence par la le*gislation penale de 
chacune des Parties. " 
72. See U. F. Doc. E/COITF. 34/21, Add 2 and Corr 1, Records (French)t 
Vol. II, P. 333 and vol. It pp. 215 and 219; see also. 2ommentary 
on-tho Sinqlo Conypntion, op. Cit., P. 440. 
44 7160 
73@ The Prench text of the Chilean re-draft reads: "4. Toutes les 
dispositions du present article seront donsiderees comme limiteesp 
en matiere de competence, par laýlegislation penale de chacune des 
Parties. " 
E/CONF-34/L. 13, Records (Prench) vol- IIP P. 54. 
74. Such stocks are known as "special stocks"; see Article l(l)(w). 
75. This applies also to dentists and veterinary surgeons. N 
76. Por a corresponding provision, see Article 19 of the Limitation 
Conventiong 1931. Not only preparations corresponding to those 
in Schedule III of the Single Conventionp but also drugs and 
preparations dispensed to individuals on medical prespriptions 
wore subject to the requirement of label information. 
77. Italics added. 
78. Article 32-: " Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Convention, a Party shall not be, or deemed to be 9 precluded from 
adopting measures of control more strict-or severe than those 
. provided 
by this Convention and in particular from requiring that 
preparations in Schedules III or drurs in Sol-iedule II be snbýcct 
to all or such of the measures of control applicable to drugs in 
Schedule I as in its opinion is necessary or'desirable for the 
protection of the public health or welfare. " 
79. Article 20(2)(a). 
80. See also the Co: mnentazZy-on the Sin., zle Conventionp opq cit., 
pp. 350-351. 
81, OP& cit-P P. 351. 
82. See Article 31, (9); see also Com-mentary on the Sinrrle Conventiong, 
op. cit-9 P. 373. 
83., OP. Cit., P. 376. 
84- No Partyto the International Opium Convention of 1925 or the 
Sin gle Conve ntion had raised any objection to this practice. 
85. See also Article 13 of the 1972 Protocol. 
In this connection see especially the staterpent made by the 
I Mexican deleg-ate at the Conference for the Adoption of thio 
Convent -ion, Official Records, vol. It P- 147. 
86. Italics added. 
"'I-- , 
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87. For a discussion on the relationship between the U. N. and the 
countries that are-not members of it, see generally H. Kelsen, 
Thp TAw of the United Vations, Stevens, 1951, pp. 106-108; 
see 
' 
also Goodricht Hambro and Simmonst Charter of the United 
Nations: Commentary and Documentog OP. cit-9 3rd edition, 
PP- 59-60. 
88, See Article 36, paragraph 4. 
89. See also Article 14 of the'1972 Protocol. 
go. See the opinion of the Soviet delegate, Official Records, 
vol, II, op, cit., p. 238- See also the opinion ofthe 
Danish delegate at the Conference, who stated, inter alia, 
that 11 Penal prýovisions were necessitated by the need to 
punish offenders; the listing of offences was of secondary 
importance. The obligation on the Parties to punish breaches 
of the Convention-was the par. -, mount consideration and should be 
subordinated to domestic law. If the domestic law was at faultt 
it should be amended. " Official Records, vol, II, op. cit., 
p. 238- This view was also supported by the Yugoslave delegatet 
ibid. 9 
91. See Official Recordag vol. II, op. cit., p. 239. Article 2 
of the 1936 Convention, however, uses the phrase "severely 
punishing. " 
92. Article 36(2)(a)(ii), 
93- See also Official RecordR, vol. I, op. cit. ', p. 123- 
94- See also Articles 7 and 8 of the 1936 Convention. 
95-. CoTiT. ental Z on the Sinrlo Convention, ON eit-9 P- 436. 
96. See also Article 36(2)(b) of the Sincle Convention. 
97. Italics added. 
98. Commentary on the Sintzle Convention, op. I Cit-9 P- 437. 
99. Article l(l)(b); see'also supra., 
100. See Article 25 of týe Limitation Convention of 1931t 
and Article 17 of the 1936. Convention. 
101. Article 25 of the Limitation Convention 
11 If there should arise between the High Contracting Parties 
a dispute of any kind relating to'interpretation or application 
of the present Convention and if such dispute cannot be satis- 
factorily settled by diplomacy, it shall be settled in accord- 
ance ' with any applicable agreements in force 
between the Parties 
providing for the cettlement of international disputes. . 
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101* In case there is no such agreement in force between the Parties, 
the dispute shall be referred to arbitration or judicial settle- 
ment. In the absence of agreement on the choice of another 
tribunal the dispute shall,. at the request of any one of the 
Parties, be referred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, if all the Parties to the dispute are Parties to the 
Protocol of December 16th, 1920# relating to the Statute of the 
Court, and if any of the Parties to the dispute is not a Party 
to the Protocol of December 16th, 1920, to an arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with the Hague Convention of October 
l8thq 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. " 
102. Article 17 of the 1936 Convention 
" If there should arise between the High Contracting Parties a 
dispute of any kind relating to the interpretation or application 
of the present Conventiont and if such dispute cannot be satis- 
factorily settled by diplomacyi it shall be settled!, in accordance 
with any applicable agreements in force between the Parties pro- 
viding for the settlement of international disputes. - 
In case there is no such agreement in force between the Parties, 
the dispute shall be referred to arbitration or judicial settle- 
ment. In the absence of ag--eement on the choice of another 
tribunal, the dispute shall, at the request of any one of the 
Parties, be referred to the Permanent Court of Inte: nlational 
Justice, if all the Parties to the dispute are Parties to the 
Protocol of December 16th, '1920, relating to the Statute 6f 
that Court, and if any of ihe Parties to the dispute is not a 
Party to 'the Protocol of December 16tht, 19201 to an arbitral 
tribunal constituted in accordance with the Hague Convention of 
October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes., ' 
103- P. C. I. J., Series A/B. 'No- 76. See also the I-Tavrornatis Palestine., Concessions case., P. C. I. J., Series A. No. 2, pp. 29-33- 
104. The case concerning the Status of Eastern Careliag P. C. I. J. t Series B. 110.5t 1923; see also the Minority Schools in 
Unper Silesia case, in which the Court stated, inter aliag 
that " Tho Court's jurisdiction depends upon the will of the 
Parties", P. C. I. J. j A-15P p. 22 and the MonetaI7 Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 caset in which the International Court of 
Justice statedt inter aliag that 11 the Court can only exercise 
jurisdiction over a'State with its consent. " I. C. J. Reportsp 
1954, P. 32, 
105. See further T. M. Franck and Bert. B. Lockwood, Jr., " Preliminary 
Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terroi-ism"t 
68 American Journal of International Law, 1974, pp. 69-909 
at po 89; see also C. H. M. Waldock, 11 Decline of the Optional 
Clause, " 32 British YeaxýBook of International Law, 1955-56, 
pp. 244-287* 
v 
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lo6. See Article 32. Such cases have to be dealt with on a separate 
footing. The usual provisions of import-export authorisations 
or permits and licences which are necessary, for premises and 
establishments# will have no application in these cases. Carrying 
of drugs in first aid kits of ships or. aircrafte under proper 
control should not, however, pose a great problem. The principal 
safeguards concerning this matter which should be taken by the 
country of registration, have been mentioned in a report of the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 14th session (1953)t paras 36&-369 
(E/3254); see also ECOSOC Resolution 770 E(XXX) and its annex. 
107. This implies the necessity of narrowing down the area of the 
so-called domestic jurisdiction of a-sovereign authority. ' The 
less a state guards its sovereignty, the greater will be the 
'-chance of international co-operation. See further the Decision 
of the Permanent Court of. International Justice in the case 
concerning the Nationality Decrees in TLinis and Mlorocco, P. C. I. J. 9 
B-49 1923 in which the Court emphasised that " The question. 
whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the juris- 
diction of a state is an essentially relative question; it 
depends upon the development of international relations. ", 
op. cit., p. 24; see further R. Higgins, The Dsvolornent of 
International Law through the Political Orf7ans of the United 
Vationst Oxford University Pý: css, 19639 PP. 76-77t and 
V. Rajan, The 'United Fations and Domestic Jurisdiction, Oxford 
University Pressq 1961. 
108, See also Article 14 of the 1972 Protocol. 
